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I W~"*ry % , THE" "jACObJOMK"
STEAMER VA S _ YSR- FOZE/GV COU/VTGLES*
BY EDWARD B. WATERWORTH,
Until Recently Company Clerk in
Marine Corps, Norfolk, Va.
/ UST what would Uncle Sam
\ do In case of war with some
first-class foreign power?
£ To take a hypothetical
* case. What could America
y do if war, which at the time
of this writing seems inev
itable, is declared by Ger
nany?
Many think the country would be helpless.
Sthers believe that we would be overwhelmed
>y superior force, even if we put up a good
Ight.
Both ideas are wrong. The United States has
10 such military preparedness as has Germany.
But the nation that "tackles" this country,
thinking it will find easy prey, will make a bad
mistake.
In the first place, the American navy's marks
nanshlp can overcome a great disparity In
lumbers.
In the second place, although the amount of
nllitary arms in this country is small, com
>ared to those existing in other countries, tTncle
v Jam would make a first-class showing when it
same to a fight
Thirdly, we have manufacturing plants that
ire already being turned to advantage in the
nanuracture of ammunition. Plants of th's
iort, developed to their highest extent, would
five us a capacity of producing ammunition
that would overwhelm the production of uny
other country.
It Is true that we are desperately in need of
fast cruiser battleships, of cruiser scouts and
>f many supply ships in the navy. We would
Savij to depend upon "the man behind the
fun," as we did in the Spanish-American war,
lit case conflict actually broke forth.
But the tide of battle would not turn against
this country for many months. Rudyard Kip
ling, who, in his tour through the United States,
tkfoke affectionately of this "great, fat, unpro
tected country," probably may have been mls
taKen about our unreadiness. At the time he
n visited the United States, prior to the Spanish-
war, our army consisted of about
U,t£jO men. lie paid a high tribute to the char
acter of the men in the service, devoting a
large part of one article to a young soldier 1)9
found patrolling a post in Yellowstone Park and
easily sitting a half-broken horse that was
made almost unmanageable by the continuous
roar of a big waterfall near by.
• • •
System of Defense Evolved.
of the fact that we citizens are prone to
•it back and look at things too complacently,
our security ha* not been overlooked.
We have a board of officers in the army and
navy, hampered, it is true, by small appropria
tions and by congresses that are riddled with
politics. But these same officers have managed
to evolve a sytem of defense, in spite of handi
caps, that will give this country more than the
average "fighting chance" against any nation
that is foolish enough to try conclusions with it.
Many of the preparations made by the army
and navy boards are not known to the average
citizen. This is as it should be. It is not best
for the knowledge of everything that is being
done to be published, so foreigners can learn
of It. So long, as we have good, active men In
telligently dlreCjng our military preparations
we can rest assur& of the results.
Marksmanship has always been featured In
our navy. We can count on the results, if the
battle off the Skaggerack, wherein both' English
and German battle fleets claim vlctooy, had
been fought with an American fleet taking part
there would be no question of the outcome.
Both fleets on that occasion claimed "low visi
bility." or a fogpy and hazy condition of tho
atmosphere, as the reason for their low per
centage of hits. • Under similar circumstances,
oft tho training •grounds' near Guantanamo
Bay, in Cuba, the American navy has raadu
treble the number of hits actually recorded.
The Jlrst step as hostilities start, is the Im
mediate order mobilizing the army and the
navy. Every available man and every available
piece of war equipment would bo brought inti>
service.
When the European war began it was esti
mated tfcat 750.000 Springfield rifles of the 190
pattern were in the hands of the regular troops
and of the militia. At the same time, it was
known that 385,000 rifles of the Krag-Jorgensen
type, such as were used in the Spanish-Ameri
can war, were being held in storage. These
Krag rifles are an effective arm and the ef
forts made by the Russian and other govern
ments to buy them from the United States at
an early stage of this war aroused widespread
publicity.
• • •
Springfield Is Best Rifle.
pHE Krags are not as powerful as the Spring.
1 field, but they are considered a better arm
than tho Mauser, which the Boers used in the
South African war. • At that time, It was con
sidered remarkable that the Boers could pick
oft n.en at 600 yards, shooting from behind
cover. Today the point-blank range of the
Springfield rifle Is 530 yards, due to an ad
justment of the sights. The actual flight of
the bullet, wherein It was a practically levol
course, la about 300 yards. The variation In
this distance is only a few inches.
The Springfield is the universal arm of the
service today. It is used by cavalry, infantry
and coast artillery. The field artillery is armed
only with the .45-callber automatio pistol, to
supplement their field pieces.
Tho Springfield is said to be the finest mili
tary ilfle in the world. It has a velocity of 2700
feet per second an<l has a "smashing power"
second to no military rifle In the world.
Ever since this war started tha United States
Government has been manufacturing rifles At
both (he Hock Island and Frankfort arsenals.
Just how many have been produced Is un
known. The government has wisely kept silent
about that. At the same time, field belts and
other equipment have been turned out In large
numbers.
Even If we had only the amount of rifles with
which this war started, we would have enough
to equip more than 1,000,000 men—for the
Krags would be perfectly serviceable for uso
by the militia and all the big battles in Europe
have been fought at a range that is well within
the limits of the rifle. Moreover, with the
number of plants now producing ammunition for
war, we could easily turn out a supply of
cartridges equal to that produced by foreign
countries. This production could be increased
indefinitely if occasion arose.
One million armed men could easily stand
off any force that attempted land in this
country, unless our fleet is destroyed. *We
have some of the largest transports in the world
in tho American service, plying betwoen this
country and the Philippines. Among them are
the Thomas and the Sheridan. The Sumno*
recently ran aground off the New Jersey Coast
and was broken up by the waves. •
One of these large ships could easily carry
2200 men. So tf any foreign nation were to
send out a fleet of transports, It can be seen
how huge a number it would take to establish
a "landing baso" In this country and also how
o va3t a fleet would become vulnerable to at
tacks by our own submarines.
That foreign vessels would have an advan
tage over our own ships in point of speed is
certain. They might be able to locate our own
fleet, then steam around it to some unprotected
section of the coast, and land their men. But
it does not seem as If this move would profit
them to any great extent.
The enemy might devastate the coast and
capture a town or two. But they would never
be able to land re-enforcements. Moreover, mo*t
of our Eastern coast Is low lying and Intervals
of swamps in the Southern States would make
a landing impracticable there. They never
could pull heavy artillery through those re
gions.
In the more Northern States the centraliza
tion of railroads would make it easy to rush
troops to the scene that could block any at
tempt at a permanent landing. Desperate
battles, of course, would ensue, but there could
bo no question of the final outcome. Unless nn
alliance was formed with Mexico by some for
eign power, our boundary lines would be prac
tically e.(e from invasion.
Destroycis Main Fighters.
FOLLOWING the mobilization of all branches
of the service and the Issuance of abun
dant supplies to all, our naval destroyers prob
ably would be ordered to take the seas at once.
We have at least seventy-six destroyers fit
for sea service. They are among our most val
uable vessels, both for scouting purposes and
for actual defense They are the especial Nemo
sis of submarines.
Even the destroyers of the type of 1808, when
3-pound and 6-pound guns were thought sum
clent armament for the Spanish-American war,
would be ships that could easily handle any
submarine. It Is true the "untersee" boals
carry 3 and 4 Inch rifles, throwing shells weigh
ing from 18 to 40 pounds. But they cannot bring
them Into action quickly and the destroyers of
the older pattern could puncture the thin shell
of a submarine with so many 6-pound shells
that the boat would be rendered unseaworthy
while a hostile submarine was unshipping it 3
gun.
If the range was too much for the older type
of destroyer, it probably could steam Into raugo
of the submarine before the latter boat could
get Its larger guns into action.
Our older type of destroyers still possess
enough speed to hold their own with any ship
afloat, except the newest models of their kind.
And to meet the new models developed by for
eign nations we have ships like the Jacob Jones,
of 1050 tons displacement and of grreat speed.
These ships are armed with 5-Inch gimp, a sin
gle shell from which will make a submarine
look like a sieve. The thin plates of the under
water boats cannot stand the explosive power
of the new form of shrapnel that has been de
veloped for the purpose of fighting submarines.
One or two destroyers of this pattern would
protect any port from the attacks of light
cruisers such as the Emden and the Karlsruhe—
the commerce destroyers that created such
havoc on the ocean some time since.
The Efcntlen was sunk by the cruiser Sidney of
the Australian fleet oft the CoCos Islands. The
Karlsruhe 13 supposed to have bfeen blown up
near the British East Indies after the com
mander of the ship found the vessel had
been crippled by striking a reef.
Our destroyers would be the shlpk*"ln demand
by foreign powers. Every additional destroyer
means that the submarine menace is lessened.
If we could send fifty destroyers to the English
channel, that Is all that could be required of
our fleet.
• • •
"Unbroken Line of Defense."
|"< HK American navy has admittedly been
1 built on the principle of having an "un
broken line of defense" along the coast. It has
repeatedly been announced that the fleet is not
intended for oftensive purposes or to attack any
nation. On this ground the designers justify the
slow speed that characterizes most of our ships
—a factor that might prove serious in time of
war, so far as we are concerned.
It was ail right to talk about the "unbroken
line of defense" when battleships the world
over averaged only seventeen knots in speed.
'J oday, however, every leading nation in the
world has battle cruisers with a speed of thirty
knots—equivalent to thirty-four miles per hour
on land—and the United States does not possess
a single battle cruiser.
Several have been provided for, but it will be
two years before they are In commission.
We have some huge ships like the Arizona.
Pennsylvania and the recently launched Missis
sippi. What will their size avail If a submarine
torpedoes them? It Is on the destroyers the
fleet will have to depend to protect those great
ships which will deliver the crushing blows in
action.
The 14-inch guns of the Pennsylvania, con
structed since criticism arose of lack of range
of some of our guns, probably can shoot as
lar as the 13-lnch guns of the Queen Elizabeth,
the battleship of the British fleet that took so
prominent 0 par* in storming the Dardanelles.
The Queen Elizabeth has a speed of twenty
flve knots or nearly twentr-nlne miles per hour,
and in this respect the Brltlab have shown
themselves cleverer than ourselvw There is
little question but that the Pennsylvania could ,
sink the Queen Elizabeth if the English oW>
would agree to fight on even terms. But It is
certain that the .British vessels would not 0o
this. It would steam away from our own bat
tleship, trusting to Its superior speed, and would .
pick Its own time and conditions for fighting. 1
r All our big ships would have to be.held near
J the coast in time of war. We have enough sub
marines to protect them. Moreover, they prob
s ably would be kept under the shelter of the big
> guns of our fortifications like those at New
! York, Boston and the entrance to Chesapeaka
Bay. w
1 With a cloud of our older destroyers 1n front
of them, with nets arranged like the British
have done along the English Channel and with
mines laid as modern warfare has proved prac
ticable, there would be little danger of any for
eign power Invading our shores.
• V •
Better Defense System.
TO BEGIN with, although there are fewer
battleships of the first class in our navy
than in any of the few fleets likely to attack
'is, wj have a much better system of defense!
Any fleet desiring to attack us would have to
steam a long distance across the ocean. Natu
rally, our submarines and destroyers would
not be Idle lr. that period.
There are no coaling stations for foreign pow
ers on this side of the Atlantic—or Pacific,
either. Pearl Harbor, at Hawaii, would prove
a mighty hard nut for any foreign power to
crack. The Western coast of the United States
is, roughly speaking, 7000 miles from Japan.
The ease with which a foreign force could
land on some of the unpvptected portions of our
coast cannot be denied. V But the ease with
which such a force could be wiped out cannot be
denied, either.
Suppose some force landed and took posses
sion of a tract In the low-lying lands south
of Norfolk. What could they do? The huge
guns that were hauled over the magnificent
roads of Belgium to bombard Namur and other
points, could not be used there. The mere
weight of the weapons would submerge them.
As for entering Chesapeake Bay Itself, that
would be one thing that every American would
like to see an enemy try in time of war. Th*
narrow mouth of the harbor, the big guns of
Fortress Monroe, the skillful mining of the
entrance that Is known to exist—all these
would make an entrance by an enemy decidedly
unhealthy.
The same could be said of the forts In San
Francisco' Bay, where the old fortifications
known by the name of Fort Winfleld Scott and
Fort Baker still exist.
In a little concrete shelter far under the de
fenses at the Presidio, opposite San Francisco,
there Is an elaborate form of periscope that
resembles what is known as the camera ob
scura. This was a device used by showmen In
the old days and one of the devices was tried
in St. Louis soon after the panorama on Wash
ington avenue was abolished. It was a series of
.lenses, showing everything that passed on the
fctreet.
This showman's toy has been turned to ad
vantage. In the little concrete cave that Is
spoken of, there Is a mirror with lenses abovo
It, showing every section of San Francisco Bay
and its approaches. But that little mirror Is
also divided into squares. When a ship steam*
over one of those squares, Its exact location Is
known. All that would be necessary in time
of war would be to press a tiny button con
nected with a mine—and that ship would cease
to exl/t except sh good matter for the front
pages of the newspapers.
• • •
Japanese Possibilities.
IF JAPAN took a notion to Invade us, she ]
might possibly send ships that would reach ]
our coastal ranges. She could run ships close
r to shore above or below San Francisco—lf they
• were fast enough—and land troops. But what
■ could the troops do?
They might ravage a few California town*
and probably would. They could never cross
i the mountain ranges that lie between them and
this section of the country. The nightmare that
seema to exist in some California minds, about
Japan getting a foothold on our shores and
holding all the country west of those ranges,
reckons entirely without our tleet. The fleet could
easily go through the Panama Canal and Japan
has nothing afloat, as yet, that could whip
cur ships. If Japanese actually landed they
might prove a valuable asset in building good
roads on the Western coast, for they surely
would be made prisoners when the American
ships shut oft their source of supplies. More
over, those who had Invaded the California
towns and "stood them on their heads" prob
ably would have an uncomfortable time of It.
Japan will not be likely to Invade California
In a hurry, except byway of sending peaceful
workers over here—and the American Immi
gration laws have a good deal to say about that.
But suppose a war actually should start with
some nation. What would be "done In an In
land city like St. Louis?
To begin with, plans have already been pre
pared antf are on file in every army office show
ing what steps would be taken. In any case,
where a declaration of war Is proclaimed, there
is a lawless element that tries to plunder por
tions of communities when the male defenders
are sent to the front.
In New York, when drafting was attempted
during the civil war, serious rioting occurred.
The Irresponsible element thought It was a go!i<i
time for outbreaks and tried anarchy. They
were quickly suppressed.
The plan laid out by the War Department is
simple. We have many men In this country
who know how to use firearms and who are OJT
pert shots with rifles and revolvers, although
they never have had military training. Many of
these men own weapons of their own.
In Germany and Austria, during the present
war, troops of the regular army are said to
have been used to keep down disorders In soma
sections of tne'eountry. This might be neces
sary In the United States, In case of war. If
there Is a large' forelgn-bom population In any
city.
The plan devised is to have all citizens pos
eesslng rifles or shotguns and who wish to serve
their own government turn those weapons In to
some branch established by the army and to
have another weapon issued in exchange.
For instance, one leading manufactory of re*
peatlng firearms has announced that more than
800,000 guns of the 44-40 caliber- a t yp e of
weapon developed in 1873—had been issued. A
3.2-20 model and a 38-40 model also were put on
the market at the same time and had heavy
sales. Ammunition for such weapons can be
obtained everywhere.
If fifty weapons of 44-40 caliber can be col
lected from citizens who wish to form a "home
guard," they will be issued to one company. All
ammunition will be taken In at the sam£ time.
Thus every man In the company will have the
same type of gun. The owner will be given •
receipt for his own weapon. If It happens to t>
of different caliber, and It will be Issued to an
other man.
The fact that the average American J* accus*
tomed to the use of firearms would ptove el
value in time of war. Men who would l> hops
lessly retired In other countries because of thelf
lack of knowledge of weapons could readily b
made Into a "home guard" hare.