5 THE PRESIDENT'S COMPLETE MESSAGE. TJHJfJ SCRAKTaJS TlUliUiSJd-TUESDAY. APRIL 12. 1898. Washington, April n, 1898. Following is the complete text oi the president's message : The Congress of the United States. OBEDIENT to the precept of the Coiistitu tion which commands the president to give from time to time to congress infor mation of the state of the Union, and to recom mend to their consideration such measures as lie shall judge necessary and expedient, it be comes my duty now to address jour body with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba. Ido so because of the intimate connection of the Cu ban question with the state of our own Union and the grave relation the course which it is now incumbent upon the nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy of our government if it is to accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the icpublic and rcligiqusly ob served by succeeding administrations to the present day. The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections which have oc curred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its pi ogress, has subjected the I'nited States to great effort and expense m enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance and disturbance among our citizens, and by the exercise of ciuel, barbarous and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympa thies of our people. The Present Revolution. SINCE the piesent revolution began in Feb ruarv, 180?, this country has been the fer tile domain at our threshold, ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle un equalled in the history of the island and raiely paralleled in human combats and the bitterness of the content by any revolution of modern times where a dependent people, striving to be free, have been opposed by the power of the sover eign state. Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralvze'd, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves con strained in the observance of that strict neutrali ty which our laws enjoin and which the law of nations commands to police our own waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans. Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost and the temper and forbearance of our people have been so se verely tried as to beget a peiilous unreal among our own citizens, which has inevitably found expression fiom time to time 111 the national legislature so that issues wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic ad vancement that becomes a self-contained com monwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken and has indeed aroused the utmost concern on the part of this government, as well during ni predecessor's term as in my own. Mediation Refused. IN April, 1896, the evils from which our coun try suffcicd through the Cuban war be came so onerous that my picdecessor made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colo ny, on the basis of some effective scheme of self government for Cuba under the flag and sovci eignty of Spain. It failed, through the refusal of the Spanish government then in power to con sider any form of mediation or indeed any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might sec fit to grant. The war con tinued unabated. The resistance of the insur gents was in no wise diminished. The effoits of Spain were increased, both by the despatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modem history of civilized Christian peoples. The policy of devastation and concentration, in augurated by General Pando, October ji, 1896, in the province of Pinar del Rio, was thence ex tended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach b occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural interior, were driven into the gai rison towns or isolated places held by the troops. The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds weretsnterdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills des troyed, and in short everything that could deso late the land and render it unfit for human habi tation or support was commanded by all the powers at their disposal. Reconccntration Enforced. BY THE Jlinie the present administration took office a year ago, reconcentration, so called, had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. The agricultural population, to the estimated number of ,500,000 or more, was herded within the towns and their imme diate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left pooily clad ami exposed to the most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devasta tion of the depopulated areas of production, des titution and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in an alarming ratio. Hy March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentra dos, from starvation and the diseases thereto in cident, exceed 50 per cent, of their total number. No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from general dearth, could give no aid. The so-called "zones of cultivation" established within the im mediate area of effective military control about the cities and fortified camps, proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most patt women and children with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by dis ease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed for their own support or pro visions for the support of the needy in the cities. The reconccntration adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the lesources of the insurgents worked its predestined result. As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare. It was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilder ness and the grave. Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable change. The ex traordinary activity that characterized the sec ond year of the war, when the insurgents invad ed even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had re lapsed into a dogged struggle in central and eastern provinces. The Spanish amis regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and paits of Havana, but, under the existing conditions (jf the rural country without immediate impiovc nient of their productive situation. Even thus paitially restricted, the revolutionists persevered and the demand for their conquest and submis sion, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant from realization as at the outset. American Charity. TN THIS state of N THIS state of affairs, my administra 1 tion found itself confronted with a grave problem of its duty. Mv message of last December reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acute ness and opening the way to some form of hon orable settlement. The assassination of the prime minister. Canovas, led to a change of gov ernment in Spain. The former administration pledged to subjugation without concession gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of refoim, involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Porto Rico. Overtures of this government, made through its new envoy, General Wood ford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island, al though not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation in any shape, were met by assur ances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba without waiting for the war to end, and that more hu mane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Coiiicidcntiallv with thce declarations the new government of Spain con tinued and completed the policy, already begun by its predecessor, of testifying friendly regard for this nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that by the end of No vember not a single person entitled in any way to our national protection remained in a Span ish prison. While these negotiations weie in progress the increasing destitution of the unfor tunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortal ity among them claimed earnest attention. Autonomy Proposed. r III-: SUCCESS which had attended the limited measure of lelief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expenditure through the con sular agencies of the money appropriated ex pressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last 1 caused to be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting con tributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January by a similar public announce ment of the formation of a central Cuban relief committee with headquarters in New York city, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and the religious establishments of the community . The efforts of that committee have been un tiring and have accomplished much. Arrange ments for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The pu'si dent of the American Red Cross and rcpicscnta tives of other contributory societies have gener ously visited Cuba and co-operated with the consul general and the local authorities to take effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly 5200,0(30 in money and supplie- has already reached the sufferers and more is forth coming. The supplies are admitted duty free and transportation to the interior has been ar ranged so that the relief, at first necessarily con fined to Havana and the larger cities, is now ex tended thro'igh most, if not all of the towns where the suffering exists. Thousand of lives have already been saved The necessity for a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish government. With in a few days past the orders of General Wcylcr have been revoked. The reconccn .ratios, it is said, are to be permitted to return to their homes and aided to resume the sclf-stipportMig pursuits of peace; public works have been ordcied to give them employment and a sum of $600,000 has been appropriated for their relief. American Intervention. THE WAR in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impossible. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of one or the other party , or perhaps nf both, a condition which in effect ended the ten years' war by the truce of Zanjon. The piospect of such a prolongation and conclusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civil ized world and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as wc are, deeply and in timately, by its very existence. Realizing this, it appeared to be mv c'y in a spirit of true, friendliness, iu less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end, 1 submitted on the 27th tilt., as a re sult of much representation and conespondencc through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish government, look ing to an armistice until Oct. 1 for the nego tiation of peace with the good offices of the piesidml. In addition I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconccntration, so as to pel mil the people to return to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies "from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities so as to afford full lelief. The reply of the Spajiish cabinet wis received on the night of the 3iktult. It offers, as the means to brine abonPtioatAe in Cuba, to confide the preparation thejroao'tftkinsular parliament inasmuch as the cone ice 0, that body would be necessary to : however, mulct st ml result, it licmg, e powers reserved cntral government by the constitution are not lessened or 11 ed. As the Cuban parliament docs not intil the lonrtli of May next, the Spanish government would not object for its part, to accept at once a suspen sion of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it would per tain in such case to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice. The propositions submitted !v General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish govern ment were both 111 the form of brief inemor-, anda, the texts of which are before me and arc substantially in the language above g'ven. The function of the Cuban parliament in the natter of "preparing" peace and the manner of its do ing so are not expressed in the Spanish mem orandum; but from General Woodford'-, ex planatory reports of preliminary discussions pre ceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish government stands ready to give the insular congress full powers to settle the tctms of peace with the insurgents, whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by means of leg islation does not appear. With this last overture in the direction of im mediate peace and its disappointing reception by Spain, the executive was brought to the end of his effort. Question of Independence. r N MY annual message of December last, I said "of the untried measures there remain only : Kecogmtion ot tlie insurgents as belligerents; lecognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a lational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. 1 speak not of forcible annex ation, for that cannot be thought of. That by our code of morality, would be criminal aggres sion." Theieupon I icviewed these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875, when, after several years of sanguinary, destiuctive and cruel hostilities in Cuba, he reached the conclusion that the recog nition of the independence of Cuba was im practicable and indefensible, and that the recog nition of belligerency was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belliger ence which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdic tion, could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities. Nothing has since occurred to change my view iu this regard and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neu trality, by which process the so-called recogni tion of belligerence is published, could, of itself, and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor, the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts its people. Important Precedents. TURNING to the question of recognizing at this tunc the insurgent government in Cuba we find safe precedents in our his tory from an early day . They arc w ell summed up in President Jackson's message to congress, Dec. 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas, lie said: In all tho contests that have arisen out of tho rcivoluilons ni Trance, out ot the dispute lelatlng to tho clowns of J'oitudul and Spain, out of tho Amtiican poisctHluMH of both governments and out ot the numetousi nd constantly r cuu Ingstiuggles for dominion In Spanish-America. 1.0 vvlMly con t-lstuit with out Just pilnclplcs hat, been tho ue tlun of our government that wo havo under tho most ciltlcnl circumstances avoided all censuro and tucounured no other evil than that pioducecl bv a transient estiangement ot good will among those utalnst whom we have heen hy torco of evi dence compelled to ilteldu. It has thus bten mido Known to the world that the uniform policy unit practico ot tho United States is to aolil all Intel fciouci-lu disputes which merely relate to tho inuinil government of othei nations and eventually to ii.iignlzo the au thority of tho prevailing party without 1 eft-unco to our particular Interests and views or to tho mer its of the otislnal lonlioversj. l,ut on this as on ovei otner ti Ins occasion, surety Is to ho found In a riKid ..dhcicnco to principle. In the contest between Spain and tho revolted colonies wo stood aloof and walled not only until tho abllltj of the now states to protect them selves was fully established, but until tho danger of their being uguin feubjugated hud entirely passed nvaj. Then, and not until then, vveio they recogricd. Such was our course In icgard to Mexico hern . It Is Hue that with re-sard to Texas tho cl II au thority of Mexico had been c-xpclleil, Its Invading aim defeated, tho chief ot tho republic himself taptuied and ull piesent power to control the new ly organized government of Texas ttuuihllat td within its eontlncs. Uut on tho other liuiul, there Is In appearance", at least, an Immense dis parity of physical forco on tho sldo of Texas. Tho Mexican republic under another legislative policy, Is rallying Us forces under a new leader, and menacing a licsh Invasion to teoover Its lost dominion Upon the ibsue of this threatened Invasion tho Independence ot Texas may be considered as suspemlid, nnd w-eio theie nothing pocullar In tho rtlatlvn situation ot the United Btutes and Texas our acknowledgment of its Independence at such 11 crisis could scaieely bo ugulded as consistent with that prudent loserve with which wo hnvo hitherto held ourselves bound to Heat ull similar ciuestlons. Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish interest in view of the former claim on our part to the ter litory of Texas, and of the avowed put pose of the Texans in seeking recognition of independ- rjav- inii mH ence as an incident to the incorporation of Texas in the Union; concluding thus; l'rudancp, therefore, seems to dlctalo thnt wo should still Htnml iiloof uiid maintain our present attitude, If not until Mexico Ittelf, or ono or tho great foreign powers shall itcognlzo tho inde pendence of tho new government, at least until the lapse of time or tho iciurse ot events shall have pvoved bevond euvll or llHuto the ability of tho people of that country to nuilfitflln their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted b them. Neither of the contend ing parties can Jiistb eomplaln of this course. Hy pursuing It we nn hut cnrrvlng out the Ioiik " tabllshid policy of our government, a policy which has .secured to us respect and Inllue-nee abioatl and Inspired confident e at home. , These are the words of the resolute and pa triotic Jackson. They are evidence that the I'nited States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral state, to wit, that the revolted slate shall "constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability." and forming dc facto, "if left to itself, a state among the nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state," has imposed for its own governance in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away. This oxticme test was in fact applied in the case of Texas. The congress to whom President Jackson referred the question as one "probably leading to war." and therefore a proper subject for "a previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be de clared, and by whom all the provisions for sus taining its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of Texas to the dis ci etion of the executive, providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when the pres ident should be satisfied that the republic of lexas had become "an independent state It was so recognized by President Van Burm, who commissioned a charge d'affaires March 7, 1837. after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at the time no bona fide contest go ing on between the insurgent province and its former sovereign. I said in my message of December last: "Tt is to be seriously consideied whether the Cuban instil rection possesses beyond dispute the attri butes of statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor." The same requirement must certainly be no less se riously considered w hen the graver issue of rec ognizing independence is in question, for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while on the other hand the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the lccognizing state, which form important factors when the recogni tion of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly elimiuable factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is not independent beyond per adventure. Recognition Inexpedient. NOR FROM the standpoint of expedience do 1 think it would be w ise or prudent for this government to recognize at the pres ent time the independence of the so-called Cu ban icpublic. Such recognition is not neces sary in order to enable the United States to in tervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to em barrassing conditions of international obliga tion towards the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be sub ject to the approval or disapproval of such gov ernment; we would be required to submit to its diiection and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally. When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharg ing the functions of a separate nation, and hav ing, as a matter of fact the proper forms and attributes of nationality of such government, it can be promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted. Reasons for Forcible Intervention. THERE remains the alternative forms of in- tcrvention to end the war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants or as the active ally of one party or the other. As to the first it is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the United States has virtually been that of friendly intervention in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result just and honorable to all interests con cerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences between us and Spain and unstained by the blood of American citizens. The forcible intervention of the United States, according to the large dictates of humanity, fol lowing many historical precedents whete neigh boring states have interacted to check the hope less sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts be yond their borders, is justifiable 011 peulral grounds. It involves, however, hostile con straint upon both the parties to the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual .settlement. The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows. First In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and honible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either un able or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another count! y, be longing to another nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is expressly our duty for it is right at our door. Second We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and pioperty which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protec tion. Third The right to intervene may be jus tified by the very serious injury to the com merce, trade and business of our peopl aud by the wanton destruction of property and devasta tion of the island. Fourth And which is of the utmost import ance. The present condition of affairs of Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails ,upon this government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations, when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined, whete our trading vessels arc liable to seizure and are seized at our very doors, by war ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of fil ibustering that we are powetless altogether to pi event, and the irritating questions and en tanglements thus arising all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting sti amed telations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace. Case of the Maine. . ' 4 T1 1IESE elements of danger and 'disorder, at- ' ready pointed out have been 'strikingly, lllusttated by a tragic event winch: has deeply ami justly moved the American peopje. 1 have already transmitted to congress 'the, 're port of the naval court of inquiiy on the de struction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of Feb ruary. The destitution of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible hor ror. Two hunched and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, re posing m the fancied security of a friendly har bor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the na tion. The naval court of inquiry, which, it is need less to say, commands the unqualified confi dence 'of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed. In any event the destruction of the Maine by whatever exterior cause is a patent and impres sive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is in tolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel 01 the American navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there. Further referring in this connection to lcccnt diplomatic correspondence, a dispatch from our minister to Spain of the 261I1 ull. contained the statement that the Spanish minister for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the hirdiest honor and justice required in the matter of the Maine. The reply above re fer! cd to of the 31st tilt, also contained an ex pression of the icadiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter which is subsequently ex plained by the note of the Spanish minister a Washington of the 10th inst. as follows: As to the fact which spilngs fiom the diversity nt lcws between the u ports ot the American and Spanish boards, Spvin proposes that tho fact bo usen tallied L an Impartial Investigation of ex perts whoso decKlon Spain accepts In advance. To this I have made no reply. Spain Fairly Warned. PRESIDENT GRANT in 1873, after dis cussing the phases of the contest as they then appeared and its hopeless and appar ently indefinite prolongation, said: In such an event I nm of the opinion that other imtlcns will bo compelled to assume tho te sponslbllltv -which deoles upon them, und to so ilouslv consider the- only remaining measures pos sible, mull itlon and Intervention. Owing perhaps to tho laige exi unse of water separating tho I.sl and from tho peninsula tlio rontundiiig parties appear to have within them selves no depositor of common confidence to suggest wis dom when paslon and excitement have their sway and to nssumo tho pait of peacemaker, in this view in the eirller dajs ot the contest the good of llecs of tho United States as 11 mediator wera tendered In good faith without any selfish pur pose, in the Interest of humanity nnd In sincere tilendshlp for both parties, but were nt tho tima declined by Spain with tho declaration never theless that at 11 futuie time they would be Indis pensable No Intimation h is been recelv id that'ln the opinion ot Spain that time his been reichcd. And ct the strife continue with all Its dread horrois and all Its Injuiles to the Inte rests of tho I'nited States and of other nations. Kach pally seems eiulto capable of working gnat Injuiy anil damage to the other as well us to nil tho rela tions and Interests dependent on tho existence) of pencil In tho Islind; but thev seem Incapable) ur leaching any adjustment and both have thus fnr failed ot achieving any miu ess whereby ono pally shall pocsoss nnd control the Island to tho exclu sion of tho other. 1'nder the ciicurastnncestho agency of tho povveii-, either by rn eolation or Intel ventlon. seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later bu invoked for tho termination of tho suite In the last message oi my immediate prede cessor during the pending struggle it was said: When tho Inability of bpaln to deal successfully with the Insuirettlon bus beeoino niiinlfont and It Is demonstrated that hu- sovereignty Is . extinct In Cuba tor all pui poses or its Hghtful ex istence and when a hopeless strugglo fur Its Teen tabllshment has desenerated Into 11 sttlfo which means nothing more than the useless sacrlllco of human life end tho uttei destiuetton of tho vory subject matter ot conflict, a Mtuation will bo pro seuteil In which our obligations to Mie sovereignty ol Spain will be supetc-ided by higher obligations which wo can liuiilly liesltutu to lec-ognlzo and discharge. In "iy annual message to congress, December last peaking to this question, I said: Tho neat futuie will demonstiiuo whether tho Indispensable condition ot a lUhteous poacn. Just nllUe to tint Cubans and to Spain ua well us ciiultahle to ull out- lull re sis ho intimately in volved In the welfai of Cuba, Is lllcely to ho oU lalned If not, the cNiRnity ot further and other action bv tho I'nited States will remain to ha taken. When that time comes tint action will ho deti-i milled Iu tho line of Indisputable? right and dutv, tt will be faeed without misgiving or lu'bltunty in the light of the obligation this govern ment owe to llM-lf. to the penplo -vho hnvo con. tided to tt the pioteetlou oi their Intellects and to the honor of humanity. Sure ot the light, keeping free fiom all offenses oursclvts, actuated onlj iiv upiight and patriotic considerations, moved neither b pusBlon nor beltlshiiebs. this government will continue Uh watchful cuieer over the lights andpiopcrty nf nierlcan citizens and will abate none of Its t-f. lorts to bring about by peace tul ogenclwi n peace which tOiall he honorable und enduilug. If It shall hereafter appear to ho a dut; lmpol by our obligations to ourm-lvcs to clvllinatlon nnd humanity to intervene with force, it shnll he with out fault on our pait unit only because) tho no eesslty for such action will bo o clear as, to corn- Continued on I'm go ID. ,1
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