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PUBLISHED WEDNESDAYS AND SATURDAYS SV JOHN K NSO, No. 6 9 . HICH-&TREET, BETWEEN AND THIRD
[No. 22, of Vol. lII.]
FROM THE (BOSTON) COLUMBIAN CENTINEL.
Mr. RUSSELL,
~E> Y the English Constitution, the whole collec
tive power of the nation is delegated, and
the constitution itfelf is alterable by the fame au
thority which is competent to the common pur
poses of legislation.
Ihe trench are to have a constitution, every
part of which will be nominally beyond thecon
troul of their common legislatures, and which
will be unalterable in all parts, except by the na
tion in its " original character." Ac least Mr.
Paine has undertaken to anfvrer for them that it
will be so: Although I have not seen any such
article in the constitution, and though perhaps
it has not yen been decreed, I am willing to take
Mr. Paine's word for the fadi, and to conlider
the fubjetft, as if it were already determined.
I have made some observations upon Mr. Pa ine's
arguments, as they refpetf: the right of a nation
to delegate all their power. As a question of ex
pediency, it may perhaps be more difficult to de
termine, which of these two schemes contains
the least evil. Both of them are fuppovted by
the example of several among the American
States, and can therefore boalt the fantfiion of
authorities equally refpeitable.
Ihe fundamental principle upon which soci
ety is formed, appears to be, in order that the
power of the whole may be rendered subservient
to the interests of the whole. The problem to
solve is, in what manner the power shall be dis
tributed, so as most effeiftually to answer that
purpose. Confldering the extreme difficulty with
which a whole nation can be brought to atfl in
their original chara<ster, it should seem, that wis
dom mult didlate to them the necessity of dele
gating their whole power, in such a manner as
that it may be rendered beneficial to the nation,
because whatever power is retained by the peo
ple, cannot be exercised for their advantage,
any more than to their injury. The question
therefore occurs, why a nation should not dele
gate all its powers > Mr. Paine has bestowed ve
ry little Cpi.fir'erstion upon this fubje<a ; I fnm
that although he gives us his own opinion very
fieely, he offers only two reafoits to support it.
One, because, " such a government would be ar
bitrary The other, because " there is a para
dox in the idea of vitiated bodies reforming
themfelyes." In the sense in which the word
binary is here used, the firft argument attacks
the foundation of civil society itfelf ; for when
ever a number of individuals aflociate together
and form themselves into a body-politick, called
a nation, the poflL-ffion and the ufi of the whole
pov.er, (which is not however arbitrary power,)
is the very objeift of their allociation. This pow
er must exist Come where, and I cannot fee the
reason why it should not exist for the benefit of
the people.—But wheneveraconftitution ismade
unalterable by the common legislative authority,
the naiion do in reality abdicate all the powers
which they are laid to retain,and declare that very
important powers (hall at all events be useless to
t hem, from an apprehension that they might pof
fiblv be abused to their injury.—lt is as if a man
should bind himfelf never to wear a sword, left
lie should turn it against his own breast. The
only reason why the whole power of a nation
should not be delegated, mult arise from the dan
ger of us being abused: And a melancholy ex
perience has always shown that when the whole
power has been thus delegated to one mau, or to
one body of men, it has invariably been grossly
abused, and the sword of the people has been
turned into a dagger against them. From the
the predure of thole evils, many nations have
been induced exprcfsly to forbid their govern
ments the use of certain powers, without consi
dering that the impotence of their supreme au
thority, would certainly be very prejudicial to
them, and perhaps as fatal, as the abuse of pow
er. This experiment has repeatedly been made;
i t has frequently failed ; and I believe that after
several more experiments shall fully demonstrate
the ill policy of thus annihilating the power of
the nation, it will be clearly seen, that all the
powers of the people ought to be delegated for
their benefit, and that their true interest consists
in the distribution of those powers in fucha inan
rer as (hall in its own operation guard against
theabufes which alone are dangerous to the neo-
IO i
c
J he ConfUtution of the United States, appears
o »«c to unite all the advantages both of the
Wednesday, July 15, 1791.
French and of the Englifti, while it has avoided
.he evils of both. By that constitution, the peo
ple have delegated the power of alteration, by
veiling it in the CongrL-fs, together with the
Mate Legislatures ; while at the fame time it has
provided for alterations by the people themselves
in their original charadler. whenever it shall evi
dently appear to be the wuhof the people to make
them. This article appears to be replete with
wisdom ; I believe it will stand the celt of the se
verest examination, though according to the ideas
emanating from Mr. Paije, and coming to us at
the I'ania tune by refle<fti( r .i from the Secretary of
State, it contains a very tiangeroua political he
resy.
It is a maxim which wi not I trust, be dispu
ted, that no government of which the people is
not a conftuuent part, an secure their equal
rights ; but where this is the cafe, to cramp the
operations of their own government, with un
neceflary reftritfions, and forbid themselves to
enact ufeful laws, what : s it but to defeat the
purposes of society, by t'. ; very art, which gives
it a permanent existence; to tie theirown hands
from an imaginary appre' enfion that if left at
liberty they would admii fterpoifon to thebody
which nourishes them ?
It is in the distribution >f the national powers;
it is in the independent fj irit of the people, and
not in the manuscript limitation of the Legisla
tive authority, that a nar jn is to secure the p; o
tecftion of its liberties.—] this Commonwealth
we have a constitution, mi ft parts of which are
unalterable by ouk- ordinary Legislatures; it has
existed but ten years ; an already its operation
has convinced us all tha several alterations in
the system would be highl ' expedient. Our Le
gislative body would be fully competent to the
purpose, and if they had ihe power would rea
dily make such alterations as might suit the con
venience of the people; but they have no autho
rity ro a<ft in these cases for the benefit of the
people, and as the inconveniences to which this
injudicious jealousy has fubjecled us, are not
'-!* this time fucii iiiipti?\aiice as to render the
alterations, of immediate or absolute neceflity,
we must wait our appointed time, and patiently
submit to the operation of bad laws, because we
have not chol'en to invert our Legislature with
the power of making good ones.—Let us not be
frightened, however, from the pursuit of our
common interelt by the words arbitrary power.
Distribute the whole of your power in such a
manner, as will neceflarily prevent anyone man,
or body of men, or any poflible combination of
individual interests, from being arbitrary, but do
not encumber your own reprefenratives with
fliackles, prejudicial to your own interests; nor
fuffer yourselves like the Spanilh Monarch, of ri
diculous memory, to be loafted to death, by de
nying to your fervantsthe power of removingtlie
fire from before you
But although a constitution, profefledly unal
terable by the common legislative authority, is
of weight fufficient to prevent the enading of
many good lawn, yet it will not always opera*e as a
check upon your legislature. Such is the pover
ty of all human labours, that even a whole na-
tion cannot exprcfs themselves upon paper, with
To much accuracy and precision, as not to admit
of much latitude of explanation and e»nftruc
tion. Thelegiflature must always be allowed to
judge of the intentions with which the instru
ment was formed, and to construe and explain
accordingly the expressions which it contains.
They fonietimes think proper to violate the let
ter' of the constitution by adhering to its spirit,
and at other times they facrifice the spirit by ad
heriug ftri(flly to the letter. But when vour le
gislature undertake to decide that the Ipirit of
the constitution, is diredly contrary to its express
letter, where is the power in the nation that
lhould controul them i The fame power, which
will al ways be ftifficient to controul a Legislature
of which the peopie are a constituent part; it is
ihefpint of the people.—Let your Legislative and'
Executive authorities be so constituted, as to pre
vent every eflential, or dangerous abuse of the
powers delegated, but depend upon the honest
and enlightened spirit of the people for a fecuri
nty which you never will obtain, by merely with
holding your powers, unless that spirit fhotfld be
constantly kept up. Divide your power so that
every part of it may at all times be used foryour
advantage, but in luch a manner that your rights
may never depend upon the will of any one man
85
[Whole No. 250.]
or body of men ; entrult even the power of ap
'ermg your constitution icfelf, because occasions
may anfe, when die ufeeven of that power, may
be absolutely neceflary for your own welfare"
when ac the lame time it may be impolfible for
you to act in your original character, with the
expedition neceff'ary for your salvation ; but re
ierve to yonrfelves a concurrent power of alter
lng the constitution in your own persons, becauf<
by the decay to which all the works of man an
hab!e, it is poflible that your Legislature,
become incompetent to make such alterations as
may be neceflary. But, when the people ar<
conftantl- -presented in the Legislature, Ibe
I,ev " "«r find it necellary to recur tt
aiadter, in order to make ani
, J. era rl % nia y deem expedient, un
power of making them to theii
-•ltly repr.
;ibe ne
jr ofij ;
"ions !• ii
ley deny the
gifts une.
" But fays Mr. Paine, " there is a paradox
11 thejdea of vitiated bodies reforming them
elves This niu'vt depend altogether upon the
oinciJance of the part vitiated, with the pare
vhich isi to apply the remedy; for unless thede
ect ii felf neceflarily precludes the poffibilitv of
'pplying the power of reformation, the paradox
eases, and no more involves an absurdity, than
hat a phyflcian should use his own prescriptions
o cure hjmfelf of a disorder.
1 he veryatfby which septennial Parliaments
vere eltabliflied m England, affords fufficient
>roof that the power of altering the constitution
tfelf onght to be delegated, and even exercised
>y the government upon certain cnriral occafi
>ns. 1 hat a (ft was made at a time v. hen the
cingdom was threatened with an immediate in
alion, when a rebellion had but just be e/, quel
ed, and when, the peace and fafety of the na
-1011 depended upon the use of this power by
he Parliament; such w as the opinion of the neo
•le at that time, and the a(ft met with genera!
ipprobation, from the general convirtion of is
leceiiity. Such occafionsmay happen in the hif
oiy of every free people, and it is therefore
>i oper that the power lnouJa be deieo-ated Up
'n. the principles of equal liberty, upon the
irinciples of public liappmefs, and therefore of
Jolitical expediency, I think it may be fairly
_oncluded that Mr. Paink's preference of the
french to the Engiifh Constitution, so far as it
relates to this article, is not founded in truth.
[The foregoing is No. 7, of Foblicola— No. 6
is not come to hand.] ' '
BERKENHOUT's Discovery, for Dying Cotton
and Linen, in Scarlet, Crimson, and other Co
lour', as conwiuuicated to the Company of Dyers
of the City of London, by the Lords CommiJJioners
of the Treasury.
or linen, either in yarn or piece
V-/ should be perfectly wet with hot water'
and then wrung out, as is the common practice'
This being done, it rnuft be perfectly soaked in
a solution of tin, diluted with an eqi al quantity
of clear foft water. The cotton or line,,, bemjx
so far prepared, mull be wrung out, but not forci
bly : then it is to be nearly dried, lying hori
zontally upon a hurdle, with a double linen
flieer between, and covered with the fame. The
(olution of tin being for scarlet, mud be made
of nitrous acid, and not of aqua fortis ; but for
crimson, aqua fortis must be used ; and the
blooni is to be given, aher it femes out ot the
dye, by a finall quantity of sal ammoniac and
pearl ashes, difl'olved perfectly in warm water;
but this water must not be more uhan niilkwai m*
The colouring vat, for the scarlet or crimson
is limply cochineal in water, no hotter than the
hand can bear ; and, as vegetable matter re
ceives only the small particles of the colour
from the nature of its pores, two oz. to a pound
of the.materials dyed may beneceflary. But cot
ton or linen, frefh prepared, will draw from the
fame vat, heated as before, all the inferior
(hades from scarlet and crimson ; and, if any
colour still remains in the vat, it may be taken
out entirely, by wool prepared in the usual man
ner. The fame preparation of tin serves for the
g c en and yellows, with the fame marei ials only
that are employed by the dyers, except the bell
yellow, which is produced from turmeric.
It is neceflary to observe, that, after the pre
paration has been made use of for scarlet orcrinv
PUBLICOLA