(P?-t/A><S£V <& tr/Axf er/<rt,- / rto i r."- /?/ / - fffb r#gf#p» £ PUBLISHED WEDNESDAYS AND SATURDAYS SV JOHN K NSO, No. 6 9 . HICH-&TREET, BETWEEN AND THIRD [No. 22, of Vol. lII.] FROM THE (BOSTON) COLUMBIAN CENTINEL. Mr. RUSSELL, ~E> Y the English Constitution, the whole collec tive power of the nation is delegated, and the constitution itfelf is alterable by the fame au thority which is competent to the common pur poses of legislation. Ihe trench are to have a constitution, every part of which will be nominally beyond thecon troul of their common legislatures, and which will be unalterable in all parts, except by the na tion in its " original character." Ac least Mr. Paine has undertaken to anfvrer for them that it will be so: Although I have not seen any such article in the constitution, and though perhaps it has not yen been decreed, I am willing to take Mr. Paine's word for the fadi, and to conlider the fubjetft, as if it were already determined. I have made some observations upon Mr. Pa ine's arguments, as they refpetf: the right of a nation to delegate all their power. As a question of ex pediency, it may perhaps be more difficult to de termine, which of these two schemes contains the least evil. Both of them are fuppovted by the example of several among the American States, and can therefore boalt the fantfiion of authorities equally refpeitable. Ihe fundamental principle upon which soci ety is formed, appears to be, in order that the power of the whole may be rendered subservient to the interests of the whole. The problem to solve is, in what manner the power shall be dis tributed, so as most effeiftually to answer that purpose. Confldering the extreme difficulty with which a whole nation can be brought to atfl in their original chara<ster, it should seem, that wis dom mult didlate to them the necessity of dele gating their whole power, in such a manner as that it may be rendered beneficial to the nation, because whatever power is retained by the peo ple, cannot be exercised for their advantage, any more than to their injury. The question therefore occurs, why a nation should not dele gate all its powers > Mr. Paine has bestowed ve ry little Cpi.fir'erstion upon this fubje<a ; I fnm that although he gives us his own opinion very fieely, he offers only two reafoits to support it. One, because, " such a government would be ar bitrary The other, because " there is a para dox in the idea of vitiated bodies reforming themfelyes." In the sense in which the word binary is here used, the firft argument attacks the foundation of civil society itfelf ; for when ever a number of individuals aflociate together and form themselves into a body-politick, called a nation, the poflL-ffion and the ufi of the whole pov.er, (which is not however arbitrary power,) is the very objeift of their allociation. This pow er must exist Come where, and I cannot fee the reason why it should not exist for the benefit of the people.—But wheneveraconftitution ismade unalterable by the common legislative authority, the naiion do in reality abdicate all the powers which they are laid to retain,and declare that very important powers (hall at all events be useless to t hem, from an apprehension that they might pof fiblv be abused to their injury.—lt is as if a man should bind himfelf never to wear a sword, left lie should turn it against his own breast. The only reason why the whole power of a nation should not be delegated, mult arise from the dan ger of us being abused: And a melancholy ex perience has always shown that when the whole power has been thus delegated to one mau, or to one body of men, it has invariably been grossly abused, and the sword of the people has been turned into a dagger against them. From the the predure of thole evils, many nations have been induced exprcfsly to forbid their govern ments the use of certain powers, without consi dering that the impotence of their supreme au thority, would certainly be very prejudicial to them, and perhaps as fatal, as the abuse of pow er. This experiment has repeatedly been made; i t has frequently failed ; and I believe that after several more experiments shall fully demonstrate the ill policy of thus annihilating the power of the nation, it will be clearly seen, that all the powers of the people ought to be delegated for their benefit, and that their true interest consists in the distribution of those powers in fucha inan rer as (hall in its own operation guard against theabufes which alone are dangerous to the neo- IO i c J he ConfUtution of the United States, appears o »«c to unite all the advantages both of the Wednesday, July 15, 1791. French and of the Englifti, while it has avoided .he evils of both. By that constitution, the peo ple have delegated the power of alteration, by veiling it in the CongrL-fs, together with the Mate Legislatures ; while at the fame time it has provided for alterations by the people themselves in their original charadler. whenever it shall evi dently appear to be the wuhof the people to make them. This article appears to be replete with wisdom ; I believe it will stand the celt of the se verest examination, though according to the ideas emanating from Mr. Paije, and coming to us at the I'ania tune by refle<fti( r .i from the Secretary of State, it contains a very tiangeroua political he resy. It is a maxim which wi not I trust, be dispu ted, that no government of which the people is not a conftuuent part, an secure their equal rights ; but where this is the cafe, to cramp the operations of their own government, with un neceflary reftritfions, and forbid themselves to enact ufeful laws, what : s it but to defeat the purposes of society, by t'. ; very art, which gives it a permanent existence; to tie theirown hands from an imaginary appre' enfion that if left at liberty they would admii fterpoifon to thebody which nourishes them ? It is in the distribution >f the national powers; it is in the independent fj irit of the people, and not in the manuscript limitation of the Legisla tive authority, that a nar jn is to secure the p; o tecftion of its liberties.—] this Commonwealth we have a constitution, mi ft parts of which are unalterable by ouk- ordinary Legislatures; it has existed but ten years ; an already its operation has convinced us all tha several alterations in the system would be highl ' expedient. Our Le gislative body would be fully competent to the purpose, and if they had ihe power would rea dily make such alterations as might suit the con venience of the people; but they have no autho rity ro a<ft in these cases for the benefit of the people, and as the inconveniences to which this injudicious jealousy has fubjecled us, are not '-!* this time fucii iiiipti?\aiice as to render the alterations, of immediate or absolute neceflity, we must wait our appointed time, and patiently submit to the operation of bad laws, because we have not chol'en to invert our Legislature with the power of making good ones.—Let us not be frightened, however, from the pursuit of our common interelt by the words arbitrary power. Distribute the whole of your power in such a manner, as will neceflarily prevent anyone man, or body of men, or any poflible combination of individual interests, from being arbitrary, but do not encumber your own reprefenratives with fliackles, prejudicial to your own interests; nor fuffer yourselves like the Spanilh Monarch, of ri diculous memory, to be loafted to death, by de nying to your fervantsthe power of removingtlie fire from before you But although a constitution, profefledly unal terable by the common legislative authority, is of weight fufficient to prevent the enading of many good lawn, yet it will not always opera*e as a check upon your legislature. Such is the pover ty of all human labours, that even a whole na- tion cannot exprcfs themselves upon paper, with To much accuracy and precision, as not to admit of much latitude of explanation and e»nftruc tion. Thelegiflature must always be allowed to judge of the intentions with which the instru ment was formed, and to construe and explain accordingly the expressions which it contains. They fonietimes think proper to violate the let ter' of the constitution by adhering to its spirit, and at other times they facrifice the spirit by ad heriug ftri(flly to the letter. But when vour le gislature undertake to decide that the Ipirit of the constitution, is diredly contrary to its express letter, where is the power in the nation that lhould controul them i The fame power, which will al ways be ftifficient to controul a Legislature of which the peopie are a constituent part; it is ihefpint of the people.—Let your Legislative and' Executive authorities be so constituted, as to pre vent every eflential, or dangerous abuse of the powers delegated, but depend upon the honest and enlightened spirit of the people for a fecuri nty which you never will obtain, by merely with holding your powers, unless that spirit fhotfld be constantly kept up. Divide your power so that every part of it may at all times be used foryour advantage, but in luch a manner that your rights may never depend upon the will of any one man 85 [Whole No. 250.] or body of men ; entrult even the power of ap 'ermg your constitution icfelf, because occasions may anfe, when die ufeeven of that power, may be absolutely neceflary for your own welfare" when ac the lame time it may be impolfible for you to act in your original character, with the expedition neceff'ary for your salvation ; but re ierve to yonrfelves a concurrent power of alter lng the constitution in your own persons, becauf< by the decay to which all the works of man an hab!e, it is poflible that your Legislature, become incompetent to make such alterations as may be neceflary. But, when the people ar< conftantl- -presented in the Legislature, Ibe I,ev " "«r find it necellary to recur tt aiadter, in order to make ani , J. era rl % nia y deem expedient, un power of making them to theii -•ltly repr. ;ibe ne jr ofij ; "ions !• ii ley deny the gifts une. " But fays Mr. Paine, " there is a paradox 11 thejdea of vitiated bodies reforming them elves This niu'vt depend altogether upon the oinciJance of the part vitiated, with the pare vhich isi to apply the remedy; for unless thede ect ii felf neceflarily precludes the poffibilitv of 'pplying the power of reformation, the paradox eases, and no more involves an absurdity, than hat a phyflcian should use his own prescriptions o cure hjmfelf of a disorder. 1 he veryatfby which septennial Parliaments vere eltabliflied m England, affords fufficient >roof that the power of altering the constitution tfelf onght to be delegated, and even exercised >y the government upon certain cnriral occafi >ns. 1 hat a (ft was made at a time v. hen the cingdom was threatened with an immediate in alion, when a rebellion had but just be e/, quel ed, and when, the peace and fafety of the na -1011 depended upon the use of this power by he Parliament; such w as the opinion of the neo •le at that time, and the a(ft met with genera! ipprobation, from the general convirtion of is leceiiity. Such occafionsmay happen in the hif oiy of every free people, and it is therefore >i oper that the power lnouJa be deieo-ated Up 'n. the principles of equal liberty, upon the irinciples of public liappmefs, and therefore of Jolitical expediency, I think it may be fairly _oncluded that Mr. Paink's preference of the french to the Engiifh Constitution, so far as it relates to this article, is not founded in truth. [The foregoing is No. 7, of Foblicola— No. 6 is not come to hand.] ' ' BERKENHOUT's Discovery, for Dying Cotton and Linen, in Scarlet, Crimson, and other Co lour', as conwiuuicated to the Company of Dyers of the City of London, by the Lords CommiJJioners of the Treasury. or linen, either in yarn or piece V-/ should be perfectly wet with hot water' and then wrung out, as is the common practice' This being done, it rnuft be perfectly soaked in a solution of tin, diluted with an eqi al quantity of clear foft water. The cotton or line,,, bemjx so far prepared, mull be wrung out, but not forci bly : then it is to be nearly dried, lying hori zontally upon a hurdle, with a double linen flieer between, and covered with the fame. The (olution of tin being for scarlet, mud be made of nitrous acid, and not of aqua fortis ; but for crimson, aqua fortis must be used ; and the blooni is to be given, aher it femes out ot the dye, by a finall quantity of sal ammoniac and pearl ashes, difl'olved perfectly in warm water; but this water must not be more uhan niilkwai m* The colouring vat, for the scarlet or crimson is limply cochineal in water, no hotter than the hand can bear ; and, as vegetable matter re ceives only the small particles of the colour from the nature of its pores, two oz. to a pound of the.materials dyed may beneceflary. But cot ton or linen, frefh prepared, will draw from the fame vat, heated as before, all the inferior (hades from scarlet and crimson ; and, if any colour still remains in the vat, it may be taken out entirely, by wool prepared in the usual man ner. The fame preparation of tin serves for the g c en and yellows, with the fame marei ials only that are employed by the dyers, except the bell yellow, which is produced from turmeric. It is neceflary to observe, that, after the pre paration has been made use of for scarlet orcrinv PUBLICOLA
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