Harrisburg telegraph. (Harrisburg, Pa.) 1879-1948, April 02, 1917, War Extra, Image 7
' Magazms® Teadbire: r* i. i i - tmmt /Vow'DIE U. S. WILL TIGHT IT < * • { T Jmtiy v * • I W~"*ry % , THE" "jACObJOMK" STEAMER VA S _ YSR- FOZE/GV COU/VTGLES* BY EDWARD B. WATERWORTH, Until Recently Company Clerk in Marine Corps, Norfolk, Va. / UST what would Uncle Sam \ do In case of war with some first-class foreign power? £ To take a hypothetical * case. What could America y do if war, which at the time of this writing seems inev itable, is declared by Ger nany? Many think the country would be helpless. Sthers believe that we would be overwhelmed >y superior force, even if we put up a good Ight. Both ideas are wrong. The United States has 10 such military preparedness as has Germany. But the nation that "tackles" this country, thinking it will find easy prey, will make a bad mistake. In the first place, the American navy's marks nanshlp can overcome a great disparity In lumbers. In the second place, although the amount of nllitary arms in this country is small, com >ared to those existing in other countries, tTncle v Jam would make a first-class showing when it same to a fight Thirdly, we have manufacturing plants that ire already being turned to advantage in the nanuracture of ammunition. Plants of th's iort, developed to their highest extent, would five us a capacity of producing ammunition that would overwhelm the production of uny other country. It Is true that we are desperately in need of fast cruiser battleships, of cruiser scouts and >f many supply ships in the navy. We would Savij to depend upon "the man behind the fun," as we did in the Spanish-American war, lit case conflict actually broke forth. But the tide of battle would not turn against this country for many months. Rudyard Kip ling, who, in his tour through the United States, tkfoke affectionately of this "great, fat, unpro tected country," probably may have been mls taKen about our unreadiness. At the time he n visited the United States, prior to the Spanish- war, our army consisted of about U,t£jO men. lie paid a high tribute to the char acter of the men in the service, devoting a large part of one article to a young soldier 1)9 found patrolling a post in Yellowstone Park and easily sitting a half-broken horse that was made almost unmanageable by the continuous roar of a big waterfall near by. • • • System of Defense Evolved. of the fact that we citizens are prone to •it back and look at things too complacently, our security ha* not been overlooked. We have a board of officers in the army and navy, hampered, it is true, by small appropria tions and by congresses that are riddled with politics. But these same officers have managed to evolve a sytem of defense, in spite of handi caps, that will give this country more than the average "fighting chance" against any nation that is foolish enough to try conclusions with it. Many of the preparations made by the army and navy boards are not known to the average citizen. This is as it should be. It is not best for the knowledge of everything that is being done to be published, so foreigners can learn of It. So long, as we have good, active men In telligently dlreCjng our military preparations we can rest assur& of the results. Marksmanship has always been featured In our navy. We can count on the results, if the battle off the Skaggerack, wherein both' English and German battle fleets claim vlctooy, had been fought with an American fleet taking part there would be no question of the outcome. Both fleets on that occasion claimed "low visi bility." or a fogpy and hazy condition of tho atmosphere, as the reason for their low per centage of hits. • Under similar circumstances, oft tho training •grounds' near Guantanamo Bay, in Cuba, the American navy has raadu treble the number of hits actually recorded. The Jlrst step as hostilities start, is the Im mediate order mobilizing the army and the navy. Every available man and every available piece of war equipment would bo brought inti> service. When the European war began it was esti mated tfcat 750.000 Springfield rifles of the 190 pattern were in the hands of the regular troops and of the militia. At the same time, it was known that 385,000 rifles of the Krag-Jorgensen type, such as were used in the Spanish-Ameri can war, were being held in storage. These Krag rifles are an effective arm and the ef forts made by the Russian and other govern ments to buy them from the United States at an early stage of this war aroused widespread publicity. • • • Springfield Is Best Rifle. pHE Krags are not as powerful as the Spring. 1 field, but they are considered a better arm than tho Mauser, which the Boers used in the South African war. • At that time, It was con sidered remarkable that the Boers could pick oft n.en at 600 yards, shooting from behind cover. Today the point-blank range of the Springfield rifle Is 530 yards, due to an ad justment of the sights. The actual flight of the bullet, wherein It was a practically levol course, la about 300 yards. The variation In this distance is only a few inches. The Springfield is the universal arm of the service today. It is used by cavalry, infantry and coast artillery. The field artillery is armed only with the .45-callber automatio pistol, to supplement their field pieces. Tho Springfield is said to be the finest mili tary ilfle in the world. It has a velocity of 2700 feet per second an<l has a "smashing power" second to no military rifle In the world. Ever since this war started tha United States Government has been manufacturing rifles At both (he Hock Island and Frankfort arsenals. Just how many have been produced Is un known. The government has wisely kept silent about that. At the same time, field belts and other equipment have been turned out In large numbers. Even If we had only the amount of rifles with which this war started, we would have enough to equip more than 1,000,000 men—for the Krags would be perfectly serviceable for uso by the militia and all the big battles in Europe have been fought at a range that is well within the limits of the rifle. Moreover, with the number of plants now producing ammunition for war, we could easily turn out a supply of cartridges equal to that produced by foreign countries. This production could be increased indefinitely if occasion arose. One million armed men could easily stand off any force that attempted land in this country, unless our fleet is destroyed. *We have some of the largest transports in the world in tho American service, plying betwoen this country and the Philippines. Among them are the Thomas and the Sheridan. The Sumno* recently ran aground off the New Jersey Coast and was broken up by the waves. • One of these large ships could easily carry 2200 men. So tf any foreign nation were to send out a fleet of transports, It can be seen how huge a number it would take to establish a "landing baso" In this country and also how o va3t a fleet would become vulnerable to at tacks by our own submarines. That foreign vessels would have an advan tage over our own ships in point of speed is certain. They might be able to locate our own fleet, then steam around it to some unprotected section of the coast, and land their men. But it does not seem as If this move would profit them to any great extent. The enemy might devastate the coast and capture a town or two. But they would never be able to land re-enforcements. Moreover, mo*t of our Eastern coast Is low lying and Intervals of swamps in the Southern States would make a landing impracticable there. They never could pull heavy artillery through those re gions. In the more Northern States the centraliza tion of railroads would make it easy to rush troops to the scene that could block any at tempt at a permanent landing. Desperate battles, of course, would ensue, but there could bo no question of the final outcome. Unless nn alliance was formed with Mexico by some for eign power, our boundary lines would be prac tically e.(e from invasion. Destroycis Main Fighters. FOLLOWING the mobilization of all branches of the service and the Issuance of abun dant supplies to all, our naval destroyers prob ably would be ordered to take the seas at once. We have at least seventy-six destroyers fit for sea service. They are among our most val uable vessels, both for scouting purposes and for actual defense They are the especial Nemo sis of submarines. Even the destroyers of the type of 1808, when 3-pound and 6-pound guns were thought sum clent armament for the Spanish-American war, would be ships that could easily handle any submarine. It Is true the "untersee" boals carry 3 and 4 Inch rifles, throwing shells weigh ing from 18 to 40 pounds. But they cannot bring them Into action quickly and the destroyers of the older pattern could puncture the thin shell of a submarine with so many 6-pound shells that the boat would be rendered unseaworthy while a hostile submarine was unshipping it 3 gun. If the range was too much for the older type of destroyer, it probably could steam Into raugo of the submarine before the latter boat could get Its larger guns into action. Our older type of destroyers still possess enough speed to hold their own with any ship afloat, except the newest models of their kind. And to meet the new models developed by for eign nations we have ships like the Jacob Jones, of 1050 tons displacement and of grreat speed. These ships are armed with 5-Inch gimp, a sin gle shell from which will make a submarine look like a sieve. The thin plates of the under water boats cannot stand the explosive power of the new form of shrapnel that has been de veloped for the purpose of fighting submarines. One or two destroyers of this pattern would protect any port from the attacks of light cruisers such as the Emden and the Karlsruhe— the commerce destroyers that created such havoc on the ocean some time since. The Efcntlen was sunk by the cruiser Sidney of the Australian fleet oft the CoCos Islands. The Karlsruhe 13 supposed to have bfeen blown up near the British East Indies after the com mander of the ship found the vessel had been crippled by striking a reef. Our destroyers would be the shlpk*"ln demand by foreign powers. Every additional destroyer means that the submarine menace is lessened. If we could send fifty destroyers to the English channel, that Is all that could be required of our fleet. • • • "Unbroken Line of Defense." |"< HK American navy has admittedly been 1 built on the principle of having an "un broken line of defense" along the coast. It has repeatedly been announced that the fleet is not intended for oftensive purposes or to attack any nation. On this ground the designers justify the slow speed that characterizes most of our ships —a factor that might prove serious in time of war, so far as we are concerned. It was ail right to talk about the "unbroken line of defense" when battleships the world over averaged only seventeen knots in speed. 'J oday, however, every leading nation in the world has battle cruisers with a speed of thirty knots—equivalent to thirty-four miles per hour on land—and the United States does not possess a single battle cruiser. Several have been provided for, but it will be two years before they are In commission. We have some huge ships like the Arizona. Pennsylvania and the recently launched Missis sippi. What will their size avail If a submarine torpedoes them? It Is on the destroyers the fleet will have to depend to protect those great ships which will deliver the crushing blows in action. The 14-inch guns of the Pennsylvania, con structed since criticism arose of lack of range of some of our guns, probably can shoot as lar as the 13-lnch guns of the Queen Elizabeth, the battleship of the British fleet that took so prominent 0 par* in storming the Dardanelles. The Queen Elizabeth has a speed of twenty flve knots or nearly twentr-nlne miles per hour, and in this respect the Brltlab have shown themselves cleverer than ourselvw There is little question but that the Pennsylvania could , sink the Queen Elizabeth if the English oW> would agree to fight on even terms. But It is certain that the .British vessels would not 0o this. It would steam away from our own bat tleship, trusting to Its superior speed, and would . pick Its own time and conditions for fighting. 1 r All our big ships would have to be.held near J the coast in time of war. We have enough sub marines to protect them. Moreover, they prob s ably would be kept under the shelter of the big > guns of our fortifications like those at New ! York, Boston and the entrance to Chesapeaka Bay. w 1 With a cloud of our older destroyers 1n front of them, with nets arranged like the British have done along the English Channel and with mines laid as modern warfare has proved prac ticable, there would be little danger of any for eign power Invading our shores. • V • Better Defense System. TO BEGIN with, although there are fewer battleships of the first class in our navy than in any of the few fleets likely to attack 'is, wj have a much better system of defense! Any fleet desiring to attack us would have to steam a long distance across the ocean. Natu rally, our submarines and destroyers would not be Idle lr. that period. There are no coaling stations for foreign pow ers on this side of the Atlantic—or Pacific, either. Pearl Harbor, at Hawaii, would prove a mighty hard nut for any foreign power to crack. The Western coast of the United States is, roughly speaking, 7000 miles from Japan. The ease with which a foreign force could land on some of the unpvptected portions of our coast cannot be denied. V But the ease with which such a force could be wiped out cannot be denied, either. Suppose some force landed and took posses sion of a tract In the low-lying lands south of Norfolk. What could they do? The huge guns that were hauled over the magnificent roads of Belgium to bombard Namur and other points, could not be used there. The mere weight of the weapons would submerge them. As for entering Chesapeake Bay Itself, that would be one thing that every American would like to see an enemy try in time of war. Th* narrow mouth of the harbor, the big guns of Fortress Monroe, the skillful mining of the entrance that Is known to exist—all these would make an entrance by an enemy decidedly unhealthy. The same could be said of the forts In San Francisco' Bay, where the old fortifications known by the name of Fort Winfleld Scott and Fort Baker still exist. In a little concrete shelter far under the de fenses at the Presidio, opposite San Francisco, there Is an elaborate form of periscope that resembles what is known as the camera ob scura. This was a device used by showmen In the old days and one of the devices was tried in St. Louis soon after the panorama on Wash ington avenue was abolished. It was a series of .lenses, showing everything that passed on the fctreet. This showman's toy has been turned to ad vantage. In the little concrete cave that Is spoken of, there Is a mirror with lenses abovo It, showing every section of San Francisco Bay and its approaches. But that little mirror Is also divided into squares. When a ship steam* over one of those squares, Its exact location Is known. All that would be necessary in time of war would be to press a tiny button con nected with a mine—and that ship would cease to exl/t except sh good matter for the front pages of the newspapers. • • • Japanese Possibilities. IF JAPAN took a notion to Invade us, she ] might possibly send ships that would reach ] our coastal ranges. She could run ships close r to shore above or below San Francisco—lf they • were fast enough—and land troops. But what ■ could the troops do? They might ravage a few California town* and probably would. They could never cross i the mountain ranges that lie between them and this section of the country. The nightmare that seema to exist in some California minds, about Japan getting a foothold on our shores and holding all the country west of those ranges, reckons entirely without our tleet. The fleet could easily go through the Panama Canal and Japan has nothing afloat, as yet, that could whip cur ships. If Japanese actually landed they might prove a valuable asset in building good roads on the Western coast, for they surely would be made prisoners when the American ships shut oft their source of supplies. More over, those who had Invaded the California towns and "stood them on their heads" prob ably would have an uncomfortable time of It. Japan will not be likely to Invade California In a hurry, except byway of sending peaceful workers over here—and the American Immi gration laws have a good deal to say about that. But suppose a war actually should start with some nation. What would be "done In an In land city like St. Louis? To begin with, plans have already been pre pared antf are on file in every army office show ing what steps would be taken. In any case, where a declaration of war Is proclaimed, there is a lawless element that tries to plunder por tions of communities when the male defenders are sent to the front. In New York, when drafting was attempted during the civil war, serious rioting occurred. The Irresponsible element thought It was a go!i<i time for outbreaks and tried anarchy. They were quickly suppressed. The plan laid out by the War Department is simple. We have many men In this country who know how to use firearms and who are OJT pert shots with rifles and revolvers, although they never have had military training. Many of these men own weapons of their own. In Germany and Austria, during the present war, troops of the regular army are said to have been used to keep down disorders In soma sections of tne'eountry. This might be neces sary In the United States, In case of war. If there Is a large' forelgn-bom population In any city. The plan devised is to have all citizens pos eesslng rifles or shotguns and who wish to serve their own government turn those weapons In to some branch established by the army and to have another weapon issued in exchange. For instance, one leading manufactory of re* peatlng firearms has announced that more than 800,000 guns of the 44-40 caliber- a t yp e of weapon developed in 1873—had been issued. A 3.2-20 model and a 38-40 model also were put on the market at the same time and had heavy sales. Ammunition for such weapons can be obtained everywhere. If fifty weapons of 44-40 caliber can be col lected from citizens who wish to form a "home guard," they will be issued to one company. All ammunition will be taken In at the sam£ time. Thus every man In the company will have the same type of gun. The owner will be given • receipt for his own weapon. If It happens to t> of different caliber, and It will be Issued to an other man. The fact that the average American J* accus* tomed to the use of firearms would ptove el value in time of war. Men who would l> hops lessly retired In other countries because of thelf lack of knowledge of weapons could readily b made Into a "home guard" hare.