THE STAR OF THE NORTH

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SPEECH OF C. R. BUCKALEW,

In Senate, March 21, 1856, upon the Joint Resolution proposing Amendments to the Constitution.

Mr. SPEAKER:—The general nature, design and results of constitutional government, ought by this time to be familiar to the American mind. But the boundaries of power, under any possible arrangement, are incapable of exact description; and besides there are great causes in constant action that drift governments in directions no wisdom can foresee or prevent.

It is impossible for the wisest of men to provide fundamental arrangements that shall keep the government permanently in its due course, protect the citizen from its usurpations or injustice, and secure perfectly the great ends for which it was instituted. The future is unknown even to the wise, and no sagacity, however deep and searching, can discover the secrets discovered within it.

Constitutions, however skilfully constructed, must therefore become imperfect in time, and inadequate to their office and object. In such case the government is in the same situation as the body of the people, when the latter are without some law required by new conditions of society for the occurrence of unexpected events. For the constitution bears a relation to the government similar to that which the laws bear to the people. The government obeys the constitution, the people the laws. A constitution is often called "the fundamental law," and it may be described as an instrument comprising the laws imposed by the people upon the government. In fact, it resembles a corporation act, which creates an artificial body and prescribes, at the same time, the rules by which it shall act.

Now, it is evident, that if the ordinary laws require occasional amendment, the constitution will also, unless time has a totally different effect upon the former from its effect upon the latter. Those who assert such difference must show it.

Nothing is more certain than the propensity of governments to usurp power and abuse power, and hence the constant efforts made in constitutional history to curb them. Herein is to be sought the reason for the limitations which abound in all our American Constitutions, and especially those of recent formation; limitations induced by experience and the pressure of disturbing forces upon the action of our governments, and proved to be indispensable to their safety and success.

With us, the Legislative department of government is the main offender, and requires the most numerous and powerful restraints. Its usurpations and abuses of power are endless; for it is strong—it is moved by hot passions—its material is subject to rapid changes, and to most pernicious influences—it often lacks experience, and (notwithstanding all assertions to the contrary) it is less responsible to public opinion than either the Executive or Judicial departments. This is not often *said*, but there is abundant evidence of its truth, and it is absolutely necessary to keep it in view in all constitutional inquiries.

Distrust of this department is largely manifested in the existing constitution. The grant of power to it is in the first article, and in general terms. But from out this grant are to be excepted the powers delegated to the government of the United States, and those reserved in the ninth article or declaration of rights. And then, throughout the whole instrument appear checks and limitations upon it, provided by the care of our ancestors, and founded in a wise distrust of those by whom in after times the powers granted would be exercised. And to secure the observance of these reservations and limitations, as well as the performance of the positive duties enjoined by the constitution, a solemn oath or affirmation is required of all who serve in this department and participate in the enactment of laws. To secure popular control also over it, its members are elected for short terms, and by general suffrage. But public opinion and oaths are not regarded as sufficient curbs upon it, and we therefore subject its action to review by the Executive. The Governor may destroy any bill unless two-thirds of each house re-enact it. Nor do we stop here. The Judicial department may annul and pronounce void any act upon a constitutional objection. This judicial veto is without review and therefore more absolute than that of the Executive, but being confined to unconstitutional acts is less extensive.

Observe also, the construction of the Legislature. It is divided into two separate and distinct branches, and the assent of both required to the enactment of a law. Concurrent majorities of both Houses are required before a bill can pass to the Executive. And, in practice, the necessity has been felt of clogging as well as perfecting, action by the institution of committees, and by rules that constantly interpose to secure delay and deliberation. But, all these arrangements are insufficient to safety and a sound system, and therefore amendments of our fundamental law are occasionally necessary in relation to the legislative as well as other departments of the government. And such amendments will almost of necessity consist of changes in the constitution of the two Houses, or of further limitations of their powers.

The amendments before us are four in number. They are all limitations of legislative power, except the third, which affects the constitution of the House of Representatives, and they are all, in my opinion, wise, necessary, and timely.

The *fourth* amendment originates with the Senator from the county, (Mr. BROWNE;) and is intended to retain control over charters of incorporation for purposes of amendment and repeal.

The *first* amendment is directed against public indebtedness, State and municipal, and will protect our people against profligate expenditures and grievous burdens consequent thereon. They demand it, and will endorse it with promptness and gladness of heart, as some security against the weakness, corruption and folly of their public servants.

The *second* amendment strikes a crying evil, I think in an effectual manner, and being already endorsed by a decisive vote of the Senate does not require further discussion. As now modified, it will prevent the creation of diminutive counties as well as the mutilation, against its will, of any one now existing.

The *third* amendment demands debate and shall have it. I will consider separately the several changes proposed by it.

It proposes to strike from section 2 of the first article of the Constitution the words "of the city of Philadelphia and of each county respectively." This is but a correction of phraseology rendered necessary by a change in the 4th section to be presently noticed.—It is next proposed to make the 4th section read in such manner as to embody several important changes on the subject of representation in the House, while retaining some features of the present session:

First—Representatives shall be appointed "among the several counties and such cities as may be entitled to a separate representation, according to the number of taxable inhabitants in each," and "any city containing a sufficient number of taxables to entitle it to at least two representatives, shall have a separate representation assigned it." This, in connection with the change in the second section just noticed, will authorize the separation of any city from the county of which it composes a part, for the purpose of representation in the House, whenever its taxables are sufficient for two members.

Second—"Each county containing not less than three thousand taxables may be allowed a separate representation." This is a material improvement. By the constitution of 1790 each county was to have one representative, but counties thereafter erected should not have a separate representation until they had the full taxable ratio for a member. This provision was not altered by the convention of 1838, and inasmuch as by the third section of the schedule to the constitution as amended by that body, all parts of the constitution unchanged were to be construed as if no amendments had been made, it follows that no county erected since 1790 can have a separate representation until it has the full ratio for a member. But this is inconvenient and leads to embarrassment and injustice. A county created since 1790 that falls short but a few taxables of the ratio, cannot have a member separately, but must be joined to a county or counties adjoining. The great number of counties which have been erected since 1790 has rendered this provision a serious grievance. Cumbrous districts are created and counties are joined having no common interests and averse to the connection into which they are forced. We get away from this difficulty by the proposed amendment, and besides, as we make provision elsewhere against the undue creation of new counties, all reason for retaining the clause in question as a discouragement to their creation, is removed.

Third—"Not more than three counties shall be joined, and no county shall be divided in the formation of a district." We have here some security against the formation of large and unwieldy districts. Were it not for the existence of such counties as Elk and Forest, I think it would be wise to prohibit the joining of counties at all in the formation of districts. That no county shall be divided, is in conformity with our past practice and with public sentiment. And so long as the formation of districts is left with the Legislature, this is proper both upon grounds of convenience and to prevent Gerrymandering.

Fourth—Any city allowed a separate representation, "shall be divided into convenient districts of contiguous territory, as near as may be of equal taxable population, each of which districts shall elect one representative;" and further: "No city shall be allowed more than fifteen representatives, nor any county or district formed of counties more than five."

We tread here upon disputed ground, but I hope we shall tread it firmly, with "an eye single" to the public weal and the improvement of our political system. Let us examine the ground upon which we are to proceed.

Upon the 2d day of Feb. 1854, the most important political bill introduced into the Legislature of this State within the recollection of men now living, was approved by the Governor and became a law. A fifth part of our population was thereby put under one municipal organization, by far the most populous and powerful of our counties, comprising within its boundaries many incorporated districts, boroughs and townships, was blotted out of existence; and a consolidated government, with high and extensive powers, established upon the ruins of limited jurisdictions. What may have been the local results of this measure, whether salutary or otherwise, it is not now necessary to inquire. But it is high time that the nature and results of consolidation as a State question should be understood; that the existing and prospective relations of Philadelphia to the rest of the State and the government of the State, should be defined and comprehended by all.

By the consolidation act, Philadelphia, with her extended boundaries, was, to a great extent separated from the rest of the State; State jurisdiction within her limits was partially withdrawn, and her relations with the rest of the State became less extensive and intimate than before. In short, she became less interested in our common government to the extent to which her local jurisdiction was extended. Speaking with strict accuracy, her full weight in the direction of public affairs was no longer so much required as previously for the protection and advancement of her peculiar interests, because they were committed to her local authorities.

But was the weight of the city in the State government lessened? Was there a withdrawal of her power and influence in the State proportioned to the decrease of State jurisdiction? So far was this from being the fact, that not only was the full proportional weight of the city in selecting incumbents for the Executive and judicial departments retained, and the full representation of her population in the House of Representatives continued, but a serious, an unprecedented, and injurious change was produced in the basis of representation for both branches of the Legislature. This point requires to be clearly stated. Under a wise provision of the Constitution no city or county can select more than four senators. Therefore, the consolidated city, under a new apportionment, will be limited to that number. But as no city or county (under another provision of the Constitution) can be divided for the election of Senators, the four will be elected by the whole body of the electors of the city—that is, will be elected by and represent one and the same constituency. So many members of the Senate have never been elected by a single district; but hereafter an elector in Philadelphia will be represented by four Senators, while in other parts of the State an election will be represented by but one or two. Heretofore the city and county of Philadelphia have usually chosen Senators of different politics; but since they are merged, this cannot be expected, and the whole four chosen by the consolidated city will be of the same political opinions. And, as the Senate is not often very unequally divided between existing political parties, it is certain that Philadelphia with her four Senators will ordinarily determine the political complexion of this body. This is to be accepted as one of the certain and necessary results of consolidation. The balance of power produced by separate elections of Senators in the former city and county is clean gone forever.

But the disturbance of power in the House of Representatives is still greater. Nearly a fifth part of the House, under the next apportionment, will be elected by the city and probably by general ticket! This will give control over that branch and over joint conventions of the two houses. To whatever party the vote of Philadelphia is given, power over legislation and patronage will pass, perhaps against a popular majority in the State to the contrary, and thus the minority be made to rule and do its pleasure. In short, Philadelphia will control the government.—Besides, as there is no limitation upon the number of representatives from any city or county, this evil will be aggravated in future, and it is possible the time may come when the city will have as many as twenty-five representatives, or one-fourth of the whole number.

The evil stated is not confined to a mere disturbance of the balance of party power.—So large a mass of votes representing the same constituency, elected together, inspired by common feelings, and united by associations and personal interests, will rule the ordinary course of legislation and all questions where the separate action of this House or the joint action of the two Houses is involved.—In all controversies the interest against which the city vote is arrayed will go to the wall.

But why has not this subject excited earnest attention and general remark? The answer is at hand and complete. It is, because the mischiefs of consolidation, as a state question, lay in the future and did not constitute a pressing, present evil. An apportionment of members of the Legislature, under the constitution, is for seven years and unchangeable until the time of revision arrives. The existing one was made in 1850 and extends to 1857: therefore, although the city and county of Philadelphia are united and merged together by the act of 1854, the former division between them yet continues in the election of members of the Senate, and House. But the time approaches and is at hand when the re-distribution of representation must be made, and when the full effect of consolidation will be discovered and felt.

The remedy now proposed is two fold:—First, a limitation of representation as to number; and next, the election of representatives by single districts.

1.—No city shall be allowed more than fifteen representatives; no county or district formed of counties, being allowed more than five, or one third the number. This limitation is justified by the facts already stated, and by other considerations. The number named will constitute a formidable force and be adequate to protect the interests of the city so far as they are involved in legislation, while it will not yield her an overwhelming weight as against other sections. It is the number to which she is now entitled and is more than one-seventh the whole House. As she has a local government consisting of councils, an executive and other functionaries, charged with the transaction and management of a great part of her public concerns, it is not unreasonable to withhold from her increased representation here; representation unnecessary to her own interests and disturbing to the balance of power which should be maintained between the different divisions of the State. It is to be observed that any county or district formed of counties is limited to five, to prevent an undue aggregation of strength at *any* point, and to preserve the feature of quality in the proposed arrangement. There is also a limitation upon the entire number of representatives from the whole State, as in the present constitution.—The number shall never be less than sixty nor greater than one hundred; so that the city with fifteen members must always have more than one seventh the whole number. Any increase of the population of the State can never be expected to make her weight and influence less than it is at present.

A reason for the proposed limitation is found in the inequality of the existing plan of distributing representation. This is not generally understood, and as it is material to the argument I will attempt to explain it. By the constitution, at the time of making each apportionment, the representatives are to be apportioned (to quote the exact words) "among the city of Philadelphia and the several counties, according to the number of taxable inhabitants in each." But this apparent equality of distribution is disturbed by a practical difficulty, always embarrassing, but greatly enhanced and aggravated by consolidation. The ratio, or number of taxables for a representative, is ascertained by dividing the whole number of taxables in the State by the number one hundred, (if that be the number of representatives fixed, as is usually the case,) the quotient is the ratio. Then the number of taxables in any city or county is to be divided by the ratio to ascertain the number to which it is entitled. The result in each case almost inevitably is, a certain number *and a fraction or surplus*.—This is the process by which the distribution is to be made to the city and the several counties, "according to the number of taxable inhabitants in each." Suppose the ratio is 5,000, and that Philadelphia has fifteen times that number and a fraction or surplus over of only a dozen taxables. She gets her fifteen representatives and the fraction is dropped. Schuylkill may have twice the ratio and two thousand taxables over, she gets two members and the fraction is lost; Lebanon, adjoining, may in like manner get one member and lose a fraction of one thousand; Northumberland may get a member and lose a fraction of five hundred; Cumberland with two members may lose a fraction of four hundred; York with three a fraction of fifteen hundred; Perry with one, six hundred; Erie with two, eighteen hundred; Washington with two, fourteen hundred; and Indiana with one, a fraction of nine hundred. Here the nine counties named would have fifteen members, (the same number as Philadelphia,) and the lost fraction when added together would amount to over ten thousand. If, however, these counties that lose in this manner were merged into one, they would get seventeen members, because, as in the case of Philadelphia, there would be a loss of but one fraction, instead of as many fractions as there are counties. It will be observed, that while the city and county were separate, there might be a loss of fractions in each, but hereafter there can be a loss of but one.

It is true the fractions are to be considered in completing the distribution. Representatives are to be allowed for some of the largest, but in this the city fraction is just as likely to be favored as any one else.

The sum of the matter is this: the city from the extent and aggregation of its population is secure from the peril of under-representation; instead of running the risk of losing a dozen fractions it can lose but one, and is not likely to lose that if it is of any magnitude. It may be remarked also, that in framing an apportionment bill the city has a manifest advantage over any other district, upon all points within the *discretion* of the Legislature. An apportionment is a question of party as well as of localities, and no party can afford to defy Phil adelphia by framing a bill displeasing to her. A county with but one or two representatives may be hardly used with impunity, but the city with fifteen members in one House and four or more in the other must be treated tenderly and can command her own terms.

A reasonable limitation of the number of representatives from the city will but preserve an equilibrium between her and other parts of the State by preventing the extreme weight which she will otherwise obtain in the government.

But it is objected that representation should be based exclusively upon numbers; in other words that the numerical majority alone should rule. I deny this proposition, and as it is the main if not the only objection made to this amendment, I shall proceed to show how deceptive and unfounded it is.

Representation in the legislature is not now based upon population but on taxables. The basis is not mere numbers, but rate payers and those taxed *per capita*.

Here is section 7, article 1, of the constitution:—"No city or county shall be entitled to elect more than four Senators." Numbers may entitle it to six or more, but they are disregarded. It can have but four. By section 4, same article, "each county [existing when the constitution was formed] shall have at least one representative;" no matter what may be its number of taxables. By section 7, no city or county can be divided in forming senatorial districts, however much the numerical principle may require it; in fact, Senators are to some extent the representatives of cities and counties and not of taxables alone.

Neither in establishing the basis of representation or of suffrage do you regard the whole number of the population, nor do you put suffrage and representation upon the same ground. You exclude from the right of suffrage aliens, minors, non-taxables, negroes and females, and require local residence, and tax payment of those otherwise qualified. But you base representation upon taxables, not excluding all whom you exclude from suffrage, but still excluding a part of the population. The result is that taxable minors, females, foreigners and negroes are represented but are not permitted to vote.—The proportion of the two first to the whole population is pretty uniform throughout the State from the operation of obvious and natural causes. But, [omitting to notice foreigners as to whom a similar course of remark would apply,] the case is different as to negroes. Four-sevenths of these are located in Philadelphia, Chester, Lancaster and Allegheny, and over one-third in Philadelphia.—There are twenty thousand in Philadelphia, the taxables among whom, although not voters, are counted to swell the representation of the city. If this class of non-voters were distributed throughout the State in uniform proportion to the white taxables in each part, there would be no disturbance of the basis of representation, but as the fact is not so, inequality to some extent is created.

It is sometimes urged as matter of reproach against the free white voters of the south that they have a represeniation in Congress based upon their negroes, and (so to speak) vote for them. The same fact stands out in our own case, (as to our free taxable negroes,) and the city and a few other points gain the advantage thereof in the distribution of political power.

But to return. Representation in the Congress of the United States is no more based on the strict principle of numbers than it is with us; on the contrary less regard is paid to it. Every one knows that representation in the United States Senate is by States and that popular numbers is entirely disregarded. Delaware, with 90,000 inhabitants, has the same number of Senators as Pennsylvania with over two millions. Have evils resulted from this? Have the interests of the large States been sacrificed or put in peril? On the contrary, is it not more than probable that this very arrangement has tended to keep the general government in its true course, and promote the common good?

Nor is the lower House of Congress formed in strict conformity to the principle. Each State, however small it may be in numbers, shall always have a Representative. Who shall elect the members, is left to each State to determine, for they are to be the same persons qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. But, what is most noticeable is the general basis of apportionment, which is to be for each State "the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons."—Gentlemen may say this is a peculiar arrangement, grounded in a compromise between great national interests. Whatever it may be, it is certainly *not* a distribution of representatives upon the strict principle of numbers.

The example of other States can also be consulted. As far back as 1819 Maine established a limitation upon the representation of towns in her House of Representatives. The whole number of members was not to be less than one hundred nor more than two hundred, and by a subsequent amendment it was fixed at one hundred and fifty-one Of these Portland had assigned to it, at first, three members, *"and no town was ever to be entitled to more than seven."* There is also a principle of graduation in the apportionment. Towns with 1500 inhabitants are to have one member; with 3750, two; 6750, three; 10,500, four; 15,000, five; 20,000, six; 26,250 and over, seven. When population becomes too large for these numbers they are to be raised, but the same principle of graduation and proportion is to be maintained.

The amended Constitution of Rhode Island provides, that the Senate of that State "shall consist of the Lieutenant Governor and of one Senator from each town or city in the State;" no regard being had to population. "The House of Representatives shall never exceed seventy-two members, and shall be constituted on the basis of population always allowing one Representative for a fraction exceeding half the ratio; but each town or city shall always be entitled to at least one member, and no town or city shall have more than one-sixth the whole number of members to which the House is limited." The population of Providence city in 1850 was 51,513, and of the whole State 147,545. And yet the former can have but one Senator, and but a sixth of the Representatives, although its population would entitle it to between one-third and one-fourth.

Maryland is a nearer case, and a striking one. Like our own Commonwealth, she has a great commercial emporium—a city, and in a recent constitutional convention, followed by a popular vote, its political relations with the rest of the State were adjusted and settled. First, the city of Baltimore and each county shall elect one Senator; although Baltimore has a population of 170,000, while a majority of the counties have less than 20,000 each.

The constitution of the House of Delegates is as follows: The whole number shall never exceed eighty nor be less than sixty-five; they shall be apportioned among the counties according to population, allowing to each not less than two members, and Baltimore city shall have four more than any county. The census of 1850 exhibits the practical operation of this arrangement. Population of Maryland, 583,034; of Baltimore, 169,054. The ratio for one representative, if the whole number is fixed at eighty, would be 7,287, which would give to Baltimore 23 members. If the whole number is fixed at sixty-five, the ratio would be 8,960, and Baltimore would have nearly enough for 19 members. *But she actually obtains but ten* under the existing apportionment, (in which 74 is fixed as the whole number)—in other words, less than one half the number to which her population would entitle her if distribution were made on that basis alone. In short, she is put in her senatorial representation upon an equality with the counties of Calvert and Caroline, having a population of only 9,000 each, and she can have but four more representatives than the most populous county, containing less than a fourth of her numbers.

The basis of representation in South Carolina is peculiar and exceptional. Her arrangement is the most complicated of any of the States, embracing the elements of white population, geography and taxation, but is directly in point upon the question we are considering, and it has admirably subserved and secured to her the main purpose of a constitution—the equal protection of all the leading interests of society considered as a State.

Further examples from our American constitutions are probably unnecessary; and I pass on to the general reasons justifying the limitation proposed. I find them stated with signal clearness and force by one of the purest and profoundest public men of his age—Mr. Calhoun. He is speaking of the principle of the numerical majority, or of basing power upon population alone, and observes:

"It assumes that by assigning to every part of the State a representative in every department of its government in proportion to its population it secures to each a weight in the government in exact proportion to its population under all circumstances. But such is not the fact. The relative weight of population depends as much on circumstances as on numbers. The concentrated population of cities for example would ever have, under such a distribution, far more weight in the government than the same number in the scattered and sparse population of the country. One hundred thousand individuals concentrated in a city two miles square would have much more influence than the same number scattered over two hundred miles square. Concert of action and combination of means would be easy in the one and almost impossible in the other; not to take into the estimate the great control that cities have over the press, the great organ of public opinion. To distribute power then in proportion to population would be, in fact, to give the control of government in the end to the cities, and to subject the rural and agricultural population to that description of population which usually congregate in them, and eventually to the very dregs of their population. This can only be counteracted by such a distribution of power as would give to the rural and agricultural population in some one of the two legislative bodies or departments of the government a decided preponderance. And this may be done in most cases by allotting an equal number of members in one of the Legislative bodies to each election district, as a majority of the counties or election districts will usually have a decided majority of its population engaged in agricultural and other rural pursuits. If this should not be sufficient in itself to establish an equilibrium, a *maximum* of representation might be established, beyond which the number allotted to each election district or city should never extend."—[Works, Vol. 1, 398.]

These words read as if written for this debate, so directly and decisively do they strike the very point in question. But, it is obvious that the equilibrium here spoken of cannot in our case be maintained in establishing an equality between the city and counties in the Senate. Passing by other considerations, by our practice the election of United States Senators and of State Treasurers and Public Printers, is by joint convention of the two Houses, in which the House has three times the weight of the Senate. Our practice in this respect is different from that of many other States, and while it has the argument of convenience in its favor, certainly extends the power of the House, and makes its voice decisive in any contest. Recourses must therefore be had to some scheme which shall affect the constitution of the House and accomplish *there* the equalization of power desired.

The Constitution of government provided for certain of our corporations, furnishes a fair argument by analogy for the proposed limitation of city representation. By the tenth section, act of 16th of April, 1850, regulating banks, it is provided that in the election of directors by stockholders each share not exceeding two shall entitle the holder to one vote, every two shares above two and not exceeding ten, one vote; every above ten, and not exceeding thirty, one vote, every ten above thirty, and not exceeding fifty, one vote; but no number of shares over fifty shall authorize the holder to give additional votes. By the act of 7th April, 1849, authorizing the incorporation of manufacturing companies, (subsequently extended to embrace companies for mining coal and various other purposes,) the number of votes which any stockholder can give in elections is limited to one third of the whole number to which the stockholders would be entitled, (Sec. 4.) And by act of 26th January, 1849, for the organization of Turnpike and Plank road companies, Sec. 3, each stockholder in elections for managers and other officers shall be entitled to one vote for each share of stock not exceeding ten, and one vote for every five shares exceeding that number. These are samples of our legislation regarding corporations, and they show that limitations are judged necessary to prevent the government of the corporation from being unduly controlled by its most powerful members. The rights of all are conceived to be best protected by limiting somewhat the powers of the strongest.

Interests with which legislation is concerned, do not run with population alone, but with geography also. They have locations, a place as well as names. A vast mass of our action is directed to particular points, and not equally or indifferently to all parts of the Commonwealth. All special legislation is of this character, and many general laws have mainly or altogether a local effect. And we have to do with interests as such, as well as with individuals in general—with railroad questions in Erie and in York, as well as with the punishment of larceny and the conveyance of lands. A canal question extends itself along some peculiar river; the division of a county concerns a single neighborhood; and a mining bill narrows itself to the coal field for which it was intended and the market it is to supply. Nature has fixed the character of places by immovable laws, and man must conform himself to the order of her arrangements. She has raised up mountains and spread out plains—has given the rivers their courses and stamped fruitfulness or sterility upon the soil. At one point she has deposited fuel, and at another ores. She has fitted the hills of Berks for vineyards, and the site of our great city for commerce, manufactures and trade. As population comes to be located over extended territory, varied pursuits and therefore interests must spring up, all deeply concerned in government, and dependant for protection and prosperity upon the laws. But to give to one spot of the State preponderating power in the government is to give to the interests there located power over those located elsewhere, and to degrade the government from a common arbiter and protector of all, to a special agent and favorite of a part. And it is immaterial, in the view here taken, whether this result is attained by an arbitrary decree, by usurpation, or by pursuing the principle of numbers or population to its utmost extent in forming the basis of representation in the government.

Suppose the limits of the State were so contracted that the population of Philadelphia exceeded one half the whole population. It is clear, if numbers alone were regarded, she would rule, and the securities of the counties would be in her moderation and not in their power of resistance. But this is really, to a great extent, the condition of things at present; because interests in other parts of the State are various, and because they are broken up by territorial divisions. They are are not identical in different places, and they cannot act with compact, united force, either for purposes of aggression or defence.

The example of England on this subject is instructive. From the British census of 1851, and the Parliamentary returns of 1853, I obtain the following statement:

	Population.	*Mem. House Commons.*
England,	16,921,888,	467
Scotland,	2,788,742,	53
Ireland,	6,553,163,	105
Wales,	1,005,731,	29
Total,	27,369,514.	654

Population and number of members returned to the House of Commons by London and the Parliamentary Boroughs contiguous:

		Members House Commons.
London, including Tower Hamlets, Westminster, Southwark, Lambeth, Finsbury, Marylebone,	2,362,236, Pop.	4 2 2 2 2 2 2
Total,		16

From this it will be seen, that while London (including the adjoining municipalities) contains one-seventh the population of England, she has but one-twenty-ninth part of the representation in the House of Commons. The same fact of limited representation is seen in the case of other [illegible] of the empire.

Cities of Scotland.	*Mem. House Commons.*
Aberdeen, 71,973,	2
Edinburgh, 158,015,	2
Glasgow, 347,001,	2
Cities in Ireland.	
Dublin, 254,850,	2
Its University, attended by students to the number of	
Cork,	
Belfast,	
Londonderry,	
Towns in England.	
Liverpool,	
Manchester,	401
Birmingham,	232
Sheffield,	135
Bristol,	137
York, (borough,)	40,
Nottingham,	100
Leeds,	17[illegible]
Towns in Wales.	
Carmarthen,	
Merthe Tydvil,	

Here is the exa[illegible]