t
JEFFERSONIAN REP IBLlOAN.
INAUGURAL ADDRESS.
OF
PRESHET-iHAlRRIS05r. '
,,. Called from a retirement which 1 had sun-
posed was tdcontifuie for the residue of mv
life, to fill thevChief Executive Office of this
groat and free nation, I appear before you,
Jttilhucitjzens, to take the oaths which the
constitution proscribes, as -a necessary quali-
ftcation for the performance of us duties. And possessed by the iJcoplc ol the United States,
in obedience to a custom coeval with our gov- a"d the4resricted grant of power to the Gov
ernment, and what I believe to be your expec- eminent which they have adopted, enough
tations, I proceed to present to you a sum- nas Deen given to accomplish all the objects
mary of the principles which will govern me r which it was created. It has been found
in the discharge of the duties which I shall powerful in war, and, hitherto, justice has
be called upon to perform. been administered, an intimate union affected,
It was the remark of a Roman Consul, in domestic tranquility preserved, and personal
an early period of that celebrated republic, liberty secured to the citizen. As was to
that a most striking contrast was observable e expected, however, from the defect of Jan
dn the conduct of candidates for office of now- guaSe and the necessarily sententious man-
and trust before and after obtaining them ner m which the Constitution is written, dis-
they seldom carrying out in the latter caso Putes have arisen as to the amount of power
the pledges and promises made in the former, which it has actually granted, or was intend
However much the world may have improv- e&tt0 grant
ed, in many respects, in the lapse of upwards This is more particularly the case in rela
of two thousand years since the remark was l,on to 'hat part of the instrument which
made by the virtuous and indignant Roman, treats of the legislative branch. And not
I fear that a strict examination of she annals onbr as regards the exercise of powers
of some of the modern eloctive governments, claimed under a general clause, giving that
would develope similar instances of violated dy the authority to pass all laws necessa-
confidence. ,
Although the fiat of the people has gone 0Ul Jn relation to the latter also. It is. how
fonh. proclaiming me the Chief Magistrate of evcr consolatory to reflect, that most of the
his glorious Union, nothing upon their part
remaining to be done, it may be thought that
motive may exist to keen tin the delusion
under which they may be supposed to have
acted in relation to my principles and opin- our statesmen, most distinguished lor talent
ions; and perhaps there may be some in this anu patriotism, have been at one time or oth
asserobly who have come here either Dre- or of their political career, on both sides of
"pared to condemn those I shall now deliver, 3acn of the most warmly disputed questions,
or approving them, to doubt the sincerity with forces upon us the inference that the orrors,
which they are uttered. But the lapse of a jf errors they were, are attributable to the
few months will confirm or dispel their fears, intrinsic difficulty in many instances, of as
The outline of principles to govern, andmeas- certainiug the intensions, of "the framers of
was to be adopted, by an Administration not 'he constitution, rather Jhan the influence of
yet begtm, will soon be exchanged for immu- any sinister or unpatriotic motive.
iabl history; and I shall stand, either exon- ut 'he great danger to our institutions
e ruled by my countrymen, or classed with the does not appear to me to be in a usurpation
mass of those who premised that they might by the government of power not granted by
deceire, afld flattered with the intention to 'he people, but by the accumulation in one of
betray. the departments, of that which was assigned
However strong may be my present pur- ' others. Limited as are the powers which
pose to realize the expectations of a magnan- have been granted, still enough have been
wwas and confiding people, I too well under- granted to constitute a despotism, if conccn
Rtand the, infirmities of human nature, and the 'rated in one of the departments. This dan
dnerous temptations lo which I shall be ex- 2er is greatly heightened, as it has been al-
posod, from the magnitude of the power which
it has .been the pleasure of the people lo com- encroacements of one department upon an
mit to my hands, not to place my chief confi- other, than upon their own reserved rights.
dene upon the aid of that Almighty Power
which has hitherto protected me, and enabled
roe to bring to favorable issues other impor
IWK4 oik SUH greatly inferior tresis, heretofore
confided to me by my country.
The broad foundation upon which our Con
sultation rests, bmttg the People a breath of
theirs having made, as a breath can unmake,
change, or modify it it can be assigned to
none of (he great divisions of Government,
bftft l that of Democracy. If such is it-, the
ory, those who are called upon to administer
it must recognise, as its leading principle,
the duty of shaping their measures so as to
produce the greatest good to the greatest
mMttbsr. But, with these broad admissions,
if we would compare the sovereignty acknowl
edge to exist in the mass of our people with
the power claimed by other sovereignties,
oven by those which have5 been considered
roost purely democratic, we shall find a most
cssenuai difference. All others lav claim to
power limited only by their own will.
The majority of our citizens, on the con
trary, possess a sovereignty with an amount
of power precisely equal lo that which has
been granted lo them by the .parties to the
national compact, and nothing be-ond. We
admit of no Government by Divine right be
lieving that, so far as.power is concerned, the
benificent Creator has- made no distinction
amongst men, that all are upon an equality,
and that the only legitimate right to govern is
an express grant of power from the governed.
The Constitution of the United States is the
iftStrtfmeut containing this grant of power to
the several departments composing the Gov
ernment. On an examination of that instru
jnef.t of power withheld. The latter is also
sasceptiWe of division into power which the
majority had the right to grant, but which
they did not thik, proper to intrust to their
ageats.tud.tjiajt j?rtiich they could not have
granted, nodtfl possessed by themselves.
1b other words, there are certain rights pos
sessed by each individual American citizen,
which, in hiss compact with the others, he has
never stir rendered. Some of them, indeed,
he- is unable to surrender, being, in the lan
guage of our system; ttntdienaWc.
The boasted privilege of a Roman citizen
wa to him a shield only against a petty pro
vincial ruler, whiist the proud democrat of
Athens could console himself under a sen
tence of desth, for a supposed violation of the
n-utona! failb, which no one understood, arul
which at times was the subject of the mock
y of ail, tn of bamrihmeiti from lire home,
fat family, and hu couuiry, w.ih or without
n ftegedcfcse; that it was the act, not of a
Mttgle tyrant, or hated aristocracy, bat of his
iiiiuXiWitid countrymen. Far different is the.
power of oor sovereignty. It can interfere
mrkbii) one's faith, prescribe forms of wor
hjf) for no one' observance, infliet jio. .pun-
tshtfttmt butfijUisextained gtiilt, the!
rafcttit of investigation under rules prescribed
by ihe Coistiiution itself. ' These preoious
privileges, afld those scarcely less importantJ
w (gi-nug oxprossion io m inoogms ana opin
t, ffiiher by wrttiiig pr speafcing, unre
skiitd btii by the 1rtfcy Tor iiifairy to oth-
e&ndmXv( a piuc: pato J rlfce,
advantages which flow from the Government,
the acknowledged propertv of all, the Amer
lean citizen derives from no charter granted
by his fellow man. He claims them because
nc himself a Man, fashioned by the same
Almighty hand as thcrest of his species, and
itled to a full share of the blessings with
W1"cn no nas endowed them.
Notwithstanding the limited sovereignly
ry 10 carry into effect the specified powers,
instances ot the alleged departure from the
euor or spirit ol the constitution, have ul-
'imately received the sanction of a majority
f 'he people. And the fact that many of
"'ays observable that men are less jealous of
When the Constitution of the United States
first came from the hands of the Convention
which formed it. many of the sternest re
publicans of the day were alarmed at the ex
tent of the power which had been granted to
the Federal Government, and more particular
ly of that portion which had been assigned to
the Executive branch. There were in it
features which appeared not to be in harmony
with their ideas of a simple representative
Democracy, or Republic. And knowing the
tendency of power to increase itself, partic
ularly when exercised by a single individu
al, predictions were made thatj at no very
remote period, the Government would ter
minate in virtual monarchy. It would not
become me to say that the fears of these pa
triots have been already realized. But, as I
sincerely believe that the tendency of meas
ures, and of men's opinions, for some years
past, has been in that direction, it is, I con
ceive, strictly proper that I should take this
occasion to repeat the assurances I have
heretofore ghen of my determination to ar
rest ihe progress of that tendency, if it real
ly exists, and restore the Government to its
pristine health and vigor, as far as this can
be effected by any legitimate exercise of the
power placed in my hands.
I proceed to state, in as summary a man
ner as I can. my opinion of the sources of
the evils which have been so extensively
complained of, and the correctives which
may be applied. Some of the former are
unquestionably to be found in the defects of
the Constitution; others, in my judgment, are
attributable to a misconstruction of some of
its provisions. Of the former is the eligibil
ity of the same individual to a second term
of the Presidency. The sagacious mind of
of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented this
error, and attemps have been made, hitherto
without success, to apply the amendatory
power of the states to its correction. As,
however, one mode of correction is in tho
power of every President, and consequently
in mine, it would be useless, and perhaps in
vidious, to enumerate the ovils of which, in
the opinion of many of our fellow-citizens,
this error of the sages who framed the Con
stitution may have been the source, and the
bitter fruits which wo are still to gather from
it, i( it continues to disfigure our system. It
may be observed, however, as a general re
mark, that Republics can commit no greater
error than lo adopt or continue any feature
jn their systems of Government which may
he calculated to create or increase the love
of power, in the bosoms of those to vrlmm
necessity Obliges them to cojnnMt the man
agement of their affairs.
And, surely, nothing is more likely to produce
such a statement of mind than the long contin
uance of an qHee of high trust. Nothing can
be more corrupting. Nothing more destructive
of all thoee noble feelings which belong to the
character of a devoted republican patriot. When
this corrupting passion once takes possession of
the 1man mind, like the love ot gold, it be
comes insatiable. Jt is the never dying worm
in his bosom, "grows with the growth, and
sirnnffthens with the declining years of its vic
tim. Jf Ais is true, it is the part of wisdom for
a KeputaU; to limit the services of it officer
at least, to whom ahe iia$ entrusted 4he managa-
ment of her' foreign relations, the execution of
her laws, and the command of her armies and
navies, to avperiod so short as.to prevent his
forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not
the principal, the servant, not the master. Un
til an amendment of the Constitution can be ef
fected, public opinion may secure the desired
object. I give my aid to it, by renewing the
pledge heretofore given, that, under no circum
stances, will I consent to serve a second term.
But if there is danger to public liberty from
the acknowledged defects of the constitution, in
the want oi limit to the continuance of Execu
tive power in the same hands, there is, I ao-
prenenu, not mucn less lrom a misconstruc
tion of that instrument, as it regards the powers
actually given. 1 cannot conceive that, by a
lair construction, any or either of its provisions
would be found to constitute the President a
part of the Legislative power. It connot be
claimed from the power to recommend, since
although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a
privnedge wnich he holds in common with eve
ry other citizen. And although there maybe
someimng more oi connaence in the propriety
of the measures recommended in the one case
than in the other, in the obligations of ultimate
. r i . .
decision there can oe no difference. In the lan
guage of tho constitution, "all the legislative
powers" which it grants "are vested in the Con
gress of the United States." It would be a
solecism in language to say that any portion of
mese is not included in the whole.
It may be said, indeed, that the constitution
has given to the Executive the power to annul
the acts of the legislative body, by refusing to
them his assent. So a similar oower has ne
cessarily resulted from that instrument to the
Judiciary, and yet the Judiciary forms no part
of the Legislature. There is, it is true, this
difference between theso grants of power; the
Executive can put his negative upon the acts
of the Legislature for other cause than that of
want of conformity to the Constitution, while
the Judiciary can only declare void those which
violate that instrument. IJut the decision of the
Judiaciary is final in such a case, whereas in
every instance where the veto of the Executive
is applied, it may be overcome by a vote of two
thirds of both houses of Congrees. The nega
tive upon the acts of the Legislative, by the Ex
ecutive authority, and that m the hands of one
individual, would seem to be an incongruity in
our system. Like some others of a similar
character, however, it appears to be highly ex
pedient, and if used only with the forbearance,
and in the spirit which was intended by its au
thors, it may be productive of great good, and
be found one of the best safeguards to the U
nion. kt the period of the formation of the constitu
tion, the principle does not appear to have en
joyed much favor in the state governments. It
existed but in two, and in one of these there
was a plural Executive. If we would search
for tho motives which operated upon the purely
patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed
.the constitution, for the adoption of a provision
so apparently repugnant to the leading demo
cratic principle, the majority should govern, we
must reject the idea that they anticipated from
it any benefit to the ordinary course of legisla
tion. They knew too well the high degree of
intelligence which existed among the people,
and the enlightened character of the state Le
gislature, not to have the fullest confidence that
the two bodies elected by them would be worthy
representatives of such constituents, and, of
course, that they would require no aid in con
ceiving and maturing the measures which the
circumstances of the country might require.
And it is preposterous to suppose that a thought
could for a moment have been entertained that
the President, placed at the capital in the cen
tre of the country, could better understand the
wants and wishes of the people than their own ;
immediate representatives, who spend a part of
every year among them, living with them, often j
laboring with them, and bound I to them by the j
triple tie of interest, duty and affection
To assist or control Congress then in its or
dinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have
been the motive for conferring the veto power
on the President. This argument acquires ad
ditional force from the fact of its never having
been thus used by the first six Presidents, and
two of them were members of the convention,
one presiding over its deliberations, and the
other having a larger share in consummating the
labors of that august body than any other per
son. But if bills were never returned to Con
gress by either of the above referred to, upon
the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as
cell adapted as they might be lo the wants of
the people, the veto was applied upon that of
want of conformity to the Constitution, or be
cause errors had been committed from a too
hasty enactment.
There is another ground for the adoption of
the veto principle, which had probably more in
fluence in recommending it to the convention
than any other; I refer to the security which it
gives to the just and equitable action of tho Le
gislature upon all parts of the Union. It could
not but have occurred to the convention that,
in a country so extensive, embracing so great a
variety of soil and climate and consequently of
products, and which, from the same causes, must
evei exhibit a great dilference in the amount of
the population of its various sections, calling
for a great diversity" in the employments of the
people, that the legislation of the majority might
not always justly iegard the rights and interests
of the minority- And that acts of this charac
ter might be passed, under an express grant by
the works of the Constitution, and, therefore,
not within the competency of the judiciary to
declare void.
That however enlightened and patriotic they
might suppose, from past experience, the mem
bers of Congress might be, and however large
ly partaking in the general, of the liberal feel
ings of the people, it was impossible to expeot
that bodies so constituted should not sometimes
be controlled bv local interests and sectional
feelhtgs. It was proper, therefore, to provide
some umpire, from whose situation andmod e of
appointment more indepencence and freedom
from such influences might be expected. Such
a one was afforded by the Executive Depart
ment, constituted by the constitution. A per
son elected to that high office, having his con
stituents in every section, state, and sub-division
of tho Union, must consider himself bound
by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect,
and defend the rights of all, and of every pop
tion, groat or small, from the injustice and op
pression of the rest.
I consider the veto power, therefore, gjven by
Jtbc Constitution to tho Executive of the Unitod
States, solely as a. conservative power. To be
usefl only,jIst, to protect the Constitution 'from'
violation; 2dly, the People from the effectsTof
hasty legislation, where their will has beempro-
uauiy msrtigurueu or not well understood; and,
3dly , to prevent the effects of combinations vio
lative of the rights of minorities. In reference
to the second of these objects, I mav obsprvp
that i consider it the light and privilege. of the
Ponnln tn lprirlr iiennffl1 nnintp nf fx .: ,
tulion, arising from the general grant of power
to Congress to carry into effect the powers ex
pressly given. And 1 believe, with Mr. Madi
son, "that repeated recognitions under various
circumstances, m acts of the legislative, execu
tive, and judicial, branches of the Government,
accompanied by indications in different modes
of the concurrence of the general will of the na
tion, as affording to the President sufficient au
thority for his considering such disputed points
as settled."
Upwards of half a century has elapsed
since the adoption of our present form of gov
ernment. It would be an object more highly
desirable than the gratification of the curiosi
ty of speculative statesmen, if its precise sit
uation could bo ascertained, a fair exhibit
made of the operations of each of its Depart
ments, otjthe powers which they respective
ly ciainrfid exercise, of the collisions which
have occurred between them, or between the
whole Government and those of the States,
or either of them. We could then compare
our actual condition, after fifty years' trial of
our system, with what it was in the com
mencement of its operations, and ascertain
whether the predictions of the patriots who
opposed its adoption, or the confident hones
of its advocates, have been realized. The
great dread of the former seems to have been,
that the reserved powers of the States would
be absorbed by those of the Federal Govern
ment, and a consolidated power established.
leaving to the States the shadow, only, of that
maepenuem action tor which ihey had so
zealously contended, and on the preservation
of which they relied as the last hope of lib
erty. Without denying that the result to which
they looked with so much apprehension is in
the way of being realized, it is obvious that
they did not clearly see the mode of its ac
complishment. The General Government
has seized upon none of the reserved rights
of the States. As far as any open warfare
may have gone, the State authorities have
amply maintained their rights. To a casual
observer, our system presents no appearance
of discord between the different members
which compose it. Even the addition of
many new ones has produced no jarring.
They move in their respective orbits in per
fect harmony with the central head, and with
each other. But there is still an under cur
rent at work, by which, if not seasonably
checked, the worst apprehension or our anti
federal patriots, will be realized. And not
only will the State authorities be overshad
owed by the great increase of power in the
Executive Department of the General Gov
ernment, but the character of that Govern
ment, if not its designation be essentially and
radically changed.
This state of things has been in part effect
ed by causes inherent to the constitution, and :
in part by the never-failing tendency of po-j the Legislature from interfering in the or
litical power to increase itself. By making I igination of such bills, and that it should
the President the sole distributor of all the
patronage of tho Government, the framers of
the constitution do not appear to have antici-
pated at how short a period it would become
a rormidable instrument to ennirnl tbn fi
operations of the State governments. Of tri
fling importance at first, it had, early in Mr
Jefferson's administration, become so powor-
- - '- V A a M A w
lul as to create great alarm in the mind of
that patriot, from the potent influence it might
exert in controlling the freedom of the elec
tive franchise. If such could have then been
tho effects of its influence, hoiv much greater
must be the danger at this time, quadrupled
in amount, as it certainly is, and more com
pletely under tho control of the Executive
will, ihan their construction of their powers
allowed, or tho forbearing characters of all
the early Presidents permitted them to make?
But it is not by the extent of its patronage
alone that the Executive Department has be
come dangerous, but by the use which it ap
pears may be made of ihe appointing power,
to bring under its control the whole revenues
of the country.
The Constitution has declared it to be the
duty of the President to see that the laws
aro executed, and it makes him tho Commander-in-Chief
of ihe Armies and Navy of the
United States. If thq opinion of tho most
approved writers upon that species of mixed
Government, which, in modern Europe, is
termed "Monarchy," in contra distinction to
"Despotism," is correct, there was wanting
no other addition to tho powers of our Chief
Magistrate to stamp a nionarchial character
on our Government, but the control of the
publicfinances. And to me it appears strange,
indeed, that any one should doubt that the
entire control which the President possesses
over the officers who have the custody of tho
public money, by the power of removal with
or without cause, does, for all mischievous
purposes at least, virtually subject tho treas
ures also to his disposal. The first Roman
Emperor, in his attempt to seize tho sacred
treasure, silenced the opposition of the officer
to whose charge it had been committed, by
a significant allusion to his sword.
By a selection of political instruments for
the caro of the public money, a reference to
their commissions by a President, would be
quite as effectual an argument as that of Cffi
sar to the Roman knight. I am not insensi
ble of the great difficulty that exists in devising-
a proper plan for the safe-keeping and
disbursement of the public revenues, and I
know the importance which has been attach
ed by men of great abilities and patriotism to
the divorce, as iuis called. Of the Treasury
from the banking institutions. It is not the
divorce which is complained of, but the un
hallowed union of the Treasury with the Ex
ecutive Department which has created such
extensive alarm. To this danger to our re
publican institutions, and that created by the
influence given to the Executive through ihe
instrumentality f the federal officers, I pro
pose to apply all the remedies which may
be at my command. It was certainly a great
error infcthc framers. of tho Constitution, .ndt
to have made thn nflinnr at the head of Jhh'
Treasury Department entirely.. independent,,
of the Executive. He should at feast have
been removable only upon the demand of the
popular branch of the Legislature. '
I have determined never to remove a Sec
retary of the Treasury without communica
ting all the circumstances attending such re
moval to both Houses of Congress. The in
fluence of the Executive in controlling the
freedom of the eh-ctive franchise through the '
medium of the public officers can be effectu
ally checked bygrcnewing the prohibition
published by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their
interference in elections further than givhio
their own votes; and their own independence
secured by an assurauce of perfect immuni
ty, in exercising this sacred privilege of free
men under the dictates ol their own unbiassed
judgments, IN ever, with my consent, shall
an officer ol tho reople, compensated lor hki
services out of their pockets, become the pli
ant instrument of Executive will.
There is no part of the means ,p!acetT
in the hands of the Executive which might
be used with greater effect, for unhallow
ed purposes, limn the control of the ptrli
lie press. The maxim which our ances
tors derived from the mother country that
"ihe freedom! the press is the greatest
bulwark of civil and religious liberty' is
one of the most precious legatees which
they have leffus. We huve learned too,
from our own as well as the experience
of other countries, that golden shackles,
by whomsoever or by whatever pretence
imposed, are as fatal to it as the iron bonds
of Despotism. The presses in the neces
sary employment of the Government
should never be used "to clear the guilty
or to varnish cr!mes.,, A decent and
manly examination of the acts of Govern,
ment should he not only tolerated but en
couraged. Upon another occasion I have given
my opinion, at some length, upon the im
propriety of Executive interference in
the legislation of Congress. That the ar
ticle in the Constitution making it the du
ty of the President to communicate infor
mation, and authorizing him to recom
mend measures, was not intended to make
him the source of legislation, and, in par
ular, that he should never be looked to for
scliemesffcfiiiance. It would be very
strane,iiiiceed, that the constitution
should have strictly forbidden one brunch of
be considered proper that an altogether,
different department of the Government?;,
should be permitted lo do so. Some of
our best political maxims aud opinions
have been drawn from our patent Isle.
There are others, however, which cannot
be introduced into oursvstem without sin
gular incongruity, and the production of
much mischief. And this I conceive to
be one. No mailer in which of the Hou
ses of Parliament a bill may originate, nor
by whom introduced, a minister, or a mem
ber of the opposition, by the fiction of law
or rather of Constitutional principle, the
Sovereign is supposed to have prepared it
agreeebly to his will, and then submitted
it to Parliament for their advice and con
sent. Now. the very reverse is Hie case here,
not only with regard to the principle, but
the forms prescribed by (lie Constitution.
The principle certainly assigns to the only
body constituted by the constitution (the
legislative body) the power to make laws,
and the forms even direct that the enact
ment should be ascribed to them. The
Senate, in relation to Revenue bills, have
the right lo propose amendments; and so
has the Executive, by the power given
him to return (hem to the House of Rep
resentatives, with his objections. It is in
his power, also, to propose amendments
in the existing revenue laws, sugestod
by his observations upon their defective
or injurious operation. But the delicate
duty of devising schemes of revenue should
be left where the constitution' has placed
it with the immediate representatives of
the People. For similar reasons the mode
of keeping the public treasure should be
prescribed by them ; and the further re
moved it may be from the control of th4i
Executive, the more wholesome the
rangement, and the more in accordance
with republican principle.
Connected with this subject is the char
acter of the currency: The idea of mak
ing it exclusively metallic, however well
intended, appears to be fraught with
more fatal consequences than any other
scheme, having no relation to the person- .
al rights of the citizen, that has ever been,
devised. If any single scheme could pro
duce the effect of arresting, at once, that
mutation of condition by which thousands
of our most indigent fellow citizens, by