[No. XCVIIt] THE TABLET. No. XCVIII. " TAKE AWAY THRONES CROWNS FROM AMONG " »JEN, AND THERE WiLL so<}N BEAN KND OF ALL DOMIN " lON and JUSTICE." NOTHJNGadmitsof clearer demonstration than that man is naturally inclined to refill go vernment. The terms made use of, in the defi nition of civil duties, denote our inherent aversi on to obedience. It will be asked how this can be reconciled with the universal practice of man kind, in voluntarily yielding to institutions for the express purpose of being governed ? And, though in many countries the eftabliilied subor dination is a matter of force, yet if the people •were left to the unrestrained ejoyment of their natural liberty they would not long remain so. Some act or other would indicate a general con sent to surrender part of their personal rights. There is-, indeed, no sentiment of the human mind that so well deserves to be called original or instinctive, as that propenfiry men discover to bind themselves by rules and associations. One should not pass over this apparent contradiction without endeavouring tofind afolution. The actions ofno individual are perfectly con sistent. Every person has passions that are more or less at variance, and different affections, by turns, preponderate. The social dispositions o perate so far as to induce men to associate with each other, for thepurpofe of mutual protection. It requires a less conqueil over the private passi ons to enter into aflbciations, than it does to ob serve them. The fame man may chearfully give his assent to some common regulations for the public welfare ; who, in the general tenor of his conduct is actuated by such personal and felfilh motives as are repugnant to the very compact he has fubferibed. His fenie of duty is not fufficient to secure his observance, when it comes in com petition with any of the vigorous passions of his nature. The most that can be expected from his reasoning on -he subject, or from his feelings of obligation, is that he should afford his aid in fup prefling or punishing the disobedience of others. For, bad as a man may be himfelf, he is willing the wickedness of other people lhould be restrain ed. He is indeed sensible that he has most to fear from perfotis most like hinjfell, and will sooner take part with the law than with the violator. This however may not be the cafe, when he is in such a lituaiion, that his own exemption or escape depends on a combination with other tranfgref fors-. A man may be dilatory and even knavish in his manner of discharging his own engage ments, and yet he will with alacrity assist the ci vil officer in compelling others to their duty. An indolent, faithlefs hireling will complain of o thers of a like (lamp and take delight in their pu nishment. In fine, man is felfifh only for hiin felf. By entering into society he does not neces sarily iofe his native love of liberty, but he in some measure becomesthe enemy of that of other people ? Ho is habitually exercised with a desire to re-aflume the rights he has himfelf relinquished, and to diminish those which other people have retained. When he is called upon to obey the laws, his aversion to personal restraint must be o vercome by causes more powerful than induced his consent to an original compact. His attenti on, in the act ot instituting government, is prin cipally employed in contemplating the advanta ges he will derive in havingother people laid un der control. While he is making the association, the ardor of private passions may be so f;ir abford cd by the occasion as to produce an acquiescence to legal institutions. But he is soon impelled by different feelings, and he must have some ftrong cr motive for obeying the laws, than what will result from the consideration that he has pvomif ed obedience. In considering the fubjeft hitherto, I have em braced the ftrppofition that all men have volunta rily entered into the form of government, under which tliey exist:. I have meant to illustrate, that xiotwititanding there was a perfed: acquiescence in the original compart, men are naturally and ftre.igly impelled to elude or violate it. But I have taken a position that futfts, in very few in iiances, will authorize. Where is the country that the people are universally in favor of their political conflitution ? The idea of original com part, as a matter ot fart, is altogether delulive. It is a just, theoretic principle and only means, that men would, if left to themselves, adopt fomc regulations relativeto protertion and allegiance, l ew people however were ever blefled with an opportunity for the put pose ; for it has generally (&azo r ( PUBLISHED WEDNESDAYS AND SATURDAYS BY JOHN FENNO, No. 9. MAIDEN-LANE, NEW-YORK. SATURDAY, MARCH, 20, 1790, happened that government has been framed un der circumstances of compulsion or artifice. In those cases, where the people are said to have combined freely into a state of government, there may ftil) be a powerful minority, who do not feel perfonably rei'ponfible, in point of conscience, to observe those laws, or defend that community, to which in sentiment they are opposed. This brings me to the idea inculcated in my motto. There must be some adventitious properties infu fed into the government to give it energy andfpi rit, or the felfifh, turbulent passions of men can never be #ontrouled. This has occasioned that artificial splendor and dignity that are to be found in the courts of so many [nations. Some admiration and refpedt must be excited towards public officers, by their holding a real orfuppo fed superiority over the mass of the people. The Sanctions and penalties of law are likewise requi site to aid in reltraining individuals from tram pling upon and demolishing the government. It is confeffed that, in some situations, a small degree of parade and solemnity, co-operating with other causes, may be fufficient to secure obe dience to the laws. In an early state of society, when the desires of men are few and easily fatis fied, the temptations to trespass upon good order and justice are neither pressing nor numerous. Avarice and ambition encreafe with population ; and in a large opulent community the daz;ling appendages and pompous formalities of courts are introduced to form a balance to the encreafing ardor of the felfifh passions, and to check that a£ cendency which afpiringindividuals would other wise gain over the public peace and authority. In a wife, enlightened community, where in formation is generally spread among the inhabi tants, the splendor and pageantry ofofficedonot excite any high degree of awe or respect. The people of the United States|may probably be induc ed to regard and obey the laws without rifquingthe experiment of expensive courts and titled mon arclis. There is a reverence paid, by a sensible nation, to wisdom and virtue, that is equivalent in point of maintaining subordination, to those magnificent establishments, which are required in governing an ignorant, servile people. It can not be determined how far it will be requisite for the United States to aflume a splendor in its public institutions. In proportion as we become populous, and wealthy, mull the tone of govern ment be strengthened, unless the people should progress in knowledge and virtue by a diffufive, judicious plan of education. An education not merely of science but of morals. If good princi ples are inculcated, and good habits formed by education, we may perhaps avoid the occasion of expensive, splendid arrangements, in order to give liability and procure subordination to the govern ment. This is a matter that will in some degree regulate itfelf. While the ciiizens are orderly andrefpectful under a plain stile of government, why need we try the alternative of creating more luitre and expencein our institutions ? Butfhould the people (hew a refractory, seditious temper, and make efforts to breakover the barriers of law and justice, regardless of the intrinsic excellence of our constitution, the government will be com pelled to have recourse to those artificial methods of gaining refpecft and obedience, which other nations find indifpenfible. Should this happen it will be confonanttothe spirit, if not ftrictlyto the letter of my motto—take away thrones and crowns from among men and there will soon be an end of all dominion and justice. CONGRESS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. FRIDAY, FEB. 26, 1790. IN Committee of the whole house. The proportion for allum ing the State debts-and the amendments proposed thereto by Mr. White, being under confederation. (continued.) MR. STONE. It is laid that immediate relief is to be afford ed the State creditors ; but upon the Secretary's idea, not one far thing is to be paid under two years : In the mean time there will be a total suspension of all payments to the State creditois, this will operate very unjuflly and oppreflively : He instanced particularly in the State of Maryland. In that State there is upwardsof 2000001. solid fubftant'al property inState paper belonging to the citizens. This property by virtue of the judicious arrangements of that State, is placed in a very eligible situation. Now what have the proprie tors done that they fliould be in a manner stripped of it. He reprobated the injustice of taxing those States who are out of debt, to pay debts contra&cd for purposes in which perhaps they are not at all interefled. He adverted to the condutt of S. Carolina, in not making provision for their State debt, on the pre emption that Congress would aflumeand fund it, without any previous intimation of any design of this nature on the part of Congress. He was sorry, he said, to mention this circumftancc, but much more sorry that it fliould ever have taken place. He concluded by faying that in all events he should advise his conftitucnts to proceed in paying excise and impost, and making provision for their debfj and if Congress plcafr d they might give £>UU$. PRICE THREL DOLLARS PR. ANN them credit, if not, he hoped they would obtain credit in ij. ,-ci Mr. Ames said that a jealousy was entertained of undue su'vai tage being procured to particular Slates. In order to remove the impediments which the supposed unworthy influence of flare in terests on his mind might plate in his way, he was obliged as well as disposed to reft his argument upon general principles. For these, like truth, upon which they are founded-, have an unchange able and uncontroulable authority. Let the firft enquiry be as to the justice of the measure. In 1773 the citizens of America, with a folcmn appeal to Heaven, made a common cause ot their violated liberty. They agreed as brethren to expose property and life in its defence, if partial dangers and loflcs were to have fallen Upon the fufferers, probably it would - have discouraged many who were mod immediately exposed and yet difplaycd the rrtoft heroic fortitude. Nor would those who were remote from the danger, and indeed from the quarrel, have become parties on any other principle than that it was the cause of all America. For instance, South-Ca rolina, as happy as peace and wealth could make her, had little cause of complaint against Britain. He did not efpoufc the cause of South-Carolina merely, but of America. Thai State gave an illustrious example of patriotism. But if her citizens when they forefaw the evils of war, had forefien that more than five millions of debt would be created against her, that the armies would live as it were, on free quarters in her territory, and that a great part of the personal property would be destroyed 6r carried away* would they have drawn the sword if they had believed that the be nefit would be common, but the burden partial? No, Sir, the spirit of the people and the resolves of Congress spoke a different language. Let him who has not forgotten the spirit of 1775 deny that this is in conformity to its di&ates. But were the state debts contra&ed for the war Pit appears by the books in the public offices that they were. Will iny one fay that the whole expcnce of defending our common liberty ought not to be a common charge ? Part of this charge was contracted by Maflachufetts, before Congress a (Turned the exercise of its powi ers. The fir ft ammunitibn that repulsed the enemy at Lexington* and made such havoc at Bunkers-Hill, was purchased by that°ftate and appears in the form of their state debt. The war was chiefly a common charge while paper money would defray it. lsut in 1780, when it became of little value, Congress called upon thp states. The states which complied with the demand contracted debts, and that in proportion to their zeal. A state which totally negle6tcd a requisition, or complied partially, would of crurlp proportionally cfcape a debt : Is this justice ? But the states were also exhauftcd, and to aid their feeble authority and (lender re sources, they called upon the towns, and these called upon claf fci, and thele upon individuals. Why not as properly fay tha£ this debt is due from towns, classes or even individuals, as from states ? Nothing can more clearly evince the injustice of calling thcfe state debts than this circumstance. Congress appointed pcrions to liquidate and fettle public accounts, and some of the states d.id die like. If a date took early measures to receive and allow claims of couife many were exhibited and allowed. But where it was convenient to apply to the offices of the United States, and espe cially in cife the Hate had not opened like tile claims chiefly appeared against the United States. Accordingly, the commissioner from Congress allowed about 280,000 dollars i 9 MalTachufetts, and near <30,000 in New-York, merely because the former (late had incorporated them with her debt, and in the latter they were received by the officers of the United States. Con grefsdelayed fending a comm ffioner to South-Carolina till 1784, Had he been sent in 1782 it is probable, the debt of that Hate would have been of less magnitude. Are circumflanccs so merely ad ventitious and casual to constitute a plea for the union to disown the debts? Formerly the states had the funds, and the creditors preferied their notes ; they agreed to this constitution which ha? given the funds to the United States, shall not the debts follow thq funds ? Shall we fiift disable the states from paying and then re fufe payment ourftlves ? Is it just that officers who fought fide by fide should have a different recompence? Let us examine this meafuie on the ground of policy. How would it fluke the people of England to divide their debt upon several counties, and to ellablifh independent revenue fyfteius for Us security ! Habit has made an idea equally dangerous and strange ly familiarin our own country. It is unfriendly to the national and State governments, to make it absolutely inevitable for them to clash and interfere.—Let us preserve the powers of both unim paired : to combine our citieens in common views, to make the revenue laws uniform, to extend permanent protection to trade and manufactures, torelieve our hUsbandry from dry taxes,areob jefts worthy of the government. It is natural too to suppose that the collection may be made less eXpensive, as it would make a double set of revenue officers unneceflary •, it will relieve us from the confufion of so many forts of paper, and by extending the market, and making the funds more certain, will encreafe the use of the State paper as money. The southern States are supposed to poflefs a fmsll {hare only of the present debt—But as Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina and South-Carolina, own near 13 millions of the State debts (more than half their amount) the aflumption will produce a more equal distribution of benefits and burdens. Besides, the State du* ties operate to the injury of the revenue—an articlethat beais a low duty of import, is dutied high by the State, and there is danger that the temptation to fraud will impair both revenues-for tho the impost alone would not fitrnifh such temptation, vet the State duty being super-added, the collection becomes insecure. But State duties are not confined merely to their own citizens. The trade from State to State has been grievously burdened by their operation—the constitution was intended to free our do meflicintercourfe from all reflraint. Further, excise duties fall upon the consumer—one State will be made tributaiy td another.— MafTachufetts has colleCled part of the duties from the citizens of Ncw-Hampfhire—the operation of the impost is well known—when it is said, therefore, let each Stale pay its own debt, we ought to expcCl that this will not take place,ifthe debts should not be assumed—and it may well be doubted whether in that cafc State duties would not prove a more grievous burden upon trade, and prodnce greater inequality and injustice than has ever been urged against the aflumption. These arguments independently considered will probably be allowed to prove the just ice and found policy of the affumpiion. But in order to preserve their full foice it is necessary to obviate some objections. The aflumption it is affirmed, tends to the consolidation of the States, and to the destruCtion of the State governments. The en tire powers of peace, war and treaty, are given to Congrefs—■>{ consequence the power of raising supplies, and when they njayfail of contracting debts to carry on war, belong to Congress. The entire debt was created by the war—it seems to be in drift con- to the spirit as well as letter of the constitution to aflume it j for it cannot be improper to exercise that pewer in this in stance, which in all like cases is exclusively veiled in Congress.—- The states arc restriCted from raising troops and carrying on war ; :} v a r -
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