PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. SPAIN GIVEN TIME. Favorable Sevalopmenta of tha Hew Policy in Regard to Cuba Will bt Awaited. Hawaii Hay Com In. The message Is as follows: To the Senate and House of Repre sentatives: It gives me pleasure to extend greet ing to the fifty-fifth Congress assem bled In regular session nt the seat of government, with many of whose sena tors ami representatives I hnve been associated In the legislative service. Their meeting occurs under felicitous oondltlons, Justifying sincere congratu lation and calling for our grateful no krowledgement to a beneficent Provi dence which has so signally blessed and prospered us a ft nation. Peace ard good will with all the nations of the earth continue unbroken. A mat ter of genuine satisfaction Is the grow ' Ing feeling of fraternal regard and uni fication of all sections of our country, the Incompleteness of which hns too long delayed the realization of the highest blessings of the Union. The spirit of patriotism Is universal and la ever Increasing In fervor. The public questions which now most engross us are lifted far above either partisanship, prejudice or former sectional differ ences. They affect every part of our common country alike and permit of no division on ancient lines. Questions of foreign policy of revenue, the sound ness of the currency, the Inviolability of national obligations, the Improve ment of the public service, appeal to the earnest citizen to whatever party he belongs or In whatever section of the country he may reside. The extra session of this Congress which closed during July last enacted Important legislation, and while Its full effect has not yet been realized, what It has already accomplished assures us of its timeliness and wisdom. To test Its permanent value further time will bo required and the people, satisfied with its operation and results thus far, are in no mind to withhold from It a fair trial. the currency question Tariff legislation having been settled by the extra session of Congress the question next pressing for considera tion is that of the currency. The work of putting our llnnnces up on a sound basis, dlttlcult as It may seem, will appear easier when wo recall the llnnnclal operations of the govern ment since 1K66. On the 30th day of June of that year we had outstanding demand liabilities In the sum of $728, 068,447.41. On the 1st of January. 1H7R. these liabilities hud be;n reduced to $443,889,49li.88. Of our Interest-bearing obligations, the figures are even more striking. On July 1, 1S61. the principal of the Interest-bearing debt of the gov ernment waa $2,3:12,3:11.208. On the 1st day of July, 189.1, this sum had been reduced to $585,037, loo, or an aggregate reduction of $1,747,294,108. Tho Interest bearing debt of the United States on the 1st day of December, 1897, was $S47. 365.620. The government money now outstanding (December 1) consists of $:i46,681,016 of United States notes, $107. 798,280 of treasury notes Issued by au thority of the law of 1890, $.184,963,504 of liver certificates and $61,280,761 of standard silver dollars. With the great resources of the gov ernment and with the honorable exam ple of the past before us, we ought not to hesitate to enter upon a currency re vision which will make our demand obligations less onerous to the govern ment and relieve our financial laws from ambiguity and doubt. The brief review of what was ac complished from the close of the war to 1893 makes unreasonable and ground less any distrust either of our financial ability or soundness; while the situa tion from 1893 to 1897 must admonish Congress of the immediate necessity of o legislating as to make the return of the conditions then prevailing Impossi ble. THE REAL EVIL There are many plans proposed as a remedy for the evil. Before we can find the true remedy we must appreciate the real evil. It is not that our cur rency of every kind Is not good, for every dollar of it is good: good be cause the government's pledge Is out to keep It so, and that pledge will not be broken. However, the guarantee of ' our purpose to keep the pledge will be best shown by advancing toward its fulfillment. The evil of the present system is found in the great cost to the govern ment of maintaining the parity of our different forms of money that Is, keeping all of them at par with gold. We surely cannot be longer heedless of the burden this imposes upon the people, even under fairly prosperous conditions, while the past four years have demonstrated that it Is not only an expensive charge upon the govern ment, but a dangerous means to the national credit. It is manifest that we must devise some plan to protect the Government against bond Issues for repeated re demptions. We must either curtail the opportunity for speculation, madd easy by the multiplied redemption of our demand obligations, or Increase the gold reserve for their redemption. We have $900,000,000 of currency which the government by solemn enactment has undertaken to keep at par with Isold. Nobody Is obliged to redeem in gold but the government. The banks are not required to redeem In gold The government is obliged to keeo equal with gold all its outstanding currency and eoln obligations, while its receipts are not required to be paid in gold. They are paid In every kind . of money but gold, and the only means by. which the government can with certainty get gold Is by borrowing. It can get It In jio other way when It most needs It. The government with out any fixed gold revenue la pledged to maintain gold redemption, which it has steadily and faithfully done, and which under the authority now given It will continue to do. THE BALE OF BONDS. The law which requires the govern ment, after having redeemed Its United States notes, to pay them out again as current funds demands a constant replenishment of the gold reserve. This is especially so In Units of business panlo and when the re venues are insufficient to meet the ex penses of the government. At such time the government has no other way to guppU ita dxiclt and maintain redemption but through the Increase of Its bonded debt, as during the ad ministration of my predecessor, when $262,315,400 of four and a half per cent, bonds were Issued and sold and tho proceeds used to pay the expenses of the government In excess of revenues and sustain th gold reserve. While It Is true that the greater part of the proceeds of these bonds were used to supply deficient receipt, a consider able portion was required to maintain the gold reserve. With our reserve equal to our ex penses, there would be no deficit re quiring the Issuance of bonds. Hut If the gold reserve falls below $100,000,. 000, how will it be replenished except by selling more bonds? Is there any other way practicable under existing law? The serious question then Is, shall we continue the policy that has been pursued In the past; that Is, when the gold reserve reaches the point of danger. Issue more bonds and supply the needed gold, or shall we provide other means to prevent these recurring drains upon the gold re serve? If no further legislation Is had and the policy of selling bonds Is to be continued, then Congress should give the secretary of the treasury authority to sell bonds at long or short periods, bearing a less rate of Interest than Is now authorised by law. AN OBVIOUS DUTY. I earnestly recommend, as soon as the receipts of the government are quite sufficient to pay all the expense of the government, that when any of the United States notes are presented for redemption In gold and are redeem ed In gold, such notes shall be kept and set apart, and only paid out In ex change for gold. This Is nil obvious duty. If the holder of the United States note prefers the gold and gets it from the government, he should not receive back from the government a United States note without paying gold for it Tho reason for this Is made all the more apparent when the govern ment Issues an Interest-bearing debt to provide gold for the redemption of United States notes a non-lnterest-bearlng debt. Surely It should not pay them out again except on demand and for gold. If they are put out In any other way. they may return again to be followed by another bond Issue to redeem them an Interest-bearing debt to redeem a non-lnterest-bearlng debt. In my view It Is the utmost Import ance that the government should be relieved of the burden of providing all the gold required for exchanges and export. This responsibility Is alone borne by the government without any of the uruhI and necessary powers to help Itself. The banks do not feel the t train of gold rederiiptlon. The whole strain rests upon the government ami the size of the gold reserve In the treasury hns come to be with or with out reason the signal of danger or of security. This ought to be stopped. If we are to have an era of prosperity In the country, with sufficient receipts for the expenses of the government, we may feel no Immediate embarrass ment from our present currency; but the danger still exists and will be ever present menacing us as long as the ex isting system continues. And besides It Is In time of adequnta revenues and business tranquility thnt the govern ment should prepare for the worst. We cannot avoid without serious con sequences tho wise consideration and prompt solution of this question. (lAOK'H PLAN INDORSED. The secretary of the treasury has outlined a plan in great detail for the purpose of removing the threatened lecurrence of a depleted gold reserve and save us from future embarrass ment.ment. To this plan I Invite your careful consideration. I concur with the secretary of the treasury In his recommendation that the natlonnl banks be allowed to Issue notes to the face value of the bonds which they have deposited for circula tion, and that the tax on circulating notes secured by deposit of such bonds be reduced to one-hulf of one per cent, per annum. I also Join him In recom mending that authority he given tor the establishment of natlonnl banks with a minimum capital of $25,000. This will enable the smaller villages and ag ricultural regions of the country to be supplied with currency to meet their needs. I recommend that the Issue of na tional bank notes be restricted to the denomination of $10 and uoward. If the suggestion I have herein made shall have the approval of Congress then I would recommend that national banks be required to redeem their notes In gold. . THE CUBAN QU8STION. The moBt Important problem with which this government Is now called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns Its duty toward Spain and the Cuban Insurrection. Problems and conditions more or lees In common with those now existing have confronted this government at various times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest; growing dissent; an effort toward a large enjoyment of liberty and self-control; of organised resist ance to the mother country; of de pression after distress and warfare; and of ineffectual settlement, to be fol lowed by renewed revolt. For no en during period since the enfranchise ment of the continental possessions of Spain In the western continent has the condition of Cuba or the policy of Spain toward Cuba not cauted con cern to the United States. The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon the Island and the political vicissitudes and embarrassments of the home gov ernment might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continent power called forth, between 1823 and 1860. various em phatic declarations of. the policy of the United States to permit no disturb ance of Cuba's connection with Spain, unless In the direction of Independence of acquisition by us through purchase; nor has there been any change of this declared policy since upon the part of the government. The revolution which began In 1868 lasted for ten years, de spite the-strenuous efforts of the suc cessive peninsular governments to suppress It, Then, as now, the govern ment of the United States testified Its grave concern and offered Its aid to put an end to bloodshed In Cuba. The overtures made by Gen. drant were refused and the war dragged on, en tailing great loss of life and Increased Injury to Amrlcan . Interests, beside throwing enhanced burdens of neutral ity upon this government. In . 1878 reace brought about by the truce of Zanjon, obtained by negotiations be tween the Spanish commander, Mar tines de Campos and the Insurgent leaders. CIVILIZED CODE DISGRACED. The present Insurrection broke out In February, 189S. It Is not my purpose at this time to recall its remarkable Increase or to characterise its tena cious resistance against enormous for ces massed against It by Spain. The re volt and the efforts to subdue It car ried destruction to every quarter of the Island, developing wide propor tions and defying the efforts for Its suppression. The civilised code of war has been disgraced, no less so by the Spaniards than by the Cubans. The existing conditions cannot but fill this government and the American people with the gravest apprehension. There Is no desire on the part of our people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of self-control which In the Inalienable, right of man, protected In their right to renp the benefit of the exhaustions treasures of their country. The offer made by my predecessor In April, 18!M), tendering the friendly of llces of this government, failed. Any mediation on our part was not accept ed. In brief the answer read: "There Is no effectual way to pacify Cuba un less It beglr.s with the actual submis sion of the rebels to the mother coun try." Then only could Spain act In the promised direction of her own motion und after her own plans. The cruel policy of concentration was Initiated February 18, 1MI8. The productive dis tricts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The agricultural Inhabitants were herded In end about the garrison towns, their lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late cabinet of Spain Justified ns a necessnry measure of nnr and as a means of cutting off sup plies from the Insurgents. It hns ut terly fulled ns a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was exter mination. ISA KN EST PROTESTS ENTERED. Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on re peated occasions to enter tho firm and earnest protest of this government. There was much of public condemna tion of the treatment of American citi zens by alleged Illegal arrests and long Imprisonment awaiting trlnl or pending Judicial proceedings. 1 felt It my first duty to make Instant demand for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest. Before the change of the Spanish cabinet In Oc tober last 22 prisoners, citizens of the United States, had been given their Ireedom. For tho relief of our own citizens suffering because of the conflict the aid of Congress was sought In a special message and under the appropriation of April 4, 1897, effective aid has been given to American citizens in tuba, ninny of them at their own request having been returned to the UnltoJ States. The Instructions given to our new minister to Spain before his departure for his post directed liim to Impress UHin that government the sincere wish of the United States to lend Its aid toward the ending of the war In Cuba by reaching a peaceful and last ing result, Just and honorable alike to Spain and to the Cuban people. These Ir.struiilons recited tho character and duration of the contest, the widespread loses It entails, the burdens and re straints It ImiMises upon us, with con slant disturbance of national Interests and the Injury resulting from an In definite cnntlnuunco of this state of things. It was stated that nt this Juncture our government was con strained to seriously Inquire If the time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, rnuve-d by her own In terests and every sentiment of hu humnnity, should not put a stop to this destructive wnr and make pro posals of settlement honorable to her self and Just to her Cuban colony. TUB SPANISH PROPOSALS. It was urged thnt as a neighboring nation, with large Interests In Culm, we could be required to wolt only a leasonable time for the mother country to establish Its authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the Island; that wo could not contem plate an Indefinite period for the ac complishment of this result. No solu tion was proposed to which the slight est Idea of humiliation to Spain could attach, and, Indeed, precise proposals were withheld to avoid embarrassment to tlmt government. All that was asked or expected was that some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored. It so chanced that tho consideration of this offer, addressed to the same Spanish administration which hnd de clined the tenders of my predecessor, and which for more than two years had poured men and treasure Into Cuba In the fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell to others. Between the departure of Clon. Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival In Spain, the statesman who had shaped the policy of his country fell by the hand of an assassin, and although the cabinet of the late premier still held office and re ceived irom our envoy the proposals he bore, that cabinet gave place with in a few days thereafter to a' new ad ministration under the leadcnihln nt Sagasta. The reply to our note wai received on the 2:id day of October. It Is In the direction of a better under standing. It appreciates the friendly purposes of this government. It ad mits that our country Is deeply affect ed by the war In Cuba, and that its desires for peace are Just. It declares that the present Spanish government Is bound by every consideration to a change of policy that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time. To this end Spain has decided to put Into effect the political reforms hereto fore advocated by tho present premier, without halting for any consideration In the path which In Its Judgment leads to peace. The military operations, It Is said, will continue, but will be humane and conducted with all re gard for private rights, being accom panied by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba, while guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, is Is claim ed, will result with Investing Cuba with a distinct personality; the Island to be governed by an executive and by a local council or chamber, reserving to Spain the control of the foreign rela tions, the army and navy and the Ju dicial administration. To accomplish this the present government proposes to modify existing legislation by de cree, leaving the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators and depu ties, to solve the economic and prop erly distribute the existing debt. In the absence of a declaration of the measures . that this government pro poses to take In carrying out Its prof fer of good oillces It suggests that Spain be left free to conduct military operations and grant political reforms, while the United States, for its ' own part, shall enforce its neutral obliga tions and cut off tho assistance which It is asserted the Insurgents receive from this country. The supposition of an Indefinite prolongation of the war Is dented. It Is asserted that the west ern provinces are already well nigh pa cified; that the planting or cane and tobacco therein has been resumed, and that by force of arms and new and ample reforms very early and complete pacification la hoped for. The Immediate amelioration of exist ing conditions under the new adminis tration of Cuban affairs la predicted, and therewithal the disturbance) and all occasion for any changed attitude on the part of the United States. Dis cussion of the question of Interna tional duties and responsibilities of the United States as Spain understands them Is presented with an apparent disposition to charge us with fail ure In this regard. Tills charge Is without any basis In fact. It could not hnve been made If Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this government hns made at the cost of millions and by the employment of the administrative machinery of the nation nt command to perform Its full duty according to the law of the pntlnns. That It has successfully pre vented the departure of a single mil itary expedition or armed vessel from our shores In violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. Hut of this aHct of the Spanish note It Is not necessary to speak further ne.w. Firm In the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due re sponse to this chnrgo has been made In diplomatic course. Throughout these heirrnrs and dan gers to our own peace this government has never In any way abrogated Its sovereign prerogative of reserving to Itself the determination of Its policy rnd course ne'corrling to Its own high sense of right and In consonnnse with the dearest Interests and convictions of our own people should the prolonga tion of the strife so demand. THE DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES. Of the untried measures there re main only: Recognition of the Insur gents as belligerents; recognition of the Independence of Cuba; natural In tervention to end tho war by propos ing a rational compromise between the contestants, and Intervention In favor ef one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for thnt cannot be thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggression. Recognition of the belligerency tif the Cuban Insurgents has often been can vassed ns a possible if not Inevitable step both In regard to the previous 10 years' struggle and during tho pres ent wnr. I am not unmindful thnt tho two Houses of Congress In the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by con current resolution that a condition of public wnr existed requiring or Justify ing the recognition erf a state of bel llgenrency In Cubn, and during the ex tra session the Senate voted a Joint resolution ef like Import, which, how ever, was not brought to a vote In the House of Representatives. In the pres ene'e of these significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative Branch It behooves the executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so Important a measure must needs rest lor Justification. It Is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban Insur rection possess beyond dispute the at tributes of statehood which aleine can demand the recognition of belliger ency In Its favor. Possession, In short, of the essential qualifications of sov ereignty by the Insurgents and the conduct of the wnr by them ne'cording to tne received coele or wnr are no less Important factors toward the deter mination if the problem of belligeren cy than are the Influences and conse quences of the struggle upon the Inter nal policy of the recognizing state. The wise utterances of President Ornnt In his memo bio message of December 7, 1875, are signally relevent to the present situation In Cuba nnd It may be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous conflict had for seven years wasted the neigh boring Island. During all those yean an utter disregard of tho laws of civil ized warfare and of the Jut demands of humanity, which called for the ex pressions ef condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued un abated. Devolution and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously ef fecting the commerce of all commer cial nations, but that 'of the United States meire than nny other by reason of proximity and larger trade and In tercourse. At thnt Juncture Oen. Grant uttered these words, which now, as then, sum up the elements of the problem: "A recognition of the In dependence of Cuba being, In myopln Inn, impracticable and Indefensible, the question which next presents Itself Is that of tho recognition of belligerent lights to the parties to the contest. In a farmer message to Congress I hnd occasion to consider this question and reached the conclusion that the conflict In Cuba, dreadful and devas tating as were its Incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. It Is possible that the acta of foreign powers, and even Spain her self, of this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such recogni tion. But now, as In its past history, the United States should carefully nvold the false lights which might lead It Into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionablo propriety, and adhere rlgidlyand sternly to the rule, which has been Its guide, of doing only thnt w hich Is right and honest and of good report. Tho question of according or of withholding rights of belllgenrency must be Judged In every case. In view of the particular attending facts. Un less Justified by necessity. It is always, nnd Justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. It Is necessary, and It Is required, when the interests and rights of another gov ernment or of Its peope are so far af fected by pending civil conflict as to require a definition of Its relations to the parties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will be recognised In the sense of International law as war." Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies, and their occasional conflicts, do not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing conditions of affairs In Cuba the teBts recognized by publicists and writers on International law. and which have been observed by nations of dignity, honesty and power, when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motive; I fall to find in the Insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organisation, real, palpable and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government tow ard Its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of Justice, with a local habitation, pos sersing such organisation of force, such material, such occupation of ter ritory as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insur rection, or occasional skirmishes, and place It on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the Insurrection has not pos sessed Itself of a single seaport whence It may send forth Its Hag, nor has It any means of communicating with foreign powers except through the mil itary lines of Its adversaries. No ap prehension of any ot those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean Is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular offi cers of other powers, calls for the de finition of their relations to the par ties to the contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature as I re gard It to be, at present, Indefensible as a measure of right. Such a recognition entails upon the country acenrdingtn the rights which Mow from It difficult and clmpllcated duties, and requires tne exaction from the contending parties of the strict ob servance of their rights and obliga tions. It confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; It would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be ransjrorted freely and without Interruption In vessels of the United States, to detention nnd to pos sible seizure; It would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for nets eione by the In surgents and would Invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by e.ur treaty 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a very large part of which. In Its traffic be tween the Atlantic and the Oulf States, and between ell of them nnd the States en the Pnclfle, passes threiugh the waters which wash the shores of Cu ba. Tho exercise of this supervision could scarce fall to lead, If not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two nations. There can be little doubt as to what result such supervision would before long draw this nation. It would bo unworthy of the United States to Inaugurate the possibilities of such a result, by measures If eiuestlonnble right or expediency, or by any Indis cretion. Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and review ing Its Inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent consid erations appear.. In the coele of na tieins there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency unaccom panied by the assumption of Interna tional neutrality. Such recognition will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not therefore actually possessed of affect the rela tions of either party to other states. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality, which relates the de facto condition of belligerency as Its motive. It announces a domestic Inw of neu trality In the declaring state. It as sumes the International obligations of a neutral In the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens nnd others within the Jurisdiction of the urocialmant that they violate thoso rigorous obligations at their own peril nnd cannot expect to be shielded from the consequences., The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of vesels nnd cargoes nnd contraband of wnr and gor.el prize under admiralty law must under. International law be admitted os a legitimate consequence of n proclamation of belligerency. While ne'cording the equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavors would be Imposed on both, which while nomin ally equal, would weigh heavily In be- rittir eif Spain herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the pnrt of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted neit only for the military Investment of the Island, but up to the margin of oifr own territorial waters, and a condi tion eif things would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could not hope to create a parallel; while its creation through nld of sym pathy from within our domain would be , even more Impossible than now with the additional obligations of In ternational neutrality we would per force assume. The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only be Influential within our own Jurisdic tion by land and sea and applicable to our own Instrumentalities. It could Impart to the United States no right of Intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the paramount au thority of Spain aenrding to the inter national rode of war. For these rensons. I regard the recog nition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now unwise, and there fore Inadmssible. Should that step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty the executive will take it. Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has been frequently suggested and has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration. But should such a step be now taken when It Is apparent, that a hopeful change has supervened In the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new government has taken office In the mother country. It Is pledged In advance to the declaration that all the effort In the world cannot suffice to maintain peace In Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solu tion of the Insular problem; that with a substitution of commanders must come a change of the past system of warfare for one In harmony with a new policy which shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to the "horrible alternative of taking to the thicket or succumbing In misery;" that reforms must be Insti tuted In acordance with the needs and circumstances of the time, and that these reforms, while designed to give full autonomy to the colony and to create a virtual entity and self con trolled administration, shall yet con serve and affirm the sovereignty of Spain by a Just distribution of powers and burdens upon a basis of mutual In terest untainted by methods of selllsh expediency. The first acts of the new government lie In these honorable paths. The policy of cruel rapine and extermination that so long shocked the universal sentiment of humanity has been reversed. Under the new military commander a broad clemency Is preferred. Measures have already been set on foot to relieve the horrors ot starvation. The power of the Spanish armies. It Is asserted, is to be used not to spread ruin and dissolu tion, but to protect the resumption of peaceful agricultural pursuits and pro ductive Industries. That past methods are futile to force a peace by subjuga tion is freely admitted and that ruin without conciliation must Inevitably fail to win., for Spain the fidelity -of a contented dependency. Not a single American citizen is now In arrest or confinement In Cuba, of whom this government has any know ledge. The near future will demon strate whether the Indispensable condi tion of a righteous peace. Just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equltable.tak.all our interests so inti mately Involved In the welfare of Cuba, Is likely to be attained. If not. the exigency of further and other action will be determined in the line of indis putable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy in the light of the obligation this gov ernment owes to ttelf, to the people who have confided to It the protection of their interests and honor, and to hu manity. Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotlo considerations, moved neither by passion, nor selfish ness, the government will continue Its watchful care over the rights and pro perty of American citizens, and wilt abate none of Its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall hereafter appear to be a duty Im posed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to Inter vene with force. It shall be without fault on our part, and only because the ne cessty for such action will be so clear as to command the support and ap prove! of the civilized world. THE ANNEXATION OF HAWAII. By a special message dated the 16th day of June Inst, I laid before the Sen ate a treaty signed that day by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and of the republic of Hawaii, having for Its purpose the Incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands as an Integral part of the United States, and under its sov ereignty. The Senate, having removed the Injunction of secrecy, although the treaty Is still pending before that body, the subject may be properly referred to In this message because the necessary action of the Congress Is required to de termine by legislation many details of the eventual union should the fact of annexation be accomplished, as I be lieve It should be. While consistently disavowing from a very early period any aggressive policy of absorption In regard to the Hawaiian group, a long series of declarations, through three-quarters of a century, hns proclaimed the vital Interest of the United States In the Independent life ot the Islands, and their Intimate commer cial dependency upon this country. At the same time, It has been repeatedly asserted that In no event could the entity of Hawaiian statehood cease by the pasage of the Islands under the domination or Inlluenre of another power than the United States. Under these circumstances, the logic of events required that annexation, heretofore offered but declined, should in the ripe ness of time come about an the natural result of the strengthening tie that bind us to those Islands, and be realized by the free will of tho Hawaiian state. That treaty was unanimously ratified without amendment by the Senate and President of the Republic of Hawaii on the 10th of September last, and only awaits the favorable action of the Am erican Senate to effect the complete ab sorption of the Islands Into the domain of the United States. What the condi tions of such a union shall be, the politi cal relations thereof to the United States, tho character of the local admin istration, the quality and degree of the elective franchise of the Inhabitants, the extension of the federal laws' to the territory or the enactment of special laws to fit the peculiar condition there of, the regulation If need be of the labor system therein, are all matters which the treaty has wisely relegated to the Congress. If the treaty Is confirmed, as every consideration of dignity and honor re quires, the wisdom of Congress will see to it thnt, avoiding abrupt assimilation of elements perhaps hardly yet fitted to share In the highest franchises of citi zenship, and having due regard to tho geographical conditions, the most Just . provisions for self-rule In local matters with the largest political liberties as an Integral pnrt of our nation, will be accorded to the Hawailans. No less Is due to a people who, after nearly five years of elemonstrated capacity fulfill the obligations of self-gvernlng state hood, come of their free will to politic. , merge their destinies In our body The questions which have arisen be tween Japan and Hawaii by reason ot the treatment of Japanese laborers emi grating to the Islands under the Hawaiian-Japanese conventon of 18S8, are in a satisfactory stage of settlement by negotiation. This government hns not -been Invited to mediate, and on the other hand has sought no intervention In that matter, further than to evince its kindliest disposition toward such a speedy and direct adjustment by the two sovereign states In Interest as shall comport with equity and honor. It Is gratifying to learn that the apprehen sions at first displayed on the part of Japan lest the cessation of Hawaii's na tional life through annexation might impair privileges to which Japan hon orably laid claim, have given place to confidence In the uprightness of this government, and In the sincerity of Its purpose to deal with all possible ul terior questions In the broadest spirit ot friendliness. , NEGOTIATIONS FOR INTERNA TIONAL BIMETALLISM. Under the provisions of the act of Congress, approved March 3, 1897, for 1 the promotion of an International agreement respecting bimetallism, I ap pointed on the 14th day of April, 1897, Hon Edward O. Wolcott, of Colorado; Hon. Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, and Hon. Charles J. Paine, of Massa chusetts, as special envoys to represent the United States. They have been diligent In their efforts to secure the concurrence and co-operation of Euro pean countries In the International set tlement of the question, but up to this time have not been able to secure an agreement contemplated by their mis sion. The gratifying action of our great sis- ' ter republic ot France, In Joining this country in the attempt to bring about an agreement among the principal com merclal nations of Europe, whereby a fixed and relative value between gold nnd silver shall be secured, furnishes assurance that we are not alone among the larger nations of the world in real izing the international character of the problem and In the desire ot reaching some wise and practical solution ot It. The British government has published a resume of the steps taken Jointly by the French ambassador In London ami the special envoys of the United States, with whom our ambassador at London actively co-operated In the presenta tion of this subject to her majesty's government. This will be laid before Congress. Our special envoys have not made their final report, as further nego tiations between the representatives ot this government and the governments of other countries are pending and in contemplation. They believe that doubts, which have been raised In cer tain quarters respecting the positon of maintaining the stability of the party between the metals and kindred ques tions may yet be solved by further ne gotiations. . Meanwhile it gives me satisfaction to state that the special envoys have al ready demonstrated their ability and fitness to deal with the subject, and it la to be earnestly hoped that their la bors may result In an International agreement which will bring about re cognition of both gold and silver as money upon such terms and with such safeguards as will secure the use of both metals upon a basis which shall work no Injustice to any class of our citizens. , RECIPROCITY ARRANGEMENTS. In order to execute as early as possi ble the provisions of the third and fourth sections of the revenue act ap proved July 24, 1897, 1 appointed the Hon. John A. Kesson, of Iowa, a special com missioner plenipotentiary to undertake the requisite negotiations with foreign countries desiring to avail themselves of these provisions. The negotiation are now proceeding with several gov ernments, both Kuronaaa ! sn-
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