E
BY MOORE & HEMPHiLL
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Secretary Marcy’s Reply lo
Gen. Scolt---Concluded.
The execution of the whole 0! the most
difficult branches oftluties appertaining to
a military expetlition—providing {or trans
portation—is, by the distribution of the
business in the War Department, allotted
to the Quartermaster General. As an ex
pedition against Vera Cruz had been re
solved on some time before you were as
signed to take command ot it. Gen. Jesup
had gone to New Orleans to be in the best
position to tnaketlte necessary preparations
tor such an enterprise. From his knowl
edge and long experience in military at
fairs, not only in his appropriate depart
ment. but as a commander in the field, the
_government 'thUUght it tortunate that you
could have the advice and assistance ot so
able a counsellor.
Your suggestion that it might be neces
sary to send ships in ballagt trotn the north
tor transports was not neglected or no
heeded by me. Whether I! “ould be ne
cessary or not, depend. according to your
statement to me, upon the means of trans
portation uhtch could be procured at New
Orleanfl. &c. My first step “as to write
to the Quartermaster General, then at that‘
place, lor information on that subject. In
my letter to him ofthe llth at December,
I said :
“It is expected that moat of the vessels In the
aorvico oflho quarterntnater'u department can he
used as transports tor the expedtnou. It Will be
necessary that the department should know what
portion of the transportation can be turnished by
the ordinary means u hicb the qoartcrmarter's dc
partment has now under its control tor the purpo
see ottts expedition. l hnvo to re'qne-t that int'ur
tnntion on this point should be furnished utthoul
delay
_‘ "Another point on which the department desires
information 11. nhat amount of mean- at transpor
tation for such on expedttion ean be turninhed at
New Orleans, Mobile, and in that quanr-r.’
"Thu expense of procuring trutraportn tron) the
Atlantic cities will be exorbitant. Freight r- \ery
high and meat ofthe good vowels are engaged tor
the ordinary purposes of commerce."
‘lt is tmportant to bear in mind that you
saw this letter on your first arrival at New
Orleans. In writing to me how that place.
December 2|, you observe: "l have seen
your letter (In the hands ot Lieut. Colonel
Hunt) to the Quartermaster General. da
ted the llth.” You could not mistake
_itsrobject, because it was clearly express
rd. I asked distinctly, “hat means at
tramportatinn tor the expedition can be
tarnished at New Orleans. &c.. anrt re
terrerl to the expense and difficulty ot pro
curing transports hour the Atlantic cilied.
You could not, therefore, but know that
my course as to sending ships irt ballast
trotn the north would bra-regulated by the
Quartermaster Generalls reply. While
waiting for this inlormation, and in order
to prevent delay. and be sure not to de‘
serve the imputation east upon me. i is
sued the order oi the lfith 0! December.
to which you reler. knowing that ll could
be modified and couturrned to [ht-exigen
cies of the service. according to the an
swer «hieh I should receive trnm General
Jesup. His reply is dated the 27th 0!
December, and tn it he says:
"Transportation can be provided here
{or allthetroops that may be drawn from
the army under tlte command 0! General
Taylor and tar all the ordnance. ordnance
stores, and other supplies. uhieh may be
drawn either from this depot {the Brawn)
or how New Orleans. The public nan»-
ports—l mean those owned by the United
States—that can be spared for the con
templated operations. it is estimated, wrll
carry three thousand men with all their
supplieS.’ Vessels can be chartered on in
vorable terms tor any additional transpor
tation that may be required.” This lot
ter was submitted to and read by you. as
appears from your endorsement thereon
After referring to some other matters in
the letter. you conclude your endorsement
as follows .- "I recommend that breVet
Maj. Gen. Jesup’s suggestions be adopt
ed.” This lact shows that the letter re
ceived your particular attention. When
this letter (which you knew was torwar'd
ed, to the department) was here received
—showmg that your apprehended diflicul
ty in obtaining suflictent transportation at
the south was unfounded. and that it could
be provided in that quarter in great ebun
dance on favorable terms—my. order at
the léth of December, so far as it related
to sending out vessels in ballast; was coun
termanded, It is strange. indeed, that.
alter you were made acquainted with the
object of my inquires and Gen. Jesup's
letter in reply to them, you should have
looked for transport vesselsin ballast from
the Atlantic cities. and still more strange
that their, non-arrival should be the prool
that you rely on to convict me of having
neglected my duty In this instanccn It,
in truth.‘;you delayed the expedition near
ly two months for these transpurlmd um
blameless. The responsibility is in ano
ther quarter. It cannot be said—that this
statement as to the sulficiency-of ;trans-
Sportstobe'obtaiued at the south had an
implied reference to what 'I had 'ordered
from the Atlantic cities. tor my order was
then unknown to yourseltandf;tlte quarter
master General. You first received a co—
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py of it several days alter the date of Gen.
Jesup’a letter to me, umluf your endorse
ment thereon. [See your letter to me of
the 12th January] Resisted at you were
by ‘ head winds,’ eovyloped in ‘lriuhtful
nurthcrs.’aod oppressed with complicated
and perplexing duties in arranging and
preparing .the expedition again-t Vera
Cruz, some temporary bgwilduruwnt may
be excused; but, to charge the War Dc
purtuwnt with _vour own misapprehemions
and mistake, is inrxcusable.
My reply to tho arruunttons lorccs me
lo oxpma some of your inisstutrmvntu of
lacl. You allege that tho t—xpedition, for
the want of the ‘teo vrssvlu,’ was delay
vd from the 15th of January to the 91h ol
Match. You rertniol)~ mean to be under
stood that on the 15th ol Jiiouurrvxyuur
troops were ready to embark. and were
delayed for want of these transports; But
this was not so; and law indebted to you
{or most abundant pruof to ebtabhsh vour
naccuracy. I
The great body of your troops for the
expedition was drawn lrom Gen. Taylor's
command at Monterey and in the Interior
ol Mexrco; and tin part of them had an]
ched either the Brazos nr 'l‘antpicn—the
points of etnharcation—on the 15rh ol Jan
uary. In your letter of the 12th ol that
mouth to Gen. Brooke, at New Orleans.
you maid: “I have now to state that It Is
probable the troops I have called for Irom
Gen. Taylor's immediate command to cm
bark here (the Brazos) and at 'l‘umptco,
will not reach them: points till late in the
present month. (January.) any about the
25th.” [lt a letter to me M the 26”) ot
January. you remark that Gen. Butler re.
spontled to your call for the troops with
the utmost prodipttturle, and that Gen.
eral Worth hatl made an admirable
movement. "The head ol his division
jAIHVV‘I ttith him at the mouth 0! the Rm
Grialnde the day bclnre yesterday," (94th
January) \\ hen the remainder came up, i
is not stated 3 yet one ofynur “naked his
torical lacta” places the \t hole command
at the point! of embarcation waiting IN
the "ten vessels" at least ten days belote
the actual arrival of any part nl them.—
But it they had been there. uhy should
they have been detained for these \‘ent‘lh?
In the same letter—written but too day~
alter the arrival of the head at the tirst di
vtniltn. and probably before the other had
come up—-vou say that "Quartermaster
General, (Brevet Major General Jesup.
at New Orleans.) I find has taken all pro~
per measures with judgment and prompt
itude to provide every thin: depending on
his department for the despntch and nor-
Cr-ss nfmy expedition." I! more “as wan
terl,curnulatrve proof might be tlrattn from
the same source—your own correspon
dence—-tr_rshow not only that this charge
against me hart no lounrlatton in truth, but
that you can have no apology for having
preleH‘tl It; 1')
Alter showing how unfortunate you haVe
been in your specific charges, I may with
propriety meet those 0! a general and
nweeping character with u lers particular
detail ul PTOUIA to show their groundless
nests.
'l'ltough the “tcn VB§~elsn were not,for
re very auflicient reasons I hau- amigo
ed, sent out in ballast from the Atlantic
titles; yet a Very large number “1'“: son:
thence with stores. ~Upplit’2. and ”00‘”,
to co-operate in the t'xpedition.
lo General Jesup’s letter to me of the
17th inst.. a copy of which is wot here
ui'h. he states that fifty-three ships, brigi,
harques. and achonners. were sent from
the north and the department actually lur
nishrd at New Orleans. Brazm. and 'l‘atn
pica, for the army. before It took up the
line of march Into the interior, one hun
rlrcrl and sixty-three revels.
I have alluded to the large number of
surf boats. and the great difficulty of pro
curing them, as the cause of the delay in
their arrival. I have also a similar roan
on to offer in reply to your complaint for
not having scasonably t'rccin-d the siege
train and ordnance supplies. The tleluy
is to be ascribed to the enormously large
outfit you required. If it Was necessary,
and despatclr was used in procuring rt. no
one iain fault. if too large; you certain
ly ahould not regard as a rcprehcnstble
delay the time necessarily taken' up to
preparing it. To show that it was large.
and required much time to procure it. I
will select from manya single item. You‘
demanded from eighty to one hundredl
thousand ten-inch shells, and forty or filly
mortars of like calibre. This cnorrnoua
quantity of shells—about four thousand
tons—was mostly to be manufactured of
tar you left Washington. All the furna
ces in the country, wrlling to engage in the
business. were set to work; but, with the
utmost diligence and dcspatch. the supply
of this one article or even tworthirda of
llthVing to be manufactured and trans
ported to the sea-board from the furnaces,
(located in most instances in the interior
of the country.) vat a season of the year
when water communications. were obstruc
ted by ice, could not be ready to' he serif
forward to you in many tnouthaaftcr vour
departure from Washington. . Had your;
requisttions been moderate—and undoubt
edly tnore. moderatoonea would ltava suf.
ficed—they could have been lurninhed at
a touch earlier period. '
'l'he memorandum which you left “for
the siege-train and ammunition therefor,”
was submitttcd to toe by the‘ O'dnancc
ULEARFIELD, PA.,JUNE3.IB4B
DePflrtment (in tho 26th of November.
with an intimation that It could no! bt‘
complied with in season for the expedition
‘" 2" for Ward as early as yon had contem
plntctl. I endorsed upon It, “comply Will!
the above us lnr as practicable.” nml this
("den I am natisfietl. alter lull examina
tion. Wns lnithtully exrcuted.
What could be done at Washington,
“03 promptly done. You had with you
the Quartermaster General. with till the‘
means nt the Command of the \\'ar De
‘pnrlment. ontll’wtth unrestricted authority
:otlo whatever you might require. He
Was under your supetvtsion, nntl nuhject
to your orders. able and uilling to execute
them. You have never lnllmnlt'tl that he
tn any respect. failed in hit duty; but on
the contrary. you have spoken in highly
commendatory terms of his efficient ser
vtcvs. ‘
lhnve already quoted your acknowl
edgctncnt that he had taken nll prOper
measures with jurtgcrnentund prornptitudc
to provide every thing depending on his
department tor the der-patch and success
of your expedition. In an issue 0! tact
between you and the head of the War Dc
pnrtment, his testimony. in connection
with yoUr own conlession, is the be»! that
can be offered to correct your misstate
ments and to retute your charges.
In his letter to me of the 2d ofJanuary.‘
1847. he says: "General Scott lelt {on
the Interior on the 29th'ultitno, and I am
taking active measures to have everything
depending opon me ready tor hi~ opera
tion». The quartermnster’s department,
I find. is called upon to do a great deal
that should be done by other branches 0'
the staff. So tar as Gen. Scott’s opera
rons go, I shall have every thing done
hut In necessary, whether it belongs to
ny department or to other departments to
lo it.”
You had with you, and subject to your
Htlt‘ffi. not only the Quartermaster Gen
eral. but officers of the other stail depart.
ineiits. They did not look to the \Var
Department, but to yourself, tor direc
lltititl; and It Was your duty. atitl not mine.
to see that your requirements were com
plied with. That they were so. to the at
llttlsl practical extent, I have no reason to
doupt; but if they were not, the fault, if
any, is not with the \Var Department.—
You also gave tho instructions in relation
to prowling ttie means of land transporta
tion. and the oiliéers charged with that
tluty were under your itnmediate control ;
and il therein blame anywhere tor and de
cienry in this respect it cannot be impu
reil to the War Department. Your whole
corre-pnntlence With me. and the stall of
ficers with you, shuns that 'you Very pro
party took upon yourself the whole charge
at givtng directions in this matter. In a
letter to Capt. lletzel. senior quarteimas
ter at the Brazos. speaking on this subject
of the land transportation which may be
needed after .ihe descent on the enemy’s
“coast near Vera Cruz, you say. "I have
already discussed and arranged with you
the detail of the EARLY land transportation
train." &c. On the 10h of March. you
lurnishcd General Jesup with your esti
mates and directions on this subject. The
stall “mu-rs being with you, and under
your orders. nothing further was, or prop
t-ily could be. reqmred or expected to em
anate Irom Washington. beyond the sup
ply ul loads; and. this being done, ifyuu
wr-re disappointed in not realizing your
expectations. you have not a culorable
pretence for imputirig blame to "the head
oi the War Dt'partiitent."
As a juat ground ol complaint. and a
matter of arcusatioii. you'relt-r In your tie.
ticiéticy of means to make the descent, and
to capture the city til Vera Cruz and the
castle of San Juan d’Ulloa. and assume
that the extent of that deticrency was the
ditlerenco baiueen what you received and
what you required. It would be quite as
correct reasoning to say. that what you
had having proved sullicicnt ior the pur
pose, that dillctence allowed the extent of
the errors in your estimate. The tiuth
lies, perhaps. between the two extremes.
You had lea», probably. than you should
have had. and you required much more
than Was necessary. i’l'hat you did not
have more, and.;indeed, all you asked for,
l have already shown was not the limit of
the War Department.
.Gen. Jesup was with you at Vera Cruz.
saw your means. and is capable of form
inu an estimate of their sufliciencv. He
is, as his letter herewith shows. disposed
to bejust. and even generous to your lame.
To his opinion on this subject. no well
foundcd exception can be taken. He says.
in reference to your complaints on account
ofa dellicient supply of surf-boats. siege
train and ordnance stores: “.'l'he result
shows that he (Gen. Scott) had surf boats
and stores enough!” And of the delay of
which you complain. he fully exonerates
the War Department. and ascribes the
whole to yourselt. and to unavoidable ac.
cidents. 'l‘he imputation that you were
designed/y crippled in your means. is a
charge as preposterous as it iii unfounded.
Q 1 am aware that. the execution til some
of the many arrangements for the Vera
Cruz Echdition was obstructed and de
layed by accrdents. but they were such as
common sagacity could not foresee, or hu
man agency- control; Ul'hey were not.
however. more ithah a considerate iiiind,
bringing into‘ view all the difficulties of the
care. wouldhave expected. When your.
complaints on this subject were first re
ceived here. evincing. as they did, that
you intended to hold the department res
ponsible for every untowa‘rtl event, the
heads of the several bureaus were called
on by me to show how they had executed
the duties which had been confided to
them, particularly in regard to matters
referred to by'ytiu. The evidence they
presented of having done all that was re
quired. or could have been expected. con
vinced me—antl I venture to say that. on
a lull examination.“ will eDllilf_V any mind
npeti to conviction—that all your cutti
plaints. so far as they imputed blamcto
the War Department. or any of its bran
ches. are unfounded. It will (In much
motor—it will show that great industry.
promlntness, uncommon capacity. and ex
traordinary exertions, in relation to every
thing connected with the war, have char
acterized the action of each of these sub
ordinate departments. As a commenda
tion justly merited by these several bran
shes of the department, assailed asthey
tire indirectly by ynti, I see no good rea.
son for withholding my opinion, that an his
stance cannot be found where so much has
been done, and well done. in so short a
time, by any similar body of officers under
similar circumstances.
As you have. by implication. laid a hea
vy hand upon the bureau which is charged
,with the onerous duties ol executing the
laws and orders for raising and sending
forward the recrutts & levies, I feel bound
to affirm that you have done that branch
of the public service the greatest injustice.
No industry has been spared—no posai~
ble effort omitted—to raise the lorcea
which were authorized. and to send them
to their destination within the briefest
practicable period. The numerousordern
issued from the Adjutant General’s office.
and its voluminouscorrespondence on that
subject, will sustain this assertion.
You have pressed with unwanted zeal l
the charge in relation to diverting the tie-l
tachments of new regiments under Gen-l
Cadwulader’s command to the Brazos, &
have indulged in the wildest speculations
as to the sad consequences which attend
ed this imputed error. Assuming that my
orders diverted these troops. or any tith
era. (an assertion nhich I shall controvert‘
hereafter.) the circumstances justified the]
measure. The critical condition of Gen.
'l'aylor, according to all accounts receiv-l
ed here at that time, iii stated in my letter(
to you of the 22d of March. To show
that the departments acted properly. tho'l
tt't‘ncurred your reproof. it is necessary to;
recall the facts as they then appeared here.
They are presented in the lollouing ex
tract lrom that letter:
" The intormation which has just reached on in
the shape of rumors. a: to the Situation of General
Taylor. and the forces under 111 l command, has ex
cited lhe most painful apprehensions for their safe
ty. it is ultnmtt certain that Santa Anna has pre
ctpiiated the large army he had collected at San
Luis de l’otosi upon General Taylor; and it may
be that the General has not been able to maintain
the advanced position he had seen fit to take at A
gua Nueva, but has been obliged to fall back on
Monteroy‘ It is equally certain that in Mexican
force has been interposed between Monterey and
the Rio Grunde. and that it has interrupted the line
of communication between the two places, and
seized largo supplies Mitch were oil the way to
General Taylor's army.
lftho hostile force botwoon the Rio Canada and
Gen Taylor's army is as large as report represents
it. our troops now on that river may not be able to
raaastabliah llio lino. nor will it. perhaps, be poaai
ble to place a force there sufficient for tho purpose.
in time to prevent disastrous consequonces to our
army, unless aid can be afforded from the troops
under your immediate command.
From one to two thousand of the new recruits
for the ten regiments, from this quarter. will be on
the way to the Brazos in ilio course of three or four
days. All the other forces will be directed to that
point, and every alfort made to rolotve Gen. 'l‘ay
lor from his critical situation. You Wlll have been
ftilly npprized before this can reach you of the con
dition ofthingl in tho vulley ofthe Rio Graiido.
and at the headquarters of General Taylor. (S: have
talten, I trust. such measures as the importance of
the subject requirca. lnaed not urge upoti you
the fatal consequences which would result from
anvjaorious disaster which might lit-fall the army
under General 'l‘oylor. nor do I doubt that you Will
do what is lit your pouer to avert such a calamity."
'l he course pursued by the War Depart
ment on that occasion, which you convert
into a charge. must, on revision, I_ think.
commend itself to general approbation.—
Had it been indifferent to the alarming con
dition of Gen. Taylor’s army. and lorborne
to use. at the earliest tnoment. tlte most en~
ergetic measures to guatd against tlte fatal
consequences of its defeat, then too probe.
ble. it would have deserved an arratgntuent
as severe as tltat which you have made a
gainst it for having done its duty in that
critical emergency. When you first recei
ved the reasons assigned for the course a
dopted here. they appear to have been sat,-
isfactory. In your despetch of the 28th of
April. you say : " Yesterday I learned, by
your letter of the 22d, and the Adjutant
General’s of the 26th ult., that all the re
crttits of the regimente—some 3,ooo—raie
ed or likely to be raised in time {or this or
my; have been ordered to the Rio Grande.”
You did not then intimate the slightest dis
eatisfection~noteven apremonitory symp
tom'fnl' that deep distress with which, in
stantly on Mr. Trist’s arrival in Mexico.
you represent yourself to have been seiz'
ed. It is a coincidencmnot unworthy of
notice. that. the letter containing your first
condetnnatory remark on thts subject was
written on the day ofthe date of Mr.’l‘rist’s
first note tovyou, and onlytthc day before
your captious tepty to it a and itt both you
transit the War Department. Yourwith~
NEW SERIES—VOL. I, NO. 23,-"WHOLE No. 1098;
ering disappointment seems to have slum.
hered for ten days. and then to have been
amused by the appearance of Mr. Tris: in
Mexico and your quarrel with him. lfthe
order from the War Department had in
fact "diverted” the forces with Gen. Cad
walader. still it was fully justified by the'
threatening aspect of affairs on the Rio
Grande; but i am quite sure it did not di.
vert them. No previous order from the
department had designated any other place
of rendezvous than the Brazos for the
troops that were tojoin your column. It
was well understood. before yen left “’ash
ington. that all the troops for both armies
were to be sent to that place, and there (0
fall under your command.
This arrangement was not nor was it ex
}pected that it would be here changed. until
‘you had penetrated so far into.the enemy’s
‘country as to render your communications
with that place of general rendezvous diffi'
cult and ditatory.
You also complain that the order was
not countermandod. If there had been such
an order, and it had been countermnnded.
what would have been the consequence!
The troops would have gone forward from
the United States under the former orders
offlthedepartment, which would have taken
them to the same place.
You allege that 't the news of the victo
ry of Roses Vista reached Washington in
time to countermand Cadwalader’e orders
for the Rio Grandc before his departure
Ifrom New Orleans. a I notice this specifi
cation of neglect of duty, to show the ex
tent to which you have carried your fault
finding. and the industry with which you
have searched for occasions to indulge it.
Your assumption is. that the news ofthe
victory of Buena Vista should have satisfi
ed the War Department that Cadwalader’s
forces were not needed on the Rio Grande;
and the emission to countermand. as soon
as that news was received. the orders to
send them there. was a neglect deserving
severe animadversion. How did you act
under similar circumstances? With better
means of information as to the actual con
dttion of the Rio Grande frontier. after the
victory of Buena Vista. you did not deem
it prudent. after being forty-one days in
possession of the news of that victory. to
issue positive orders to remove a single
man from that frontier 3 yet you venture to
censure me for not having sent the troops
away the moment the news reached Wash
ington.
You roceived informatiori'of that victory
on or before the 14th ofMarch. for on that
day you proclaimed it‘in orders to your ar
my. 0n the 25th day oprril. more than
forty days thereafter. you Issued an order
to the commanding officer at the Brazos to
embark for Vera Cruz. “such detachments
of the new regiments as may have heenvor
dered by the War Department to Point II
abel;” bntyou made it conditional with
reference to the safety of the line of the
Rio Grande ; and said to that officer, that
you relied upon his "sound judgment to
determine on the spot whether. that line
would not be too much exported by the
withdrawal ofthetroops in question.’ Thus
it appears that you do not hesitate to im
ypute neglect of duty to me, for not having
adopted and acted on the conclusion that
the line of the Rio Grande was safe the
moment I heard of the victory of Buena
Vista; but, when acting on the same sub
joct. you dared not adopt that conclusion.
although you had been in possession of the
same information forty-one days. Your
own conduct in this matter completely re~
futes this charge of yours against the'War
Department. It does more; it shows how
rash and inconsiderate you have been in
selecting! topics for attack.
But the most serious consequences are
attributed to the long delay of these troops
at the Brazos. For your sake. I sincere
ly hope these consequences are much ex
aggerated, because I am quite confident
it will be ‘shown that you alone are respon
sible for the delay. The War Depart
ment did not—nod it was proper that it
should not—issue any order in regard to ~
the movement 0! thetroops after their ar
rival in Mexico. The order from the de-
purtmcnt ofthe 30th of April, making a
division ol the new levies between tltetwu'
columns. does not contradict this asser
tion. lnr these levies were then mostly
\Vllhin the United States; only portions of
them had reached Mexico. Until this or
der took ,efl'ect, the troops at the Brazos;
and, undead. on the Rio Grande and with
Gen. Taylor. were under your entire and
unrestricted command. As to this unt-
ter. you were under no misapprehension;
for on the 25th of April, before you were
informed ivhat had been done here to we
cure the Rio Grunde line, you issued an
ordering relation to the troops at tha~Braé
209. This place. you well know. was lhii
general rendezvous of the new levies from,
the United Staten, and before you sailed,
on your expedition to Vern Cluz. you
Wine notified that the Mexican army weiq
advancing upon Gen. Taylor. 'l‘o hll.
assumed that you had not left at the Bin-5
209. with a view to meet any probable con-H
tingoncy. orders for the proper disposition.
of the troops which were. or might be thin! '
there. would have implied an opinion l'htit
you wanted unimble qualifications {outfit}
high station which had been 'uoéigneg'l'to
IiZA
, .'l‘hcae troops were a part ‘of ybur Cofi¢
mand, angi subject to your oiders ;‘md‘if