E BY MOORE & HEMPHiLL ~‘- may-I‘m“ trMMal'iSe 'l‘ho “ DEMOCRATIC BA'N'NER" IR publmho weekly. xllB2 par unnnm—or S] 50 if paid In nd vunco. .4 , No paper can bo dilscnnlinnod (unless at the up “on ofthe editors) until all arrenragos nrc pnid. WAdvorlmomcnm. &c.. M (ho usual rulos. Secretary Marcy’s Reply lo Gen. Scolt---Concluded. The execution of the whole 0! the most difficult branches oftluties appertaining to a military expetlition—providing {or trans portation—is, by the distribution of the business in the War Department, allotted to the Quartermaster General. As an ex pedition against Vera Cruz had been re solved on some time before you were as signed to take command ot it. Gen. Jesup had gone to New Orleans to be in the best position to tnaketlte necessary preparations tor such an enterprise. From his knowl edge and long experience in military at fairs, not only in his appropriate depart ment. but as a commander in the field, the _government 'thUUght it tortunate that you could have the advice and assistance ot so able a counsellor. Your suggestion that it might be neces sary to send ships in ballagt trotn the north tor transports was not neglected or no heeded by me. Whether I! “ould be ne cessary or not, depend. according to your statement to me, upon the means of trans portation uhtch could be procured at New Orleanfl. &c. My first step “as to write to the Quartermaster General, then at that‘ place, lor information on that subject. In my letter to him ofthe llth at December, I said : “It is expected that moat of the vessels In the aorvico oflho quarterntnater'u department can he used as transports tor the expedtnou. It Will be necessary that the department should know what portion of the transportation can be turnished by the ordinary means u hicb the qoartcrmarter's dc partment has now under its control tor the purpo see ottts expedition. l hnvo to re'qne-t that int'ur tnntion on this point should be furnished utthoul delay _‘ "Another point on which the department desires information 11. nhat amount of mean- at transpor tation for such on expedttion ean be turninhed at New Orleans, Mobile, and in that quanr-r.’ "Thu expense of procuring trutraportn tron) the Atlantic cities will be exorbitant. Freight r- \ery high and meat ofthe good vowels are engaged tor the ordinary purposes of commerce." ‘lt is tmportant to bear in mind that you saw this letter on your first arrival at New Orleans. In writing to me how that place. December 2|, you observe: "l have seen your letter (In the hands ot Lieut. Colonel Hunt) to the Quartermaster General. da ted the llth.” You could not mistake _itsrobject, because it was clearly express rd. I asked distinctly, “hat means at tramportatinn tor the expedition can be tarnished at New Orleans. &c.. anrt re terrerl to the expense and difficulty ot pro curing transports hour the Atlantic cilied. You could not, therefore, but know that my course as to sending ships irt ballast trotn the north would bra-regulated by the Quartermaster Generalls reply. While waiting for this inlormation, and in order to prevent delay. and be sure not to de‘ serve the imputation east upon me. i is sued the order oi the lfith 0! December. to which you reler. knowing that ll could be modified and couturrned to [ht-exigen cies of the service. according to the an swer «hieh I should receive trnm General Jesup. His reply is dated the 27th 0! December, and tn it he says: "Transportation can be provided here {or allthetroops that may be drawn from the army under tlte command 0! General Taylor and tar all the ordnance. ordnance stores, and other supplies. uhieh may be drawn either from this depot {the Brawn) or how New Orleans. The public nan»- ports—l mean those owned by the United States—that can be spared for the con templated operations. it is estimated, wrll carry three thousand men with all their supplieS.’ Vessels can be chartered on in vorable terms tor any additional transpor tation that may be required.” This lot ter was submitted to and read by you. as appears from your endorsement thereon After referring to some other matters in the letter. you conclude your endorsement as follows .- "I recommend that breVet Maj. Gen. Jesup’s suggestions be adopt ed.” This lact shows that the letter re ceived your particular attention. When this letter (which you knew was torwar'd ed, to the department) was here received —showmg that your apprehended diflicul ty in obtaining suflictent transportation at the south was unfounded. and that it could be provided in that quarter in great ebun dance on favorable terms—my. order at the léth of December, so far as it related to sending out vessels in ballast; was coun termanded, It is strange. indeed, that. alter you were made acquainted with the object of my inquires and Gen. Jesup's letter in reply to them, you should have looked for transport vesselsin ballast from the Atlantic cities. and still more strange that their, non-arrival should be the prool that you rely on to convict me of having neglected my duty In this instanccn It, in truth.‘;you delayed the expedition near ly two months for these transpurlmd um blameless. The responsibility is in ano ther quarter. It cannot be said—that this statement as to the sulficiency-of ;trans- Sportstobe'obtaiued at the south had an implied reference to what 'I had 'ordered from the Atlantic cities. tor my order was then unknown to yourseltandf;tlte quarter master General. You first received a co— :iffl‘fi- “.:- I . - /. 1.53.3651; t"? ‘ V‘ ~ - ' I ‘ 0 .V - "'y > A r I I 3‘ 4 I. I ‘ 4 a - I i . T", "I" - “‘3 3" J ‘‘ i .'.g 33' -. 3! A. , L “iv. ‘ h V l ‘ . , “Min; ".1- ;x M ,'.‘- f; fa 3b: .., , ' V . .1 . . .94“... iii-(u. “ L; .v r: ‘L I i I I r ,V 2‘»; .A' 1: 1'; \‘ 9' I H.I w“ h ‘ ‘ m. ‘~-—~ V .‘. 3;... in; i. g , . v - x . .. <__.:;—_A~V.-W.._ ‘ xt- ‘ V i ‘ ‘‘H ‘ ‘ n V >Z~f~__u‘ V I v. V : .‘., ‘ a - W ‘s‘A—fi H I 'l‘ .... ’. I V l Mm—i l‘ a} u . _in ' ..- '3 I ‘ I ' I,” ,{ ‘1“ ' py of it several days alter the date of Gen. Jesup’a letter to me, umluf your endorse ment thereon. [See your letter to me of the 12th January] Resisted at you were by ‘ head winds,’ eovyloped in ‘lriuhtful nurthcrs.’aod oppressed with complicated and perplexing duties in arranging and preparing .the expedition again-t Vera Cruz, some temporary bgwilduruwnt may be excused; but, to charge the War Dc purtuwnt with _vour own misapprehemions and mistake, is inrxcusable. My reply to tho arruunttons lorccs me lo oxpma some of your inisstutrmvntu of lacl. You allege that tho t—xpedition, for the want of the ‘teo vrssvlu,’ was delay vd from the 15th of January to the 91h ol Match. You rertniol)~ mean to be under stood that on the 15th ol Jiiouurrvxyuur troops were ready to embark. and were delayed for want of these transports; But this was not so; and law indebted to you {or most abundant pruof to ebtabhsh vour naccuracy. I The great body of your troops for the expedition was drawn lrom Gen. Taylor's command at Monterey and in the Interior ol Mexrco; and tin part of them had an] ched either the Brazos nr 'l‘antpicn—the points of etnharcation—on the 15rh ol Jan uary. In your letter of the 12th ol that mouth to Gen. Brooke, at New Orleans. you maid: “I have now to state that It Is probable the troops I have called for Irom Gen. Taylor's immediate command to cm bark here (the Brazos) and at 'l‘umptco, will not reach them: points till late in the present month. (January.) any about the 25th.” [lt a letter to me M the 26”) ot January. you remark that Gen. Butler re. spontled to your call for the troops with the utmost prodipttturle, and that Gen. eral Worth hatl made an admirable movement. "The head ol his division jAIHVV‘I ttith him at the mouth 0! the Rm Grialnde the day bclnre yesterday," (94th January) \\ hen the remainder came up, i is not stated 3 yet one ofynur “naked his torical lacta” places the \t hole command at the point! of embarcation waiting IN the "ten vessels" at least ten days belote the actual arrival of any part nl them.— But it they had been there. uhy should they have been detained for these \‘ent‘lh? In the same letter—written but too day~ alter the arrival of the head at the tirst di vtniltn. and probably before the other had come up—-vou say that "Quartermaster General, (Brevet Major General Jesup. at New Orleans.) I find has taken all pro~ per measures with judgment and prompt itude to provide every thin: depending on his department for the despntch and nor- Cr-ss nfmy expedition." I! more “as wan terl,curnulatrve proof might be tlrattn from the same source—your own correspon dence—-tr_rshow not only that this charge against me hart no lounrlatton in truth, but that you can have no apology for having preleH‘tl It; 1') Alter showing how unfortunate you haVe been in your specific charges, I may with propriety meet those 0! a general and nweeping character with u lers particular detail ul PTOUIA to show their groundless nests. 'l'ltough the “tcn VB§~elsn were not,for re very auflicient reasons I hau- amigo ed, sent out in ballast from the Atlantic titles; yet a Very large number “1'“: son: thence with stores. ~Upplit’2. and ”00‘”, to co-operate in the t'xpedition. lo General Jesup’s letter to me of the 17th inst.. a copy of which is wot here ui'h. he states that fifty-three ships, brigi, harques. and achonners. were sent from the north and the department actually lur nishrd at New Orleans. Brazm. and 'l‘atn pica, for the army. before It took up the line of march Into the interior, one hun rlrcrl and sixty-three revels. I have alluded to the large number of surf boats. and the great difficulty of pro curing them, as the cause of the delay in their arrival. I have also a similar roan on to offer in reply to your complaint for not having scasonably t'rccin-d the siege train and ordnance supplies. The tleluy is to be ascribed to the enormously large outfit you required. If it Was necessary, and despatclr was used in procuring rt. no one iain fault. if too large; you certain ly ahould not regard as a rcprehcnstble delay the time necessarily taken' up to preparing it. To show that it was large. and required much time to procure it. I will select from manya single item. You‘ demanded from eighty to one hundredl thousand ten-inch shells, and forty or filly mortars of like calibre. This cnorrnoua quantity of shells—about four thousand tons—was mostly to be manufactured of tar you left Washington. All the furna ces in the country, wrlling to engage in the business. were set to work; but, with the utmost diligence and dcspatch. the supply of this one article or even tworthirda of llthVing to be manufactured and trans ported to the sea-board from the furnaces, (located in most instances in the interior of the country.) vat a season of the year when water communications. were obstruc ted by ice, could not be ready to' he serif forward to you in many tnouthaaftcr vour departure from Washington. . Had your; requisttions been moderate—and undoubt edly tnore. moderatoonea would ltava suf. ficed—they could have been lurninhed at a touch earlier period. ' 'l'he memorandum which you left “for the siege-train and ammunition therefor,” was submitttcd to toe by the‘ O'dnancc ULEARFIELD, PA.,JUNE3.IB4B DePflrtment (in tho 26th of November. with an intimation that It could no! bt‘ complied with in season for the expedition ‘" 2" for Ward as early as yon had contem plntctl. I endorsed upon It, “comply Will! the above us lnr as practicable.” nml this ("den I am natisfietl. alter lull examina tion. Wns lnithtully exrcuted. What could be done at Washington, “03 promptly done. You had with you the Quartermaster General. with till the‘ means nt the Command of the \\'ar De ‘pnrlment. ontll’wtth unrestricted authority :otlo whatever you might require. He Was under your supetvtsion, nntl nuhject to your orders. able and uilling to execute them. You have never lnllmnlt'tl that he tn any respect. failed in hit duty; but on the contrary. you have spoken in highly commendatory terms of his efficient ser vtcvs. ‘ lhnve already quoted your acknowl edgctncnt that he had taken nll prOper measures with jurtgcrnentund prornptitudc to provide every thing depending on his department tor the der-patch and success of your expedition. In an issue 0! tact between you and the head of the War Dc pnrtment, his testimony. in connection with yoUr own conlession, is the be»! that can be offered to correct your misstate ments and to retute your charges. In his letter to me of the 2d ofJanuary.‘ 1847. he says: "General Scott lelt {on the Interior on the 29th'ultitno, and I am taking active measures to have everything depending opon me ready tor hi~ opera tion». The quartermnster’s department, I find. is called upon to do a great deal that should be done by other branches 0' the staff. So tar as Gen. Scott’s opera rons go, I shall have every thing done hut In necessary, whether it belongs to ny department or to other departments to lo it.” You had with you, and subject to your Htlt‘ffi. not only the Quartermaster Gen eral. but officers of the other stail depart. ineiits. They did not look to the \Var Department, but to yourself, tor direc lltititl; and It Was your duty. atitl not mine. to see that your requirements were com plied with. That they were so. to the at llttlsl practical extent, I have no reason to doupt; but if they were not, the fault, if any, is not with the \Var Department.— You also gave tho instructions in relation to prowling ttie means of land transporta tion. and the oiliéers charged with that tluty were under your itnmediate control ; and il therein blame anywhere tor and de cienry in this respect it cannot be impu reil to the War Department. Your whole corre-pnntlence With me. and the stall of ficers with you, shuns that 'you Very pro party took upon yourself the whole charge at givtng directions in this matter. In a letter to Capt. lletzel. senior quarteimas ter at the Brazos. speaking on this subject of the land transportation which may be needed after .ihe descent on the enemy’s “coast near Vera Cruz, you say. "I have already discussed and arranged with you the detail of the EARLY land transportation train." &c. On the 10h of March. you lurnishcd General Jesup with your esti mates and directions on this subject. The stall “mu-rs being with you, and under your orders. nothing further was, or prop t-ily could be. reqmred or expected to em anate Irom Washington. beyond the sup ply ul loads; and. this being done, ifyuu wr-re disappointed in not realizing your expectations. you have not a culorable pretence for imputirig blame to "the head oi the War Dt'partiitent." As a juat ground ol complaint. and a matter of arcusatioii. you'relt-r In your tie. ticiéticy of means to make the descent, and to capture the city til Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan d’Ulloa. and assume that the extent of that deticrency was the ditlerenco baiueen what you received and what you required. It would be quite as correct reasoning to say. that what you had having proved sullicicnt ior the pur pose, that dillctence allowed the extent of the errors in your estimate. The tiuth lies, perhaps. between the two extremes. You had lea», probably. than you should have had. and you required much more than Was necessary. i’l'hat you did not have more, and.;indeed, all you asked for, l have already shown was not the limit of the War Department. .Gen. Jesup was with you at Vera Cruz. saw your means. and is capable of form inu an estimate of their sufliciencv. He is, as his letter herewith shows. disposed to bejust. and even generous to your lame. To his opinion on this subject. no well foundcd exception can be taken. He says. in reference to your complaints on account ofa dellicient supply of surf-boats. siege train and ordnance stores: “.'l'he result shows that he (Gen. Scott) had surf boats and stores enough!” And of the delay of which you complain. he fully exonerates the War Department. and ascribes the whole to yourselt. and to unavoidable ac. cidents. 'l‘he imputation that you were designed/y crippled in your means. is a charge as preposterous as it iii unfounded. Q 1 am aware that. the execution til some of the many arrangements for the Vera Cruz Echdition was obstructed and de layed by accrdents. but they were such as common sagacity could not foresee, or hu man agency- control; Ul'hey were not. however. more ithah a considerate iiiind, bringing into‘ view all the difficulties of the care. wouldhave expected. When your. complaints on this subject were first re ceived here. evincing. as they did, that you intended to hold the department res ponsible for every untowa‘rtl event, the heads of the several bureaus were called on by me to show how they had executed the duties which had been confided to them, particularly in regard to matters referred to by'ytiu. The evidence they presented of having done all that was re quired. or could have been expected. con vinced me—antl I venture to say that. on a lull examination.“ will eDllilf_V any mind npeti to conviction—that all your cutti plaints. so far as they imputed blamcto the War Department. or any of its bran ches. are unfounded. It will (In much motor—it will show that great industry. promlntness, uncommon capacity. and ex traordinary exertions, in relation to every thing connected with the war, have char acterized the action of each of these sub ordinate departments. As a commenda tion justly merited by these several bran shes of the department, assailed asthey tire indirectly by ynti, I see no good rea. son for withholding my opinion, that an his stance cannot be found where so much has been done, and well done. in so short a time, by any similar body of officers under similar circumstances. As you have. by implication. laid a hea vy hand upon the bureau which is charged ,with the onerous duties ol executing the laws and orders for raising and sending forward the recrutts & levies, I feel bound to affirm that you have done that branch of the public service the greatest injustice. No industry has been spared—no posai~ ble effort omitted—to raise the lorcea which were authorized. and to send them to their destination within the briefest practicable period. The numerousordern issued from the Adjutant General’s office. and its voluminouscorrespondence on that subject, will sustain this assertion. You have pressed with unwanted zeal l the charge in relation to diverting the tie-l tachments of new regiments under Gen-l Cadwulader’s command to the Brazos, & have indulged in the wildest speculations as to the sad consequences which attend ed this imputed error. Assuming that my orders diverted these troops. or any tith era. (an assertion nhich I shall controvert‘ hereafter.) the circumstances justified the] measure. The critical condition of Gen. 'l'aylor, according to all accounts receiv-l ed here at that time, iii stated in my letter( to you of the 22d of March. To show that the departments acted properly. tho'l tt't‘ncurred your reproof. it is necessary to; recall the facts as they then appeared here. They are presented in the lollouing ex tract lrom that letter: " The intormation which has just reached on in the shape of rumors. a: to the Situation of General Taylor. and the forces under 111 l command, has ex cited lhe most painful apprehensions for their safe ty. it is ultnmtt certain that Santa Anna has pre ctpiiated the large army he had collected at San Luis de l’otosi upon General Taylor; and it may be that the General has not been able to maintain the advanced position he had seen fit to take at A gua Nueva, but has been obliged to fall back on Monteroy‘ It is equally certain that in Mexican force has been interposed between Monterey and the Rio Grunde. and that it has interrupted the line of communication between the two places, and seized largo supplies Mitch were oil the way to General Taylor's army. lftho hostile force botwoon the Rio Canada and Gen Taylor's army is as large as report represents it. our troops now on that river may not be able to raaastabliah llio lino. nor will it. perhaps, be poaai ble to place a force there sufficient for tho purpose. in time to prevent disastrous consequonces to our army, unless aid can be afforded from the troops under your immediate command. From one to two thousand of the new recruits for the ten regiments, from this quarter. will be on the way to the Brazos in ilio course of three or four days. All the other forces will be directed to that point, and every alfort made to rolotve Gen. 'l‘ay lor from his critical situation. You Wlll have been ftilly npprized before this can reach you of the con dition ofthingl in tho vulley ofthe Rio Graiido. and at the headquarters of General Taylor. (S: have talten, I trust. such measures as the importance of the subject requirca. lnaed not urge upoti you the fatal consequences which would result from anvjaorious disaster which might lit-fall the army under General 'l‘oylor. nor do I doubt that you Will do what is lit your pouer to avert such a calamity." 'l he course pursued by the War Depart ment on that occasion, which you convert into a charge. must, on revision, I_ think. commend itself to general approbation.— Had it been indifferent to the alarming con dition of Gen. Taylor’s army. and lorborne to use. at the earliest tnoment. tlte most en~ ergetic measures to guatd against tlte fatal consequences of its defeat, then too probe. ble. it would have deserved an arratgntuent as severe as tltat which you have made a gainst it for having done its duty in that critical emergency. When you first recei ved the reasons assigned for the course a dopted here. they appear to have been sat,- isfactory. In your despetch of the 28th of April. you say : " Yesterday I learned, by your letter of the 22d, and the Adjutant General’s of the 26th ult., that all the re crttits of the regimente—some 3,ooo—raie ed or likely to be raised in time {or this or my; have been ordered to the Rio Grande.” You did not then intimate the slightest dis eatisfection~noteven apremonitory symp tom'fnl' that deep distress with which, in stantly on Mr. Trist’s arrival in Mexico. you represent yourself to have been seiz' ed. It is a coincidencmnot unworthy of notice. that. the letter containing your first condetnnatory remark on thts subject was written on the day ofthe date of Mr.’l‘rist’s first note tovyou, and onlytthc day before your captious tepty to it a and itt both you transit the War Department. Yourwith~ NEW SERIES—VOL. I, NO. 23,-"WHOLE No. 1098; ering disappointment seems to have slum. hered for ten days. and then to have been amused by the appearance of Mr. Tris: in Mexico and your quarrel with him. lfthe order from the War Department had in fact "diverted” the forces with Gen. Cad walader. still it was fully justified by the' threatening aspect of affairs on the Rio Grande; but i am quite sure it did not di. vert them. No previous order from the department had designated any other place of rendezvous than the Brazos for the troops that were tojoin your column. It was well understood. before yen left “’ash ington. that all the troops for both armies were to be sent to that place, and there (0 fall under your command. This arrangement was not nor was it ex }pected that it would be here changed. until ‘you had penetrated so far into.the enemy’s ‘country as to render your communications with that place of general rendezvous diffi' cult and ditatory. You also complain that the order was not countermandod. If there had been such an order, and it had been countermnnded. what would have been the consequence! The troops would have gone forward from the United States under the former orders offlthedepartment, which would have taken them to the same place. You allege that 't the news of the victo ry of Roses Vista reached Washington in time to countermand Cadwalader’e orders for the Rio Grandc before his departure Ifrom New Orleans. a I notice this specifi cation of neglect of duty, to show the ex tent to which you have carried your fault finding. and the industry with which you have searched for occasions to indulge it. Your assumption is. that the news ofthe victory of Buena Vista should have satisfi ed the War Department that Cadwalader’s forces were not needed on the Rio Grande; and the emission to countermand. as soon as that news was received. the orders to send them there. was a neglect deserving severe animadversion. How did you act under similar circumstances? With better means of information as to the actual con dttion of the Rio Grande frontier. after the victory of Buena Vista. you did not deem it prudent. after being forty-one days in possession of the news of that victory. to issue positive orders to remove a single man from that frontier 3 yet you venture to censure me for not having sent the troops away the moment the news reached Wash ington. You roceived informatiori'of that victory on or before the 14th ofMarch. for on that day you proclaimed it‘in orders to your ar my. 0n the 25th day oprril. more than forty days thereafter. you Issued an order to the commanding officer at the Brazos to embark for Vera Cruz. “such detachments of the new regiments as may have heenvor dered by the War Department to Point II abel;” bntyou made it conditional with reference to the safety of the line of the Rio Grande ; and said to that officer, that you relied upon his "sound judgment to determine on the spot whether. that line would not be too much exported by the withdrawal ofthetroops in question.’ Thus it appears that you do not hesitate to im ypute neglect of duty to me, for not having adopted and acted on the conclusion that the line of the Rio Grande was safe the moment I heard of the victory of Buena Vista; but, when acting on the same sub joct. you dared not adopt that conclusion. although you had been in possession of the same information forty-one days. Your own conduct in this matter completely re~ futes this charge of yours against the'War Department. It does more; it shows how rash and inconsiderate you have been in selecting! topics for attack. But the most serious consequences are attributed to the long delay of these troops at the Brazos. For your sake. I sincere ly hope these consequences are much ex aggerated, because I am quite confident it will be ‘shown that you alone are respon sible for the delay. The War Depart ment did not—nod it was proper that it should not—issue any order in regard to ~ the movement 0! thetroops after their ar rival in Mexico. The order from the de- purtmcnt ofthe 30th of April, making a division ol the new levies between tltetwu' columns. does not contradict this asser tion. lnr these levies were then mostly \Vllhin the United States; only portions of them had reached Mexico. Until this or der took ,efl'ect, the troops at the Brazos; and, undead. on the Rio Grande and with Gen. Taylor. were under your entire and unrestricted command. As to this unt- ter. you were under no misapprehension; for on the 25th of April, before you were informed ivhat had been done here to we cure the Rio Grunde line, you issued an ordering relation to the troops at tha~Braé 209. This place. you well know. was lhii general rendezvous of the new levies from, the United Staten, and before you sailed, on your expedition to Vern Cluz. you Wine notified that the Mexican army weiq advancing upon Gen. Taylor. 'l‘o hll. assumed that you had not left at the Bin-5 209. with a view to meet any probable con-H tingoncy. orders for the proper disposition. of the troops which were. or might be thin! ' there. would have implied an opinion l'htit you wanted unimble qualifications {outfit} high station which had been 'uoéigneg'l'to IiZA , .'l‘hcae troops were a part ‘of ybur Cofi¢ mand, angi subject to your oiders ;‘md‘if