I'AGIJ 0
THE CITIZEN, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER. 0, 1011.
IESSA0E OF
THE PRESIDENT
Mr. Tall Champions the Anti
trust Statute.
NEW REMEDIES SUGGESTED,
Not Repeal or Amendment, but Sup
plemental Legislation Needed Tin
Tobacco Trust Decision an Effective
One Federal Incorporation Recom
mended and a Federal Corporation
Commission Proposed The Test of
"Reasonableness."
To the Senate nnd House of llepre
sentatlves: This message Is the first of several
which I shall send to congress during
the Interval between the opening of
its regular session and Its adjourn
ment for the Christmas holidays. The
amount of information to bo commu
nicated as to the operations of the
government, the number of important
subjects calling for comment by the
executive and the transmission to con
gress of exhaustive reports of special
commissions make it Impossible to in
clude in one message of n reasonable
length a, discussion of the topics that
ought to be brought to the attention
of the national legislature at its first
regular session.
Tho Anti-trust Law The Supreme
Court Decisions.
In May last tho supreme court hand
ed down decisions In tho suits in equi
ty brought by the United States to en
join the further maintenance of the
Standard Oil trust and of the Ameri
can Tobacco trust and to secure their
dissolution. The decisions are epoch
making and servo to advise the busi
ness world authoritatively of the
scope and operation of tho anti-trust
act of 1800. The decisions do not de
part in any substantial way from the
previous decisions of the court in con
struing and npplylng this important
stntute, but they clarify those deci
sions by further defining tho already
admitted exceptions to the literal con
struction of the act. By the decrees
they furnish a useful precedent as to
tho proper method of dealing with the
capital and property of Illegal trusts.
These decisions suggest the need and
wisdom of additional or supplemental
legislation to make it easier for the
entire business community to square
with tho rule of action and legality
thus finally established and to pre
serve tho benefit, freedom and spur of
reasonable competition without loss of
real efficiency or progress.
No Change In the Rule of Decision,
Merely In Its Form of Expression.
Tho statute in its first section de
clares to be Illegal "every contract,
combination in tho form of trust or
otherwise or conspiracy in restraint
of trade or commerce among tho sev
eral states or with foreign nations"
and in the second declares guilty of a
misdemeanor "every person who shall
monopolize or attempt to monopolize
or combine or conspire with any other
person to monopolize nny part of the
trade or commerce of tho several states
or 'with foreign nations."
In two early cases, where tho statute
was Invoked to enjoin a transporta
tion rate agreement between inter
state railroad companies, it was held
that it was no defense to show that
the agreement as to rates complained
of was reasonable at common law, be
cause it was said that tho statute wai
directed against all contracts and com
binations In restraint of trade, whether
reasonable at common law or not. It
was plain from tho record, however,
that the contracts complained of In
those cases would not have been deem
ed reasonable at common law. In sub
sequent cases tho court said that tho
statute should bo given n reasonable
construction and refused to include
within its inhibition certain contrac
tual restraints of trade which it de
nominated as Incidental or as Indirect.
These cases of restrant of trade that
the court excepted from the operation
of the statute were instances which
at common law would have been call
ed reasonable. In tho Standard Oil
and tobacco cases, therefore, the court
merely adopted the tests of the com
mon law and in defining exceptions to
tho literal application of the statute
only substituted for the test of being
incidental or indirect thaf of being
reasonable, nnd this without varying
in tho slightest tho actual scope and
effect of the statute. In other words,
all the cases under tho statuto which
have now been decided would havo
been decided tho same way If the
court had originally accepted In Its
construction the rulo at common law.
It has been said that the court by in
troducing into the construction of the
statute common law distinctions has
emasculated It. This Is obviously un
true. By its Judgment every contract
and combination In restraint of inter
state trade made with the purpose or
necessary effect of controlling prices
by stifling competition or of establish
ing in whole or in part a monopoly of
such trade is condemned by the stat
ute. Tho most extreme critics cannot
Instance a case that ought to be con
demned under tho statute which Is not
brought within Its terms as thus con
strued. Tho suggestion is also made that tho
supreme court by Its decision in tho
last two cases 'tins committed to the
court the undefined nnd unlimited dis
cretion to determine whether n case of
rRstralnt of trnrtn Is within tho teruia
of the stntute. This Is wholly untrur.
A leaoniible restraint of trr.de nt com
mon l-.w Is well understood and Jh
lc.tri.- deilacd. It does not rest in th"
JlsrVftlon of th court. It must b
llmltcd to uccon ";ish the purpose of a
lawful main contract to which in order
that it shall be enforceable at all It
must be incidental. If It exceed the
needs of that contract It Is void.
The test of reasonableness was never
applied by the court nt common Inw
to contracts or combinations or con
spiracies in restraint of trade whoso
purpose was or whoso necessary effect
would be to stifle competition, to con
trol prices or cstnbllsh monopolies.
The courts never assumed power to
say that such contracts or combina
tions or conspiracies might be lawful
if the partlds to them were only mod
erate in the use of tho power thus se
cured and did not exact from tho pub
lic too great and exorbitant prices. It
is true that many theorists nnd others
engaged in business violating the stat
uto have hoped that some such line
could bo drawn by courts, but no court
of authority has ever attempted It.
Certainly there is nothing in the deci
sions of the latest two cases from
which such n dangerous theory of ju
dicial discretion in enforcing this stnt
ute can derive the slightest sanction.
Force and Effectiveness of Statute a
Matter of Growth.
We havo been twenty-one years mak
ing this statute effective for the pur
poses for which It was enacted. The
Knight case was discouraging and
seemed to remit to the states the whole
available power to attack and suppress
the evils of the trusts. Slowly, howev
er, the error of that judgment was cor
rected, and only in tho last three or
four years has the heavy hand of the
law been laid upon the great illegal
combinations that have exercised such
an absolute dominion over many of our
industries. Criminal prosecutions have
been brought, and a number are pend
ing, but juries have felt averse to con
victing for Jail sentences and judges
havo been most reluctant to Impose
such sentences on men of respectable
standing in society whose offense has
been regarded as merely statutory.
Still, as the offense becomes better un
derstood and the committing of it par
takes more of studied and deliberate
defiance of the law wo can be confi
dent that juries will convict individu
als nnd that jail sentences will be Im
posed. The Remedy In Equity by Dissolution.
In the Standard Oil case the supreme
and circuit courts found tho combina
tion to be a monopoly of the interstate
business of refining, transporting and
marketing petroleum and its products,
effected and maintained through thirty-seven
different corporations, tho
stock of which was held by a New Jer
sey company. It in effect commanded
the dissolution of this combination, di
rected the transfer and pro rata distri
bution by the New Jersey company of
the stock held by it in the thlrty-seveu
corporations to nnd among its stock
holders, and the corporations and indi
vidual defendants were enjoined from
conspiring or combining to restore
such monopoly, nnd all agreements be
tween the subsidiary corporations tend
ing to produce or bring about further
violations of tho act were enjoined.
In tho tobacco case the court found
that tho individual defendants, twenty-nine
in number, had been engaged
In a successful effort to acquire com
plete dominion over the manufacture,
sale and distribution of tobacco In this
country and abroad and that this had
been done by combinations made with
a purpose and effect to stifle competi
tion, control prices and establish a
monopoly, not only in the manufacture
of tobacco, but also of tin foil and lic
orice used in its manufacture and of
Its products of cigars, Cigarettes nud
snuffs. Tho tobacco suit presented a
far more complicated and difficult case
than the Standard Oil suit for a decree
which would effectuate the will of the
court and end the violation of the stat
ute. There was hero no single hold
ing company, ns in the case of the
Stnndard Oil trust. The main company
was the American Tobacco company,
a manufacturing, selling and holding
company. The plan -adopted to de
stroy the combination and restore com
petition Involved tho redlvislon of the
capital and plants of the whole trust
between some of the companies con
stituting the trust and now companies
organized for tho purposes of the de
cree and made parties to it and num
bering, new nnd old, fourteen.
Situation After Readjustment.
The American Tobncco company
(old), readjusted capital $02,000,000;
tho Liggett & Meyers Tobacco company
(new), capital $07,000,000; the P. Lorll
lard company (new), capital $47,000,
000, and the It. J. Reynolds Tobacco
company (old), capital $7,525,000, are
chiefly engaged in tho manufacture
and salo of chewing and smoking to
bacco and cigars. The former one tin
foil company Is divided into two, one
of $S25,000 capital and tho other of
$400,000. Tho ono snuff company is
divided Into three companies, one with
a capital of $15,000,000, another with a
capital of $8,000,000 and a third with
a capital of $8,000,000. Tho licorice
companies are two, ono with a capital
of $5,758,300 and another with a capi
tal of $2,000,000. There is also the
British-American Tobacco company, a
British corporotlon, doing business
abroad with a capital of $20,000,000,
the Porto IMcan Tobacco company,
with a capital of $1,800,000, and tho
;orporatlon of United Cigar Stores,
with a capital of $0,000,000.
Under this arrangement each of the
different kinds of business will be dis
tributed between two or more compa
nies with a division of the prominent
brands in tho samo tobacco products,
so ns to mako competition not only
possible, but necessary. Thus tho
smoking tobacco business of the coun
try Is divided so that the present In
dependent companies hnvo 21.30 prr
cent, whlln the American Tobacco com
pany will have 33.08 prr cent, the I.lg
gctt & Meyers 20.05 per ceut. tho Lovll
lard company 22.82 per cent nnd th"
Ileynolds company 2.00 per cent. Tho
stock of the other' thirteen companies,
both proferml and common, has boo:i
taken from the defendant American
Tobacco company and has been dis
tributed among its stockholders. All
covenants restricting competition have
been declared null nnd further per
formance of them has been enjoined.
The preferred stock of the different
companies has now been given voting
power which was denied' It under the
old organization. Tho ratio of the pre
ferred Btock to tho common was' as 78
to 40. This constitutes a very decided
change in tho character of tho owner
ship and conttol of each company.
In tho original suit there were twenty-nine
defendants, who wero charged
with being tho conspirators through
ivhom the illegal combination acquired
and exercised its unlawful dominion.
Under tho decree these defendants will
hold amounts of stock In tho various
distributee companies ranging from 41
per cent as a maximum to 284 per
cent as a minimum, except in the case
of ono small company, tho Porto Itlcan
Tobacco company, in which they will
hold 45 per cent. Tho twenty-nine In
dividual defendants are enjoined for
three years from buying nny stock ex
cept from each other, and tho group Is
thus prevented from extending its con
trol during that period. All parties to
the suit and tho now companies who
nro made parties are enjoined perpet
ually from In nny way effecting any
combination between any of tho com
panies in violation of the- statuto by
way of resumption of the old trust.
Each of the fourteen companies is en
joined from acquiring stock in any of
tho others. All these companies are
enjoined from having common direc
tors or officers, or common buying or
selling agents, or common offices, or
lending money to each other.
Size of New Companies.
Objection was made by certain in
dependent tobacco companies that this
settlement was unjust because it left
companies with very large capital In
nctlvo business and that the settle
ment that would bo effective to put all
on an equality would bo a division of
the capital and plant of the trust into
small fractions in amount more near
ly equal to that of each of the inde
pendent compnnies. This contention
results from a misunderstanding of
the anti-trust law and its purpose. It
is not Intended thereby to prevent the
accumulation of large capital in busi
ness enterprises in which such a com
bination can secure reduced cost of
production., sale and distribution. It
is directed against such an aggrega
tion of capital only when its purpose
is that of stifling competition, enhanc
ing or controlling prices and establish
ing a monopoly. If we shall have by
tho decree defeated these purposes
and restored competition between the
large units Into which tho cupital and
plant have been divided wo shall have
accomplished tho useful purpose of
tho statute.
Confiscation Not the Purpose of Hie
Statute.
j It Is not the purpose of tho statute
iu tuuimiuu wie property anu capital
of the offending trusts. Methods of
punishment by fine or Imprlsonmonf
of the individual offenders, by fine of
the corporation or by forfeiture of its
goods In transportation nro provided,
but the proceeding in equity is n spc
clfic remedy to stop tho operation of
tho trust by Injunction and prevent
tho future use of the plant and capital
In violation of the statute.
Effectiveness of Decree.
I venture to say that not In tho his
tory of American law has a decree
more effective for such a purpose been
entered by n court than that against
tho tobacco trust. As Circuit Judge
Noyes said In his Judgment approving
tho decree:
"Tho extent to which it has been
necessary to tear npart this combina
tion nnd force it Into new forms with
the attendant burdens ought to demon
strate that the federal anti-trust statute
Is a drastic statute which accomplishes
effective results, which so long ns It
stands on the statute books must be
obeyed nnd which cannot bo disobey
ed without Incurring farreachlng pen
nlties. And, on the other hand, the
successful reconstruction of this or
ganization should teach that the effect
of enforcing this statute is not to de
stroy, but to reconstruct; not to de
'mollsh, but to recreate In accordance
with tho conditions which tho congress
has declared shall exist among the
people of tho United States."
Common Stock Ownership.
It has been assumed that tho pres
ent pro rata and common ownership in
nil these companies by former stock
holders of the trust would insuro a
continuance of tho samo old single con
trol of all the companies into which
tho trust has by decree been disinte
grated This la erroneous and is based
upon the nssumed inefflcncy and lnnoc
uousuess of judicial Injunctions. The
companies uro enjoined from co-operation
or combination; they havo differ
ent managers, directors, purchasing
nnd sales agents. If all or many of
tho numerous stockholders, reaching
into tho thousands, attempt to secure
couccrted action of tho companies with
a view to tho control of tho market
their number is so largo that such an
attempt could not well bo concealed,
and its prime movers and all its partic
ipants would bo at once subject to con
tempt proceedings and Imprisonment
of a summary character. The immedi
ate result of tho present situation will
necessarily bo activity by nil tho com
panies under different managers, nnd
then competition must follow or there
will be nctivity by ono company nnd
stagnation by another. Only a short
time will Inevitably lead to n change
in ownership of the stock, ns nil op
portunity for continued co-operntlon
must disappear. Those critics who
speak of this disintegration in the trust
as a mere .change of garments have not
given consideration to the inevitable
working of the decree and understand
little the personal danger of attempt
ing to evnde or set at naught the sol
emn injunction of a court whose object
is made plain by tho decree and who-e
inhibitions nro set forth with a deta.l
nnd comprehensiveness unexnmpled in
the history of equity Jurisprudence.
Voluntary Reorganizations of Other
Trusts at Hand.
The effect of these two decisions has
led to decrees dissolving tho combina
tion of manufacturers of electric
lamps, a southern wholesale grocers'
association, an interlocutory decree
against the powder trust, with direc
tions by the circuit court compelling
dissolution, and other combinations of
a similar history are now negotiating
with the department of justice looking
to a disintegration by decree and re
organization in accordance with law.
It seems possible to bring about these
reorganizations without general busi
ness disturbance.
Movement For Repeal of the Anti
trust Law.
But now that the anti-trust act is
seen to be effective for tho accomplish
ment of the purpose of its enactment
wo are met by a cry from many differ
ent quarters for its repeal. It is said
to be obstructive of business progress,
to be an nttompt to restore old fash
ioned methods of destructive competi
tion between small units and to mnko
impossible those useful combinations
of capital und the reduction of the cost
of production that are essential to con
tinued prosperity and normal growth.
In tho recent decisions tho supreme
court makes clear that there is noth
ing in the statute which condemns
combinations of capital or mere big
ness of plant organized to secure econ
omy in production and a reduction of
its cost. It Is only when the purpose
or necessary effect of the organization
and maintenance of the combination
or tho aggregation of immense size nro
the stifling of competition, actual and
potential, nnd the enhancing of prices
and establishing a monopoly that the
statute is violated. Mere size Is no
sin against the law. The merging of
two or more business plants necessari
ly eliminates competition between the
units thus combined, but this elimina
tion is in contravention of tho statute
only when the combination is made for
purpose of ending this particular com
petition In order to secure control of
and enhance prices and creato a mo
nopoly. Lack of Definiteness In the Statute.
The complaint is made of the stat
ute that it is not sufficiently definite
In Its description of that which Is for
bidden to enable business men to avoid
its violation. The suggestion is that
we may have a combination of two
corporations which may run on for
years and that subsequently tho at
torney general may conclude that It
was a violation of the statute nnd that
which was supposed by the combiners
to b'e innocent then turns out to be a
combination in violation of the statute.
The answer to this hypothetical case
Is that when men attempt to amass
such stupendous capital as will enable
them to suppress competition, control
prices and establish a monopoly they
know the purpose of their acts. Men
do not do such a thing without having
it clearly In mind. If what they do Is
merely for tho purpose of reducing the
cost of production, without the thought
of suppressing competition by uso of tho
bigness of the plant they are creating,
then they cannot be convicted at the
time the union Is made, nor can they
be convicted later unless It happen
that later on they conclude to sup
press competition and tako the usual
methods for doing so and thus estab
lish for themselves a monopoly. They
can in such a case hardly complain If
the motive which subsequently Is dis
closed is attributed by the court to tho
original combination.
New Remedies Suggested.
Much Is said of the repeal of this
statute and of constructive legislation
intended to accomplish tho purpose
and blaze a clear path for honest mer
chants and business men to follow. It
may be that such a plan will bo
evolved, but I submit that tho discus
sions which have been brought out in
recent days by tho fear of tho con
tinued execution of the anti-trust law
have produced nothing but glittering
generalities and have offered no line
of distinction or rule of action ns defi
nite and as clear as that which the su
preme court Itself lays down in en
forcing the statute.
Supplemental Legislation Needed, Not
Repeal or Amendment,
I see no objection, and Indeed I can
see decided advantages, In the enact
ment of a law which shall describo
and denounce methods of competition
which nre unfair and are badges of tho
unlawful purpose denounced In tho
anti-trust law. Tho attempt and pur
pose to suppress n competitor by un
derselling him at a price so unprofita
ble ns to drive him out of business or
tho making of exclusive contracts with
customers, under which they are re
quired to give up association with oth
er manufacturers and numerous kin
dred methods for stifling competition
and effecting monosoly should bo de
scribed with sufficient accuracy In a
crlmlnol statute on tho one hand to
enable the government to shorten Its
task by prosecuting single misdemean
ors instead of nn entlro conspiracy and
on tho other hand to servo the purpose
of pointing out more In detail to
the business community what must be
avoided.
Federal Incorporation Recommended,
In a special -message to congress pn
Jan. 7, 1010, I ventured to point out
tne dlsturbani o to business that would
probably attend tho dissolution of these
offending trusts. I Bald:
"But such nn Investigation and pos
sible prose: utlon of corporations whose
prosperity or destruction affects tho
comfort not only of stockholders, but
of millions of wage earners, employees
nnd associated tradesmen, must neces
sarily tend to disturb the confidence
of tho business community, to drj' up
tho now flowing sources of capital
from its places of hoarding and pro
duce n hall In our present prosperity
thnt will eatfe suffering nnd strained
clriumstnnciM nmong the innocent
many for the faults of the guilty few.
Tho question Which I wish in thl
message to bring clearly to the con
sideration nnd discussion of congress
is whether. In order to avoid such a
possible business danger, something
cannot be done by which these busi
ness combinations may bo offered a
means, without great financial dis
turbance, of changing the charncter,
organization nnd extent of their busi
ness Into one within the lines of the
law under federal control and super
vision, securing compliance with the
anti-trust statute.
"Generally In the Industrial combina
tions called 'trusts' the principal busi
ness is the salo of goods in many states
and in foreign markets in other words,
tho interstate and foreign business far
exceeds the business done in any one
state. This fact will justify the fed
eral government in granting a federal
charter to such n combination to make
and sell In interstate and foreign com
merce the products of useful manufac
ture under such limitations as will se
cure a compliance with tho anti-trust
law. It is possible so to frame a stat
uto that, while it offers protection to a
federal company ngalust harmful, vex
atious and unnecessary Invasion by the
states, it shall subject it to reasona
ble taxation and control by the states
with respect to Its purely local busi
ness. "Corporations organized under this
act should bo prohibited from acquir
ing and holding stock in other corpo
rations (except for special reasons,
upon approval by tho proper federal
authority), thus avoiding tho creation
under national auspices of the holding
company with subordinate corporations,
in different states, which has been
such an effective agency in the crea
tion of the great trusts nnd monopo
lies. "If the prohibition of the anti-trust
act against combinations in restraint
of trade is to bo effectively enforced
it is essential that the national govern
ment shall provide for tho creation of
national corporations to carry on a le
gitimate business throughout the Unit
ed States. The conflicting laws of the
different states of tho Union with re
spect to foreign corporations make it
difficult, if not impossible, for ono cor
poration to comply with their require
ments so ns to carry on business in a
number of different states."
I renew the recommendation of tho
enactment of a general law providing
for the voluntary formation of cor
porations to engage In trade and com
merce among the states nnd with for
eign nations. Every nrgument which
was then advanced for such a law and
every explanation which was at that
time offered to possible objections has
been confirmed by our experience since
the enforcement of tho anti-trust stat
ute has resulted in tho actual dissolu
tion of active commercial organiza
tions. It Is even more manifest now than
it was then that tho denunciation of
conspiracies in restraint of trade
should not nnd does not mean the de
nial of organizations large enough to
be Intrusted with our interstate and
foreign trade. It has been made more
cledr now than it was then that n
purely negative statute like tho anti
trust law may well be supplemented
by specific provisions for the building
up and regulation of legitimate na
tional nnd foreign commerce.
Government Administrative Experts
Needed to Aid Courts In Trust
Dissolutions.
Tho drafting of the decrees in the
dissolution of tho present trusts, with
a view to thoir reorganization into le
gitimate corporations, has made it es
pecially apparent that the courts aro
not provided with tho administrative
machinery to make the necessary in
quiries preparatory to reorganization
or to pursue such inquiries, and they
should be empowered to invoke tho
nld of the bureau of corporations In
determining the suitable reorganiza
tion of the disintegrated parts. Tho
circuit court and the nttorney general
were greatly aided in framing tho de
cree in the tobacco trust dissolution by
an expert from the bureau of corpora
tions. Federal Corporation Commission Pro
posed. I do not set forth In detail tho terms
and sections of a statute which might
supply the constructive legislation per
mitting and aiding the formation of
combinations of capital into federal
corporations. They should bo subject
to rigid rules as to their organization
nnd procedure. Including effective pub
licity, nnd to the closest supervision as
to the lssuo of stock and bonds by an
executlvo bureau or commission in the
department of commerce and labor, to
which in times of doubt they might
well submit their proposed plans for
future business. It must be distinctly
understood that incorporation under a
federal law eould not exempt the com
pany thus formed nnd its Incorporators
and managers from prosecution under
the anti-trust law for subsequent il
legal conduct, but the publicity of its
procedure nnd the opportunity for fre
quent consultation with the bureau or
commission In charge of the incorpora
tion as to the legitimate purpose of its
transactions would offer it ns great se
'urltv against successful prosecutions
for violations of the law as would bo
practical or wise.
Such a bureau or commission might
well be invested also with tho duty
already referred to of aiding courts
in the dissolution nnd recreation of
trusts within the law. It should bo an
executive tribunal of the dignity and
power of the comptroller of the cur
rency or the interstate commerce com
mission, which now exercises supervis
ory power over important classes of
corporations under federal regulation.
Tho drafting of such a federal in
corporation law would offer ample op
portunity to prevent many manifest
evils in corporato management today,
Including Irresponsibility of control in
the hands of the few who aro not tho
real owners.
Incorporation Voluntary.
I "recommend that the federal char
ters thus to bo granted shall bo volun
tary, at least until experience Justifies
mandatory provisions. Tho benefit to
be derived from the operation of great
businesses under the protection of such
a charter would attract all who are
anxious to keep within tho lines of the
law. Other lnrge combinations that
fail to tako advantage of the federal
Incorporation will not havo a right to
complain if thoir failuro Is ascribed to
unwillingness to submit their transac
tions to tho careful official scrutiny,
competent supervision nnd publicity
attendant upon tho enjoyment of such
a charter.
Only Supplemental Legislation Needed.
The opportunity thus suggested for
federal incorporation, it seems to me,
Is suitable constructive legislation
needed to facilitate the squaring of
great Industrial enterprises to the rulo
of action laid down by tho anti-trust
law. This statuto as construed by the
supreme court must coutlnuo to be tho
lino of distinction for legitimate busi
ness. It must bo enforced unless we
nre to banish individualism from all
business and reduce it to one common
system of regulation or control of
prices llko that which now prevails
with respect to public utilities and
which when applied to all business
would bo a long step toward state so
cialism. Importance of the Anti-trust Act.
The anti-trust act is the expression
of the effort of a freedom loving peo
ple to preserve equality of opportunity.
It Is the result of tho confident deter
mination of such a people to maintain
their future growth by preserving un
controlled nnd unrestricted tho enter
prise of tho Individual, his Industry.
Ids Ingenuity, his Intelligence and his
Independent courage.
For twenty years or more this stat
ute has been upon the statute book.
All knew Its general purpose and ap
proved. Many of its violators wero
cynical over Its assumed impotence.
It seemed Impossible of enforcement.
Slowly the mills of the courts ground,
and only gradually did the majesty of
the law assort itself. Many of its
statesmen-authors died before it be
came a living force, and they and oth
ers saw tho evil grow which they had
hoped to destroy. Now Its efficacy Is
seen; now its power Is heavy: now its
object Is near achievement. Now wo
hear tho call for Its repeal on the plea
that It Interferes with business pros
perity, and we are advised in most
general terms how by some other stat
uto and In some other way the evil
wo nro Just stamping out can be cured
If we only abandon this work of twen
ty years and try another experiment
for another term of years.
It Is said that the act has not done
good. Can this be said In tho face of
the effect of the Northern Securities
decree? That decree was in no way
so drastic or inhlbitlvo in detail as ci
ther the Standard, Oil decree or the
tobacco decree. But did' it not stop
for all time the then powerful move
ment toward the- control of all the
railroads of the country in a single
hand? Such a one man power, could
not have been a healthful influence in
the republic, even though exercised
under the general supervision of an
Interstate commission.
Do wo desire to make such ruthless
combinations nnd monopolies lawful?
When all energies aro directed, not to
ward tho reduction of the cost of pro
duction for the public benefit by a
healthful competition, but toward new
ways and means for making perma
nent in n few hands the absolute con
trol of' tho conditions nnd nrlces nro-
rnnn lnrnviniini nnrni-nnsi, 111111 i'iiii
commercial freedom will be dead.
WM. H. TAFT.
Tho White House, Dec. 5, 1011.
Got a Free Lecture.
Tho agent for n handsomely Illus
trated book to be sold on long time
credit a feast to tho Intellect and nn
adornment to any library leaned
ngalnst the side of the bouse, caught
his breath, clinched his fist and looked
skyward.
"What's the matter?." nsked a police
man. "I've met the meanest man," he an
swered. "I've beard of him. and I've
read about-him iu the papers, but I
never expected to ' meet him face to
face."
"Where is he?'
"Up in that building."
"How do you know he's tho meanest
man?"
"By the way ho ncted. I showed
him this work of art, lectured on It
for half nu hour, pointed out the ru
gravlngs, and when I hinted it would
bo a good thing to order what do you
think he snld?"
"I don't know,"
"lie said he never bought books,
he didn't have to. He Just waited for
some idiot of an agent to come nloug
and tell him all that was in 'em nnd
turn over the leaves while he looked
at tho pictures. Nice, Isn't It?" Ep-