[No. XCVIIt]
THE TABLET.
No. XCVIII.
" TAKE AWAY THRONES CROWNS FROM AMONG
" »JEN, AND THERE WiLL so<}N BEAN KND OF ALL DOMIN
" lON and JUSTICE."
NOTHJNGadmitsof clearer demonstration than
that man is naturally inclined to refill go
vernment. The terms made use of, in the defi
nition of civil duties, denote our inherent aversi
on to obedience. It will be asked how this can
be reconciled with the universal practice of man
kind, in voluntarily yielding to institutions for
the express purpose of being governed ? And,
though in many countries the eftabliilied subor
dination is a matter of force, yet if the people
•were left to the unrestrained ejoyment of their
natural liberty they would not long remain so.
Some act or other would indicate a general con
sent to surrender part of their personal rights.
There is-, indeed, no sentiment of the human
mind that so well deserves to be called original or
instinctive, as that propenfiry men discover to
bind themselves by rules and associations. One
should not pass over this apparent contradiction
without endeavouring tofind afolution.
The actions ofno individual are perfectly con
sistent. Every person has passions that are more
or less at variance, and different affections, by
turns, preponderate. The social dispositions o
perate so far as to induce men to associate with
each other, for thepurpofe of mutual protection.
It requires a less conqueil over the private passi
ons to enter into aflbciations, than it does to ob
serve them. The fame man may chearfully give
his assent to some common regulations for the
public welfare ; who, in the general tenor of his
conduct is actuated by such personal and felfilh
motives as are repugnant to the very compact he
has fubferibed. His fenie of duty is not fufficient
to secure his observance, when it comes in com
petition with any of the vigorous passions of his
nature. The most that can be expected from his
reasoning on -he subject, or from his feelings of
obligation, is that he should afford his aid in fup
prefling or punishing the disobedience of others.
For, bad as a man may be himfelf, he is willing
the wickedness of other people lhould be restrain
ed. He is indeed sensible that he has most to fear
from perfotis most like hinjfell, and will sooner
take part with the law than with the violator.
This however may not be the cafe, when he is in
such a lituaiion, that his own exemption or escape
depends on a combination with other tranfgref
fors-. A man may be dilatory and even knavish
in his manner of discharging his own engage
ments, and yet he will with alacrity assist the ci
vil officer in compelling others to their duty. An
indolent, faithlefs hireling will complain of o
thers of a like (lamp and take delight in their pu
nishment. In fine, man is felfifh only for hiin
felf. By entering into society he does not neces
sarily iofe his native love of liberty, but he in
some measure becomesthe enemy of that of other
people ? Ho is habitually exercised with a desire
to re-aflume the rights he has himfelf relinquished,
and to diminish those which other people have
retained. When he is called upon to obey the
laws, his aversion to personal restraint must be o
vercome by causes more powerful than induced
his consent to an original compact. His attenti
on, in the act ot instituting government, is prin
cipally employed in contemplating the advanta
ges he will derive in havingother people laid un
der control. While he is making the association,
the ardor of private passions may be so f;ir abford
cd by the occasion as to produce an acquiescence
to legal institutions. But he is soon impelled by
different feelings, and he must have some ftrong
cr motive for obeying the laws, than what will
result from the consideration that he has pvomif
ed obedience.
In considering the fubjeft hitherto, I have em
braced the ftrppofition that all men have volunta
rily entered into the form of government, under
which tliey exist:. I have meant to illustrate, that
xiotwititanding there was a perfed: acquiescence
in the original compart, men are naturally and
ftre.igly impelled to elude or violate it. But I
have taken a position that futfts, in very few in
iiances, will authorize. Where is the country
that the people are universally in favor of their
political conflitution ? The idea of original com
part, as a matter ot fart, is altogether delulive.
It is a just, theoretic principle and only means,
that men would, if left to themselves, adopt fomc
regulations relativeto protertion and allegiance,
l ew people however were ever blefled with an
opportunity for the put pose ; for it has generally
(&azo r (
PUBLISHED WEDNESDAYS AND SATURDAYS BY JOHN FENNO, No. 9. MAIDEN-LANE, NEW-YORK.
SATURDAY, MARCH, 20, 1790,
happened that government has been framed un
der circumstances of compulsion or artifice. In
those cases, where the people are said to have
combined freely into a state of government, there
may ftil) be a powerful minority, who do not feel
perfonably rei'ponfible, in point of conscience, to
observe those laws, or defend that community, to
which in sentiment they are opposed. This
brings me to the idea inculcated in my motto.
There must be some adventitious properties infu
fed into the government to give it energy andfpi
rit, or the felfifh, turbulent passions of men can
never be #ontrouled. This has occasioned that
artificial splendor and dignity that are to be
found in the courts of so many [nations. Some
admiration and refpedt must be excited towards
public officers, by their holding a real orfuppo
fed superiority over the mass of the people. The
Sanctions and penalties of law are likewise requi
site to aid in reltraining individuals from tram
pling upon and demolishing the government.
It is confeffed that, in some situations, a small
degree of parade and solemnity, co-operating
with other causes, may be fufficient to secure obe
dience to the laws. In an early state of society,
when the desires of men are few and easily fatis
fied, the temptations to trespass upon good order
and justice are neither pressing nor numerous.
Avarice and ambition encreafe with population ;
and in a large opulent community the daz;ling
appendages and pompous formalities of courts are
introduced to form a balance to the encreafing
ardor of the felfifh passions, and to check that a£
cendency which afpiringindividuals would other
wise gain over the public peace and authority.
In a wife, enlightened community, where in
formation is generally spread among the inhabi
tants, the splendor and pageantry ofofficedonot
excite any high degree of awe or respect. The
people of the United States|may probably be induc
ed to regard and obey the laws without rifquingthe
experiment of expensive courts and titled mon
arclis. There is a reverence paid, by a sensible
nation, to wisdom and virtue, that is equivalent
in point of maintaining subordination, to those
magnificent establishments, which are required
in governing an ignorant, servile people. It can
not be determined how far it will be requisite
for the United States to aflume a splendor in its
public institutions. In proportion as we become
populous, and wealthy, mull the tone of govern
ment be strengthened, unless the people should
progress in knowledge and virtue by a diffufive,
judicious plan of education. An education not
merely of science but of morals. If good princi
ples are inculcated, and good habits formed by
education, we may perhaps avoid the occasion of
expensive, splendid arrangements, in order to give
liability and procure subordination to the govern
ment. This is a matter that will in some degree
regulate itfelf. While the ciiizens are orderly
andrefpectful under a plain stile of government,
why need we try the alternative of creating more
luitre and expencein our institutions ? Butfhould
the people (hew a refractory, seditious temper,
and make efforts to breakover the barriers of law
and justice, regardless of the intrinsic excellence
of our constitution, the government will be com
pelled to have recourse to those artificial methods
of gaining refpecft and obedience, which other
nations find indifpenfible. Should this happen
it will be confonanttothe spirit, if not ftrictlyto
the letter of my motto—take away thrones and
crowns from among men and there will soon be an end
of all dominion and justice.
CONGRESS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
FRIDAY, FEB. 26, 1790.
IN Committee of the whole house. The proportion for allum
ing the State debts-and the amendments proposed thereto by
Mr. White, being under confederation.
(continued.)
MR. STONE. It is laid that immediate relief is to be afford
ed the State creditors ; but upon the Secretary's idea, not one far
thing is to be paid under two years : In the mean time there will
be a total suspension of all payments to the State creditois, this will
operate very unjuflly and oppreflively : He instanced particularly
in the State of Maryland. In that State there is upwardsof 2000001.
solid fubftant'al property inState paper belonging to the citizens.
This property by virtue of the judicious arrangements of that State,
is placed in a very eligible situation. Now what have the proprie
tors done that they fliould be in a manner stripped of it.
He reprobated the injustice of taxing those States who are out
of debt, to pay debts contra&cd for purposes in which perhaps
they are not at all interefled. He adverted to the condutt of S.
Carolina, in not making provision for their State debt, on the pre
emption that Congress would aflumeand fund it, without any
previous intimation of any design of this nature on the part of
Congress. He was sorry, he said, to mention this circumftancc,
but much more sorry that it fliould ever have taken place.
He concluded by faying that in all events he should advise his
conftitucnts to proceed in paying excise and impost, and making
provision for their debfj and if Congress plcafr d they might give
£>UU$.
PRICE THREL DOLLARS PR. ANN
them credit, if not, he hoped they would obtain credit in ij. ,-ci
Mr. Ames said that a jealousy was entertained of undue su'vai
tage being procured to particular Slates. In order to remove the
impediments which the supposed unworthy influence of flare in
terests on his mind might plate in his way, he was obliged as
well as disposed to reft his argument upon general principles. For
these, like truth, upon which they are founded-, have an unchange
able and uncontroulable authority.
Let the firft enquiry be as to the justice of the measure. In 1773
the citizens of America, with a folcmn appeal to Heaven, made a
common cause ot their violated liberty. They agreed as brethren
to expose property and life in its defence, if partial dangers
and loflcs were to have fallen Upon the fufferers, probably it would
- have discouraged many who were mod immediately exposed and
yet difplaycd the rrtoft heroic fortitude.
Nor would those who were remote from the danger, and indeed
from the quarrel, have become parties on any other principle
than that it was the cause of all America. For instance, South-Ca
rolina, as happy as peace and wealth could make her, had little
cause of complaint against Britain. He did not efpoufc the cause
of South-Carolina merely, but of America. Thai State gave an
illustrious example of patriotism. But if her citizens when they
forefaw the evils of war, had forefien that more than five millions
of debt would be created against her, that the armies would live
as it were, on free quarters in her territory, and that a great part
of the personal property would be destroyed 6r carried away*
would they have drawn the sword if they had believed that the be
nefit would be common, but the burden partial? No, Sir, the
spirit of the people and the resolves of Congress spoke a different
language. Let him who has not forgotten the spirit of 1775 deny
that this is in conformity to its di&ates.
But were the state debts contra&ed for the war Pit appears by
the books in the public offices that they were. Will iny one fay
that the whole expcnce of defending our common liberty ought
not to be a common charge ? Part of this charge was contracted by
Maflachufetts, before Congress a (Turned the exercise of its powi
ers. The fir ft ammunitibn that repulsed the enemy at Lexington*
and made such havoc at Bunkers-Hill, was purchased by that°ftate
and appears in the form of their state debt. The war was chiefly
a common charge while paper money would defray it. lsut in
1780, when it became of little value, Congress called upon thp
states. The states which complied with the demand contracted
debts, and that in proportion to their zeal. A state which totally
negle6tcd a requisition, or complied partially, would of crurlp
proportionally cfcape a debt : Is this justice ? But the states were
also exhauftcd, and to aid their feeble authority and (lender re
sources, they called upon the towns, and these called upon claf
fci, and thele upon individuals. Why not as properly fay tha£
this debt is due from towns, classes or even individuals, as from
states ?
Nothing can more clearly evince the injustice of calling thcfe
state debts than this circumstance. Congress appointed pcrions to
liquidate and fettle public accounts, and some of the states d.id die
like. If a date took early measures to receive and allow claims
of couife many were exhibited and allowed. But where it was
convenient to apply to the offices of the United States, and espe
cially in cife the Hate had not opened like tile claims
chiefly appeared against the United States. Accordingly, the
commissioner from Congress allowed about 280,000 dollars i 9
MalTachufetts, and near <30,000 in New-York, merely because
the former (late had incorporated them with her debt, and in the
latter they were received by the officers of the United States. Con
grefsdelayed fending a comm ffioner to South-Carolina till 1784,
Had he been sent in 1782 it is probable, the debt of that Hate would
have been of less magnitude. Are circumflanccs so merely ad
ventitious and casual to constitute a plea for the union to disown
the debts? Formerly the states had the funds, and the creditors
preferied their notes ; they agreed to this constitution which ha?
given the funds to the United States, shall not the debts follow thq
funds ? Shall we fiift disable the states from paying and then re
fufe payment ourftlves ? Is it just that officers who fought fide by
fide should have a different recompence?
Let us examine this meafuie on the ground of policy. How
would it fluke the people of England to divide their debt upon
several counties, and to ellablifh independent revenue fyfteius for
Us security ! Habit has made an idea equally dangerous and strange
ly familiarin our own country. It is unfriendly to the national
and State governments, to make it absolutely inevitable for them
to clash and interfere.—Let us preserve the powers of both unim
paired : to combine our citieens in common views, to make the
revenue laws uniform, to extend permanent protection to trade
and manufactures, torelieve our hUsbandry from dry taxes,areob
jefts worthy of the government. It is natural too to suppose that
the collection may be made less eXpensive, as it would make a
double set of revenue officers unneceflary •, it will relieve us from
the confufion of so many forts of paper, and by extending the
market, and making the funds more certain, will encreafe the use
of the State paper as money.
The southern States are supposed to poflefs a fmsll {hare only of
the present debt—But as Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina
and South-Carolina, own near 13 millions of the State debts
(more than half their amount) the aflumption will produce a more
equal distribution of benefits and burdens. Besides, the State du*
ties operate to the injury of the revenue—an articlethat beais a low
duty of import, is dutied high by the State, and there is danger
that the temptation to fraud will impair both revenues-for tho
the impost alone would not fitrnifh such temptation, vet the State
duty being super-added, the collection becomes insecure.
But State duties are not confined merely to their own citizens.
The trade from State to State has been grievously burdened by
their operation—the constitution was intended to free our do
meflicintercourfe from all reflraint. Further, excise duties fall upon
the consumer—one State will be made tributaiy td another.—
MafTachufetts has colleCled part of the duties from the citizens of
Ncw-Hampfhire—the operation of the impost is well
known—when it is said, therefore, let each Stale pay its own debt,
we ought to expcCl that this will not take place,ifthe debts should
not be assumed—and it may well be doubted whether in that cafc
State duties would not prove a more grievous burden upon trade,
and prodnce greater inequality and injustice than has ever been
urged against the aflumption.
These arguments independently considered will probably be
allowed to prove the just ice and found policy of the affumpiion.
But in order to preserve their full foice it is necessary to obviate
some objections.
The aflumption it is affirmed, tends to the consolidation of the
States, and to the destruCtion of the State governments. The en
tire powers of peace, war and treaty, are given to Congrefs—■>{
consequence the power of raising supplies, and when they njayfail
of contracting debts to carry on war, belong to Congress. The
entire debt was created by the war—it seems to be in drift con-
to the spirit as well as letter of the constitution to aflume
it j for it cannot be improper to exercise that pewer in this in
stance, which in all like cases is exclusively veiled in Congress.—-
The states arc restriCted from raising troops and carrying on war ;
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