•i • ] o ' Teru!s 'of riebliCat .. • Two DottAtts per annum. paya le sem advance. If not paid within the y lat., $2 charged., : ' • i • : •- 1 1 4r l'aners : delivered . by the Post Rider w cd•2s cents extra. : .-,' . , ': • i Advertisements not exceeding t :elve li!, .charged $L for three insertions—rani 50 ce' insertion.[ Larger ones in proporti in. All advertifieniente will bq insertcri until 4 unless.the time for Which they are o be c specitiedOnd will be charged acco ingly. r i 3 -' - Yearly advertisers will be charg ,ii $l2 including .subscription to the Paper+with t of kepinione Werti.vementinot exceeding ' standing duringithe STear, and the insertion 9 ', one in each paper fcir, three luccessi le time•• All letters addresSed to the editor must b' ' otherwise no intention will be paid o them All nonce's for meetings, & I % arid 'they no have heretoford been-inserre'd gratis. will i! 25 cents each, nxcept Marriages an.. Death -1 Trj= Pa'rnpAtells.C/weks, Gards, B Ils o f Handbills of ,r v;ry fir :rripti9n, neaaj . o;ri Officeat thelow :et rash prices lu INAUGURAL A. DR • Dr PRESIDENT HA RI • CALLED from a retirement hich I .posed was to continue for the residue of fill the Chief Executive office of this gre li nation, Lappedc before,you, fellety-eitize the oaths whfch the >Constitution pros • necessary qualification for the performanc ties. -And in obedience to a - cuiStin coo t , Government, and what I believeit be yo tions, I proceed to present to you p sumn principles winch will govern me; in the d the dutieS which I shall be 'called iipon to It was the reireark of a Roman onsul, period of that Celebrated RepubUle.that a ing contrast was observable in the condo. dates for' officeknf power and trust, befor --,_obtaining . theinL-they • seldom carrying the Pledges , H latter case !edges and promi+ made mer. However much the world inaY hay in many irespeets,sn•the lapse o • upivar thousand.yearsl since tyre remark was mi virtuous and indignant liomati, j . ::fear Id examination of the annals of sore of tl elective Goveraments, wo u ld de , - , stances of violaed confidence. • - Although th 4 fiat of the people claiming me the Chief Magistratp Union, nothinglupon their part re4iailaine it may be thought that a motive i;ay ex up the delusion under which theylmayl to have acted in relation to my peicipies ions ; and pert4ps there may he sine in 11 bly who have come here either pre ared t those I shall noW deliver, or; approv ng the the sincerity with which they were tittere lapse of a few tniontlis will confi In to l fears. The outline of principlel to w t Measures'to bo: adopted, by an . 'dminisl yet begun, will soon be exchang if for history ; and I I shall stand,- either ixoner countrymen, or, classed with the riass of promised that they might deceive, and tla the intention to betraVi. , . However along may be my pres .l ent pu alize the expectations of a magnai lawns ding People, I too well understuns the in human nature, and the dangereiL4 terns which I shall be exposed4roin the : magni power which it, has becu the plea Ure of to commit to in l / 4 / holds, not to plac'ey c m . -Bence upon the t aid' of that Almig ity Po has hitheto prdtected me, and • ended in to favorable isiues other important, but inferior trusts, I heretofore ' confiad to t country. The broad foundation upon which our tion rests, being the people—a breach p of the made, as a breath can unmake, chlinge, o —it can i,e'cis . ..igned to none of th ,: great rn govement bui to that of Demo acy. the theory, those that are called upim too must recognizil, as its leading principle, t i shaping their treasures so as to pri)duce ti good to the greatest number. Butt with I admissions, if , we would comparii the .H acknowledged t exist in the mass cif onr p the power donned by other sorer' igntie those'which ltaie been consideredost p ... ocratic, we shall, find a most•e,Esenti I ditb r. others lay claini to power limited tly , by will. The majOrity of our citizens) on th possess a sovereignty with an amount of cisely equal to t lot which has 'Ten grant, 1 by the parties t the national compact, at beyond. We admit of no government right—believine, that, so far as po ver is c the beneficent (I'reator has made io dis mongst men, that all are upon an qualit the only legitimate right ti govern i an ex 1 of 'Power from the governed. The, Cons the United States is the instrument cont grant of power tb the several thita4ments the Government. On an examinaCon of t i ment, it will be ~ ound to contain deparatio: er granted, anti; of power withheld. Th also susceptible of division, into . lower I majority had the right to giant. lult whirl not think proper to intrust to thei agent which they cnu(l not have granted, not tressed by themselves. In other wtils, thi fain rights possessed by each individual citizen, ssbich, ih his compact withlthe otn never surrendered. Some of them ,l indeed able to surrender, being, in the lanuage 1 tern, unalienabl ~.. . The boasted Privilege of a Rom '' , him a shield on:ly against a petty Whilst the proud democrat of Atli himself under a.'aentence of death, latiOn of the nationfil faith, which and which at tines was the sure. of all, or of banishment from h!fs" and his country ! , with or without c i b that it was the !act, not of a sing) tyrai aristocracy,- but !of hie assembled ountry different is the power of our sovere gnty. terfere with no 'one's faith, preseri e four ship for no one's observance, intli. t no p but after well aScertained ! guilt, the result gatton under !hies prescribed by the Co itself. These precious privileges, a n d thus less important, if giving epresiiiis to his and opinions, either by writing Sr. speakm trained but by the liabil4 fur injury to of that of full participation in all thladvanta JEW froin the fioverninent, the acknowled eity.of all, the American citizen deiives fro: fellow man. I e claims - ,1 ter granted by Ins! cause he is liiinself a Man. fashio ed by Almighty' hand as the rest of his i pecies, tled to a full share of blessings rth whic endowed them. I , . • Notwithstanding the limited sov by the People o 4 the United States,. giant of power t 4 the Governmen adopted, enough% has been given I the objects for Which it. was creai found 'powerful in war, and, hitherti administered, an intimate union tranquillity preserved; and persona t liberty the citizens. AS was to be ex pect6d, howe the defect of 14gUage, and iliddecessarilj f n 'tious manner in which the Cons tution is 1:1 disputes have! riseii, as to the a oust of which it has actually granted, of was inn grant. This is ; more particularly the case Zion to that part icy( the instrumen which. the Legislative %ranch.' And no - only at the exercise of powers claimed under a clause, giving that body aid out witty to, ~, - •annual in 50, sill be 1 be charg- es will be 1 t 6 for one rdered oat missed is er annum, e privilege vo squares r f a smaller ; post paid iceswhich e charged 'cling and" ed at this /TM had sup , y lifL, to t and free s. to take ribes, as a of its du with ,our lr expecta lary of the scharge of perform, n an early lost strik t of candi and after ut in the in the for impro'ved, I ds of two de by the la a strict e modern !imilar in- /as th forth, pro : glorious o be (bre, Ft to keep supposed and opin ia , to doubt . But the ispel their tern, and ration not minutatde fed by my those who tered with Jose to re nd confi -li-waits of , tatiotts to ode of the he People I icf conti er RhiCh to brine 111 greatly ' to by tn!. Constitu irahaving modify it ivision of such is minister it e duty of me greatest ese broad terci4nty ople with even by rety dem nce. All MIXED contrar), )on er pre d to them l i d nothing ,V divine oncerned, tenon a and that .ress zrant ituti.m of fining this oLiposing pow latter is hich the they did , and that l ieing pos re are cer- American rs, he has he is un- MEM ~iliLiL7 l ~ r. Was to ial ruler, console iosed 1.10- der-tood, mockery is family, proven arra ~~~ 1:1=E1 t of th E 133 II cauz-L ; or hated eu. Far =ES F. 5 of wor- I nilhment IE3EI stitution scarcely boughts 111,TCS . ers. and es which .ed prop no char ' them he he same :nd end he has assessed cstricted ey have .fish all as been as been ' loinestie cured to er, from 1 senten- '-reignty and the hich l o accom 'ed. It •, justice -frected, ritten, power aided to in rela ;eats of regards general pas.; all • C ••• i ta 0 ~4 4toe, */ Nitt34, i f • G ` • IV "I will teach`you tolpierce the bowels of the Earth, and bring out from the Caverns of Mcinntains, Metals which will give strength to our Rands and subject all Natureto oirruse and pleasure.—The • JOHNSON." VOL, XVI.I. laws necessary \ to carry' into effect the specified pow ers, but in relation to the litter also. h is, however, consolatory to reflect, that most, of the instances of alledged departure from the letter or spirit of the,Con stitution, have ultimately - received the sanction of a majority of the people. And the fact, that many of our statesmen, most distinguished for talent and pat riotism, have been, at one time or other of their po litical career, on both sides of each of the most warm ly disputed questions, force upon us the inference that the errors, if errors they were, are attributable to the intrinsic difficulty, in many instances, of ,as certaining the intentions of the framers of the Constitution, rather than the influence of any sinis ter or unpatriotic motive. But the great danger- to our institutions does not appear to me to be in usurpation, by the Government, of power not grained by the People, but by the ac cumulation, in one of the Departments, of that which was assigned to others. Limited as are the powers which - have been granted, still enough have been granted to constitute a despotism, if concentrated in to one of the departments. This danger is greatly heightened, as has been always observable that men are less jealous of encroachments of one department upon another, than upon their own reserved. rights. When the Constitution of the United States first came from the hands of the Convention which form ed it, many of the sternest republicans of the day were alarmed at the extent of the power which had been granted the Federal Government, and more par ticularly of that portion which had Leen assigned to the executive branch. There were in It features which appeared not to be in concert with their ideas of a simple representative democracy, or Republic. 'And knowing the tendency of pOwer to increase itself, particulaq when exercised by a single individual, predictions were Made' that, at no very remota period, ,the fioqrnment z W'ould terminate in virtual mon archy. It would not become me to say that the fears of these patriots have been already realized. But, as I sincerely believe that the 'tendency of measures, and of men's opinions, for some years past, has been in that direction,..it is, I conceive, strictly- proper that I should take this occasion to repeat the assu rances I have heretofore given of my determination to arrest the progress of that tendency, if it really ex ists, and restore the government to its pristine health and vigor, as far as this can be effected by any legit imate exercise of the power placed in my hands. I proceed to state, in as summary manlier as I can, my opinions of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively complained of, and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the former are un questionably to be found in the detects of the Con stitution ; others, in my judgment are attributable to a misconstruction of some Of its provisions. Of the former is the eli2ibility of the same individual to the second term of the Presidency. The sagacious mind of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented this error, and attempts have been made, hitherto -without suc cess, to apply the amendatory power of the States to is c rrection. As, however, one mode of correction is in the pow er of every President, and consequently in mine, it would be useless, and perhaps invidious to enumer ate the evils of which, in the opinions of many of oar fellow•-citizens, this error of the sages who framed the Constitution may have been the source, and the bit ter fruits which we are still to gather from it, if it con tinues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general remark, that Republics can commit no greater error than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create and increase the love of power, in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges theni to commit the management of their af fairs. And, surely, nothing is more likely to pro duce such a state of mind than the; long continuance Of an officer of high trust. Nothing can be more cOrrupting, nothing more destructive of all those no ble feelings which belong to the character of a devot ed republican patriots When this corrupting passion once takes posses sion of the human mind, like the love of gold, it be= comes insatiable. It is the never.dying worm in his bosom; grows with his growth, and strengthens with the declining years of its victim. If this be true, it is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit the ser vice of that officer at least to whom she has entrus ted the . management of her foreign relations, the ex- ' ccution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, ta a period so short as to prevent his for getting that he is the accountable agent, not the prin cipal—the servant, not the master. Until an amend ment to the constitution can be effected, public opin ion may secure the desired object. I give my aid to it, by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under no circumstances, will I consent to serve a sec ond term. Bunif there is danger to ,publmi liberty from the acknowledged defects of the constitution, in the want of limit to the Continuance of the executive power in the satne hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less from a misconstruction of that instrument as it regards the powers actually "given. I cannot con ceive that, by a fair construction:any or either of its provisions would be found to constitute, the President a part of the legislative power. It cannot be claim- - ed from the power to recommend, since, although en joined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege which he holds in common with every other citizen. And al. though there may be something more of confidence in the propriety of the measures recommended in the one case than m the other, in the obligations of ul timate decission there can be no difference. In the language of the constitution, "all the legislatiNe powers " ,which 'it grants, 4 , are vested in the Con gress of 'the United States." It would bq a solecism• in languagC to say that any portiOn of these is not included In the whole. It may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has given -to the Executive the, power to annul the acts of the legislative body by, refusing to them his assent. So a similar power has necessarily resulted from that instrument to the Judicairy; and yet the Judicary forms no part of the Legislature. There is, it is true, this difference between these grants of power: the Executive can put his negative upon the acts of the Legislature for other causes than ithat of want of conformity to the Constitution, whilst the Judicairy can only declare void those which violate - that instru metit. But the decision of-the Judicairy is final in such a case, whereas, in every instance where the• veto of the Executive is applied, it may be 'overcome by a vote of two-thirds,of both Houses of Congress. The negative upon the acts of the Legislative, by the Executive authority, and that in the hands of one in dividual, would seem to bd an incongruity in our system. Like some others of a similar character, however, it appears to be highly expedient ; and if used only with the forbearance, abd the spirit which was intended by its aWiars, it may be productive of E AND P Weekly by Benl - Curnin Rannan, Pottsville, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. great good, and be found one of the best safeguards to the Union. At the period of the formation of the Constitution, the principle does not appear to have enjoyed much favor in the State Governments. It existed but in two, and in one of these there was- a plural Exectitive. If we would search for the mo tives which operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed the Constitution, for the adoption of a provision so apparently repug nant to the leading democratic principles, that the majority should govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too well the degree of intelligence which existed among the People, and the-enlightened character of the State Legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence that the two hod-• ics elected by them would be worthy representatives of such constituents, and, of course, that they would require no aid in conceiving and maturing the meas ures which the circumstances of the country might require. Abd it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been entertained, that the President, placed at the capital, in the centre of the country, could better understand the wants and wish es of the people than their own immediate represen tatives, who spent a part of every year among them, living among them, often labouring with them, and bound to them by the triple tic of interest, duty and affection. To assist or control Congress, then in its ordinary legislation, could cut, I conceive, have been the motive for conlerring veto power on the President. This argument acquires additional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first six Presidents—and two of them were members of We convention, one presiding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger share in consummating the labors of that august body than any other person. But if Bills were never returned to Congress by either of the Preiidents above te . brred to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they 'might be to the wants of the People, the veto was applied upon that of want of conformity to the Constitution; or because errors bad been committed front a too hasty enact ment. There :is another ground for the adoption of the ve to principle, which had probably more influence in recommending it to the convention than any other. I refer to the security whiCh it gives to the just and equitable action of the legislature upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have occurred to the convention that, in a country so extensive, embracing so great a variety of soil and climate, and, conse quently, of products, and which from the same caus es must ever exhibit a great difference in the amount of the population of ,ts various sections, 'calling for a groat diversity m the employments of the people, that the legislation of the majority might not always justly regard the rights and interests of the minority. And that acts of this character might be passed, un der an express grant by the words of the Constitu tion, and, therefore not within the competency cf the judiciary to declare void. That however enlighten ed and patriotic, they might suppose, from past experience, the members of Congress might be, a nd however largely partaking in the general, at the lib eral feelings of the People, it was impossible to ex pert that bodies so constituted should not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to provide some umpire, from whose situation and mode of appointment more independence ar d freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the Exec utive Department constituted by the Constitution. A person elected to that high office, having his constituents in every section, State and sub-division of the Union, must consider himself bound by the mbst solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend the rights of all, and of every portion great or small, from 'the injustice and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the Con stitution to the Executive of the United States, sole ly as a conservative power. To be used only, Ist, to protect. the Constitution from violation : 2dly, the People from the effects of hasty legislathin; where their will has been probably disregarded or not Well understood ; and 3dly, to prevent the effects of com binations violative of the rights of minorities. .In re-. ference to the second of these objects, I may observe . that, I consider it the right and privilege of the Peo ple to decide dsputed points of the Constitution, arising from the general grant 'of power to Con gress to carry into effect the powers expressly given. And I believe, with Mr. Madison, "that repeated recognitions under varied circumstances, in nets of legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications in dif ferent modes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authOrity for his considering such disputed points as settled." Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It' would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of spetulative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, a fair ex hibit made of the operations of each of its Depart ments, of the powers which they respectively claim and exercise, of the collisions which have occurred between them, or between the whole Government and those of the States, or either of them. We could then compare our actual condition, after fifty years' trial of our system, with what it was in the commencement of its operations, and ascertain whe ther the predictions of the patriots who opposed its adoption, or the confident hopes of its advocates, have been realized. The great dread of the former seems to have been, that the reserved powers of the States would be absorbed by those of the Federal Government, and a consolidated power established, leaving to the States the shadow, only, of that inde pendent action for which they had so zealously con tended, and on the preservation of which they relied as the last hopes of liberty. Without denying that the result to which they looked with so much appre hension is in the way of being realized, it is obvious that they did not clearly see the mode of its accom plishment. The General Government has seized upon none of the reserved rights of the States. As far as any open warfare may have gone, the State authorities have amply maintained their tights. To a casual observer, our system presents no appearance of discord between the different members which compose it. Even the additidn of many new ones has produced no jarring. They move in their re spective orbits in perfect harmony with the central head, and with each other. But there is still an un der current at work, by which, if not seasonably checked, the worst apprehensions of our anti-federal patriots will be realized. And not only will the State authorities be overshadowed by the great increase of SATURDAY MORNING.. MARCH 13. 1841. ADVERTISER. power in the Executive Department of the General Governmeht, but the character of that Government, tf not its designation, be esseutia!ly and radically changed. This state of things has been in part effected by causes inherent in the constitution, and in part by the never failing tendency of political power to in crease itself. By making the President the sole dis tributor of all the patronage of the Government, the framers of the Constitution did not appear to have anticipated at how short a period it would become a formidable instrument to control the free Operations of the State Governments. Of trifling importance at first, it had, early in Mr. Jefferson's administra tion, became so powerful as to create great alarm in the mind of that patriot, from the potent influence it might exert in controlling the freedom of the elec tive franchise. If such could have then been the ef fects of its influence, how much greater must be the danger at this time, quadrupled in amount, as it cer tainly is, and more completely under the control of the Executive will, than their construction of their power; allowed, or the forbearing characters of all the early Presidents permitted them to make I But it is not by the extent of its patronage alone that the Executive Department has become so dangerous, but by the use which it appears may be made of the appointing power, to bring under its control the whole revenues of the country. The Constitution has declared it to he the duty of the President to see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the Commander in-Chief of the Armies and Navy of the United States. If the opinion of the most approved writers upon that species of mixed Government. which in modern Europe is termed Monarchy, in contradistinction to Dt. , petisnr, is correct, there was wanting no other addition to the powers of our Chief Magistrate to stamp a monarchical character on our Government, but the control of ,the public finances. And to me it appeals stranee indeed, that any one should doubt that the entire control which the Pres ident possesses over the officers vilie have the custo dy of the public money, by the power of removal with or without cause, does, for all mischevious pur poses at least, virtually subject the treasure also to his disposal. The first Roman Emperor, in his at tempt to seize the sacred treasure, silenced the op position of the officer to whose charge it had been committed, by a significant allusion to his sword.— By a selection of political instruments for the care of the public money, a reference to their commis sions by a President, would be quite as effectual an arNmelat as that of Caesar to the Roman Knight. I am not insensible of the great difficulty that exists in devising a proper plan for the safe-keeping and disbursement of the public revenues, and I know the importance which has been 'attached by men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as it is called, of the Treasury front the banking institutions. It is not the divorce which is conTLained of, but the un hallowed union of the Treasury with the Executive Department which has created such extensive alarm. To this danger to our republican institutions, and that created by the influence given to the Executive through the instrumentality of the federal officers, I. propose to apply all the remedies which may be at my command. It was certainly a great error in the framers of the Constitution, not to have made the officer at the head of the Treasury Department entirely indepen dent of the Executive. lie should at least have been removable only upon the demand of the popu lar branch of the Legislature. I have determined never to remove a Secretary of the Treasury without communicating all the circumstances attending such removal to both Houses of Congress. The influ ence of the Executive in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise through the medium of the public officers, can be eff.ctually checked by renew ing the prohibition published by Mr. Jefferson, for bidding their Interference in elections, further than giving their own voles ; and their own independence secured by an assurance of perfect immunity, in ex ercising the sacred privilege of freemen under the dictates of their own unbiassed judgments. Never, with my consent, 'shall an officer of the People, com pensated for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of Executive will. There is no part of the means placed in the hands of the Executive which might be used with greater effect, for unhallowed purposes, than the control of the public press. The maxim which our ancestors derived from the mother country, that "the freedom of the press is the great bulwark of civil and religious liberty," is one of the na9st precious legacies which they have left us. We have learned, too, from our own as well as the experience of other countries, that golden shackles, by whomsoever or by what ever pretence imposed, are as fatal to it as the iron bonds of Despotism. The presses in the necessary employment of the Governinent should never be used "to clear the guilty, or to varnish crimes." A decent and manly examination of the acts of the Government should be not only tolerated but en couraged. Upon another occasion I have given my opinion, a:I some length, upon the impropriety of Executive interference in the legislation of Congress. That the article in the Constitution making it the duty of the President to communicate information, and au thorizing him to recommend measures, was not in tended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should never be looked to for schemes of finance. It would be very strange, in deed, that the Constitution should have strictly for bidden one branch of the Legislature from interfer ing in the origination of such bills, and that it should be considered proper that an altogether different de partment of the Government should be permitted to do so. Some of our best political maxims and opin ions have been drawn from our parent Isle. There are others, however, that cannot be introduced into our system without singular incongruity, and the production of much mischief. And this I conceive to be one. No matter in which of the Houses of Parliament a bill may originate, nor by whom intro duced, a minister, or a member of the opposition, by the fiction of law, or rather of Constitutional princi ple, the Sovereign is supposed to have prepared it agreeably to his will, anikthen stilt iiiiled it to Par liament for their advice and consent- Now, the ve ry reverse is the case here, not only with regard to the principle, but the forms prescribed by the Con stitution. The principle certainly assigns to the only body constituted by the Constitution (the le gislative body) the power to make laws, and the forms even direct that the enactment should be as cribedlto them. The Senate, in relation to Revenue bills, have the right to propose amendments; and so has the Executive, by the power given him to re turn them to the House of Representatives, with his objections. It is in his power, also, to propose a. mendmente in the .existing revenue laws, suggested t , 21 . • 4. ' .. ? ?•• • • - x... • C by his obserations upon their defective or injurious operation. But the delicate duty of devising schemes of revenue should be left where the.-Constitution has placed it—with the immediate rfpresentatives of the people. Far similar reasons; themode of keeping the public treasure should be prescribed by tr.em ; and the farther removed it may be from the control of the Executive, the more wholesome the arrange- ment. and the More in accordance with Republican principles. Connected with.th.s subject is the character of the currency : The idea of making it exckisively metal lic, however ended, appears to to be fraught with more fatal consequences than 6 y other scheme, having no relation to the personal rights of the citizen, that has ever been devised. If any sin gle scheme could produce the effect of arresting, at once, that mutation of condition by w hick thousands of our most indigent fellow citizens, by there indus try and; enterprise, are raised to the possession t. wealth, that is the one. If there is one peasore better calculated than another to produce that state of things so much deprecated by all true republicans, by which the rich are daily adding to their hoards, and the poor sinking deeper into penury, it is an ex clusive metallic currency. Of if there is a process E by which the character of the country for generosity and nobleness of feeling may be destroyed by the great increase and necessary toleration of usury, it LC an exclusive metallic_ currency. Amongst the other duties of a delicate character which the President is called upon to perform, is the supervision of the government of the Territories of the United States., Those of them that are des tined to become members of our great political fami ly, are compensated by their rapid progress from in fancy to manhood, for the partial and temporary de privation of their political rights. It is in this Dis trict, only, were American citizens are to be found, ho, under a settled system of policy, are deprived of many important political privileges, without any inspiring hope as to the future. Their only conso. lotion, under circumstances of such deprivation, is that of the devoted exterior guards of a camp—that their sufferings secure tranquillity and safety within. Ara there any of their countrymen who would sub ject them to greater sacrifices, to any other humilia tions than those essentially necessary to the security of the object for which they were thus separated from their fellow citizens? And are their rights alone not to he guaranteed by the application of those great principles, upon which all our constitutions are four.ded ? We ore told by the greatest of British Orators and Statesmen, that, at the commencement of the war of the Revolution, the most stupid men in England spoke of "their American subjects."— Are there, indeed, citizens of any of our States who have dreamed of their Julject, in the District of Col umbia ? Such dreams can never be realized by any agency of mine. The people of the District of Columbia are not subjects of the people of the States, but free Ameri. can citizens. Being in the latter condition when the Constitution was formed, no words used in that instrument could have been intended to deprive them of that character. If there is any thing in the great principle, of unaleinable rights, so em phatically insisted upon in oar Declaration of nth - pendence, they could neither make, nor the United States accept, a surrender of their liberties, and be. come the subjects, in other words the slaves, of their former fellow citizens. If this be true, and it will scarcely be denied by any one who has a cor• rect idea of his own Tights as an American citizen, the grant to Congress of exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, can be interpreted, so far as respects the aggregate people of the 'United States, as meaning nothing more than to allow to Congress the controlling power necessary to afford a free and safe exercise of the functions assigned to the General Government by the Constitution. In all other respects the legislation of Congress should be adapted to their peculiar position and Wants, and be conformable with their. deliberate opinions of their own interests. I have spoken of the necessity of keeping the re spective Departments of the Government, as well as the other authorities of our country, within their ap propriate orbits. This is a matter of difficulty in some cases, as the powers which they respectively claim are often not defined by very distinct lines. Mischievous, however, in their tendencies, as collis ions of this kind may be, those which arise between the respective communities, which for certain pur poses compose one nation, are much more so: for no such nation can exist lung without the careful culture of those feelings of confidence and affection which are the effective bonds of union between free and confederated States. Strong as is the tie of in terest, it has been often found in effectual. Men, blinded by their passions, have been known to adopt measures for their country in direct opposition to the suggestions of policy. The alternative then, is, to destroy or keep down a bad passion by creating and fostering a good one ; and this seems to be the corner stone upon which our American pollitical architects have reared the fabric of our Government. The ce ment which was to hind it, and perpetuate is exis tence which was the affectionate attachment between all its members. To insure the continuance of this feeling, produ ced at first by a community of dangers, of sufferings and of interests, the advantages of each were made accessible to rill. No participations in any good, possessed by any member of tui extensive confedera cy, except in domestic government, was withheld from the citizen of any other member. By a process attended with no difficulty, no delay, no expense but that of removal, the citizen of one might become the citizen of any other, and successively of the whole. The lines, too separating powers to be exercised by the citizens of une State from those of another seem to be so distinctly drawn as to leave no room for misunderstanding. The citizens of each state unite in their persons all the privileges which that character confers, and all that they may claim as citizens of the United- States ; but in no case can the same person, at the same time, act as the citizen of two separate states, and he is therefore positively precluded from any interference with the reserved powers of any State but that of which he is, for the time being, a citizen. He may indeed offer to the citizens of other States his advice as to their man agement, and the form in which it is tendered is left to his own discretion and sense of propriety. It may be observed, that organized associations, of citizens, requiring con.pltance with their wishes, too much resemble the recommendations of Athens to her allies—supported by an armed and powerful fleet. It was: indeed, to: the ambition of the leading States of Greece to control the domestic cpncerns of the r othe' e, that the destruction of that celebrated etintbd4 I entry, and subsequently of all its members, is mainly to be attributed. And it is owing to the absenee of that spirit that the Helvetic confederacy has for so many years been • preserved. Nriver has there been se2n in the institutions of the seperate memSers of any c nfigleracy more elements of discord. In the principles and forms of goverment and religion, as well as in the circumstances of the several cantons, , z so marked a discrepance'mas observable, as to prom• ise any thing but harmony in 'their intercourse or permanency in their alliance. And yet, foi age*, neither has been interrupted. Content with the toe itive benefits which their union produeed, with the in dependence and safety from foreign aggression which it secured, these sagacious People respected the in• atituticlfts of each other, however repugnant to their own principles and prejudices. Our Confederacy, fellow citizens, can only be pre served ty the same forbearance. Our citizens must ho content with the exercise of the powers with which the Constitution cloths them. The attempt of those of one State to ecetrol the domestic institu tions ofianother, can. only result in feelings,of dis -trttSt and_jeniouvohe cert ain ar violence, civil war, and the ultimate destruction of our free institutions. Our Confederacy is per fectly illustrated by the terms and principles govern ing a common copartnership. There a fund of pow . er is to be exercised tinder the direction of the joint• councils of the allied members, but that which has been reserved by the individual members is intangi ble to the common government or the individual members compcsmg it. To attempt it, finds no sup part in the principles of our Constitution. It should be cur constant and earnest entleavot mutually to cultivate a spirit of concord and harmony among the various parts of our Confederacy. Experience hes abundantly taught us that the agitation by citizens of one part of the titian of a sul ject not confided to the Genera! Government, but exclusively under the guardianship of the local authorities, is produc tive of no other. consequences than bitterness, aliens, Lion, discord, and injury to the very cause which is intended to be advanced. Of all the 1. tmt interests ohich appertain to our country, that of union, cor dial, confiding, fraternal union, is by far the most important, since it is the only true and sure guaran ty of all others. NO 11. In consequence of the embarrassed state of busi ness and the currency. some of the States may meet with difficulty in their finan,:ial concerns. However deeply we may regret any thing imprudent or exces sive in the engagements into which States have en tered for purposes" of their own, it does not become us to disparage the State Governments, nor to dis courage them from making proper efforts for their' own relief: on the contrary, it is our duty to encoui ago them, to the extent of out constitutional author ity, to apply their best means, and cheerfully to make all necessary Haman-ea and submit to all necessary burdens to !Cf:( their engageTnents and maintain their credit; for the character and credit of the sev eral States form part of the character and credit of the whole country. The resources of the country are abundant, the enterprise and activity of our peo ple proverbial; and we may well hope that wise leg islation and prudent administration, by the respective' Governments, each acting within its own sphere, will restore former prosperity. Unpleasant and even dangerous as collisions may sometimes be, between the constituted unthorities or the citizens of our country, in relaiion to the lines which seperate their :eliective jurisdictions, the result can he of no vital injury to our institutions, if that ardent patriotism, that devoted attachment to liberty, that spirit of moderation and forbearance for which our countrymen were once distinguished. continued to be cherished. If this continues to be the ruling passion of our souls, the weaker feelings of the mistaken enthusiast will be corrected, the Eu ropean dreams of the scheming politician dissipated, and the complicated intrigues of ttre demagouge ren dered harmless. The spirit of,liberty is the sover eign balm for every injury which our institutions may receive. On the contrary, no care that can be used in'the construction of our Government ; no di vision of powers, no distribution ofshecks in its sev eral departments, will prove effectually to keep us a free People, if this spirit is Buffett d to decay ; and decay it, will •vithout constant nurture. To the neg lect of this duty, the best historians agree in attribu ting the ruin of all the Republics with whose exis tence and fall their writings have made us acquaint ed. The same causes will ever produce the same effects : and as long as the love of potver is a domi nant passion of the human bosom, and as long as the understandings of men can be warped and their affec tions changed by operations upon their passions and prejudices, So long will the liberty of a peoplo de pend on their own constant attentiott, to its preserve tion. The danger to all well-established and free govern ments arises from the unwillingness of the People to believe in its existence, or from the influence of de signing men, diverting their attention from the quar ter whence it approaches, to a source from which it _ can never come. This is the old trick of those vvlo would usurp the government of their country. In the name , of Democracy they speak, warning the People against the influence of wealth and the dan ger of aristocracy. History, ancient and modern, is full of such examples. Cmser became the master of the Roman people and the Senate under the pretence of supporting the democratic claims of' the former against the aristocracy of the latter; Cromwell, in the character of protector of the liberties of the Peo ple, became the dictator of England; and Bolivar possessed himself of unliwited power, with the title of his country's Liberator. There is, on the contrary: no single instance on record 'of an extensive and well-established republic being changed into an aris tocracy. The tendencies of ail such Governments in their decline, is to monarchy ; and the antagonist principle to liberty there is the spirit of faction—a spirit which assrmcs the character, and, in titres of great excitement, imposes itself upon the People as the genuine.spirit of freedom, and like the false :• Christs whose coming was foretold by the Savour seeks to, and were it possible would,• impose upon the true and most faithful disciples of liberty. It is in periods like this that it behooves the Peo ple to be most watchful of those to whcm they have entrusted power. And although there is at ti much dffictilty in distinguishing the false from true spirit; a calm and dispassionate investigation will detect the counterfeit as well by the character of Its operations. as the results that are produced. The true spirit of liberty, although devoted; persevering, bold arid uncompromising in principle, that Secured, is mild and tolerant and scrupulous as to the means it employs; whilst the spirit of party, assuming to be that of liberty, is harsh, vindictive, and intolerant, and totally reckless as to the character of the allies which it brings to the aid of its cause. When the genuine spirit of liberty animates the body of a pee. pieto a thorough examination of their affairs, it leads to the excission of every excrescence, which may have fastened itself upon any of the Depart- • ments of the Qovernment, and restores' the system to its prtstin e health and beauty. But the reign of an intolerant spirit of party amongst a free people, seldom fails to result in a .dangerous accession to the Executive power introduced and established amidst unusual professions of devotion to Democ racy. The fOregoing remarks relate almost exclusively to matters connected with our domestic concerns:— It may be proper, howeier, that that;l should give maw indications to my fellow citizens of my proposed course of conduct in the management ofour foteigo relations. I assure them, therefore, that it ts my intention to use every means in my poyne, 111.1 El
Significant historical Pennsylvania newspapers