E JOURNAL. , ne count, y ,one comfit ution one elestin guniitagdon, ?March 1021841 We this week give the President's Inaug ural Address entire, to the exclusion of all other articles. Inaulmral Address of PRESIDENT lIAIIRISON. CALLRD from a retirement which 1 had supposed was to continue for the residue of my Ur!, to till the Chief Executive office of this great and free nation, I ap pear before you, fellow-citizens, to take the oaths which the Constitution prescribes as a necessary qualification fur the perfor• mance of its duties. And in obedience to a custom coeval with our Government, and what I believe to be your expectations, I proceed to present to you a summary of the principles which will govern the in the discharge of the duties which 1 shall be called upon to perform. It was the remark of a Roman Consul, in an early period of that celebrated Re- public, that a most striking contrast was observable in the conduct of candidates: for offices of power and trust, before and after obtaining them—they seldom carry• ing out in the latter case the pledges and promises made in the former. However much the world may have improved, in many respects, in the lapse of upwards of ' two thousand years since the remark was made by that virtuous and indignant Ro• man, 1 tear that a strict examination of the annals of some of modern elective Gov ernments, would develope similar instant ces of violated confidence. Although the fiat of the people has gone forth, proclaiming me the Chief Magic. trait' of this glorious Union, nothing upon their part remaining to be done, it may be thought a motive may exist to keep up the delusion under which they may be supposed to have added in.relation to my principles and opinions; and perhaps there may be some in this assembly who have curve here either prepared to condemn those I shall now deliver, or, approving them, to doubt the sincerity with which they are uttered. But the lapse of a few months will confirm or dispel their fears. The outline of principles to govern and measures to be adopted by an Administra tion not yet begun, will soon be exchang• ed for immutable history ; and I shall stand, either exhonerated by toy country men, or glassed with the mass of those who promised that they might deceive, and flattered with the intention to betray, however strong may be my present pur pose to - realize the expectations of a mag uaniinous and confiding people, 1 too well understand the infirmities (Shuman nature .nil the dangerous temptations to which I -Hall be exposed, from the magnitude of tai. power which it has been the pleasure 0; the people to commit to my hands, not to place my chief confidence upon the aid of that Almighty Power which has hitherto protected use and enabled me to bring to favorable issues other important, but still greatly inferior trusts, heretofore confided to me by my counrty. The broad foundation upon which our Constitution rests, being the people—a breath o theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or modify it—it can assigned to none of the great divisions ‘f Government but to that of Democracy. f such is its theory, those who are called pan to administer it must recognize as s leading principle, the duty of shaping their measures so as to produce the great . at good to ihelgreatest number. But, with iese broad admissions, if we could coin , r, the sovereignty acknowledged to ~ a t in the mass of our people with the ~,,wer claimed by other sovereigns even .1 those who have been considered the roost purely democratic, we shall find a most essential difference. All others lay claim to power limited only by their own will. 'llse majority of our citizens on thelcontrary, possess a sovereignty with an amount of power precisely equal to that which has been granted to them by the parties to the nation compact, and noth ing beyond. We admit of no Govern• meat by Divineright—believing that so far ss power is concerned, the benificent creator has made no distinction amongst ' , ten, that all are. upon an equality, and hat the only legitimate right to govern is an express grant of power from the govern. ed. The Constitution of the United States is the instrument containing this grant of power to the several departments composing the Government. On an ex amination of that instrument, it will be found to contain declarations of power granted, and of power withheld. The Fatter is slim susceptible of division, into [sewer which the majority had the right to grant. but which they did nut think proper to intrust to their agents, and that which t ,ey could not have granted, not being oii.issssed by themselves. In other words, t -te are certain rights possessed by each swat American citizen which, in his co ~,, a ct with the others, he has never sur L•reo. Some of them, indeed, he i• a to to surrenler, being, in the languagd y ir system, unalienable. ie boasted privilege of a Roman cis sea was to him a shield only against a pet-I y provincial ruler, whilest the proud ',!mucrat of Athena would console him- Al under a sentence of death, fur a sup .o,ed violation of the national faith, 'lnch no one understood, aid which at linos was the subject of the mockery of 11, or of banishment from his home, his ,tinily, and his country, with or without n alleged cause; that it was the act, not .1 a single tyrant, or hated aristocracy, tut of its assembled countrymen. Far tit) rent is the power of our sovereignty. It can interfere with no one's faith, pre scribe furtns of worship fur no one's ob. servance, inflict no punishment but after w , tll ascettained guilt, the result of inves tigation under rules prescribed by the onstitution itself. 'These precious priv• eleges, and those scarcely less important, of giving expression to his highest tlio'ts and opinions, either by writing or speak ing, unrestrained but by the liatulity for to others, and that of a full participation in all thu advantages which flow from the Government, the acknowledged property of all, the American citizen derives from no charter granted by his fellow man. He claims then) because he is himself a man,' fashioned by the same Almighty hand as 1 the rest of his species, and entitled to a full share of the talessings with which he has endowed him. Notwithstanding the limited sovereignty' posessed by the people of the U. States, and the restricted gram of power to the Government which they have adopted, enough has been given to accomplish all :he objects for which it was created. It has been found powerful in war, and, hitherto, justice has been administered, an intimate union effected, domestic tran quility preserved, and personal liberty se cured to the citizen. As was to be ex. pected, however, from the defect of lan- I guage, and the necessarily sententious manner in which the Constitution is writ en, disputes have arisen as to the amount of power which it has actually granted, or was intended to grant. This is more particularly the case in relation to that part of the instrument which treats of the Legislative branch. And not only as re gards the exercise of powers claimed un der a general clause, giving that body the authority to pass all laws necessary to car ry into effect the specified powers, but in relation to the latter also. It is, however, ' consolotary to reflect, that most of the in. stances of alleged departure from the let -I ter or spirit of the constitution, have ulti• tnately received the sanction of a majori ty of the people. And tne fact, that many of our statesmen, most distinguished for talent and patriotism; have been, at one time or other of their political career, on, both i sides of each of the most warmly dis puted questions, forces upon us the infers voce that the errors, if errors they were, are attributable to the intrinsic difficulty, in many instances, of ascertaining the ins tent ions, of the framers of the constitution rather than the influence of any sinister or unpatriotic motive. But the great danger to our institutions does not appear to me to be in the usurpa tion, by the Government, of power not granted by the people, but by the accumu lation, in one of the Departments, of that which was assigned to others. Limited as are the powers which have been grant ed, still enough has been granted to con stitute a despotism, if concentrated in one of the departments. This danger is greatly heightened as it has been always ob servable that men are less jealous of en• croachment of one department upon an other. than upon then own reserved rights. - IVhen the constitution of the U. States first came from the hands of the Conven tion which tot med it, many of the stearnest republicans of the day were alarmed at the extent of the power which had been grunted to the Federal Government, and inure particularly of that portion which had been assigned to the Executive branch There were in it features which appeared not to be in harmony with the ideas of a simple representative Democracy or Re public. And knowing the tendency of power to increase itself, particularly when exercised by a single individual, predic tions were made that at no very remote period ehe Government would terminate In virtual monarchy. It would not be come me to say that the fears of these pat riots have been already realized. But, as I sincerely believe that the tendency of measures, and of men's opinions for some years past, has been in that direction, it is, I conceive, strictly proper that I should take this occasion to repeat the assurances I have heretofore given of my determina tion to arrest the progress of that tendency if it really exists, and restore the Gov ernment to its pristine health and vigor, as far as this can be effected by any legiti mate exercise of the power placed in my hands. I proceed to state in as summary a man; ner as I can, my opinion of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively , complained of, and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the former are , unquestionably to be found in the defects of the Constitution; others, in my knife. ment,lare attributable to a misconstruction of some of its p r ovisi ons . Of the former ' is the elligihility of the same individual to a second term of the Presidency. The,! sagacious mind of Mr. Jefferson early sawi itid lamented this error, and attempts: lave been made, hitherto without success, io apply the amendatory power of the states to its correction. As, however, one mode of correction s in the power of every President, and •onsequentlyin mine, it would be useless, ad perhaps invidious, to enumerate the . . •vils 31 which, in the opinion of many of J u r fellow citizens, this error of the sages who framed the Constitution may have ueen the source, and the bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it, if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general re mark, that Republics can commit no grea er error than to adopt or continue any 'feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create or in [crease the love of power, in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit the management of their of lairs. And, surely, nothing is more like ly to produce such a state of mind than the long continuance of an of fi ce of high trust. Nothing can be more corrupting, nothing more destructive of all those no ble feelings which belong to the character of a devoted republican patriot. When this corrupting passion once takes pus session of the human mind, like the love of gold, it becomes insatiable. It is the never.tlying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth, and strengtheni' with the declining years of its victim. If this is true, it is the part of wisdom for a repub lic to limit the service of that officer, at least, to whom she has intrusted the inan• ageinent of her foreign relations, the exe cution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, to a period so short' as to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not the principal—the servant, not the master. Until an am endment of the Constitution can be effec ted, public opinion may secure the desired object. : give my aid to it, by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under no circumstances, will I consent to serve a second term. But if th,re is danger to public liberty from the acknowledged defects of the Constitution, in the want of limit to the continuance of the Executive power in the same hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less from a misconstruction of that instrument, as it regards the powers actu ally given. I cannot conceive that, by a fair construction, any or either of its pro• visions would be found to constitute the President a part of the legislative power. It cannot be claimed from the power to recommend, since, although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege which he holds in common with every other citizen. And although there may be something more of confidence in the propriety of the measures recommended in the one case than in the other, in the obligations of u 1..! timate decision there can be no difference.' In the language of the Constitution, "all' the legislative powers" which it grants "are vested in the Congress of the Uni ted States." It would be a solecism in language to say that any portion of these is taut included in the whole. It may be said, indeed, that the Con stitution has given to the Executive the power to annul the acts of the legislative body by refusing to them his assent. So a similar power hasnecessarily from that ins.rument to the Judiciary ; and yet the Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature. There is, it is true, this difference between these grants of power • the Executive can put his negative upon the acts of the Le.. gislature for other cause than that of want of conformity to the Constitution, whilst the Judiciary can only declare void those which violate that instrument. But the decision of the Judiciary is final in such a case, whereas, in every instance where the veto of the Executive is applied, it may be overcome by a vote of two-thirds of both nooses of Congress. The newt live upon the acts of the Legislative, the Executive authority, and that in the hands of one individual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some others of a similar character, how ever, it appears to be highly expedient ; and if used only with the forbearance, and in the spirit which was intended by its authors, it may be productive of great good, and he found one of the best safe guards to the Union. At the period of l the formation of the Constitution, the, principle does nut appear to have enjoyed much favor in the State Governments.— It existed but in two ; and in one of these there was a plural Executive. If we would search for the motives which ope• rated upon the purely patriotic and en lightened assembly which framed the Constitution, for the adoption of a pro vision so apparently . repugnant to the leading democratic principle, that the ma ' jority ehould govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any be, nifit to the ordinary course of leelslation., They knew too well the high degree of intelliger.ce which existed among the Peo ple, and the enlightened character of the State Legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies electeii by them would be worth) representatives of such constituents, and, of course, that they would require no aid in conceiving and maturint , ' the measures which the cir• cuinstances of the country might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been en, tertained, that the President, placed at the Capital, in the centre of the c .untry, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people than their own im., mediate representatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with then), often laboring with them, and bound ! to them by the treple tie of interest, duty, and affection. To assist or control Con, gress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could nut, I conceive, have been the tive for conferring the veto power on the President. This argument acquires ad• ditiunal force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first six Pre sidents—. and two of them were members ' of the convention, one presiding over its deliberations and the other having a lar• ger share in consumating the labors of 'that august body than any other person. But if bills were never returned to Con gress by either of the Presidents above retet red to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or nut as well adapted as I they might be to the wants of the People, the veto was applied upon that of •rant of conformity to the Constitution, or because errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment. There is another ground for the adop tion of the Veto principle, which had pros hlably inure influence in recommending it to the convention than any other. I refer to the security which it gives to the just and equitable action of the Legisla ture upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have occurred to the con vention that, in a country so extensive, embracing so peat a variety of soil and climate, and, consequently, of products,' and which, from the same causes, must ever exhibit a great difference in the amount of the population of its various sections, calling for a great diversity in the employments of the People, that the' legislation of the majority might not al ways justly regard the rights and inter ests of the minority. And that acts of this character might be passed, under an express grant by the words of the Consti tution, and, therefore, not within the com petency of the judiciary to declare void. That however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past experience, the members of Congress might be, and however largely partaking in the general, of the liberal feelings of the People, it was impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should nut sometimes be con-' trolled by local interests and sectional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to provide some umpire, from whose aqua-, tion and mode of appointment more in dependence and freedom (rein such influ ences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the Executive Depart ment, constituted by the Constitution.-- A person elected to that high (Ace, hav ing his constituents in every section, state, and sub-division of the Union, must consider himself bound by the most sol emn sanctions, to guard, protect and de fend the rights of all, and of every per tion, great or small, from the injustice and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the' Constitution to the Executive of the Uni ted States, solely as a conservative power. To be used only, Ist, to protect the Con stitution from violation; 2dly, the People) from the effects of hasty legislation, where' their will has been probably disregarded or not well understood ; and, 3dly, to' prevent the effects of combinations vio- 1 lative of the rights of minorities. In re ference to the second of these objects, I may observe that, I consider it the right and privilege of the People to decide dis puted points of the Constitution, arising from the general grant of to Congress to carry into effect the powers expressly giv en. And I believe, with Mr. Madison, "that repeated recognitions under varied circumstances, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications in different mod us of the concurrence of the general will of the nation as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed puints as settled." Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, a fair exhibit made of the operations of each of its Departments, of the powers which they respectively claim and exer cise of the colisions which have occurred between them, or between the whole Go ernment and those of the States, or either' of them. We could then compare our actual condition, lifter fifty years' trial of our system, with what it was in the com mencement of its operations, and ascer tain whether the predictions of the patri ots who opposed its adoption, or the con fident hopes of its advocates, have been best realized. The great ,dread of the former seems to have been, that the re versed powers of the States would be ab• sorbed by those of the Federal Govern ment, and a consolidated power establish ed, leaving to the States the shadow, imly, of that independent action for which they had so zealously contended, and on the preservation of which they relied as the last hope of liberty. Without denying that the result to which they looked with so much apprehension is in the way of be ing realized, it is obvious that they did not clearly see the mode of its accom plishment. The General Government has seized upon none of the reserved rights of the States. As far as any open warfare may have gone, the State author• ities have amply maintained their rights. To a casual observer, out system presents no appearance of discord between the dit ferent members which compose it. Ever the addition of many new ones has pro duced no jarring. They move in their respective orbits in perfect harmony with the central head, and with each other.— But there is still an under current at work by which if not seasonably checked, the worst apprehensions of our anti-fede ral patriots will be realized. And not only with the State authorities be over shadowed by the great increase of power in the Executive Department of the Gen eral Government, but the character of that Government, if not its designation, be essentially and radically changed.— This state of things has been in part ef- fected by causes inherent in the Constitu• thin, and in part by the never-failay, ten-, dency of political power to increase it. self. By making the President the sole dis tributer of all the patronage of the Govern went, the framers of the constitution do not appear to have anticipated at how short a period it would become a formida• tile instrument to control the free opera• lion of the State governments. Of tri fling importance at first, ;t had early in Air. Jefferson's administration, become so powerful as to create great alarm in the mind of that patriot, from the potent in fluence it might exert in controlling the freedom in the elective franchise. 11 such could have been the effects ol its in. flt.ence, how much greater must have been the danger at this time, quadrupled in a mount, as it certainly is, and more coin• pletely under the control of the Executive will, titan their construction of their pow- , era allowed, or the forbearing characters of all the early Presidents permitted them to make: But it is not by the extent of their patronage alone that the Executive Department has become dangerous, but oy the use which it appears may be made of the appointing power, to bring under, its control the whole revenue of the coun-, try. 'The Constitution has declared it to be the duty of the President to see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the Commander-in• Chief of the Armies and Navy of the United States. If the opi nion of the most approved writers upon that species of mixed Government, which in modern Europelis termed Monarchy, in contradistinction to Despotism, is cur• rect, there was wanting no other addition to the powers of our Chief Magistrate to stamp a monarchical character upon our Government, but the control of the public finances. And to me it appears strange,' indeed, that any one should doubt that entire control which the President posses. see over the officers who have the custo dy of the public money, by the power of removal with or without cause, (lees, for all mischievous purposes at least, virtual ly subject the treasure also to his dispo• sal. The first Roman Emperor, in his at tempt to seize the sacred treasure, silen ced the opposition of the officer to whose charge it had been committed, by a vig• nificatit allusion to his sword. By a se• lection of political instratnents for the care of the public money, a reference to their commissions by a President, would be quite as effectual an argument as that of Caesar to the Roman Knight. lam not insensible of the great difficulty that exists in devising a proper plan for the safe-keeping and disburstnent of the pub lic revenues, and I know the importance which have been attached by men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as it is called, of the Treasury from the ban king institutions. It is nut the divorce which is complained of, but the unhallow ed union of the Treasury with the Execu tive Department which has created such extensive alarm. To this danger to our republican insti tutions, and that created by the influence given to the Executive through the instru mentality of the federal officers, I propose to apply all the remedies which may be at my command. It was certainly a great error in the framers of the Constitution, not to have made the officers at the heart of the Treasury Department entirely in dependent of the Executive. He should at least have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of the Legislature. I have determined never to remove a Secretary of fie Treasury with. out communicating all the circumstances attending such removal to both Umses of Congress. The influence of the Exe cutive in controlling the freedom of th. elective franchise through the minim of the public officers can be effectually check ed by renewing the prohibition publisher by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their interle ranee in elections further than givin; their own votes; and their own indepen dence secured by an assurance of per feet immunity, in exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under the dictat..s of their own unbiassed judgments. Never with my consent, shall an officer of dit People, compensated for his services our of their pockets, become the pliant instil, went of Executive will. There is no part of the means placer' in the hands of the Executive which ,night be used with greater effect, for on hallowed purposes, than the control of the public press. The maxim which our an cestors derived from the mother country, that "the freedom of the press is the great bulwark of civil and religious liberty," is one of the most precious legacies which they have left us. We have learned, too from our own as well as the experience of other countries, that the golden shac• Ides. by whomsoever or by whatever Ares tence imposed, are as null to it as the iron bands of Despotism. The presses in the necessary employment of the Govern meat should never be used "to clear the guilty, or to varnish crimes." A decent and manly examination of the acts of the Government should not be on ly tolerated but encouraged. Upon another oocasion 1 have given my opinion at some length, upon the im propriety of Executive interference in the legislation of Congress. That the arth rte in the Constitution making it the du ty of the President to comm unicate infer oration, and authorising hint to recom. mend measures, was not intended to make him the source of legislation, and in par ticular, that lie should never be looked to fur schemes of finance. It would be very strange, indeed, that the Constitution should have strictly forbidden one branch of the Legislature from interfering in the origination of such bills an I that it should; re considered proper that an altogether different department of the Government should be permitted to do so. Some of our best ipulitical maxims and opinions have been drawn (ruin our parent Isle . i here are others,however,wlll,:h cannot be introduced into our system without sin gular incongruity, and the production of much misc hief. And this I conceive to be one. No matter in which of the Hou ses of Parliament a bill may originate, nor by whom introduced, a minister or a member of the opposition, by the fiction of law or tether of the Constitutional princi ple; the Sovereipn is supposed to have pre pared it agreeably to his will, and then submitted it to Parliament for their ad vice and consent. Nuw, the very reverse is the case here, not only with the reerd to the principle, but the forms . prescribed by the Constitution. The principle cer tainly assigns to the only body constitu ted by the Constitution (the legislative body,) the power to make laws and the forms even direct that the eirictinent should be ascribed to them. The Senate in relation to revenue bills, have a eight to propose amendments; and so has the Executive, by the power given him to re turn them to the Douse of Representatives with his objections. It is in his power al so, to propose amendments in the ems ting revenue laws, suggested by his obser vations upon their defective or injurious operation. But the delicate•daty of de vising schemes of revenue should be left where the Constitution has placed it— with the immediate representatives- of the People. For similar reasons, the mode of keeping'the public treasurer should be• pre scribed by them; and the fartherremoved it be from the control of the Execu. rive, the more wholesome the arrange-. inent, and the more in accordance with: Republican principle. Connected with this subject is the char-• ureter of the currency. The idea of ma king it exclusivaty metalic; however well intended, appears to tire to be fraught with• more fatal consequences than any other scheme, having no relation to the perso nal rights of the citizen, that has ever been devised.—lt any single scheme could pro. duce the effect of arresting, at once, that mutation of condition by which thousands of our most indigent fellow citizens, by , their industry and enterprise, are raised to the possession of wealth, that is the one. If there is one measure better calcu toted than another to produce that state of things so much depricated by all true republicans, by which the rich are daily adding to ieir hoards, and the poor sin king deeper into penury, it is an exclu sive metalic currency. Or if there is a process by which the character of the country for generosity and nobleness of feeling may be destroyed by that great in crease and necessary toleration of usury, it is on exclusive metalic currency. Amongst the other duties or a delicate character which the President is called upon to perform, is the supervision of this government of the Territories of the Uni ten States. Those of them whkh are destined to become members of our great political family, are compensated by their rapid progress from inflincy to manhood, for the partial temporary deprivation of their political rights. It is in this Dis trict, only, where American citizens are to be found, who untie: a settled system of policy, are deprived of ninny important political privileg es, without any inspiring 'rope as to the uture. Their only coaso• lation, under circumstances of such de privation, is that of the devoted exterior ;mortis of a camp—that their sufferings secure tranquility and safety within. Ore there any of their countrymen who could subject them to greater sacrifices, . .o any other humiliations than those essen •ially necessary to the security of the oh.- ,ect fur which they were thus separated" i'rom their fellow citizens. kre their rights alone not to be guaran eed by the application of those great irinciples upon which all our ronstitu ions are founded? We are told by th.!, •neatest of British Orators and Statesmen, hat, at the commencement of the war of;' he Revolution, the most stupid men in Ingland spoke of "their American sub jects."—Are there, indeed, citizens of II .ny of our States, who have dreamed at their subjtvls in the District of Columbia. iuch dreams cannot be realized by any (gency of mine. — The' peopletif the District of Columbia ire not the subjects of the people of the states, but free Ametican citizens. Be ing in the latter condition when the Con stitution was formed, no words used . in. that instrument • could have been inten ded to deprive them of that character. If there is any thing in the great principles of unalienable rights, so emphatically in• sisted upon in our Declaration of Indepen 'fence; tliey could neither make, nor the United States accept, a surrender of their liberties, and become the suljecle, in oth er words the slaves of their former fellow citizens. If this be true, and it will . scarcely be denied by any one who has a correct idea of his own rights as an Amer ican citizen, the grant of Congress of ex, elusive jurisdiction in the District of Co lumbia, can be interpreted, so far as re vects the aggregate people of the United States, as 'nestling nothing more than to allow to Congress the controlling power necessary to afford a free and safe exer cise of the functions assigned to the Gen eral Government by the Constitution. In all 'other respects the legislation of Con gress should be adopted to their peculiar position and wants and be conformable with their deliberate opinions of their (At iinterests. 1 have spoken of the necessity of keep ing the respective departments of the Gov
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