seamen, See. because we fay that they are the in cidents to that power : The molt familiar and undisputed acts of legiflation'w;]l Ihew, that we have adopted it as a fafe rule of atftion to legi- Jlate beyond the letter of the constitution. He proceeded to enforce this idea by several confederations, and illultrated it by various ex amples. He said that the ingenuity of man was unequal to providing, especially beforehand, tor all the contingencies that would happen. 1 lie constitution contains the principles which are to govern in making laws ; but every law requires an application of the rule to the cafe in quettion. We may err in applying it ; but we are to exer cise our judgments, and on every occasion to de cide according to an honest convidtion of its true meaning. The danger of implied power does not arile from its afluming a new principle : We have not only pratftifed it often ; but we can scarcely pro ceed without it: Nor does the danger proceed so vauch from the extent of the power, as from its uncertainty. While the oppofers of the Bank ex claim against the exercise of this power by Con gress, do they mark out the limits of the power which they will leave to us, with more certainty than is done by the advocates of the Bank ? Their rules of interpretation by co-temporaneous testi mony, the debates of conventions, and the doc trine of substantive and auxiliary powers, will be found as obfeure, and of course as formidable, as that which they condemn : They only set up one confirmation against another. The powers of Congress are disputed : We are obliged to decide the question according to truth. The negative, if falfe, is less fate than the affir mative if true : Why then shall we be told, that the negative is the fafe fide ? Not exercising the powers we have, may be as pernicious, as ufurp ingthofe we have not. If the power to raise ar mies had not been exprefled in the enumeration of the powers of Congress, it would be implied from other parts of the constitution. Suppose, however, that it were omitted, and our country invaded, Would a decision in Congress against railing armies be fafer than the affirmative ? The blood of our citizens would be shed, andfhed un avenged. He thought therefore, that there was too much prepoffelfion with some against the Bank, and that the debate ought to be consider ed more impartially, as the negative was neither more fafe, certain, nor conformable to our duty, than the other fide of the queltion. After all, the proof of the affirmative imposed a fufficient bur den, as it is easier to raise objeiftions than to re move them. Would any one doubt that Congress may lend money—that they may buy their debt in the market, or redeem their captives from Al giers ?. Yet no such power is expressly given, tho it is irrefiftably implied If therefore foine interpretation of the confti .ution innftbe indulged, by what rules is it to be governed ? The great end of every aflbciation of persons or States, is, to effect the end of its insti tution. The matter in debate affords a good il lustration : A corporation, as soon as it is crea ted, has certain powers, or qualities, tacitly an nexed to it, which tend to promote the end for ■which it was formed—fuch as, for example, its individuality—its power to sue, and be sued— and the perpetual fucceflion of persons. Govern ment is itfelf the highell kind of corporation, and from the instant of its formation, it has ta citly annexed to its being, various powers which the individuals who framed it did not fepararely poflefs, but which are ellential to its effecting the purposes for which it was framed—to declare, in detail, every thing that government may do, could not be performed, and has never be<-n at tempted : It would be endless, useless, and dan gerous—exceptions of what it may not do, are ihorter and fafer. Congress may do what is necessary to the end for which the constitution was adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural rights of man, or to those which they have expressly refervec! to themselves, or to the powers which are afllgned to the States : This rule of interpretation seems to be a fafe, and not a very uncertain one, inde pendently of the constitution itfelf : By that in strument certain powers are fpecifically delega ted, together with all powers neceflary and pro per to carry them into execution : That construc tion may be maintained to be a fafe one which promotes the good of the society, and the ends for which the government was adopted, without impairing the rights of any man, or the powers of any State. This, he said, was remarkably true of the Bank man could have cause to complain of it ; the bills would not be forced upon any one. It is of the firft utility to trade. Indeed the in tercouvfe from State to St.ne can never be on a good footing without a Bank ; wliofe paper •will circulate more extensively than that of any State Bank. Whether the power to regulate trade from State to State will involve that of re gulating inland bills of exchange and bank pa per, as the inftrnments of the trade and incident to the power, he would not pause to examine. That is an injury and wrong which violates the right of another. As the Bank is founded on tlie free choice of-thofe who make use of and is highly ufeful to the people, and to government, a liberal oonftrwftion is natural and fafe. This circumftahce creates a preemption in favor of its conformity to the constitution. This pre emption is enforced by the necessity of a Bank to other governments. The mod orderly go vernments in Europe have Banks. They are conlidered aS indifpenfibly necessary ; these ex amples are not to be supposed to have been un noticed. We are to pay the interest of our debt in 13 places. • Is it poilible to transport the reve nue from one end of the continent to the other : Nay,a week before the quarter's interest becomes due, transfers may be made which will reqaire double the sum in Boston which was expected. To guard against this danger, an extra sum must be depofired at the different loan-offices. This extra sum is not to be had ; our revenue is bare ly equal to the interest due. This imposes an absolute necessity upon the government to make use of a Bank. The answer is, that the State Banks will supply this aid. This is risking a good deal to the argument against the Bank ; for will they admit the necessity and yet deny to the government the lawful and only adequate means of providing for it. Ten of the States have no Banks ; those who have may abolilh theirs, or fuffer their charters to expire. But the State Banks are infufficient to the purpose—their pa per has not a fufficient circulation—of conrfe their capitals are small. Congress is allowed to have a complete legislative power over its own finances ; and yei T without the Qourtefy of the States it cannot4>e exereifed. This seems to be inconsistent. If a w*r should suddenly break out, how is Congress to provide for it ? Perhaps Congress would not be fitting ; great expences would be incurred, and they mult inliantly be provided for. How is this to be done—by taxes ? And will the enemy wait till they can be collected ? by loans at home ? Our citizens would employ their money in war speculations, and they are not individually in a condition to lend a fuffi cient sum in specie—or fliall we feiid across the sea for loans? The dispute between England and Spain furnifh an example ; the aid of their Banks for several millions was prompt and effec r tn»l. Or will you fay that Congress might iflue money? That power, ruinous and fallacious"" as it is, is deduced from implication, for it is not expressly given. A Bank only can afford the neceflary aid in time of sudden emergency. If we have not the power to establish it, our social compact is incomplete, we of felf preservation. I /hall perhaps be told, that necefiity is the ty rant's plea. I answer that it is a miserable one, when it is urged to palliate the violation of pri* vate right. Who fulfers by this use of our au thority ? Not the States, for they are not war ranted to establish a national Bank : Not indivi duals, for they will be assisted in trade and de fended from danger by it. Having endeavored to enforce his argument by noticing the uses of Banks to trade, to revenue, to credit, and in cases of exigency, he adverted totlieauthority ofourown precedents: Our right to govern the Western Territory is notdifputed. It is a power which' no (late can exercise : It miijl be exercised, and therefore it resides in Congress. But how does Congress get this power ? It is not expressly given in the Constitution, but is deri ved either from the nature of the cafe, or by im plication from the power to regulate the proper ty of the United States. If the power flows from the nature and neceflity of the cafe, it maybe de manded, Is there not equal authority for the Bank? If it is derived from the power of Congress to re gulate the territory and other property of the United States, and to make all needful rules and regulations concerning it, and for thedifpofal of it, a ftriift conflruetion would restrain« Congress merely to the management and disposal of pro perty, and of its own property : Yet it is plain, that moreisintended. Congrefshasaccordingly made rules not only for governing its own pro perty, but the property of the persons refidino there : It has made rules which have 110 relation to property at all—forpunifhing crimes : In (hort it exercises all power in that territory : Nay; it has exercised this very power of creating a cor poration : The government of that territory is a corporation—and who will deny that Congre/S may lawfully establish a Bank beyond the.Ohio ? It is fair to reason by analogy from a pow' r which is unquestionable, to one which is theiubjecil of debate. He then alked, whether it appeared on this view of the fubjecft, that the eftab/iflunent of a National Bank would be a violent mis-interpre tation of the Constitution. He did not contend for an arbitrary unlimited difcetion in the £o vernmentto do every thing : He took oecafion co protest against such a mis-conception of his argu ment. He had noticed the preat marks by which the conftrndlion of the C'onilitution, he conceiv ed, innft be guided and limited—and thei'e, if not ablolutely certain, were very far from beina 762 arbitrary or unfafe : It is for the honfe to judge, whether the conftruc r tion which denies the pow er of Congress, is more definite and 'fafe. In proving thac Congress may exercise powers which are not exbrcfsly granted by the coiiftiru tion, he had endeavoured to establish such rule* of interpretation, and had illustrated his ideas by such observations, as would anticipate, in a considerable degree, the application of his-prin ciples to the point in question. Before he pro ceeded to the conftrin!tion of the clauses of the conftitutioi: which apply to the argument, heob ferved that it would be proper to notice the qua lities-os a corporation, in order to take a more exact view of the controversy. He adverted to the individuality and the per petuity of a corporation, and that the property of the individuals should not be liable for rlie debts of the Bank or Company. These qualities are nqt more ufeful to the corporation than con formable to reason : but government, it is said, cannot create these qualities. This is the nar row of the argument: For Congress may set up a Bank of its own, to be managed as public pro perty, to issue notes which fhajl be received in all payments at the treasury, which shall be ex changeable into specie on demand, and which it shall be death to counterfeit. Shell a bank would be less fafe and less ufeful than one tinder the direction of private persons—yet the power to establish it is indisputable. If Congress has authority to do this business illy, the question returns, whether the powers of a corporation, which are eflential to its being well done, may be annexed as incident to it. The bank of New- York is not a corporation, yet its notes have cre dit. Congress may agree with that bank, or with a company of merchants, to take their notes, and to cause all payments to pass through their cof fers. Every thing that government requires of and will perform to the bank, may be lawfully done without giving them corporate powers— but to do it well, l'afely and exrenfively, those powers are indifpenfible. This seems to bring the debate within a very narrow com pass. This led him to consider whether the corpo rate powers are incidental to those which Con gress may exercise by the conftitntion. He entered into a difcuflion of the conftrucftion of that clause which empowers Congress to regu late the territory and other property of the Uni ted State# The United States may hold pro perty—may dispose of it—they may hold it in partnerfliip—they may regulate the terms of the partnership. One condition may be, that the common stock only shall be liable for the debts of thejmrmerlbiw, and. that any purchaser of a share shall become a partner. These are the chief qualities of a corporation. It seems that Congress, having power to make all needful rule* and regulations foi the property of the United Stales, may establish a corporation to manage it —without which we have seen, that the regula. tion cannot be either fafe or ufeful: The United States will be the proprietor of one tenth of the Bank Stock. Congress may exercise exclusive legislation ia all cases whatsoever, over' the 10 miles square, and the places ceded by the States for arsenals, light-houles, docks, &c.—Of course it may esta blish a Bank in those places, with corporate pow ers. The bill has not restrained the Bank to this city—and if it had, the dispute would lose a part of its solemnity : If instead of principles, it con cerns only places, what objection is there to the constitutional authority of Cengrefs to fix thi» Bank at Sandy-Hook, or Reedy Illand, where we have light-houses, and aright ofexclufive legisla tion ? A Bank established there, or in the diftricft located by law on the Potowmac for the feat of government, could fend its paper all over the Union : It is true, that the places are not the molt proper for a Bank ; but the authority to establish it in them, overthrows the argument which isdeduced from the definite nature of the powers veiled in Congress, and the dangerous tendency of the proposed conftruc r tion of them. The preamble of the constitution warrants this remark, thataßani is not repugnant to thefpirit and eflential objects of that instrument. He then confi.lered the power to borrow money. He said it was natural to understand that autho rity asit wasatfually exercised in Europe—which is, 10 borrow of the Bank. He observed, the pow er to borrow, was of harrow use, without the in stitution of a Bank—and in the most dangerous ciifis of affairs would be a dead letter. After noticing the power to lay and colle<ft tax es, he adverted to the sweeping clause, as it is ufiially called, which empowers Congress to exer cise all powers neceflary and proper to carry the enumerated powers into execution. He did not pretend that it gives any new powers ; but it ef tabliihed the do«flrine of implied powers.—He then denianded whether the power to incorporate a Bank is not fairly relative, and a neceflary in cident to, the entire powers to regulate trade and revenue, and to provide for the public credit and defence. He entered into a particular answer to several objections, and after recapitulating his argument,
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