i Tlir: STAR OP THE NORTE 'i'W'iifcr.rwW.r.J SSgsKi; K • THC STAR OF THE NORTH S PSBLIBHXD EVERY Tttt'RSnsV MQiIMNU BY R. tV. WIIAVKR, ■OFFICE—Up stairs, in the new brick build ing, on the south sute of Main Street, third square be.'ow Market. T £ R fll 8 :—Two Dollars per annnm, if Daid within six months from the lime of sub kcribiitjj; ; two dollars and fifty cents if not paid within the year. No. subecriptiur. re esived fof a less period titan six monies ; no discontinuance permitted unlit alt arrearages are paid, unless at the option of the editor. ADVERTISEMENTS not exceeding one square will be inserted three times foi One Dollar and twenty five cents for each additional in asrtion. A liberal discount will be made to - those who advertise by the year. SPKMII OP . It. DUCK iMitf, Jn Senate, March 21, 1696, upon the Joint Res olution proposing Amendments io the Coiufi- Mr. SPEAKER : —The general nature, design and results of constitutional government, ought by this time to be familiar to the Amer ican mind. But the boundaries of power, wider any possible arrangement, are incapa ble of exact description ; and besides there ara great causes ir. constant action that drift governments in directions no wisdom can foresee or (frevent. It is impossible for the wisest of men to provide fundamental arrangements that shall keep the government permanently in its due course, protect the citizen from its usurps, lions or injustice, and secure perfeotly the great ends for which it was instituted. The fature is unknown even to the wise, and no sagacity, however deep and searching, can discover the secrets discovered wiihin it. Constitutions,-however skilfully construct ed, mast therefore become imperfect in time, BDd Mkdeqnate to thqir office and objeol. In 'auch c.ue the government is in the same sit uation as the body of the people, when the latter ar? without some law required by new j conditions of society lor the occurrence of; unexpected events. For the constitution bears a lelslion to the government simitar to that which the laws bear to the people. The j government obeys the constitution, the peo-I pie the laws. A constitution is olten called : "the fundamental law," and it may be de scribed as au instrument comprising the laws imposed by (he people upon tha government. In fact, ft resembles a corporation act, which creates nn artificial body and prescribes, at i the same time, the rules by which it shall ■4l. Now,'it is evident, that if the ordinary laws .aequira occasional amendment, the constitu-1 (ion will also, unless time has a totally dif- '■ ferent effect upon the former from its effect upon the latter. Those who assert such dif fetence must show it. Nothing is more certain than the propen sity of governments to usurp power and a busa power, and hence the cons'ant efforts made in constitutional history to curb them. ! Herein is to be sought the reason for the lim itations which abound in all our American j Constitutions, and especially those of recent formation ; limitations induced by experience kUd the pressure of distufbirig forces upon the action of our governments, and proved to be ittdiapensabie to their eafely and sue- , cats. i. With ha, the Legislative department oi government is the mam offender, and re- j quires the most numerous and powerful re-I strain Is. Its usurpations and abuses of power are endless ; for It is strong—it is moved by hoi passions—its material is subject, to rapid ehar.ges, and to most pernicious influences— it often lacks experience, and (notwithstand ing all assertions to the contrary) it is less responsible to public opinion than either the Executive or Indicia! departments. This is not often said, but there is abundant evidence of its truth, and it is absolutely necessary to keep it in -view in all constitotinnai inquiries, j Distrust of this department is largely man- , treated in the exts'ing constitution. The grant of power-to it is iu (he first article* and ir. ! general terms. But from out this grant are to be excepted the powers delegated to the government of the United Slates, and those .reserved in the ninth article or declaration of rights, 'l&ilihenjtokoeghotif the whole in- 1 itrurnent appear checks and limitation] upon 1 it, pro<ridM - TOrt of onr ancestors, j and founded iu g wise distrust ol those by whom in after times the powers granted ■ would be exercised. And to secure the ob servance of these reservations and limita tions, as well as ihe'putformance'ar the pos itive duties enjoined by the constitution, a goleuiu oath or affirmation is required of all who serve in this department and participate in the enactment of laws. To secure popu lar control also over if, its members are elect ed for short terms, and by general suffrage. But public opinion and oaths are not regard ed as so flic ient cqrbs upon tt, and we there , (of* euhject'ltS atllon to review by the Ex-1 ectniye. The Governor may destroy any l bill unless two-thirds of each heote re-enact it.< Ner do we stop here. The Judicial de -0 psrlmem may annul and pronounce void any u P? n * constitutional objection. Tltia judicial veto ja without review and therefore more absolute than that of the Executive, but being Confined to unconstitutional acts is less extensive. Observe'flag, the construction of the Le ogioiature. It ia divided into two separate •Bd distinct* branches, and the assent of both required to the enactment of a Igw. Con ..current majorities of boll. Houses are required befqr* a bill oan pasa to the Executive. And, in practice, the necessity has been felt of clogging as well as perfecting, action by the lion of degnuiiteef, en J by tuldd that " constantly interpose to secure deloy ami de deliberation. Bpl, >ll (h*e arrangements •re iitynf&cient fp xf#iy end' a sOtir.d system, and therefore amend wen is of our fundamen- ~ REOOM.SRURJS, COLUMBIA 'COUNT W T A., THUBSDAY, APRIL 10, 1856. tl law ate occasionally necessary in relalion to the legislative as well Eta other departments of the government. And such amendments will almost of necessity consist oi changes in the constitution of the two Houses, or of farther limitations of their powers. The amendments before us aro four in number. They are all limitations of legis lative power, except the third, which affect* the constitution of the House of Representa tives, and thpy are all, in my opinion, wise, necessary, and timely. The fourth amendment originates with the Senator from the county, (Mr. BHOWNE;) and is intended to retain control over charters of incorporation for purposes of amendment and repeal. The Just amendment is directed against public indebtedness, State and municipal, and will protect our people against profligate ex penditures and grievous burdens consequent thereon. They demand it, and will endorse it with promptness and gladness of heart, as some security against the weakness, corrup tion and folly of their public servants. Tha second amendment strikes a crying evil, I think in an effectual manner, and be ing already endorsed by a decisive vote of the Senate does not require further discus sion. AB now modified, it will prevent the creation of diminutive counties as well as the mutilition, against its will, of any one now existing. The third amendment demands debate and shall have it. I will consider separately the several changes proposed by it It proposes to strike from section 2 of the first article of the Constitution the words "of the city of Philadelphia and of each county respectively." This is but a correction of phraseology rendered necessary by a change in the 4th section to be presently noticed.— It is next proposed to make the 4th section read in such manner as to embody several important changes on the subject of repre sentation in the House, while retaining some features of the present session : First— Representatives shall be appoint ed "among the several counties and such cities as may be entitled to a sepa-ate rep resentation, according to the number of taxable inhabitants in each,,' and "any city containing a sufficient number of tsxs bies to entitle i: to at least two representa tives, shall have a separate representation assigned it." This, in connection with the change in the second section ju st noticed, will authorize the separaiioti of any city from the county of which it composes a pan, for the purpose of representation in the House, whenever its laxables are sufft i cient lor two members. Second— "Each county containing not le6s than three thousand taxables may be al lowed a separate representation." This is a material improvement. By the constitu tion of 1790 each county was to have one representative, but counties thereafter erect ed should not have a separate representation until they had the full taxable ratio for a member. This provision was not altered by the couventiou of 1838, and inasmuch as by the third section of the schedule to the con stitution as amcndeikby that body, all parts of tbe constitution unchanged were to be construed as if no amendments had been made, it follows that no county erected since 1790 can have a separate representa tion until it has the full ratio for a member. But this is inconvenient ami leads tu embar rassment and injustice. A county created since 1790 (hut falls short but a few laxables \ of the ratio, cstmot have a member sepa rately, but must be joined lo a county or counties adjoining. The great number of, ' counties which have been erected since 1790 has rendered this provision a serious griev-1 ■ aiice. Cumbrous districts are created and ; 1 counties are joined having no common in-i terests and averse to the connection into i which they are forced. We getaway from this difficuly by the proposed amendment, and besides, as we make provision else where against the undue creation of new , ' counties, all reason for retaining the clause : in question as a discouragement lo their j 1 creation, is removed. | ITiuYt?—"Not more than three counties 1 shall be joined, and no oounty shall be divi- j ! dad ia tha faun alien of a district." jVe I ' have here some security tgejnai the forma tion of large and unwieldy districts. Were it not for the existence of such counties as Elk and Fotesl, I think it would be wise to ' prohibit ths joining of counties at all in the 1 formation of districts. That no county shall be divided, ia in conformity with our past practice and with public sentiment. And. so long as the formation of districts is left wjih the Legislature, this is proper both upon grounds of convenience and to prevent Qer j ryrtiaudering. Fourth —Any city allowed a separate rep resentation, "shall be divided into cortve. nfout districts of contiguous territory, as near as may be of equal taxable population, each of which districts shall elect one representa tive;" qnd further: "fio city shall be allow ed .more than fifteen representatives, nor any CQttnty or district formed of counties more titan five." We tread here upon disputed ground, But 1 hope we sit ail tread .it firmly, with "an eye stin gk" to She public weal and the im provement of oar political system. Let us examine the ground upon which we are to proceed, /r*- Upon the 3d day of Feb. 1854, the most important political bill introduced into the Legislature of this State within the recollec tion of man now living, was approved by the Uovernur aud became, a.kw. A fifth pert of our population was thereby put under one municipal organization, by far the most populous and powerful of onr coun ties, comprising within its boundaries many incorporated districts, boroughs and 'town ships, was blotted nut of existence; and a consolidated government, with high antl ex tensive powers, established upon the ruins of limited jurisdictions. What may have been the local results ofthis measure, wheth er salutary or otherwise, it is not now neces sary to inquire. But it ia high lime that the nature and results of consolidation as a State question 6hotihl be understood; that the ex isting and prospective relations of Philadel phia to the rest of the State and the govern ment of (ho State, should be defined and comprehended by all. By the consolidation act, Philadelphia, with her extended boundaries, was,toagreat extent separated from rest of the State ; ju risdiction within her limits was partially withdrawn, and her relations with the rest of the Slate became less extensive and intimate than before. In short, she became less in terested iu our common government to the extent to which her local jurisdiction was ex tended. Speaking with strict accuracy, her full weight in the direction of public aflairs was no longer so much required as previous ly for the protection and advancement of her peculiar interests, because they were com mitted to her local authorities. But was the weight of the city in tbe State government lessened ? Was there a with drawal of her power and influence in the State proportioned to the decrease of State juris diction 1 So far was this from being the fact, that not only was the full proportional weight of the city iu selecting incumbents lor the Executive and judicial departments retained, and -be felt4kkprsen:atlon Of ber population in the House of Representatives continued, but a serious, an unpreceden'od, and injuri ous change was produced in the basis of rep resentation for both branches of the Legisla ture. This point requires to be clearly sta ted. Under a wise provision of the Constitu tion no oily or county can select more than four seuators. Therefore, the consolidated city, under a new apportionment, will he lim ited to that number. But as no city or coun ty (under another provision ol the Constitu tion) cau be divided foe the election ol Sena tors, the four will be elected by the whole body pi the electors of the city—that is, will be elected by and represent qna and die same constituency. So many members of the Sen ate have never been elected by a single dis trict; but hetcaheran elector in Philadelphia S will be represented by four Senators, while iu ( other parts of the Stale an election will be represented by but one or two. Heretofore | the city and county of Philadelphia have usu ' ally chosen Senators of different politics ; but : since they are merged, this cannot he expec- I ted, and the whole four chosen by the con solidated city will be of the same political opinions. And, as the Senate is not ohen very unequally divided between existing po litical patties, it is certain that Philadelphia with her four Senators will otdinarily deter mine the political complexion of litis body. This is to be accepted a* one of the certain and necessary results of consolidation. The balance of power produced by separate elec tions oi Senators in the former city and coun ty is clean gone forever. But the disturbance of power in the House :of Representatives ie alill greater. Nearly a 1 fifth part of the House, under the nextappor ' tionment, will be elected by the city and i probably by general ticket! This will give control over that branch and over joint con ventions of the two bouses. To whatever : party the vote of Philadelphia is given, pow er over legislation and patronage will pass, | perhaps agaiust a popular majority in the State to the contrary, and tnus the minority be made to rule and do its pleasure. Id short, i Philadelphia wHI control the government.— Besides, as there is no limitation upon toe number of representatives Irom any city or county, this evil will be aggravated in fu ture, and it is possible the time may come when the city will have as many as twenty ' five representatives, or one-fourlbof the whole i number. • I The evil staled is not confined Io a mere ! disturbance of the balance of party power.— i So large a mass of votss representing the ' same constituency, elected together, inspired ("Ay common leelings, and united by assocta : lions and personal interests, will rule the or- I dmary course p_f legislation and all questions | wheie the separate action of the House or the l joint -action of the two Houses is involved.— ;Iu all controversies the interest against ; which thexitV'vote is arrayed will go to the I wall. i Bu'. why has not this subject excited earnest attention and general remark? The answer is at hand and complete. It is, because the mischiefs of consolidation, as a state ques tion, lay in the future sud did not constitute • pressing, present evil. An apportionment of members of the Legislature, Under the con stitution, is for seven years and unchangea ble until the time of revision arrives. The existing one was made in 1860 and extends to 1857: therefore, although the city ar.d coonty of Philadelphia are united and merged together by lh4 act of 1854, the former divis ion between them yet continues in the elec tion of members of tha Senate, and House. But t|)* Itrpej fip|ifoacbes aritl fa gf hand when the redistribution of representation must be made, and when the full effect of consolida tion will.be dtsoovered and felt. . The remedy now proceed is two fold : First, a limitstiun of representation alto num ber,- apd next, the ekcticmrof rejweMntatives "by single districts. L 1.-rNo city shall be allowed more than fif teen representatives; no oonnty or district formed of counties, beirig allowed more than five, or one third the number. This limila- ; — I'OIUI urn. . 1 I'LL,.— E I T ■ Truth, ml Wghlr— *#d*V toeHuir>. * ♦ * - , . . i •, - • -j- — lion is justified by the facts already staled, and by other cbnsideratious. Tbe number named will constitute a formidable force end be adequate to protect the internals of thecity so far as they are, involved in legislation, whila it will not yield her au overwhelming weight as against other sections. It is the number to which the is now entitled and is mors than one-seventh the whale House. As she las a local government contistiug of councils, an executive aud other functiona ries, charged with the transaction and man agement af a groat part of her public con cerns, it is not unreasonable Io withhold from her increased representation here; represen tation unnecessary to Iter owo interests and disturbing to the balance of power which should be maintained between the different divisions of the State. he observed that any count) or <litrierT*md of coun ties is limited to five, to prevent an undue ag gregation of strength at any point, and to pre serve the feature of quality in the proposed arrangement. There ie also a limitation upon the entire number ol representative* from tbe whole Stale, as in the present constitution.— The number shall never be less than sixty nor greater than one hundred; so that the city with fifteen members must always have more than one seventh the whole number. Any increase of the population of the State can never bo expected to make her weight and iufluence less than it is at present. A reason for tbe proposed limitation is found in the inequality of the existing plan of distributing representation. This is not generally undetstood, and as it is material to the argument I will attempt to explain it. By the constitution, at (he UnjoTf making each apportionment, the ara to be apportioned (to quote words) "a mong the city of Philadelphia and the sev eral counties, accordiug to the number of taxabla inhaoitsnls in each." But this ap parent equality of distiibulion is disturbed by a practical difficulty, always embarrassing, but greatly enhanced and aggravated by con solidation. The ratio, or aumber of taxablss for a representative, is ascertained by divi ding the whole number of taxables in the Slate by the number one hundred, (if that he the number of representatives fixed, as is usually the rase,) the quotient is the ratio. Then the number uf laxables in any city or county is to be divided by the ratio to ascer tain the number to which it is entitled. The result in each case almost inevitably is, a certain number and a fraction or surplus.— This is the ptocess by which the distribu tion is to tni.de to itvfcei)/ eu f l " w counties, "according to the number of taxa ble inhi-bitanis in each." Suppose (he ratio is 5,00°, and that Philadelphia has fil teen times that number and a fraction or surplus over of only s dozen taxables. She gets her fifteen representatives and lite fraction is dropped. Schuylkill may have twice the ra tio and two thousand taxables over, site gets two members and the fraction is lost; Leba non, adjoining, may in like manner get one member anil lose a fraction of one thousand; Northumberland mav get a member and lose a fraction of five hundred ; Cumberland with two members may lose a fraction of four hundred; York with three a fraction of fif teen hundred; Perry with one, six hundred; Erie with two, eighteen hundred; Washing ton with two, fourteen hundred; and Indiana with one, a fraction ol nine hundred. Here the nine counties warned wauWdiave fifteen members, (the same number as Philadel phia,) and tbe lost fraction when added to gether would amount to over leu thousand. If, however, these counties that lose in this manner were merged into one, they would get seventeen members, because, us in the case of Philadelphia, (here would bo a loss ol but one fraction, instead of as many frac tions as there are oonnties. It will be obser ved, that while the city and county were sep ] arate, there might be a loss of fractions in | each, but hereafter tbera can be a loss of but i one. It is true the fractions are to be considered in completing tbe distribution. Representa tives are lo be allowed for some of the lar gest, but in this (lie city fraction is just at: likely to be favoted as any one else. The sum of the matter is this: the city from tbe extent and aggregation of its population is secure from the peril of undbr-fepresenta tion; instead of running the risk of losing a dozen fractions it can lose but one, and is not likely to lose that if it is of any magnitude. It may be remarked also, that in framing an apportionment bill the city has a manifest advauiage over any other district, upon all points within ths discretion of the Legislature. An apportionment is a question of party as well a| of localities, and no psrly can afford to defy Phil adelphia by framing a bill displeas ing to her. A county with but one or two representatives tnay be hardly used with im punity, but the city with fiheen members in one House and lour or more in tbe ot.ier must be treated tenderly and can command her own terms. A reasonable limitation of the nnmber of representatives from the city wiif but pre serve an equilibrium between her and other parts of the Slate by preventing the extreme weight which she WliroiheiwUe obtain in the government. But it Is objeoted that representation should I be baaed exclusively upon number*; in oth er words tbst the numerical majority alone 1 should rule. T deny this proposition, and as it is the main if not the only objection made to tbis amendment, I shall proceed to show how deceptive and unfounded it ie. Representation in the legislature Is not now based upon population but on taxable*. .The, basis fa not more cnmhets, hot rue payors antl those taxed per capita. Here is section 7, article 1, of (be oonsti ration "No city or county shall be entitled to elect more than four Senators." Numbers may entitle it to six or more, but they are dis regarded. It can have but four. By section 4, tame article, "etch county [existing when the constitution was formed] shall have et least one representativeno matter what may be iu number of laxables. By section 7, no pity or count) can be divided in form ing senatorial districts, however much the uvmerioal principle may require it; In fact, Senators are to some extent the representa tives of cities and counties aud not of lax ables alone. Neither in establishing the basis of repre sentation or of suffrage do you regard the whole number of the population, nor do you put suffrajf& and representation upon- the • sine ground. -Jfog exclude- (rem the right of suffrago aliens, minors, non-taxables, ne groes and lemalss, atul require focal resi dence, and tax payment of those otherwise qualified. But you base representation upon taxables, not excluding all whom you exclude from suffrage, but still excluding a part of the population. The result ia that taxable mi nors, females, foreigners and negroes are represented but are not permitted to vote.— The proportion of the iwo first to the whole population is pretty uniform throughout the State from the operation of obvious and nat ural causes. But, [omitting tn notice foreign ers as to whom a similar course of remark would apply,] the case is different ss to ne groes. Four-sevenths of these ais located in Philadelphia, Chester, Lancaster and Alle gheny, and over one-third in Philadelphia.— There are twenty thonsand in Philadelphia, the taxables among whom, although not vo ters, aro"ecumed to swell the representation of the city. 'lf this clars of non-voters were distributed throughout the Slate in uniform proportion to the white taxables in each part, there would be no disturbance of the basis of representation, but as the fact is not so, ine quality to some extent is created. It is sometimes u-ged as matter of reproach against the free white voters of the south that they have a representation in Congress based upon their negroes, and (so to speak) vole for them. The same lacl stands out in our own case, (as to our free taxable negroes.) arid the city and a few other points gain the advantage thereof in tbe distribution of po litical power. But to return. Representation in the Con gress of the United Slates is no more based on the strict principle of numbers than it is with usj on the contrary less regard is paid to it. Every one knows that representation in the United States Senate is by States and that popular numbers is entirely disregarded. Delaware, with 90,000 inhabitants, has the same number of Senators as Pennsylvania with over two millions. Have evils resulted irom this? Have the interests of the large Stales been sacrificed or put in perilr On the contrary, is it not more than probable that this very arrangement has tended to keep the general government in its true course, and promote the common good! Nor is the lower House of Congress form ed in strict conformity to the principle. Each Stele, however small it may be in numbers, shall always have a Representative. Who shall elect the members, is left to each State to determine, for they are to be the same persons qualified to vote for members of the most numeroos branch of the State Legisla ture. But, what is most noticeable is the gen eral basis of apportionment, which is to be for each State "the whole number.of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons.'"— Gentlemen may say this is a peculiar ar rangement, grounded in a compromise be tween great national interests. Whatever it may be, it is certainly not a distribution of representatives upon the strict principle of numbers. The oxample of other Stales can also be consulted. As far back as 1819 Maine es tablished a limitation upon the representa tion of towns in her House of Represent lives. The whole number of members was not to be less than one hundred nor more then two hundred, and by a subsequent amendment it was fixed at one hundred and fifty-one Of these Portland had assigned to it, ai first, three members, "and no town Was ever lo be entitled to more than seven." There is also a principle of graduation in the appor tionment. Towns with 1500 inhabitants are (o have one member; with 3750, two; 6750, three; 10,500, lour; 15,000, five; 20,000, six; 26,250 and over, seven. When population becomes too large for these numbers they are to be raised, but the same principle of graduation and proportion is fo be aaintaiu ed. The amended Confutation of Rhode Isl and provides, that the Senate of that State "shall constat of the Lieutenant Governor and of one Senator irom each (own or city ir. the State;" no regard being had to population. "The House ot Representatives shall never exceed seventy-two members, and shall be constituted on th 9 basis of population always allowing one Representative for a fraction exceeding half the ratio; bat each town or oily shall always be entitled to at least one member, and no town or city shall have more than one-sixth the whole number of mem bers to which the House is limited." The population of Providence city in 1850 was M,513, and of the whole Slats 147,545. And yet the former can have but one Senator, and but a sixth of the Representatives, although its population wonld entitle it to between one-third and one-fourth. Maryland is a nearer case, and a striking, one., Like, our own Comraonwealtji, she! has a great commercial empoiiumeqf oily,' and in a recent constitutional convention, fol lowed by u populas vote, its political relations with the rest of the Slate were adjusted and settled. First, the city of Baltimore and each county shall elect one Senator; although Bal timore has a population of 170,000, while a majority of the counties have leas than 20,- 000 each. The constitution of the House of Delegates is as follows: The whole number shall nev er exceed eighty nor be lees than sixty.five; they shall be apportioned umonglhe coun ties according to population, allowing to each not leas than two members, and Baltimore oily shall have four more than any county. The census of 1850 exhibitathe practical op eration of this arrangement. Population of Maryland, 583,034 ; of Baltimore, 180,054. The ratio for if ma whole number is fixed at eighty, would be 7,287, which would give to Ballimere 23 members. If the whole number is fixed at sixty-five, the ratio would be 8.960, and Baltimore would have nearly enough for 19 members. Rut she actually obtains but ten under the existing apportionment, (in which 74 is fixed as the whole number; —in other words, less than one hall the number to which her popula tion would entitle her if distribution were made on that basis alone. In short, she is put in her senatorial representation upon an equality with tbe counties of Calvert and Caroline, having a population of only 9,000 each, and she can have but four more rep resentatives than the most populous coun ty, containing less than a fourth of ber num bers. The basis of representation in South Caro lina is peculiar and exceptional. Her ar rangement is the most complicated of any of the States, embracing the elements of white population, geography and taxation, but is di rectly in point upon the question we are considering, and it has admirably subserved and secured to her the main purpose of a constitution—the equal protection of nil the leading interests of society considered as a Stale. Further examples from our American con stitutions are probably unnecessary; and 1 pass on to the general reasons justifying the limitation proposed. I find them stateo with signal clearness and force by one of the pu rest and proloundesl public nten of his age —Mr. Calhoun. Ha is speaking of the prin ciple of the numerical majority, or of basing power upon population alone, and observes: "It assumes that by assigring to every part of the State a representative in every depart ment of its government in proportion to its population it secures to each a weight in the government in exact proportion to its popu lation under all circumstances. But such is not the fact. The relative weight of populu lion depends as much on circumstances as on numbers. The concentrated population of cities for example would ever have, un der such a distribution, far more weight in the government than the same number in the scattered and sparse population of the country. One hundred thousand individu als concentrated in a city two miles square would have much more influence than the same number scattered over two hundred miles square. Concert of action and com bination of means would be easy in the one and almost impossible in the other; not to take into the estimate the great control that cities have over the press, the great organ of public opinion. To distribute power then in proportion to population would be, in fact, to give tbe con'rol of government in the end to the cities, and to subject the rural and ag ricultural population to (hat description of population which usually oongregate in them, and eventually to the very dregs of their pop ulation. This can only be counteracted by such a distribution of power as would give to the rural and agricultural population in some one of the two legislative bodies or departments of the government a decided preponderance. And this may be done in most cases by allotting an equal number of members in one of the Legislative bodies to each election district, as a majority of the counties or election districts will usually have a decided majority of its population engaged in agricultural and other rural pur suits. If this should nut he sufficient in it self to establish an equiribtium, a maximum of representation might be established, be yond which the number allotted to each elec tion district or city should never extend."— [Works, Vol. 1,398.] These words read aa if written for thii de bate, so directly and decisively do they strike the very point in question. But, it is obvious that the equilibrium here spoken of cannot in our case be maintained in estab lishing an equality between the city and counties in the Senate. Passing by other considerations, by our practice the election of United States Senators and of Slate Treas urers and Public Priflters, is by joint con vention of the two Houses, in which the House has three times the weight of the Sen ate. Our practice in ibis respect is different from that of many other States, and while it has the argument of convenience in its fa vor, certainly eatends the power of the House, and makes its voice decisive in any oontest. Recourses -must therefore be had to some scheme whi<£ shall affect the con stitution of Jhe accomplish thert the equalization desired. The Consiilutiomof government provided ' for certajp of onr coronation!, furnishes a lair argument by an4gy for the proposed limitation of city representation. By the tenth section, lfitbof April, 1850, teg. ulating provided that ip the elec- directors by stockholders each share Cot exceeding two shall entitle the holder to vote, every two share* above two and % not exceeding ten, one vole; | above ten, and oot exceeding lbivtf,^s3^^^i l vole, every ten above thirty, end not exoeed- I iog fifty, one vote;.but no natnbeiSof aharei over fifty shall authorize the bolder to give additional rates. By the act of 7th April,, | 1849, authorizing the incorporation of mart)- | factoring companies, (subsequently exlenif- I ed to embrace companies for mining coal 1 and various other purposes,) the number of votes which any stockholder cat) give in elections is limited to one third of the whole number to which the stockholders would be entitled, (Sec. 4.) And by act of 26th Janu ary, 1849, for tbe organization of Turnpike and Flank road companies, See. 3, each stockholder in elections lor managers and oth er officers shall be entitled to one vote fqr reach share ol not exceeding ten, and one vote for every five shares exceeding that number. These are samples of our legisla tion regarding corporations, and .they show that limitations are judged necessary to pre vent the government of the corporation ffota being unduly controlled by its most powerful members. The rights of alt are conceived to be best protected by limiting somewhat the powers of the strongest. Interests with which legislation is concern ed. do t.ot tup.jjjjh. papulation .alone, but with geography also., They base locations, a place as well * Uftjqes.. >A vast mass of our action is directed.to particular PbiuifSand not equally or indifferently to all purta of the Commonwealth. All special legislation is of this character, and many general laws have mainly or altogether a local effect. And we have to do with interests as sucb, as well as with individuals in general—will) Milread questions in Eric and in York, eu well a, with the punishment ol larceny and tbe con veyance of lands. A canal question exteuds itself along some peculiar river; the division of a county aoimems a single neighborhood; and a mining bill narrows itself to the coal field for whioh it was "intended and the mar ket it is to supply. Nature hat fixed tbe character of places by immovable laws, and man must conform himself to the order ol her arrangements. She has raised up mountains and spread out plains—has given the rivers their courses and stamped fruilfuJiißss or ate rillitv upon the soil. At one point she has deposited fuel, and at another ores. She bag lilted the hills of Berks for vineyards, and the site ol our great city for commerce, man ufactures and trade.. As population comes to be located overextended territory, varied pursuits and therefore intereyts must spring up, all deeply concerned in government, and dependant for protection and prosperity upon the laws. But to give to one spot of the Stale preponderating power in the govern ment is to give to the intends there located power over those located elsewhere, and to degrade the government (rom a common ar biter and protector of all, to a special agent and favorite of a pari. And it is immaterial, j in the view here taken, whether this result is attained by an arbitrary decree, by uiar | patioa, or by pursuing the principle of nun l bers or population to its utmost extent in for ming the basis of representation in the gov ernment. Suppdae the limits of the Slats were so con tracted that the population of Philarfelphiaex ceeded one half the whole population. It is clear, if numbers alone were regarded, she would rule, and the securities of the coun ties would be in her moderation and not in their power of resistance. But this ie really, to a great extent, the condition of things at present; because interests in other parts of the State are various, and because they are broken up by territorial divisions. They are are not identical in different places, and they cannot act with compact, united force, ei i thor for purposes of aggression or defence. The example of England on this is instructive. From the British census of 1851, and the Parliamentary returns of 1863, I obtain the following statement: Population. Mem. Hume Commune. England, 16,921,888,.. 467 Scotland, 2,789,742, 53 Ireland, 6.553,(63, 105 Wales, ty)05,731, W i ' Total, 27,369,514. .■ 664 Population and number of members returned to the House of Commons by London and the Parliamentary Boroughs contiguous : Member* House Commons. London, including 4 Tower Hamlets, 2 Westminster, 2 Soulhwark, • 2,362,236, Pop. 2 Lambeth, ' * 2 Finsbury, " " '■ '•' 2 Mtrylebone, .. J; 2 Total, 16 * * - From this it will be seen, thai while Lon don (inolnding the adjoining munrciphlities) contains one-seventh the population bt Eng- t land, she has but ihe representation in the House, mons. The same fact of lipiited is streu in the case of oAer the Cities of Scotland. Mem. House of CoU Aberdeen, 71,973, Edinburgh, 158,0 lag , Glasgow, 347,001; ■ Cities in Ireland. >r 1 . 4> -. Dublin, 254,850, Z lis University,attend students the nnmbirvf Londonderry, Towns I (borough,) Wales Mertba
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