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VOL. XVIII.
Harper's Magazine for August, 1881.]
THE SURRENDER OF CORN
WALL! S.
The French Ducde la Rochefoucauld-
Liancourt, who made a tour of the
United States at tbe close of the last
century, expressed surprise and disap
pointment at not finding the monument
at Yorktown, Virginia, which the Con
tinental Congress, fifteen years before,
had voted to erect there in commemo
ration of Cornwallis' surrender. 'lt is
not even yet begun,' fie wrote, in 1796;
and if be grew indignant enough to
add that "sucb negligence is inconceiv
able, shameful and unaccountable,' we
must admit that as one of that nation
which contributed so much to the
great event, he was not at all officious
in bis rebuke. But perhaps the Duke
was a trifle severe, and judged us by
tbe standard of republican Home,
which accorded military trinmphs and
set up memorials and statues without
stint. Why no monument was erected
at Yorktown during the Revolutionary
generation is not altogether unaccount
able, in view of the thousand and one
more serious matters in band. Tbe di
lemma of the finances, and the creation
of a new political system requiring tbe
attention of years, inevitably overshad
owed everything of a purely sentimen
tal nature. A monument could wait,
as long aa the patriotic intent and res
olution were on record. It could wait,
indeed, until some later generation, ap
preciating fully the magnitude of the
victory, would be disposed to commem
orate it in a fitting manner, and make
the memorial truly historical, repre
senting alike the struggles of tbe fath
ers and the gratitude of their descend
ants. Tbe time for it has come around
with the completion of the century,
and we are now promised both a grand
celebration and a grand monument—
the Forty-sixth Congress making good
the resolution of the Continental Con
gress by voting an appropriation of
one hundred and forty thousand dollars
for both objects.
The scene of tbe surrender has long
been a much-neglected spot. Yoik
town is not reached by railway, and is
off the line ot progress. Some day it
may revive its old-time prosperity ; at
least it ought to become more accessi
ble as a point for future pilgrimage.
Before the Revolution tbe town was
quite an emporium, the only port from
which tbe Virginia planters shipped
their tobacco to Kngland. Baltimore
aud Norfolk gradually reduced it by
competition. Some two centuries or
more ago we first hear of it as one of
tbe few outposts or forts in the colony.
In 1825 it was tbe centre of a thriving
county—an Episcopal parish of sixty
communicants, with a church. Wil
liamsburg, tbe capital, with its House
of Burgesses aud growing college, at
tracting thither tbe wisdom and fash
ion of the Dominion, was scarce a doz
en miles away. Until Cornwallis sta
tioned himself tbere, Yorktown bad es
caped the ravages of war on tbe Virgi
nia coast, and after its surrender it
still contaiued about seventy houses,
not more than two or tbree having
been wholly destroyed. Fifteen years
later it bad not extended its limits, and
we find its population, more than half
of wbiiill wad composed of negroes,
numbering about eight hundred souls.
The last war, it need hardly be said,
left in a depressed condition, almost
beyond recovery, and to-day it con
tains not more than three hundred in
habitants, among whom are to be found
but few descendants of the ancient pro
prietors. In fact, it seems to be tbe
lot of Yorktown that the more it be
comes a historical spot, the less it be
comes anything else
How It »iar>j>cned tbivt no grcut u
Strode Uh tlie tmpturc of tin: ablest lirit-
Uh general in America wus finally ef
fected at thirt little town in Western
Virginia, Involves u lengthy chapter in
the history of the struggle. Thin con
spicuous fact, however, goes far toward
explaining it. In the early years of
the war the enemy struck at the head
of the revolt. Unsuccessful there, they
turned in later years to secure the
weaker section, the s<M|th, mu\ I in
thuudet-bolt directed against it waH
|<ord Comwallis. Thus, upon the oc
cupation of New York city in 1770,
and Philadelphia in the following y< ar,
the British commanders and the minis
try at home believed that the reduction
of the strong northern und central col
onies was half accomplished, and their
exacted possession of the Hudson to
its source would render cirgw
lyc<4 jso-ojuirmUm und resistance impos
sible. 'I |iis grand scheme, ncrorthe.
less, wuh doomed to disappointment.
New York and Philadelphia were ex*
cellent bases for military operations,
but tbey never tacaroe the centres of
recovered territory. The British made
no headway inland, ami could <-ontrol
very little beyond the strips of sett
coast lyhich they
By y«'ur tacitly confess
ed that the war in the northern colonies
was a failure; that the poHNession of
the two cities, one of which had al
ready been given up, did not diminish
tbe resources or weaken the army of
the rebels. Burgoynu had beei) (inp.
showed Washington
Stronjj and confident ill the field, and
Htonv point furnished satisfactory
proof that bis troops, thugh reduced in
numbers, were Istter disciplined and
more effective than ever.
Baffled in the north, the British turn
ed to the conquest of the less populous
south. They proceeded npon the as
sumption that if the southern colonies
should first be subdued and recovered
iu the Dortbprn fcuu'tl thereafter
bi> fodticpd by isolation and exhaustion
For a ti(ue success—rapid and alarm
ing success—attended the execution of
this plan. In 1778 Savannah was ta
ken and (Jeorgia overrun. American
attempts to retake the city in the fol
lowing year proved disastrous. In
May, 17HO, Charleston fell, and Lord
Comwallis assumed the command. By
tbe month of July he had occupied the
principal poiuts in the Htnte At {.his
erisij ' Congr.es* bent Hates into the
southern field, who in August of the
same year suffered the crushing defeat
at Camden, which seemed to lay open
everything below Virginia to the occu
pation and ravages of the enemy. Com
wallis, to all appcurawcs, was master
of the situation. Even Greene, who
bad next been appointed to face him,
as the only hope of the Americana, did
I not dare to rink a battle until tbe spring
|of 1781, and then considered himself
fortunate that he was not beaten as
badly as he might have been. The
two brilliant affairs of King's Mountain
and tbe Cowpros, it is true, bad mean
while temporarily disconcerted and de
layed tbe British general; but should
he still snccecd in delivering a damag
ing blow at Greene, their effect would
be entirely neutralized, and the country
south of the James come under his
power. A blow was finally given on
March 15, 1181, at Guilford Court
House, in North Carolina, near the
Virginia border, and had it proved in
every respect another Camden, the in
terests of the British in tbe south
might have become very securely root
ed. But rigiit there at Guilford Court
House we have a crisis in the cam
paign, a turn in British affairs which
led straight on to the Yorktown catas
trophe. The victory over Greene was
won at too great a cost to l>e pursued,
and Cornwallis found himself compell
ed to retire to the coast to refit and re
enforce his exhausted and diminished
army. lie fell back, or to tbe right, to
Wilmiugtou, North C'arolija, and for
tbe time being surrendered tbe situa
tion to his lately beaten antagonist, so
that the south, at least above the
South Carolina liDe, yet remained to
be conquered. «
Notwithstanding this apparent re
treat, these operations from the capture
of Charleston to Guilford won for
Cornwallis a great reputation. He had
proved himself the boldest, the most
original, and tbe most dangerous of the
British leaders, and bis successes reviv
ed the spirits and hopes of tbe ministry
at home, who still expected that from
Wilmington ho would continue his
conquering career. Greene called him
tbe "modern Hannibal," and La Fay
ette referred to him as that "formida
ble" Britisher who made no mistakes.
His next step wan awaited by the
Americuus with deep interest und not
a little anxiety.
The course which Cornwallis deter
mined to pursue from Wilmington in
volved an important personal question
as well as vital consequences. When
Sir Henry Clinton, tbe commander-in
chief at New York, subsequently held
him responsible for his surrender, he
turned back to this Wilmington decis
ion aB one of the causes, if not, indeed,
the main cause, of tbe disaster. Corn
wallis bad made up bis mind to push
into Virginia, aud reduce that "power
ful province," as he styles it, before
operating again to tbe south of it; for
it is to be uoticed that, notwithstand
ing his brilliant detour from Charles
ton northward, and the flattering com
pliments il provoked at bome, be was
secretly conscious that the sum total of
advantages gained amounted to noth
iug, and that the whole field would
have to be fought over agaiu, by begin
ning, however, at tbe other end with
the conquest of Virginia, and there he
proposed to carry the war. Clinton
ufterward pronounced the decision to
Ixj contrary to the spirit of his instruc
tions, which required him to hold uud
secure South Carolina. By inarching
to Virginia he was abandoning it.
"Had you intimated the probability of
your intention,!' wrote Clinton to Corn
wallis iu May, "I should certainly have
endeavored to have stopped you, as I
did then as well as now consider such
a move as likely to be dangerous to
our interests in the southern colonies."
And tbirteeu years later wbeu Clinton
was answering ihe criticisms of the
historian Stedman, lie again insisted
that "Cornwall)* bad been ordered,
ttiid had promised, in ease of failure in
North Carolina, to fall back on South
Carolina and secure it." To all this
Cornwallis bad tbe ready answer that
a return to South Carolina was imprac
ticable, that at so great a distance he
had to act according to his best judg
ment, und that Virginia once sub
dued, the lower provinces would
fall "without much difficulty." The
two generals continued the controversy
Ut a jater date with some acrimony,
but Cornwallis had tho moral support
of the home minister, and the com
mander-in-chief actually found himself
obliged to accommodate bis own future
plans to this movement of his subordi
nate. Whatever the merits of the case,
we have the undisputed fact that Corn
wallis entered Virginia uguinst the
expectations and wishes uf his superi
or.
The final movements of our 'modern
Hannibal,' the ill-timed necessities
which compelled him to coop himself
up behind intrenchments at Yorktown,
compose a distinct and absorbing act
in this military drama. Tbe dreuin of
laying Virginia at bis feet, which at
one time seemed to be on tho point of
realization, was rudely interrupted by
ftn qncifpctitcd oombinatiou of circum
stances. He had now reached a point
wh'-ro be could not act as Independ
ently as Is-fore. Ho was just near
enough his chief at New York to find
that the two must thenceforth co-o|>er
ate, and as Clinton presently discover
ed t|int bis moyunicuto must be deter,
mined by those of tbe Americans and
their French allien, both on land and
sea, we find Cornwallis likewise ham
pered by what may lie called u triple
contingency, namely, the possible
movements of Washington, the uncer
tain operations of French aud British
fleets, and the consequent plans enforc
ed upon Clinton. When combinations
finally Isigan to take definite sha|M) to
ward the c|cme of t|<e gttwmer, th«y
matured so rapidly tlmt fur tbe British
the end came like a shock.
To summarize those intermediate
events—details being beyond our limit
—it will Is* recalled that lie fore Corn
wallis reached Virginia, Clinton had
dispatched two expeditions early iu
1781 to ravage the coast of that State,
one under Arnold, another under Phil
lips. To meet them, Washington sent
Lu Kayctte down in the spring with a
select body o| tW w, Y<' hundred light in-,
fantry, mainly from Now Kuglund. On
tho 20th of Muy Cornwallis arrived at
Petersburg from Wilmington, joined
the expeditionary corpa to his own ar
my, aud with four thousand veteran
infantry, and two well-mounted de
tachmouts of troojiers under Simeoe
BUTLER, PA., WEDNESDAY, JULY 27,1881
j and Tarleton, procetded to operate in
; tbe State. Against such a force La
| Fayette could do uothing. Cornwallis
chased him as far as tho North Anna,
I but failing to bring him to action, be
suddenly turned in a south-westerly
course to Elk Island, in the upper
James, where he covered Simcoe's raid
upon the magazines at Point of Fork,
which Steuben was guarding with
about five hundred Virginia recruits.
The troopers under Tarleton, whom
the State miiitia avoided as they would
"so many wild beasts," rode at will
over tbe country, and nearly succeeded
in capturing Governor Jefferson and
the Assembly at Charlottsville. Mean
while La Fayette bad been re-enforced
by Wayne, near the Kapidan, with one
thousand Pennsylvania Continentals,
and following Cornwallis, dexterously
managed to prevent tbe further destruc
tion of stores, and also joined Steuben's
troops to his own. Cornwallis then
retired to Richmond, the Americans
watching him always, and about the
20tb of June marched to Williamsburg,
on the Peninsula—a move not caused
by inability on bis part to bold his own
in tbe heart of tbe State, but evidently
to await further developments as to the
plan of thoroughly subjugating it
Once more, however, he found bis plans
thwarted. The dearly bought victory
at Guilford Court House crippled him
in North Carolina, and now the situa
tion and demands of his chief at New
York cut off all hope of present success
in Virginia; for upon his arrival at
Williamsburg he received orders from
Clinton to send him three thousaud
men, and with tbe rest to establish a
defensive post on the coast as a bast;
for future expeditions, and a protection
for ships of war. Cornwallis could do
no less than obey, and marching to
Portsmouth, was proceeding to embark
tbe troops, when later instructions per
mitted him to retarin them, and further
more directed him to fortify Old Point
Comfort in Hamptou Roads as the na
val station in view. But upon exam
ination, finding that the Point could
uot lie defended, Cornwallis kept on to
Yorktown to establish tbe post there.
Thus, in the first week in August,
1781, after marching and figbtiug over
a line of fifteen hundred miles since be
left Charleston, and sweeping all be
fore him, this British general reached
tbe point from which he was not to
move again except as a prisoner of war.
And here once more came up tbe ques
tion of responsibility. Cornwallis re
ported after the surrender that he had
never regarded Yorktown in a favora
ble light; that he occupied it in compli
ance with what he beliovcd to lie tbe
spirit of Clinton's orders, and because
he supposed that in an emergency bo
could be relieved by Clinton and a Bri
tish fleet. But Clinton replied that his
instructions to occupy Yorktown were
discretionary, and that he "never re
ceived the leant hint" from Cornwallis
that the position was untenable until
after be capitulated. And on these
points, as well as others, the two con
tinued to differ years after the war,
each throwing the responsibility for
the bad selection of tbe site upon tbe
other. Cornwallis, whose ambition
was to conduct o|»erations on a greut
scale in the State, objected in tolo to
posts, stations, and coast expeditions,
and wished to leave tho State entirely
if he could not remain there in heavy
force. Clinton, who could not send
more troops to Cornwallis at that crisis,
preferred to retain the posts for future
starting-points. Whose policy was
the wisest, not looking at tbe issue, is
a military problem. Both geuerals
bud their friends und defenders.
But to complete tho chain of inci
dents which finally entangled Corn
wallis in the fatal Yorktown meshes,
we must cross into the camps of the
Americans and their friends tho French.
Washington, who with a wretchedly
clothed and often but half-fed army
bad been sustaining the cause of the
Revolution through six anxious years,
never felt the embarrassment of bis sit
uation more than in tho early part of
tho year 17 HI. He could do little to
assist the south, and saw no fluttering
prospects of achieving anything deci
sive in the north. The only ray of
hope that Unshed through the clouda
was the probability that in the course
of tho summer a large French fleet
would appear upon the American
coast, with whose assistance something
might be effected. But even here so
many contiugon<H>s were Involved that
success still seemed an aggravating un
certainty. A campaign, nevertheless,
was arranged. On the' 23d of May,
Washington met Count de Rocham
beau, commanding tho French allies at
Newport, in conference at Wethers
field, Connecticut, where it was agreed
that the French should join the Amer
icans on the Hudson, and an attempt
bo made to capture New York city.
A request was sent later to the Count
de Grasse, admiral of tbe expected fleet
iu the West Indies, to co-operate by
entering the harbor. This was Wash
ington's plun, while it would seem that
Rochambeau, although yielding to him,
had misgivings lb regard to It At
the same oonferenoo tho project of
marching to Virginia was alluded to,
but it was held that that State could
bo relieved quite us effectually by at
tacking Clinton in tho north, und pre
venting him from sending further ro
enforeeiuents southward Still, every
thing depended upon De Grasse, With
out him the year would probably closn
with matters continuing in utatu i/uo ;
with him a great blow might be struck
somewhere, and that sowwhere was
now the problem. Although Washing
ton had committed himself at the
Wethersfiold conference to an attack
upon New York, and expected the co
oporation of the French admiral, we
find, as the summer advanced, and the
situation in Virginia changed by tbe
retirement of Cornwullis to the sea
coast, that he recognized the possibility
of a change of plan on his own part,
aud this before Do Grasso's final desti
nation aqd intentions were known. By
the 2d of August ho ha I informed La
Fayette of tbe contingency that might
take him to Virginia, where they could
unite in falling upon Cornwallis; and
be had Hounded Mr. Roliert Morris as
to transportation from Philadelphia,
from which we are to infer—as indeed
one of his letters authorizes the infer-
once—that even had De Orasse come
to New York, Washington was ready
to suggest his sailing back to the Ches
apeake, while the army would more to
the same point. In other words, the
march upon Cornwallis, perhaps tbe
most splendid episode of the war, was
an alternative plan already maturing in
Washington's mind before word came
from De Grasse that for good reasons
he should not sail further north than
Virginia
De Grasse's announcement that he
would be in tbe Chesapeake about the
first of September, and that be expect
ed to meet the allied army there and
not at New York, did not reach Wash
ington until August 14. At once the
latter turned his entire attention to tbe
descent upon Cornwallis. Demonstra
tions had been made against New York
in July with a serious intent, but now
they were conducted as a feint. It was
of the greatest importance that Clinton
should not suspect the intended march
until Washington was well on his way
southward. The plan remained a pro
found secret with both tho American
and French chiefs. The troops were
put on the move agaiu toward the city
as if for an attack, and when they turn
ed about and crossed the Hudson at
King's Ferry, late in August, the feint
was still kept up on tbe Jersey side for
a day or two, when the entire force
headed for the Chesapeake. On the
2d of September the American wing,
two thousand strong—four thousand
having been left to guard tbe Hudson
under Heath—marched through Phila
delphia, followed the next day by the
French contingent, which delighted
Congress and the citizens with its in
spiring music and brilliant appearance.
Here tbe news was received that De
Grasse had arrived in the Chesapeake
with a powerful fleet, and Washiugton
pushed on with the livliest anticipa
tions of success. The troops took the
straight road to tbe head of the 101 k
and Baltimore, and after a short delay
embarked in transports for the James.
In spite of tbe fatigues of tbe march
they were all in good spirits, with
hardly a sick man among them, and
Beemed to realize the probably decisive
results of tho movement they were en
gaged in. "We shall soon look in
upon Cornwallis as stern as tbe gravo,"
wrote an officer to a friend in the
North, and be only reflected the gen
eral expectation. From Baltimore,
Washington aud Ilochambeau and
their suites rode rapidly overland, stop
ping at Mount Vernon on the <Jth and
10th—tbe chiefs first visit to his home
for six years—and on the 14th reach
ed the camp of La Fayette at Williams
bwrg, who had been re-enforced with
thrco thousand French troops under
St. Simon, brought on by De Grasse.
When Clinton, at New York, woke up
to the fact that Washington had given
him the slip, he saw no other way of
meeting the danger to which Cornwal
lis would be ex]>onod but by attempt
ing to go to his relief by sea.
La Fayette's little army at Williams
burg, the American part of which had
been hovering about aud dodging Corn
wallis ever since be entered the State
—once, indeed, attacking him at Green
Springs, near Jamestown, but without
success—received Washington with
unbounded enthusiasm. As he ap
proached the camps with Kocharobeau,
the troops turned out on their parades,
a salute of twenty-one guns was fired,
and later in tho afternoon the Marquis
St. Simon gave a sumptuous entertain
ment, at which tbe chiefs and all tbe
ofUccrs were present. "To add to the
happiness of tbe evening," says one of
tbe guests, "an elegant band of music
played an introductivo part of a French
opera, signifying the happiness of tbe
family when blessed with the presence
of their father, and their great de|>end
ence upon bitn About ten o'clock tbe
company rose up, and after mutual
congratulations und the greatest ex
pression of joy, they separated." In a
h-w days tho troops from the north
ward arrived in transports from the
bead of tbe ChrKa|M)ake, landing near
Williamsburg by way of tbe James,
and on tbe 27th of September the com
bined force was ready to move upon
Cornwallis at Yorktown below. The
situation thux preaented wax tb« groat
surprise of the devolution. It appears
as one of the few grand relieving feat
ures in an otherwise comparatively
tedious war, for here we have a piece
of strategy on Washington's part
which involved for tbe lirst time exten
sive and critical movements, and whose
details were carried out with singular
precision and success. Clinton is oiiiet
ly left in the lurch at New York;
Washington boldly marches four hun
dred miles away, and suddenly cruah
es his famous lieutenant at a point
where assistance can not roach him.
The (Kisitton at Yorktown, on the
bunk of the York River, so formidable
in the late war, proved a weak one as
Cornwallis was situated. He threw
up works around tho place, and occu
pied the high ground, nearly half a
mile beyond, on the Williamsburg
road, then known as "Pigeon Quarter,"
a name still familiar to old residents
of tho [ilace. It was here that Ma
gruder's Confederate 'Red'and 'White'
redoubts stood in 1802. Cornwallis
hail redoubts on the same sites, but
their guns pointed in nearly the oppo
direction. The works around the town
wore protected on the right by a deep
ravine, and on the left by the head of
Wormeley Creek, which set in from
the river below. At tbe mouth of the
ravine on the right, und across it, a
strong work was thrown up, and gar
risoned by a portion of the Royal
Welsh Fusl leers. The officer second
in command was Captain Thomas
Saumauroz, who lived long enough to
be promoted to the rank of lieutenant
general in the British army on the day
of Queen Victoria's coronation. Two
other young captains—Charles Asgill,
of the Guards, and Samuel Graham, of
the Seventy-sixth—also rose to the
same grade, The British position was
defended by seventy-seven pieces of ar
tillery and seven thousand livo hun
dred men. General O'llara happened
to IMI tho only general officer present,
after Cornwallis, and important com
mands necessarily fell to Bold and line
officers Lieutenant-Colonel Dundas
was intrusted with the right of the
works, und Liouteuaut-Colonel A tier
crombie with the left.
On the morning of September 28,
Washington and the allied army moved
forward from Williamsburg for the
investment of Yorktown—a march of
eleven miles. That night they encamp
ed vitbin a mile and a half of the ene
my's position. On the 29th they ap
proached still nearer, and some skirm
ishing followed. On tbe same day
Cornwallis received dispatches from
Clinton which decided him to evacuate
his outworks at Pigeon Quarter, and
retiro within the lines immediately sur
rounding the town. This move became
tbe subject of criticism. The posses
sion of the works in question by the
British would have delayed the be
siegers, but Cornwallis justified his
action by the tenor of his dispatches,
which he claimed contained promises
from Clinton that relieving forces
would sail from New York about the
sth of October, and that until their ar
rival he could bold out within his in
terior position. He claimed, further,
that Washiugton, by crossing Worme
ly Creek below, would soon turn his (
left, and compel him to fall back. Clin
ton, however, seems to have been dis
inclined to accept this explanation, and
insisted that Cornwallis had represent
ed, some weeks before, that the exte
rior position had been surveyed, and
would be fortified, leaving Clinton to
infer that he would hold it as loug as
possible. Clinton also explains that
his dispatches only held out hopes that
a fleet would sail about October 5, re
lieving troops not being mentioned. In
short, be insinuates that Cornwallis
had not done all iu his power to gain
time—then the one thing to be gained
But whether Coruwallis's reasons were
sufficient or not, his move precisely
suited tbe Americans and French, who,
on the 30th, occupied the abandoned
works, and thus found themselves in
an unexpectedly favorable position for
advancing their siege operations. The
French manned two of the redoubts,
while the Americans reversed another
and built a fourth, which effectually
hemmed in the British in the town.
The working parties were covered by
the American light-infantry, whose
loss that day, the 30th, was trifling iu
numbers, but serious in the fall of the
brave and much-loved Colonel Alexan
der Scammell, of New Hampshire. As
officer of the day, be advanced with a
small party to reconnoitre the deserted
works, when ho was suddenly surpris
ed by Lieutenant Cameron and some
troo|>erß of Tarleton's legion, and mor
tally wounded the moment after his
surrender. His wounds were dressed
in Yorktown. when be was returned on
parole to Williamsburg, where he died
on the evening of the 6th of October.
One of tbe heroes of Saratoga, lately
adjutant-general of tho army, a noble
and gifted soul, with enviable prospects
lieforo him, his fall was hardly less
than a public loss.
The allied forces now spread out
into permanent camps, and prepared
for vigorous work. The French ex
tended ou the left from tbe river above
the town half way around, and the
Americans continued tho line along
the right to the river below. The
camps themselves were some two
utiles from the enemy's works, the
pickets within half a mile. In rouud
numbers there were on both sides ol
the river sixteen thousand liesiegers
against seven thousand besieged,
though in point of effectiveness the
tho proportion was more iu favor of the
latter. The American wing waa com
posed of three divisions of Contiueu
tals, two brigades iu each—in all, five
thousaud men—and between three and
four thousand Virgiuian militia under
General Nelson, whose brigadiers were
Geuerals Wcedon, Stevens, and Lawson,
all good officers. For the division
commanders wo have Generals Lin
coln, La Fayette, and Steuben. La
Fayette's division, which took the
right of the entire line, included the
select troops of the army known as the
corps of light-infantry. General
Mublenburg commanded tbe First
Brigade, General Hazen tbe Second.
Tbe three battalions of tbe First were
led by Colonel Vose, of Massachusetts,
Lieutenant-Colonel Gimat, aid to La
Fayette, and Lieutenan-Colonel Barber,
of N'ew Jersey ; those of tho Second
by Lieutenant-Colonel Huntington, of
Connecticut, Lieutenant-Colonel Alex
under Hamilton, of New York, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, of South
Carolina, aide to Washington. Bri
gaded with those, also, wns lla/.en's old
Canadian regiment, some two hundred
aud fifty strong. Kxcluding the latter,
the light-infantry numbered about
fourteen hundred men, nearly all of
whom had been detached from tbe
New Kngland lines. The Frist Bri
gade, which had been with him
trough the Virginia campaign, was La
Fayette's favorite, and he used to say
of it that liner troops could not IMI found
the world over. Steuben's division in
cluded tbe brigades under Generals
Wayne and (41st. In the former were
two Pennsylvania mgiinents, com
manded by Colonels IMchard Butler
and Walter Stewart, and a lately rais
ed Virginia Continental regiment,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Gaakins,
while two Maryland regiments, under
Colonel Adams aud Major Boxburgh,
composed Giat's brigade. In Lincoln's
division we have the two New York
regiments of Van Cortlandt and Van
Schaik forming one brigade, under
General James Clinton, and Olnov's
full Bliodc Island regiment, with
Dayton's and Ogdcn's New Jersy bat
talions, making up tho remaining bri
gade, under Colonel Dayton. On tbe
side of the French we find seven
regiments, under the names of Bour
bonnois,Douxponts, Soissonois, Sain
tonge, Ageuois, Touraine, and Gatnois,
averaging a thousand men each, anil
formed into three brigades, under Baron
Vlomeuil, tbe Viscount Vlomenil, and
Marquis St. Simon. A fine corpa of artil
lery— tbe American detachment lieing
under General Knox, Colonel Lamb,
Lieutenant-Colonels Stevens and Car
rington. aud Major Biiuman—complet
ed the force o|s'rating against York
town. A point iu the of tho cen
tre of the entire lino, half a mile north
woat of Wynne'a Mill, and two and a
half miles bark from the Yorktown
works, was the spot where Washing
i ton established his head-quarters.
CONFESSION.
Guiteau's Movements as Discovered
by the Attorney General.
WASHINGTON, July 14.—United
Stales District Attorney Corkhill
furnishes the following for publication:
'The interest felt by the public iu
the details of the assassination, and
the many stories published, justify me
in stating that the following is a cor
rect and accurate statement concerning
the points to which reference is made:
The assassin, Charles Uuiteau, came
to Washington City on Sunday eve
ning, March 6, 1881, and stopped at
the Ebbitt House, remaining only one
day. He then secured a room in
another part of the city and has board
ed and roomed at various places, the
full details of which I have. Wednes
day, May 18, 1881, the assassin
DETERMINED TO MURDER THE PRESIDENT.
lie had neither money nor pistol at
that time. About the last of May he
went into O'Meora's store, on the cor
ner of Fifteenth and I streets, this city,
and examined some pistols, asking for
the largest calibre. He was shown
two, similar in calibre and only differ
ent in price. On Wednesday, June 8,
he purchased the pistol which he used,
for which he paid $lO, bo having in
the meantime borrowed sls of a gentle
man in this city on the plea that he
wanted to pay bis board bill. On the
same evening, about 7 o'clock, he took
the pistol and went to the foot of
Seventeenth street aud practiced liring
at a board, firing 10 shots. He then re
turned to his boarding place aud wiped
the pistol dry and wrapped it in his
coat aud waited his opportunity.
On Sunday morning, Juno 12, he
was sitting in Lafayette Park, and
saw the President leave for the Chris
tian church, on Vermont avenue, and
he at once returned to his room, obtain
ed his'pistnl and put it in his hip pock
et, and followed the President to
church. He eutered the church, but
found he could not kill him there with
out tho danger of killing some one
else. He noticed that the President
sat near a window. After church he
made an examination of the window,
and found he could reach it without
any trouble, and that from this point
be could shoot the President through
the head without killing any one else.
The following Wednesday be went
to the church and examined the loca
tion and window, and became satisfied
that he could accomplish his purpose,
and he determined, therefore, to make
the attempt at church on the following
Sunday. He learned from the papers
that the President would leave the
city on Saturday, tho 18th of June,
yvith Mrs. Qarfielil, for Long Brauch ;
be therefore determined to meet him at
tho depot. He left bit boarding place
about 5 o'clock on Saturday morning,
June 18, and went down to the river
at the foot of Seventeenth street, and
fired five shots, to practice his aim, and
Ije certain his pistol was in good order.
He then went to the depot and was in
the ladies waiting room of the depot
with his pistol ready when tho Presi
dental party entered.
He saw Mrs. Garfield looked so
weak and frail he had not the heart to
shoot the President in her presence,
and as he kucw he would bavo another
opportunity be left the depot. He bad
previously engaged a carriage to take
liim to jail.
On Wednesday evening the Presi
dent and his son, and I think United
States Marshall Henry, wont out for a
ride. Tho assassin took his pistol and
followed them, aud watched them for
some time in hopes tho carriage would
stop, but no opportunity was given.
On Friday evening, July 1, he was
sitting on a seat in tho Park, opposite
the White House, when he saw the
President come out alone. He follow
ed him down the ayenuo to Fifteenth
street, ami then kept on tho opposite
side of the street, un Ffteenth, until
the President entered tho residence of
Secretary Blaine. He waited at the
corner of Mr. Morton's late residence,
corner of Fifteenth and H streets, for
some time and then, as ho was afraid
he would attract attention, he went in
to an alley in the rear of Mr. Morton's
residence. There he examined his
pistol and waited. The President and
Secretary Blaine came out together
and he followed them over to a gate of
the White House, but could get no op
portunity to use his weapon. On the
morning of Saturday, July 2, he break
fasted at tho Biggs House about
seven o'clock, lie then walked up in
to the park and sat there for an hour.
He then took a one horse avouuo car
and rode to Sixth street, he got out and
went into the depot and loitered
around there; had his shoes blacked
and engaged a hackman for two dollars
to take him to jail, lie then went into
the water closet and took his pistol out
of his hip pocket and unwrap|ied the
paper from around it which he had put
there fur the purpose of preventing the
perspiration from his body dampening
the powder, lie examined his pistol
carefully, tried the trigger, and then re
turned and took a seat iu the ladica'
waiting room, and as soon as the Pros!-
dent entered he advanced from behind
him und fired two shots.
These facts I think can lie relied
upon as accurate, aud I give them to
the public to contradict false rumors in
connection with this most atrocious of
atrocious crimes.'
[(itfu'o Fall*, (N. V.) Timed.)
A < nr«l.
(JI.RN'S FALLS, N. V., Dec. 14, 'BO.
IN. .'/r. I, JV. BT. o*9*l
I>KAK Sin. Will you please stute
lielow what satisfaction St. Jacobs Oil
gives you, which you got of us some
time ago, and oblige
LEUOKTT & BOSII.
Very effective.
L. N. ST. ONUC.
Peruna should be taken for all skin
diseases.
The Czar has issued an ini|s<rial
ukase commuting the sentence of death
passed on Hessy llclfiuan, one of
those impliealcd in the assassination
of Alexander 11.
4iad an almost invisible skin disease,
itching intolerable. I'eruna cured
it. 11. Ambil, Pittsburgh.
ADVERTISING RATES,
On* square, OM insertion, 91; each tabM
quent insertion, 10 cent*. Yearly advertisement
exceeding one-fourth of • column, 96 per inch
Piguae work doable these rate*; »d<fctien»
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made. Local advertisement* 10 oent* per Una
for first insertion, and 5 cents per line for each
additional insertion. Marriage* cad death* pub
lished free of etas rye. Ohituwy notke* thai gad
as advertisement*, and payable when banded in
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trators' Notice*, 93 each; Eatray, Caation an*
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Prom the fact that the Cmrex to the oldes*
established and most extensive ly circulated lie
publican newspaper in ButlerAounty. (a Kepufc
liean county) it must be apparent to business
men that It to the medium th«y should use la
advertising their bnsinea*.
NO. 35
A ROMANTIC STORY.
Col. Albert G. Pelton, whose beauti
ful 20,000 acre ranch is out toward the
Rio Grande, near Laredo, has been the
Peter the Hermit of the Texans for
years. He came to Texa9 in 1844, a
common soldier. By talent and cour
age be rose to the rank of Colonel, and
finally, in 1856, commanded Fort
Macrae That year he fell in lore
with a beautiful Spanish girl at Albe
quiu, New Mexico. Tbo admiration
of the young people was mutual, and
parental objections only intensified the
affection of the lovers Fnally, alter
two years of entreaty and devotion,
Col. Pelton won the consent of the
purents of the beautiful Spanish girl
and they were married.
One day the two, accompanied by
the young wife's mother and twenty
soldiers, rode out to the hot springs,
six miles from the fort, to take a bath
While in the bath, which is near the
Rio Grande, an Indian arrow passed
over their heads. Then a shower of
arrows fell around them, and a band of
wild Apache Indians rushed down
upon them, whooping and yelling like
a baud of demons. Several of the
soldiers fell dead, pierced with poisoned
arrows. This frightened the rest, who
fled. Another shower of arrowrs, and the
beautiful bride and her mother dropped
into the water, pierced by the cruel
of the Apaches. With his wife dying
before his eyes, Col. Pelton dashed up
the banks, grasping bis rifle, and killed
the leader of the savage fiends. But
the Apaches were too much for the
Colonel. Pierced with two poisoned ar
rows, he swam the river and hid under
an overhanging rock. After the sava
ges had left, the Colonel swam the
river and made his way back to Fort
Macrae. Here his wounds were dron
ed, and bo finally recovered, but only
to live a blasted life—without love,
without hope—with a vision of his
beautiful wife, pierced with poisoned
arrows, lying perpetually before his
eyes.
After the loss of his wife a change
came over Col. Pelton. He seemed to
think that he had a sacred mission
from heaven to avenge her death. He
secured the most unerring rifles, sur
rounded himself with brave companions,
and consecrated himself to tbo work of
revenge. He was alwavs anxious to
lead any and all expeditions against
the Apaches. Wbenevor any of the
other Indians wore at war with the
Apaches. Col. Pelton would HOOB be
at the bead of the former. One day
he would be at the head of his own
soldiers and the next day be would be
at the bead of a baud of Mexicans. He
defied Indian arrows and courted
death. Once, with a baud of the wild'
est desperadoes, he penetrated a
hundred miles into the Apache country.
The Apaches never dreamed that any
thing but an ontire regiment would
dare to follow them to their camp in
the mountains. So when Col. Pelton
swoo]>ed down into their camp with
ten trusty followers, firing their Henry
rifles at the rate of twenty times a min
ute, the Apaches fled in cousternation,
leaving their women and children be
hind. It was then that there darted
out of a loge a white woman.
'Spare the women !' she cried, and
then she fainted and fell to the ground.
When the Colonel jumped from the
saddle to lift up the woman be found
she was blind.
'How came you here, woman, with
these Apaches!" be asked.
'I wan wounded and captured,' abe
Httid, 'ten years ago. Take, ob, take
IIH> buck again !'
'Have you any relatives In Textsf*
asked tbe Colonel.
'No. My father lives in Albequln.
My busband, Col. I'elton, and my
mother were killed by tbe ludiana.'
'Great God, Bella! is It you—injr
wife ?'
'Ob, Albert! I know you would
come,' exclaimed tbo poor wife, blindly
reaching ber bands to clasp ber bus
hand.
When I saw tbo Colonel le waa
rending a newspaper to his blind wife,
while in her hand she held a boquet of
fragrant jessamines wbicb ho bad gath
ered.
A LITERARY TiI UNDER'
A review of the revision of tbo New
Testament written from the point of
view of general approval, is printed in
iho Evening I'out to-day. Without
going over tbe ground of that review,
and without giving any opinion upon
substantial differences between tbe old
ami new versions, wo may direct at
tention to what seeniH to be a literary
blunder on tbe part of tbe revlaera—•
blunder which ia HO grave as to be well
nigh incredible, and .which 1b likely to
rob the labor of the learned committee
men on either side of the Atlantic of ft
great part of Its value by hindering, if
not absolutely preventing tbe genoral
acceptance of its rei-ults.
If some ingenious peraon should pro
pare an edition of the works of Mhakea*
|>earc with all the old-fashioned worda
struck out and modern wordM put in
their place*, and with the quaint forma
of s|»oecb carefully corrected so as to
make smooth, atraight, everyday
sentences, be would have hia labor for
his pains. Nobody would acccept hia
new version. If his work was notlce
ed at all, its author would lie sharply
rebuked as an officious meddler. It
would bo taid very justly that we want
tbe old-fashioned words and tbe quaint
forms; that they are the very charact
eristics which have made the worda
familiar ; that the plays translated into
contemporaneous Knglish would seem
like strangers to us; that we find littl*
difficulty in interpreting the obaoletft
words, and thut If we did the interpre
tation should Ite embodied in notes and
commentaries and the pure text aavod.
It is safe to say that the readers of
the Knglish Bible are at least at con
servative of its literary features aa the
readers of Hhnkesjsmre are of tbe fa
miliar characteristics of bis worka. At
least as many passages from the Bible aa
from the plays have become rooted and
grounded in the nopular memory. Tbe
former ia a storehouse of Knglish aa
well as the latter.
For all derangementa of tbe Urinary
Organs wear a l>ay Kidney I'ad.