seamen, See. because we fay that they are the in
cidents to that power : The molt familiar and
undisputed acts of legiflation'w;]l Ihew, that we
have adopted it as a fafe rule of atftion to legi-
Jlate beyond the letter of the constitution.
He proceeded to enforce this idea by several
confederations, and illultrated it by various ex
amples. He said that the ingenuity of man was
unequal to providing, especially beforehand, tor
all the contingencies that would happen. 1 lie
constitution contains the principles which are to
govern in making laws ; but every law requires
an application of the rule to the cafe in quettion.
We may err in applying it ; but we are to exer
cise our judgments, and on every occasion to de
cide according to an honest convidtion of its true
meaning.
The danger of implied power does not arile
from its afluming a new principle : We have not
only pratftifed it often ; but we can scarcely pro
ceed without it: Nor does the danger proceed so
vauch from the extent of the power, as from its
uncertainty. While the oppofers of the Bank ex
claim against the exercise of this power by Con
gress, do they mark out the limits of the power
which they will leave to us, with more certainty
than is done by the advocates of the Bank ? Their
rules of interpretation by co-temporaneous testi
mony, the debates of conventions, and the doc
trine of substantive and auxiliary powers, will be
found as obfeure, and of course as formidable, as
that which they condemn : They only set up one
confirmation against another.
The powers of Congress are disputed : We are
obliged to decide the question according to truth.
The negative, if falfe, is less fate than the affir
mative if true : Why then shall we be told, that
the negative is the fafe fide ? Not exercising the
powers we have, may be as pernicious, as ufurp
ingthofe we have not. If the power to raise ar
mies had not been exprefled in the enumeration
of the powers of Congress, it would be implied
from other parts of the constitution. Suppose,
however, that it were omitted, and our country
invaded, Would a decision in Congress against
railing armies be fafer than the affirmative ? The
blood of our citizens would be shed, andfhed un
avenged. He thought therefore, that there was
too much prepoffelfion with some against the
Bank, and that the debate ought to be consider
ed more impartially, as the negative was neither
more fafe, certain, nor conformable to our duty,
than the other fide of the queltion. After all, the
proof of the affirmative imposed a fufficient bur
den, as it is easier to raise objeiftions than to re
move them. Would any one doubt that Congress
may lend money—that they may buy their debt
in the market, or redeem their captives from Al
giers ?. Yet no such power is expressly given,
tho it is irrefiftably implied
If therefore foine interpretation of the confti
.ution innftbe indulged, by what rules is it to be
governed ? The great end of every aflbciation of
persons or States, is, to effect the end of its insti
tution. The matter in debate affords a good il
lustration : A corporation, as soon as it is crea
ted, has certain powers, or qualities, tacitly an
nexed to it, which tend to promote the end for
■which it was formed—fuch as, for example, its
individuality—its power to sue, and be sued—
and the perpetual fucceflion of persons. Govern
ment is itfelf the highell kind of corporation,
and from the instant of its formation, it has ta
citly annexed to its being, various powers which
the individuals who framed it did not fepararely
poflefs, but which are ellential to its effecting the
purposes for which it was framed—to declare, in
detail, every thing that government may do,
could not be performed, and has never be<-n at
tempted : It would be endless, useless, and dan
gerous—exceptions of what it may not do, are
ihorter and fafer.
Congress may do what is necessary to the end
for which the constitution was adopted, provided
it is not repugnant to the natural rights of man,
or to those which they have expressly refervec! to
themselves, or to the powers which are afllgned
to the States : This rule of interpretation seems
to be a fafe, and not a very uncertain one, inde
pendently of the constitution itfelf : By that in
strument certain powers are fpecifically delega
ted, together with all powers neceflary and pro
per to carry them into execution : That construc
tion may be maintained to be a fafe one which
promotes the good of the society, and the ends
for which the government was adopted, without
impairing the rights of any man, or the powers
of any State.
This, he said, was remarkably true of the Bank
man could have cause to complain of it ;
the bills would not be forced upon any one. It
is of the firft utility to trade. Indeed the in
tercouvfe from State to St.ne can never be on
a good footing without a Bank ; wliofe paper
•will circulate more extensively than that of any
State Bank. Whether the power to regulate
trade from State to State will involve that of re
gulating inland bills of exchange and bank pa
per, as the inftrnments of the trade and incident
to the power, he would not pause to examine.
That is an injury and wrong which violates the
right of another. As the Bank is founded on tlie
free choice of-thofe who make use of and is
highly ufeful to the people, and to government,
a liberal oonftrwftion is natural and fafe. This
circumftahce creates a preemption in favor of
its conformity to the constitution. This pre
emption is enforced by the necessity of a Bank
to other governments. The mod orderly go
vernments in Europe have Banks. They are
conlidered aS indifpenfibly necessary ; these ex
amples are not to be supposed to have been un
noticed. We are to pay the interest of our debt
in 13 places. • Is it poilible to transport the reve
nue from one end of the continent to the other :
Nay,a week before the quarter's interest becomes
due, transfers may be made which will reqaire
double the sum in Boston which was expected.
To guard against this danger, an extra sum must
be depofired at the different loan-offices. This
extra sum is not to be had ; our revenue is bare
ly equal to the interest due. This imposes an
absolute necessity upon the government to make
use of a Bank. The answer is, that the State
Banks will supply this aid. This is risking a
good deal to the argument against the Bank ; for
will they admit the necessity and yet deny to the
government the lawful and only adequate means
of providing for it. Ten of the States have no
Banks ; those who have may abolilh theirs, or
fuffer their charters to expire. But the State
Banks are infufficient to the purpose—their pa
per has not a fufficient circulation—of conrfe
their capitals are small. Congress is allowed to
have a complete legislative power over its own
finances ; and yei T without the Qourtefy of the
States it cannot4>e exereifed. This seems to be
inconsistent.
If a w*r should suddenly break out, how is
Congress to provide for it ? Perhaps Congress
would not be fitting ; great expences would be
incurred, and they mult inliantly be provided
for. How is this to be done—by taxes ? And
will the enemy wait till they can be collected ?
by loans at home ? Our citizens would employ
their money in war speculations, and they are
not individually in a condition to lend a fuffi
cient sum in specie—or fliall we feiid across the
sea for loans? The dispute between England and
Spain furnifh an example ; the aid of their Banks
for several millions was prompt and effec r tn»l.
Or will you fay that Congress might iflue
money? That power, ruinous and fallacious"" as
it is, is deduced from implication, for it is not
expressly given. A Bank only can afford the
neceflary aid in time of sudden emergency. If
we have not the power to establish it, our social
compact is incomplete, we of
felf preservation.
I /hall perhaps be told, that necefiity is the ty
rant's plea. I answer that it is a miserable one,
when it is urged to palliate the violation of pri*
vate right. Who fulfers by this use of our au
thority ? Not the States, for they are not war
ranted to establish a national Bank : Not indivi
duals, for they will be assisted in trade and de
fended from danger by it.
Having endeavored to enforce his argument
by noticing the uses of Banks to trade, to revenue,
to credit, and in cases of exigency, he adverted
totlieauthority ofourown precedents: Our right
to govern the Western Territory is notdifputed.
It is a power which' no (late can exercise : It miijl
be exercised, and therefore it resides in Congress.
But how does Congress get this power ? It is not
expressly given in the Constitution, but is deri
ved either from the nature of the cafe, or by im
plication from the power to regulate the proper
ty of the United States. If the power flows from
the nature and neceflity of the cafe, it maybe de
manded, Is there not equal authority for the Bank?
If it is derived from the power of Congress to re
gulate the territory and other property of the
United States, and to make all needful rules and
regulations concerning it, and for thedifpofal of
it, a ftriift conflruetion would restrain« Congress
merely to the management and disposal of pro
perty, and of its own property : Yet it is plain,
that moreisintended. Congrefshasaccordingly
made rules not only for governing its own pro
perty, but the property of the persons refidino
there : It has made rules which have 110 relation
to property at all—forpunifhing crimes : In (hort
it exercises all power in that territory : Nay; it
has exercised this very power of creating a cor
poration : The government of that territory is a
corporation—and who will deny that Congre/S
may lawfully establish a Bank beyond the.Ohio ?
It is fair to reason by analogy from a pow' r which
is unquestionable, to one which is theiubjecil of
debate.
He then alked, whether it appeared on this
view of the fubjecft, that the eftab/iflunent of a
National Bank would be a violent mis-interpre
tation of the Constitution. He did not contend
for an arbitrary unlimited difcetion in the £o
vernmentto do every thing : He took oecafion co
protest against such a mis-conception of his argu
ment. He had noticed the preat marks by which
the conftrndlion of the C'onilitution, he conceiv
ed, innft be guided and limited—and thei'e, if
not ablolutely certain, were very far from beina
762
arbitrary or unfafe : It is for the honfe to judge,
whether the conftruc r tion which denies the pow
er of Congress, is more definite and 'fafe.
In proving thac Congress may exercise powers
which are not exbrcfsly granted by the coiiftiru
tion, he had endeavoured to establish such rule*
of interpretation, and had illustrated his ideas
by such observations, as would anticipate, in a
considerable degree, the application of his-prin
ciples to the point in question. Before he pro
ceeded to the conftrin!tion of the clauses of the
conftitutioi: which apply to the argument, heob
ferved that it would be proper to notice the qua
lities-os a corporation, in order to take a more
exact view of the controversy.
He adverted to the individuality and the per
petuity of a corporation, and that the property
of the individuals should not be liable for rlie
debts of the Bank or Company. These qualities
are nqt more ufeful to the corporation than con
formable to reason : but government, it is said,
cannot create these qualities. This is the nar
row of the argument: For Congress may set up
a Bank of its own, to be managed as public pro
perty, to issue notes which fhajl be received in
all payments at the treasury, which shall be ex
changeable into specie on demand, and which
it shall be death to counterfeit. Shell a bank
would be less fafe and less ufeful than one tinder
the direction of private persons—yet the power
to establish it is indisputable. If Congress has
authority to do this business illy, the question
returns, whether the powers of a corporation,
which are eflential to its being well done, may
be annexed as incident to it. The bank of New-
York is not a corporation, yet its notes have cre
dit. Congress may agree with that bank, or with
a company of merchants, to take their notes, and
to cause all payments to pass through their cof
fers. Every thing that government requires of
and will perform to the bank, may be lawfully
done without giving them corporate powers—
but to do it well, l'afely and exrenfively, those
powers are indifpenfible. This seems to bring
the debate within a very narrow com pass.
This led him to consider whether the corpo
rate powers are incidental to those which Con
gress may exercise by the conftitntion.
He entered into a difcuflion of the conftrucftion
of that clause which empowers Congress to regu
late the territory and other property of the Uni
ted State# The United States may hold pro
perty—may dispose of it—they may hold it in
partnerfliip—they may regulate the terms of the
partnership. One condition may be, that the
common stock only shall be liable for the debts
of thejmrmerlbiw, and. that any purchaser of a
share shall become a partner. These are the
chief qualities of a corporation. It seems that
Congress, having power to make all needful rule*
and regulations foi the property of the United
Stales, may establish a corporation to manage it
—without which we have seen, that the regula.
tion cannot be either fafe or ufeful: The United
States will be the proprietor of one tenth of the
Bank Stock.
Congress may exercise exclusive legislation ia
all cases whatsoever, over' the 10 miles square,
and the places ceded by the States for arsenals,
light-houles, docks, &c.—Of course it may esta
blish a Bank in those places, with corporate pow
ers. The bill has not restrained the Bank to this
city—and if it had, the dispute would lose a part
of its solemnity : If instead of principles, it con
cerns only places, what objection is there to the
constitutional authority of Cengrefs to fix thi»
Bank at Sandy-Hook, or Reedy Illand, where we
have light-houses, and aright ofexclufive legisla
tion ? A Bank established there, or in the diftricft
located by law on the Potowmac for the feat of
government, could fend its paper all over the
Union : It is true, that the places are not the
molt proper for a Bank ; but the authority to
establish it in them, overthrows the argument
which isdeduced from the definite nature of the
powers veiled in Congress, and the dangerous
tendency of the proposed conftruc r tion of them.
The preamble of the constitution warrants this
remark, thataßani is not repugnant to thefpirit
and eflential objects of that instrument.
He then confi.lered the power to borrow money.
He said it was natural to understand that autho
rity asit wasatfually exercised in Europe—which
is, 10 borrow of the Bank. He observed, the pow
er to borrow, was of harrow use, without the in
stitution of a Bank—and in the most dangerous
ciifis of affairs would be a dead letter.
After noticing the power to lay and colle<ft tax
es, he adverted to the sweeping clause, as it is
ufiially called, which empowers Congress to exer
cise all powers neceflary and proper to carry the
enumerated powers into execution. He did not
pretend that it gives any new powers ; but it ef
tabliihed the do«flrine of implied powers.—He
then denianded whether the power to incorporate
a Bank is not fairly relative, and a neceflary in
cident to, the entire powers to regulate trade and
revenue, and to provide for the public credit and
defence.
He entered into a particular answer to several
objections, and after recapitulating his argument,