t JEFFERSONIAN REP IBLlOAN. INAUGURAL ADDRESS. OF PRESHET-iHAlRRIS05r. ' ,,. Called from a retirement which 1 had sun- posed was tdcontifuie for the residue of mv life, to fill thevChief Executive Office of this groat and free nation, I appear before you, Jttilhucitjzens, to take the oaths which the constitution proscribes, as -a necessary quali- ftcation for the performance of us duties. And possessed by the iJcoplc ol the United States, in obedience to a custom coeval with our gov- a"d the4resricted grant of power to the Gov ernment, and what I believe to be your expec- eminent which they have adopted, enough tations, I proceed to present to you a sum- nas Deen given to accomplish all the objects mary of the principles which will govern me r which it was created. It has been found in the discharge of the duties which I shall powerful in war, and, hitherto, justice has be called upon to perform. been administered, an intimate union affected, It was the remark of a Roman Consul, in domestic tranquility preserved, and personal an early period of that celebrated republic, liberty secured to the citizen. As was to that a most striking contrast was observable e expected, however, from the defect of Jan dn the conduct of candidates for office of now- guaSe and the necessarily sententious man- and trust before and after obtaining them ner m which the Constitution is written, dis- they seldom carrying out in the latter caso Putes have arisen as to the amount of power the pledges and promises made in the former, which it has actually granted, or was intend However much the world may have improv- e&tt0 grant ed, in many respects, in the lapse of upwards This is more particularly the case in rela of two thousand years since the remark was l,on to 'hat part of the instrument which made by the virtuous and indignant Roman, treats of the legislative branch. And not I fear that a strict examination of she annals onbr as regards the exercise of powers of some of the modern eloctive governments, claimed under a general clause, giving that would develope similar instances of violated dy the authority to pass all laws necessa- confidence. , Although the fiat of the people has gone 0Ul Jn relation to the latter also. It is. how fonh. proclaiming me the Chief Magistrate of evcr consolatory to reflect, that most of the his glorious Union, nothing upon their part remaining to be done, it may be thought that motive may exist to keen tin the delusion under which they may be supposed to have acted in relation to my principles and opin- our statesmen, most distinguished lor talent ions; and perhaps there may be some in this anu patriotism, have been at one time or oth asserobly who have come here either Dre- or of their political career, on both sides of "pared to condemn those I shall now deliver, 3acn of the most warmly disputed questions, or approving them, to doubt the sincerity with forces upon us the inference that the orrors, which they are uttered. But the lapse of a jf errors they were, are attributable to the few months will confirm or dispel their fears, intrinsic difficulty in many instances, of as The outline of principles to govern, andmeas- certainiug the intensions, of "the framers of was to be adopted, by an Administration not 'he constitution, rather Jhan the influence of yet begtm, will soon be exchanged for immu- any sinister or unpatriotic motive. iabl history; and I shall stand, either exon- ut 'he great danger to our institutions e ruled by my countrymen, or classed with the does not appear to me to be in a usurpation mass of those who premised that they might by the government of power not granted by deceire, afld flattered with the intention to 'he people, but by the accumulation in one of betray. the departments, of that which was assigned However strong may be my present pur- ' others. Limited as are the powers which pose to realize the expectations of a magnan- have been granted, still enough have been wwas and confiding people, I too well under- granted to constitute a despotism, if conccn Rtand the, infirmities of human nature, and the 'rated in one of the departments. This dan dnerous temptations lo which I shall be ex- 2er is greatly heightened, as it has been al- posod, from the magnitude of the power which it has .been the pleasure of the people lo com- encroacements of one department upon an mit to my hands, not to place my chief confi- other, than upon their own reserved rights. dene upon the aid of that Almighty Power which has hitherto protected me, and enabled roe to bring to favorable issues other impor IWK4 oik SUH greatly inferior tresis, heretofore confided to me by my country. The broad foundation upon which our Con sultation rests, bmttg the People a breath of theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or modify it it can be assigned to none of (he great divisions of Government, bftft l that of Democracy. If such is it-, the ory, those who are called upon to administer it must recognise, as its leading principle, the duty of shaping their measures so as to produce the greatest good to the greatest mMttbsr. But, with these broad admissions, if we would compare the sovereignty acknowl edge to exist in the mass of our people with the power claimed by other sovereignties, oven by those which have5 been considered roost purely democratic, we shall find a most cssenuai difference. All others lav claim to power limited only by their own will. The majority of our citizens, on the con trary, possess a sovereignty with an amount of power precisely equal lo that which has been granted lo them by the .parties to the national compact, and nothing be-ond. We admit of no Government by Divine right be lieving that, so far as.power is concerned, the benificent Creator has- made no distinction amongst men, that all are upon an equality, and that the only legitimate right to govern is an express grant of power from the governed. The Constitution of the United States is the iftStrtfmeut containing this grant of power to the several departments composing the Gov ernment. On an examination of that instru jnef.t of power withheld. The latter is also sasceptiWe of division into power which the majority had the right to grant, but which they did not thik, proper to intrust to their ageats.tud.tjiajt j?rtiich they could not have granted, nodtfl possessed by themselves. 1b other words, there are certain rights pos sessed by each individual American citizen, which, in hiss compact with the others, he has never stir rendered. Some of them, indeed, he- is unable to surrender, being, in the lan guage of our system; ttntdienaWc. The boasted privilege of a Roman citizen wa to him a shield only against a petty pro vincial ruler, whiist the proud democrat of Athens could console himself under a sen tence of desth, for a supposed violation of the n-utona! failb, which no one understood, arul which at times was the subject of the mock y of ail, tn of bamrihmeiti from lire home, fat family, and hu couuiry, w.ih or without n ftegedcfcse; that it was the act, not of a Mttgle tyrant, or hated aristocracy, bat of his iiiiuXiWitid countrymen. Far different is the. power of oor sovereignty. It can interfere mrkbii) one's faith, prescribe forms of wor hjf) for no one' observance, infliet jio. .pun- tshtfttmt butfijUisextained gtiilt, the! rafcttit of investigation under rules prescribed by ihe Coistiiution itself. ' These preoious privileges, afld those scarcely less importantJ w (gi-nug oxprossion io m inoogms ana opin t, ffiiher by wrttiiig pr speafcing, unre skiitd btii by the 1rtfcy Tor iiifairy to oth- e&ndmXv( a piuc: pato J rlfce, advantages which flow from the Government, the acknowledged propertv of all, the Amer lean citizen derives from no charter granted by his fellow man. He claims them because nc himself a Man, fashioned by the same Almighty hand as thcrest of his species, and itled to a full share of the blessings with W1"cn no nas endowed them. Notwithstanding the limited sovereignly ry 10 carry into effect the specified powers, instances ot the alleged departure from the euor or spirit ol the constitution, have ul- 'imately received the sanction of a majority f 'he people. And the fact that many of "'ays observable that men are less jealous of When the Constitution of the United States first came from the hands of the Convention which formed it. many of the sternest re publicans of the day were alarmed at the ex tent of the power which had been granted to the Federal Government, and more particular ly of that portion which had been assigned to the Executive branch. There were in it features which appeared not to be in harmony with their ideas of a simple representative Democracy, or Republic. And knowing the tendency of power to increase itself, partic ularly when exercised by a single individu al, predictions were made thatj at no very remote period, the Government would ter minate in virtual monarchy. It would not become me to say that the fears of these pa triots have been already realized. But, as I sincerely believe that the tendency of meas ures, and of men's opinions, for some years past, has been in that direction, it is, I con ceive, strictly proper that I should take this occasion to repeat the assurances I have heretofore ghen of my determination to ar rest ihe progress of that tendency, if it real ly exists, and restore the Government to its pristine health and vigor, as far as this can be effected by any legitimate exercise of the power placed in my hands. I proceed to state, in as summary a man ner as I can. my opinion of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively complained of, and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the former are unquestionably to be found in the defects of the Constitution; others, in my judgment, are attributable to a misconstruction of some of its provisions. Of the former is the eligibil ity of the same individual to a second term of the Presidency. The sagacious mind of of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented this error, and attemps have been made, hitherto without success, to apply the amendatory power of the states to its correction. As, however, one mode of correction is in tho power of every President, and consequently in mine, it would be useless, and perhaps in vidious, to enumerate the ovils of which, in the opinion of many of our fellow-citizens, this error of the sages who framed the Con stitution may have been the source, and the bitter fruits which wo are still to gather from it, i( it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general re mark, that Republics can commit no greater error than lo adopt or continue any feature jn their systems of Government which may he calculated to create or increase the love of power, in the bosoms of those to vrlmm necessity Obliges them to cojnnMt the man agement of their affairs. And, surely, nothing is more likely to produce such a statement of mind than the long contin uance of an qHee of high trust. Nothing can be more corrupting. Nothing more destructive of all thoee noble feelings which belong to the character of a devoted republican patriot. When this corrupting passion once takes possession of the 1man mind, like the love ot gold, it be comes insatiable. Jt is the never dying worm in his bosom, "grows with the growth, and sirnnffthens with the declining years of its vic tim. Jf Ais is true, it is the part of wisdom for a KeputaU; to limit the services of it officer at least, to whom ahe iia$ entrusted 4he managa- ment of her' foreign relations, the execution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, to avperiod so short as.to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not the principal, the servant, not the master. Un til an amendment of the Constitution can be ef fected, public opinion may secure the desired object. I give my aid to it, by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under no circum stances, will I consent to serve a second term. But if there is danger to public liberty from the acknowledged defects of the constitution, in the want oi limit to the continuance of Execu tive power in the same hands, there is, I ao- prenenu, not mucn less lrom a misconstruc tion of that instrument, as it regards the powers actually given. 1 cannot conceive that, by a lair construction, any or either of its provisions would be found to constitute the President a part of the Legislative power. It connot be claimed from the power to recommend, since although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a privnedge wnich he holds in common with eve ry other citizen. And although there maybe someimng more oi connaence in the propriety of the measures recommended in the one case than in the other, in the obligations of ultimate . r i . . decision there can oe no difference. In the lan guage of tho constitution, "all the legislative powers" which it grants "are vested in the Con gress of the United States." It would be a solecism in language to say that any portion of mese is not included in the whole. It may be said, indeed, that the constitution has given to the Executive the power to annul the acts of the legislative body, by refusing to them his assent. So a similar oower has ne cessarily resulted from that instrument to the Judiciary, and yet the Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature. There is, it is true, this difference between theso grants of power; the Executive can put his negative upon the acts of the Legislature for other cause than that of want of conformity to the Constitution, while the Judiciary can only declare void those which violate that instrument. IJut the decision of the Judiaciary is final in such a case, whereas in every instance where the veto of the Executive is applied, it may be overcome by a vote of two thirds of both houses of Congrees. The nega tive upon the acts of the Legislative, by the Ex ecutive authority, and that m the hands of one individual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some others of a similar character, however, it appears to be highly ex pedient, and if used only with the forbearance, and in the spirit which was intended by its au thors, it may be productive of great good, and be found one of the best safeguards to the U nion. kt the period of the formation of the constitu tion, the principle does not appear to have en joyed much favor in the state governments. It existed but in two, and in one of these there was a plural Executive. If we would search for tho motives which operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed .the constitution, for the adoption of a provision so apparently repugnant to the leading demo cratic principle, the majority should govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legisla tion. They knew too well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the people, and the enlightened character of the state Le gislature, not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by them would be worthy representatives of such constituents, and, of course, that they would require no aid in con ceiving and maturing the measures which the circumstances of the country might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been entertained that the President, placed at the capital in the cen tre of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people than their own ; immediate representatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with them, often j laboring with them, and bound I to them by the j triple tie of interest, duty and affection To assist or control Congress then in its or dinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the President. This argument acquires ad ditional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first six Presidents, and two of them were members of the convention, one presiding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger share in consummating the labors of that august body than any other per son. But if bills were never returned to Con gress by either of the above referred to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as cell adapted as they might be lo the wants of the people, the veto was applied upon that of want of conformity to the Constitution, or be cause errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment. There is another ground for the adoption of the veto principle, which had probably more in fluence in recommending it to the convention than any other; I refer to the security which it gives to the just and equitable action of tho Le gislature upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have occurred to the convention that, in a country so extensive, embracing so great a variety of soil and climate and consequently of products, and which, from the same causes, must evei exhibit a great dilference in the amount of the population of its various sections, calling for a great diversity" in the employments of the people, that the legislation of the majority might not always justly iegard the rights and interests of the minority- And that acts of this charac ter might be passed, under an express grant by the works of the Constitution, and, therefore, not within the competency of the judiciary to declare void. That however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past experience, the mem bers of Congress might be, and however large ly partaking in the general, of the liberal feel ings of the people, it was impossible to expeot that bodies so constituted should not sometimes be controlled bv local interests and sectional feelhtgs. It was proper, therefore, to provide some umpire, from whose situation andmod e of appointment more indepencence and freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the Executive Depart ment, constituted by the constitution. A per son elected to that high office, having his con stituents in every section, state, and sub-division of tho Union, must consider himself bound by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend the rights of all, and of every pop tion, groat or small, from the injustice and op pression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, gjven by Jtbc Constitution to tho Executive of the Unitod States, solely as a. conservative power. To be usefl only,jIst, to protect the Constitution 'from' violation; 2dly, the People from the effectsTof hasty legislation, where their will has beempro- uauiy msrtigurueu or not well understood; and, 3dly , to prevent the effects of combinations vio lative of the rights of minorities. In reference to the second of these objects, I mav obsprvp that i consider it the light and privilege. of the Ponnln tn lprirlr iiennffl1 nnintp nf fx .: , tulion, arising from the general grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the powers ex pressly given. And 1 believe, with Mr. Madi son, "that repeated recognitions under various circumstances, m acts of the legislative, execu tive, and judicial, branches of the Government, accompanied by indications in different modes of the concurrence of the general will of the na tion, as affording to the President sufficient au thority for his considering such disputed points as settled." Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of gov ernment. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosi ty of speculative statesmen, if its precise sit uation could bo ascertained, a fair exhibit made of the operations of each of its Depart ments, otjthe powers which they respective ly ciainrfid exercise, of the collisions which have occurred between them, or between the whole Government and those of the States, or either of them. We could then compare our actual condition, after fifty years' trial of our system, with what it was in the com mencement of its operations, and ascertain whether the predictions of the patriots who opposed its adoption, or the confident hones of its advocates, have been realized. The great dread of the former seems to have been, that the reserved powers of the States would be absorbed by those of the Federal Govern ment, and a consolidated power established. leaving to the States the shadow, only, of that maepenuem action tor which ihey had so zealously contended, and on the preservation of which they relied as the last hope of lib erty. Without denying that the result to which they looked with so much apprehension is in the way of being realized, it is obvious that they did not clearly see the mode of its ac complishment. The General Government has seized upon none of the reserved rights of the States. As far as any open warfare may have gone, the State authorities have amply maintained their rights. To a casual observer, our system presents no appearance of discord between the different members which compose it. Even the addition of many new ones has produced no jarring. They move in their respective orbits in per fect harmony with the central head, and with each other. But there is still an under cur rent at work, by which, if not seasonably checked, the worst apprehension or our anti federal patriots, will be realized. And not only will the State authorities be overshad owed by the great increase of power in the Executive Department of the General Gov ernment, but the character of that Govern ment, if not its designation be essentially and radically changed. This state of things has been in part effect ed by causes inherent to the constitution, and : in part by the never-failing tendency of po-j the Legislature from interfering in the or litical power to increase itself. By making I igination of such bills, and that it should the President the sole distributor of all the patronage of tho Government, the framers of the constitution do not appear to have antici- pated at how short a period it would become a rormidable instrument to ennirnl tbn fi operations of the State governments. Of tri fling importance at first, it had, early in Mr Jefferson's administration, become so powor- - - '- V A a M A w lul as to create great alarm in the mind of that patriot, from the potent influence it might exert in controlling the freedom of the elec tive franchise. If such could have then been tho effects of its influence, hoiv much greater must be the danger at this time, quadrupled in amount, as it certainly is, and more com pletely under tho control of the Executive will, ihan their construction of their powers allowed, or tho forbearing characters of all the early Presidents permitted them to make? But it is not by the extent of its patronage alone that the Executive Department has be come dangerous, but by the use which it ap pears may be made of ihe appointing power, to bring under its control the whole revenues of the country. The Constitution has declared it to be the duty of the President to see that the laws aro executed, and it makes him tho Commander-in-Chief of ihe Armies and Navy of the United States. If thq opinion of tho most approved writers upon that species of mixed Government, which, in modern Europe, is termed "Monarchy," in contra distinction to "Despotism," is correct, there was wanting no other addition to tho powers of our Chief Magistrate to stamp a nionarchial character on our Government, but the control of the publicfinances. And to me it appears strange, indeed, that any one should doubt that the entire control which the President possesses over the officers who have the custody of tho public money, by the power of removal with or without cause, does, for all mischievous purposes at least, virtually subject tho treas ures also to his disposal. The first Roman Emperor, in his attempt to seize tho sacred treasure, silenced the opposition of the officer to whose charge it had been committed, by a significant allusion to his sword. By a selection of political instruments for the caro of the public money, a reference to their commissions by a President, would be quite as effectual an argument as that of Cffi sar to the Roman knight. I am not insensi ble of the great difficulty that exists in devising- a proper plan for the safe-keeping and disbursement of the public revenues, and I know the importance which has been attach ed by men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as iuis called. Of the Treasury from the banking institutions. It is not the divorce which is complained of, but the un hallowed union of the Treasury with the Ex ecutive Department which has created such extensive alarm. To this danger to our re publican institutions, and that created by the influence given to the Executive through ihe instrumentality f the federal officers, I pro pose to apply all the remedies which may be at my command. It was certainly a great error infcthc framers. of tho Constitution, .ndt to have made thn nflinnr at the head of Jhh' Treasury Department entirely.. independent,, of the Executive. He should at feast have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of the Legislature. ' I have determined never to remove a Sec retary of the Treasury without communica ting all the circumstances attending such re moval to both Houses of Congress. The in fluence of the Executive in controlling the freedom of the eh-ctive franchise through the ' medium of the public officers can be effectu ally checked bygrcnewing the prohibition published by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their interference in elections further than givhio their own votes; and their own independence secured by an assurauce of perfect immuni ty, in exercising this sacred privilege of free men under the dictates ol their own unbiassed judgments, IN ever, with my consent, shall an officer ol tho reople, compensated lor hki services out of their pockets, become the pli ant instrument of Executive will. There is no part of the means ,p!acetT in the hands of the Executive which might be used with greater effect, for unhallow ed purposes, limn the control of the ptrli lie press. The maxim which our ances tors derived from the mother country that "ihe freedom! the press is the greatest bulwark of civil and religious liberty' is one of the most precious legatees which they have leffus. We huve learned too, from our own as well as the experience of other countries, that golden shackles, by whomsoever or by whatever pretence imposed, are as fatal to it as the iron bonds of Despotism. The presses in the neces sary employment of the Government should never be used "to clear the guilty or to varnish cr!mes.,, A decent and manly examination of the acts of Govern, ment should he not only tolerated but en couraged. Upon another occasion I have given my opinion, at some length, upon the im propriety of Executive interference in the legislation of Congress. That the ar ticle in the Constitution making it the du ty of the President to communicate infor mation, and authorizing him to recom mend measures, was not intended to make him the source of legislation, and, in par ular, that he should never be looked to for scliemesffcfiiiance. It would be very strane,iiiiceed, that the constitution should have strictly forbidden one brunch of be considered proper that an altogether, different department of the Government?;, should be permitted lo do so. Some of our best political maxims aud opinions have been drawn from our patent Isle. There are others, however, which cannot be introduced into oursvstem without sin gular incongruity, and the production of much mischief. And this I conceive to be one. No mailer in which of the Hou ses of Parliament a bill may originate, nor by whom introduced, a minister, or a mem ber of the opposition, by the fiction of law or rather of Constitutional principle, the Sovereign is supposed to have prepared it agreeebly to his will, and then submitted it to Parliament for their advice and con sent. Now. the very reverse is Hie case here, not only with regard to the principle, but the forms prescribed by (lie Constitution. The principle certainly assigns to the only body constituted by the constitution (the legislative body) the power to make laws, and the forms even direct that the enact ment should be ascribed to them. The Senate, in relation to Revenue bills, have the right lo propose amendments; and so has the Executive, by the power given him to return (hem to the House of Rep resentatives, with his objections. It is in his power, also, to propose amendments in the existing revenue laws, sugestod by his observations upon their defective or injurious operation. But the delicate duty of devising schemes of revenue should be left where the constitution' has placed it with the immediate representatives of the People. For similar reasons the mode of keeping the public treasure should be prescribed by them ; and the further re moved it may be from the control of th4i Executive, the more wholesome the rangement, and the more in accordance with republican principle. Connected with this subject is the char acter of the currency: The idea of mak ing it exclusively metallic, however well intended, appears to be fraught with more fatal consequences than any other scheme, having no relation to the person- . al rights of the citizen, that has ever been, devised. If any single scheme could pro duce the effect of arresting, at once, that mutation of condition by which thousands of our most indigent fellow citizens, by
Significant historical Pennsylvania newspapers