The RIGHT CONSTITUTION of a COMMON WEALTH EXAMINED. [Continued from our AN ariitocracy, like tlie Roman senate, be tween the abolition of royalty and the inltitution of the tribunate, is of itfelf a faction, a private partial intereit. Yet it waslefs fotlian an aliem bly annually chosen by the people, and vested with all authority, would be ; for l'uch an aflem bly runs falter and easier into an oligarchy than an hereditary ariltocratical aflembly. The lead ing members having, as has been before shewn in detail, the appointment of judges, and the nomi nation to all lucrative and honorable offices, they have thus the power to bend the whole executive and judicial authority to their own private in tereit, and by tliefe means to increase their own reputations, wealth, and influence, and those of their party, at every new election : whereas, in a simple hereditary ariltocracy, it is the intereit of the members in general to preserve an equality among themselves as long as they can ; and as they are smaller in number, and have more know ledge, they can moreealily unite for that purpose, and there is no opportunity for any one to in crease his power by any annual elections. An aspiring arillocratic therefore mult take more time, and use more address, to augment his in fluence : yet we find in experience, that even hereditary ariltocracies have never been able to prevent oligarchies riling up among them, but by the most rigorous, severe and tyrannical regula tions, l'uch as the institution of inquilitions, &c. It may found oddly to lay that the majority is a fadtion ; but it is, neverthelels, literally just. If the majority are partial in their own favour, if they refufe or deny a perfect equality to every member of the minority, they area faction : and as a popular aflembly, collective or reprei'entative, cannot aCt, or will, but by a vote, the firlt (tep tuey take, if they are not unanimous, occasions a divilion into majority and minority, that is, intd two parties, and the moment the former is unjult itisa faJtion. The Roman decemvirs themselves were let up by the people, not by the senate : much longer time would have been required for an oligarchy to have grown up among the patri cians and in the senate, if the people had not interposed and demanded a body of laws, that is, a conltitution. The senate oppoled the requilition as long as they could but at last appointed the decemvirs, much againll their own inclinations, and merely in compliance with the urgent cla mours of the people. Nedham thinks, that "as " the firlt founders of the Roman liberty did well <£ in driving out their kings; 10, on the other " fide, they did very ill in fettling a standing " authority within themselves." It is really very injudicious, and very ridiculous, to call those Ro man nobles who expelled their kings, founders of the Roman liberty : noteing was farther from their heads or their hearts than national liberty ; it was merely a Itruggle for power between a king and a body of haughty envious nobles ; the intereit of the people and of liberty had no Ihare in it. The Romans might do well in driving out their king : he might be a bad and incorrigible character ; and in such a cafe any people may do well in expelling or depoling a king. But they did not well in dcmolifhing the lingle executive magiltracy : they should have then demanded a body of laws, a definite constitution, and an in tegral lhare in thelegillature for the people, with a prccife delineation of the power of the firlt ma giltiate'and senate. In this cafe they would have been entitled to the praise of founders of Roman liberty : but as it was, they only substituted one fyltein of tyranny for another, and the new one was worse than the old. They certainly " did " very ill in fettling a Itandingfovereigu l'upreine " authority within themselves." Thus far our author is perfectly in the right, andtlie reason he gives for this opinion is very well founded : it is the fame that was given thousands of years before him, by Plato Socrates, and others, and has been conltantly given by all succeeding writers in fa vour of mixed governments, and againlt simple ones, " because, lying open to the temptations of " honor and profit," or, in other words, haying their ambitijn and vanity, avaiiceand lust, hatred and resentment, malice and revenge, in jfliort their felt-love, and all their paifions (" which are " fails too big for any human bulk") unrestrain ed by any controuling power, they were at once transported by them ; made use of their public power not for the good of the commonwealth, but tor the gratification of their private pallions, whereby tliey'put the commonwealth into frequent flames of discontent and fediiion. Thus far is very well : but when our author goes 011, " which " might all have been prevented, could they " have fettled the ltate free, indeed, by placing " an orderly fuccedion of supreme authority in " the hands of th<; people," he can be followed by 110 one who knows what is in man, and in society—because that supreme authority falls out of the whole body into a majority at the firft vote. To exped: fell-denial from men, when they have a majority in their favour, and consequently power to gratify themselves, is to diibelieve all history and universal experience ; it is to tiiibelieve Revelation and the Word of God, which informs us, the heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked. There have been examples of (elf-denial,and will be again; but l'uch exalted virtue never yet exilted in any large body of men and lalted long : and our author's argument re quires it to be proved, not only that individuals, but that nations and majorities of nations, are ca pable not only of a iingle aift, or a few aifts of disinterested justice and exalted felf-denial, but of a course of l'uch heroic virtue for ages and ge nerations ; and not only that they are capable of this, but that it is probable they will pra<flife it. There is 110 man lo blind as not to lee, that to talk of founding a government upon a fuppofiti -011 that nations and great bodies of men, left to themselves will practiie a course of felf-denial, is either to babble like a new-born infant, or to deceive like an unprincipled impoltor. Nedham hasliimfelf acknowledged, in leveral parts of this •work, the depravity of men in very ftrongterms. In this fifth reafonhe avers " temptations of 11011- " our and profit to be fails too big for any human " bulk." Why then does he build a system on a foundation which he owns to be f'o unliable ? If his mind had been at liberty to follow his own ideas and principles, he must have seen that a fuccelfion of supreme authority in the hands of the people, by their house of representatives, is at firlt ail ariltocracy asdefpotical as a Reman se nate, and becomes an oligarchy even sooner than thatallembly fell into the decimvirate. There is this infallible disadvantage infucha government, even in companion with an hereditary ariltocra cy, that it lets in vice, profligacy and corruption, like a torrent, with tyranny ; whereas the latter often guards the morals of the people with the utmost leverity : even the despotism of arilto cracy prelerves the morals of the people. (To be continued.J An ESSAY on FREE TRADE and. FINANCES. [Continued from No. XXVI.J I come now to the confide ration of the prac ticability of the mode of taxation which I propo lied, ami which 1 do conceive is a matter of ca pital weight in this di scullion, for which I do re ly on these two grand propositions. ilt. That whatever is the real, great interest of the peo ple, they may, by proper measures, be made to believe and adopt: And, 2d. That whatever is admitted to be a matter of common and important interest, in the general opinion of the people, may be easily put in practice, by wisdom, pru dence, and due management of the affairs. I do contend, that when this tax is fairly proposed to the public, with a proper elucidation of the evils it avoids, and the advantages which result from it, it will not be looked on as a burden of opprel fion, aniinpolition of power, but as the purchase of our molt precious blelfings, as a measure abso lutely neceilary to our molt cliential and impor tant interelts ; therefore any attempt to avoid this tax, by smuggling or any other way, will be deemed by general consent, anatft of meanness ; an avoidance of a due share of the public burden; si ultrating the neceilary plans of public fafety, and rendering ineffectual the public measures adopted by general conlent, for the public secu rity, tranquility and liappinefs. isucli an action implies in it gieat meanness of character in the agent, and a high crime against the State, and the detection of it will be conlidered as a very material service to the commonwealth. Where any actions are deemed crimes, scandals and nui sances by the general voice of the people, detec tions and informations against them are reputa ble ; they cease to be infamous—the infamy of an informer does not take place in such instances. The reasons of governmental measures ought always to attend their publication lb far as to af ford good means of conviction to the people at large, that their objeCt and tendency is the public good. This greatly facilitates their execution and success. 'Tis hard governing people against their interests, their persuasions, and even againlt their prejudices. 'Tis better to court tlicir un derltaiuhngs lirlt withreafon, candor and sinceri ty, and we may be almolt lure all their pailions will follow loon. I abhor a mysterious govern ment. I think an adminiltration, like a private man, which affeifts to have a great many iecrets that must not be explained, has generally agreat many faults which will not bear telling ; or a great deal of corruption, which will not bear exami ning. Government, like private persons, may indeed have l'ecrets, which ought to be kept so ; but in that cafe, caution lhoulii be used against any intimations or hints getting abroad, even that there are such l'ecrets, or any lecrets: for this would produce an anxious enquiry and folicitousinfpeCtion, which mightmake the keep ing thefecret more difficult, and besides bring on many other inconveniencies arising from imm berlefs apprehensions, which such acircumftance would give birth to. An oltentatious given out that there are mighty l'ecrets in the cabinet, or many myitcries in the State that must not be pry. Ed too clofcly into, is the very contrary of all this, and generally is a sign of a weak adminiltration, and not seldom of a corrupt one; Lut of n lie measures, which require explanations'r/f" people, that of taxes, which touches their ney, which is always a very sensible pa a tto ' Hand as chief; and to make these <r 0 ' R:; - v thing well, 'tis always neceilkry to tore-id , verlal conviction, ill. That the money in taxes is neceflary for the public , , 2 dly, 1 hat it will certainly be fX) >' ® 1 only on the objects for which 'tis a Iked aucUivl, and if these two things are really °.i ' will rarely be much difficulty in making iw" 6 be believed through the moll sensible part oftl!" commonwealth ; but of these two things e J are not really true, or not really and geneJk beheved, I dont know that a 11 anding army v, u( ,|d be fufhcient to collect the taxes. I ain 0 f 0 • • on their force, authority and influence Hketh conquelb of the British army, would last „ 0 lT germ any place than they staid to fupporti- When ever they ilrall go away, I i mag f„ e the L ; will find that they have left behind themi:ifi n i tt : ly more abhorrence than obedience amon® the people. Though lam clearly of opinion°that there mult exilt an ultimate force or power of compulsion in every effective and good govern ment, yet 'tis plain to me, that such force is ne ver to be put in a<ftion against the general convic tion or opinion of the people ; nor indeed do 1 believe it es er can be so exercifed,with fuccefsand final efl'eifl, for every attempt of this kind tends to convulsions and death. Such an ultimate force in deed ought to fall upon and correct tliofe whofia against the peace, interest and security of the public, but this can be done with fafety and ad vantage only in cases where the crime pumfhed is against the opinions, the sentiments and moral or political principles, which generally prevail in the people ; for if the moll violent declaimer and mover of feditioh in a government, fliould happen to be received by the people as a patriot, and his harangues fliould be eagerly adopted a? the doctrines of their liberties and rights, anyat tempt topunilh him would be in vain or ufeleft; foreitherthe people would interpose and refcije him, or if he was puniihed, they would consider hnn as the martyr of their cause, and thereby the public uneasiness, tumult and uproar would be augmented. (To be continued.J THE NATIONAL MONITOR. No. XIV. " Self-love but fcrves the virtuous mind to wake. As the lmall pebble stirs the peaceful lake ; The centre mov'd, a circle straight succeeds. Another still, and still another spreads; Friend, parent, neighbour, fii ft it will embrace, Its country next; and next all human race ; Wide and more wide, th' overflowings of the mind Takes ev'ry creaturc in of, ev'rv kind ; Earth imiies aiound with boundlcfs bounty blest, And Heav'n beholds its image in its brcaft." THE words local attachment, an J partial pr?-> judices,have hadfuch a peat rung upon them, that the) now jornt the mojt uncertain and confufed found ima ginable : But so far at they are understood with any precifton, they convey an idea that is almtfi itn'i verfally reprobated—with how much reason will a(- pear, when it is considered that very jew of the hw man race are without those attachments and preju dices ; and if they generally were, the condition of humanity would be altered infinitely for the worse. The truth is, those attachments are interwoven lit the very texture of our natures by the Author of Ex ijtence, and subserve the mo ft valuable and important purposes ; to these we are indebted for the noblejl ex ertions of the human mind, and they prove the fpritl of the fine ft enjoyments of life. There are but few minds so capaciously formed, is to embrace the interests of a large community, in such manner as to enter into all their enjoyments and dif trejfes, with those lively sensations which fyvipathy ex cites for a friend, a family, or a neighbourhood. It" generally true, that in proportion to the txpanfion if what is called the philanthropic principle, in the fane proportion it is faint and inoperative—and a perfo" totally dejlitute of local and partial attachments, viill want the amor patria in the bejl sense of the words. It is not intended by these remarks to advocate a eon trafted and felfifh principle—they are not dejigned to fanftion that local policy, which shuts up the oejt af fections of the heart, and confines every benevolent wish to the spot where we were bom, or to the par ticular circle with which we happen to be more particu larly connelled.—They are dejigned to abate that ardour of spirit which proscribes all partialities and predilections,however jnftjfiable ; for we deceive our- J'eves byf'ppofing that : heje attachments can be anni hilated, or that it wouldJerve any valuable pnrpofe life if they could. As in the genera! administration of human affairs, the be ft interejt of society is promoted by every indivi dual's purfutng with steadiness, andperjeveranc ' their own particular advantage in conformity to the laws--- so the great objects of patriotism are mojt essential'/ advanced, by the attachments which are difcovere ty every person to the state, the country, the town, neighbourhood, the family, &c. with which they are more immediately connefied—this is nature,reafon/' 1 common sense. PubliJhed by JOHN FENNO, No. 9, MA / ID p EN ' Lane, near tlic Ofwcgo-Markct, NeWtYork.—'[3«*
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