The press. (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1857-1880, April 06, 1863, Image 1

I 1 jar Advertisement! Insetted at the usual rates. 81* *
L in«s constitute a equate.
THK TRI-WBEKhY PRESS,
Mailed to Buhsorlberfl out of the City at tnaa DotLAae
[pga AJinrmt, la advance.
YARNS, BATTING, *
A. H. FRANOISOUS,
No. 488 MARKET,
No. 5 NORTH FIFTH STREET,
, l
Had store the largest stock in tWs City.of
arnb, batting, wadding,
tarns batting, wadding,
(•arns BATTING, wadding,
tarns BATTING,
ARNS BATTING, WADDING,
-ARNS- BATTING, WADDING,
Cotton Batting, Wadding,
Carpet Chain, Cotton Yarn,
Twines, Wicking, Ropes, &o.
Goods Sold at lowest Cash Prices.
WOODEN AND WIMLOW WARE.
A. H. FRANOISOUS,
*3 MARKET, and 5 North FIFTH Street,
Calls the attention of dealers to his
IMMENSE STOCK
WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOODEN AND "WILLOW WARE,
I WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOO„DEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE,
BUCKETS, TUBS, CHURNS,
•BRUSHES, BASKETS, BROOMS,
LOOKING-GLASSES,
table and-floor oil-cloths,
WINDOW-SHADES. .
CLOCKS,
FANCY BASKETS, <SsO.
A LARGER STOCK OF THE ABOVE GOODS THAN
ANY OTHER HOUSE IN THE COUNTRY.
CLOTHES WHINGERS.
''HE GEEAT CLOTHES WRINGER
"PUTNAM
[SELF-ADJUSTING CLOTHES WRINGER”
Is warranted tof'bo-supGrior'to any otlief in use.
EVERY FAMILY SHOULD POSSESS A
CLOTHES WRINGER.
BECAUSE,
irt. It i» a relief to the hardest part of washing day.
!4. It enables Its washing to he done in one-third lesa
X it save) clothes ftom the Injury always given by
tth It helps to wash the clothes as well as dru them*
WB BELIEVE XT ADVISABLE TO PROCURE
PHAM SEW-iDJtJSTINO CLOTHES WHINGER,
ill llltss mi iifni
« SMBS Mill:
BBCADSB.
'IB9T The rolls, beini of vnlcanlzednibtrar, will
»r hot emleoldwaler, nßetWtiteaeltheitbreak hot tsar ,
iECTSD° B 'Thß teams being of Iron, tt™"? 11 }?
led. all danger from rost Is removed, and the iiabrnty
thrlnk, sweil» spHW&e., bo unavoidable in wooden
Pniin? over the rolls render this
ShfrS JSiSjStingrso that small and large articles,
\vell as artioTes uneven In thickness, are certain to
by wWot the machine
Sened toifie tub, webeileyetobe tuperlorinsim
wy K lonSforMnare. fromone-
Sno ra“Sa-a-awt«r .Wbea In thlokneaa, without
' least alteration, . ■■
RETAIL PRICE :
i, se ....Ho. a,#!?•••<••"
• Agente wanted In every county.
Sellable and energatlo mga will be liberally dealt
- or sale at the .
T OODENWAKE ESTABLISHMENT”
OF
A. H. FKANOISOTJS,
TSo 433 MABKET St. and 80. 5 North FIFTH St •
ihl6-2m Wholesale A«enfc for Poniißylvania.
MII.DINERY GOODS.
STBAW GOODS,
FRENCH FLOWERS,
T.Afina AND BIBBONS,
OF THE JjATEST FASHIONS,
JOTT OPENED
HOS. KENNEDY & BEO.'S’
No. 730 CHESTNUT Street, bolow BIOSTH.
' * . mh3l-zBl
SPRING MILLINERY-
ie undersigned has norr open a
handsome stock op
IBBONS, SILKS, CRAPES,
ILLUSIONS AND LACES.
Iso, a splendid assortment of
f BENCH IIOWIBRS,
insisting of fine
All of the most fashionable, shades and styles.
BIBBONS AND FIOWEBS
{last season’s importation, will "b®
CLOSED OUT VERY CHEAP.
M. BERNBCEIM,
No. 728 OHEBTNUT STREET.
S P BING
BROOKS A ROSENHEIM,
(lAtt Eo«nKdm. Biaoia, &Oo.).
Jfo. 431 MARKET STREET, North Bids,
I„ e BOTr open,'*nd «e dolly making additions thereto.
A HASDSOH* VARIETY OR
RIBBONS, BONNETS,
MISSES' ANT) CHIiDEEN’S HATS, FLOWERS,
MILLINKBX GOOBB IN GKNEBAIi,
which the attention of the trade le /
ie<j. ...: > ' "«* *““•*•
R I B B ON S
MILLINERY goods.
IL. DANNBNBAOM & 00.,
Ho. •
im sow open a large «■*' admlrably-aasorted eta*
itUeabovegood*. * • - _> '
KEBOHAirrS and MHUaISES -
H Sad Inducements la states sai prices unequalled l ]!
' Market.
SPB I N G
WOOD <6 OABY.
No. 125 CHESTNUT STREET,
tars now ttt«ter»* complete stock of (
'HAW ; AN© MTLUNBBY GOODS,
> ' nbunm
•AW HASS ADD BOKHBTB. '
misSm* <ak»'ohu.dhhh’b straw goods.
jSAKOT ASD CRAPS BONHSTH.
yESHCH K.QWBBS, BIBBOSB. to,
>'o vhioh.-tlior B»wi«tfljllrlJiTU« Uw attention of M«-
Uld)|9)|jUfi^:'<!. ' o ■!
JABH ftfllUtofl medal adrantage iaCTtAmttt
- , • ■ fe3B»2n
I L Lf'N’llf
JOSEPH gtreat.
{(,*•> wapwtftßir’gWtai .tfle-»ttedtldn<f
■Latter “ A.” SB.
1863.
A LOT 07
1863.
1863
YOL. 6-NO. 209.
DRY-GOODS JOBBERS.
L. HALLO WELL & 00,
NO. 615 CHESTNUT STREET,
(JAYNE'S MARBLE BUILDING,)
Haro now in. stock, and are daily receiving, a handsome
assortment of New Foreign
FA NC Y DR Y GOO D S
SILKS,
All purchased since the recent
DECLINE IN GOLD AND EXCHANGE
'and Which will he sold at a
SMALL ADYANOE FOR CASH.
apl-2n> ; - ■
SPRING 1863.
1863.
DRY GOODS.
HOOD, BONBRIOHT, <6 00.
WHOLESALE BEALSES IN
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
DM 6QO D S,
NO. 433 MABKETSTBBET, PHILADELPHIA.
The attention of the TRADE is invited to their large
Stock of
STAPLE AND FANCY 600DS,
Among which are choice brands of Sheet
ing and Shirting Mußlins,
Madder Prints, De Lalnes,
.Ginghams, Lawns, and
Newest Styles Dbess Goods.
MEN’S WEAR
. I2TGERKAT VAKI2TY. *
GREAT INDUCEMENTS OFFERED TO
CASH BUYERS.
mM3-2m
JAMES R, CAMPBELL & 00.,
IStPOETEES, JOBBERS, AND RETAINERS OB
DRY GOODS.
727 CHESTNUT STREET.
Invite the attention of Oash Buyers to their
FULL AND COMPLETE STOCK,
Embracing the most desirable styles of
SILKS AND DRESS ROODS,
IN ANY MARKET,
MODERATE PRICES.
jnk7-tap26
pAVID ROGERS,
BOOTH FOURTH STREET,
Importer and Jobber of
MEN AND BOYS’ WEAR,
LADIES’ CLOAKINGS, &a
jnh23-2m*
gPRING STOCK
fiTLK AND FANCY DRESS GOODS.
A. W. LITTLE «B 00.,
BM-2m No. 3SS MARKET STREET.
1863. spring. 1863 .
RIEGEIi, WIEST, Os ERVIN.
IMPORTERS AND JOBBERS
DRY GOODS,
No. 47 NORTH THIRD STREET,
PHILADELPHIA.
Merehants visiting tW» olty to purchase Dkt
Goods will find our Stock large.
and' admirably assorted, and at
Low Fiqokbs. In certain classes
ol Goods we offer Inducement* to
purchasers unequalled by any other house In
Philadelphia. teUMtm
JAMES, KENT.
SANTEE, A. 00.,
imposters and jobbers
on
. DRY GOODS,
KOI. 3139 andiMJN. THIRD STREET, ABOVE RACE.
pTTTT. * niiT.Pm A.
Hsve now open their usual
LARGE AND COMPLETE STOCK
oy
yOBEIW AMD DOMESTIC DRY GOODS.
Wn. Which will be found a more than usually attrs*-
tive variety of ,
LADIES’ DBEBS GOODS;
Albo, a fall assortment of
HUUWTMAQg AITO COCHECO PRINTS,
and
FHILADBLPHIA-MADEaOODB.
To which they invite the special attention of cash buyers.
fe!B-2m
gPBING, 1863.
YARD,eiLLUOBE, «i 00.,
Importers and Jobbers of
BILKS
and
FANCY DRY GODDS,
UOS. OHESTNTJT AND 814 JAYNE STS.,
Store nowopen, at THEIR OWH IMPORTATION, a
LARGE and handsome stock
; * . . OF
.?'■■■ SPRING- GOODS.
;coMPßisiHa
BBESS GOODS, BHAWI.6, EIBBOWB.
GLOVES, &a
. mmrtrnent of
mnasrs, poehishiho goods, BH.
1 bboidbbies, and lacks
To* .<wKm of the trade 1* rwtnegtea, teW-toa
1863. 91,a,!<0 - 1863.
JOHNEB, BEERY, A 00..
(Successors to Abbott, Johns*. Jk Co. 5 ».
j^ 0 097 yrtißirM 1 . and SSS4t COMSTBBCB Street*
PHILADELPHIA.
HKFOB.TBBB ASTB JOBB*RB OF
S ILK
a*®
; fancy dry goods.
«0W Open aLAB® '*&> ATTRACTIVE STOCK
DRESS goods.
Idaptedtothe Seaaon. Also.
WHITB GOODS, RIBBONS, GLOVES,
SHAWIS,&o. f
Whleh tharMfer *
- rtASHBCYEKB • „
, Are ~rtl<mUrlr terltad to CTamlneOTrStoch^^^
GAS
ABOH STBEET.
a. a. vankirk<& OQ..
A imp AOTPBBS 8 OF
OH AND EL lERS
AND OTHEK
GAS FIXTURES.
AUo, French Bronia Kgoiee and Ornamenta.l’orMUln
tnd Mica Shade*. and a variety of
FANCY GOODS.
WHOLESALE AND EETAID.
Pleue cell end cramlna foods, , 4aU-lF
MONDAY. APRIL 6. 1883.
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
A False Alarm—Reports of Deserters—Con
dition of tire Relrels—Tire Enemy Still In
Force on tire Rappahannock, dec., Ac.
[Special Correspondence of The Press. 3
Army or this Potomac,
Thursday, April 2, 1863.
It has been rumored In camp, and published at
Washington, that Stuart’s cavalry hare been prowl- .
ing through the country west of this place, but, save ;
the rumor, the doughty knight has not been heard of
on thtß side of the Rappahannock ainoe General
Averlll paid him his'respects beyond Kelly’s Ford.
On Monday, however, a squadron of the Bth Illinois
Cavalry picked up, in the vicinity or Dumfries; ten
rebel cavalrymen from seven different regiments—
the Ist and 2d South Carolina, the Ist North Caro
lina, the Ist, 2d, 4th and 6th Virginia—-representing
Hampton’s Legion and -Fitzhugh Bee's division.
The prisoners were doubtless stragglers, and had
been on this tide a long while, foraging. They were,
perhaps,; not avei Be to being as they made
but Eight resistance. , .
The capture of these prisoners, representing the
'several regiments above named, gave new credence
to the report that a large body of rebel cavalry was
scouring the country on our right flank: and yes
terday morning, at one o’clock, the matter broke
out in a disgraceful fright. Some of the Infantry
pickets, alarmed at a phantom on the brain, or per
haps hearing the neigh of a horse belonging to the ,
outer-pickets, reported to the officer of the day,
Lieutenant Colonel Thompson, that a cavalry force,
with six pieces or artillery, was marching down the
Hartwood road. Colonel Thompson, perhaps even
more frightened than the picket, at once telegraphed
to headquarters that the enemy was moving on our
lines with a heavy force. A second despatch of
similar purport waß sent. The troopß forming the
extreme right were ordered under arms, with In
structions to march toward the Hartwood road at
the sound of the first.gun. The men were out of
their beds and in the .ranks in an incredible short
time, and all-were in high glee at the prospect of
meeting the enemy. All ears were “ erect ”to eateh
the Bignal for advance ; one, two, three hours
passed, and not a sound was heard Indicating the
presence of an enemy. In the meantime, General
Averlll, who never sleeps at his post, nor la alarmed
at shadows, telegraphed to headquarters that he had
no report from his pickets of any enemy being In,
front, and he believed thereportto be utterly ground
less. A cavalry scout was sent out by Geh. Couch,
which returned M daylight and reported ail quiet
and no enemy any where in the neighborhood. The
several brigades were ordered back to their quarters,
and thus the; “big scare” ended. Considering it as a
scene for “ All-ioole’-day,” it may be laughed at and
paßscdasa joke; but aßamilitary “scare” it reflects
most disgracefully on the officer of the day who
would thus eaßily be frightened into a stampede and
give the alarm to the' entire army. It cannot be
feasible that he has ever snuffed the air of battle,
yen afar off, for an officer fit to lead in battle would
not perform thus foolishly when no enemy is nigh.
Desertions from the rebel hrrny beyond the Rappa
annock are numerous. Scarcely a day passes with
out the arrival of one or more of these fugitives
from starvation and oppression. Their stories are
essentially the same, the oft-repeated tale of woe
hard timeß, conscription, poor rations, no Bheiter,
starvation, oppression and murder. From the re
ports of deserters and from information from other
sources, it is believed the enemy is still in full force
on the banks of the Rappahannock.
Samuel Boyer, formerly a citizen of Luzerne
county, Fa., came in yesterday, a deserter from the
6th Virginia Cavalry. He was given the altema-,
tive of going into the service or to prison. He ■ chose
the former and has just accomplished his original in
tention by deserting to our lines, A week' ago Mr.
Boyer was in Fitzhugh Dee’s command on the Ra
pidan, in Culpeper county. He says' a small in
fantry force was at Culpeper'Court House removing
all Btores and Government property further South.
The enemy ia fortifying the fords on the Rapidan.
Averill’s cavalry expedition-across Kelley’s ford so
terrified the rebels that they deemed their supplies in
Culpeper quite unsafe, and hence commenced re
moving and fortifying with all diligence. 'Many of
the soldiers at Culpeper were . without shoes or shel
ter. A cup of meal and raw rice are the customary
rations; salt, sugar, molasses, and coffee have not
been issued for six. months.
The officers in the rebel army are still boastful and
sanguine of final success against the national force?,
but the privates, when alone, arenot “afraid to speak
their mind;” say they might as well give it up: The
North is too strong; even if allthe meirjiow in,the.
field were Hilled,'as many more Would come at them.-
The privates are discouraged, and will-never again
go into battle with the same, spirit, and hope that'
Abstained them (faring the campaign of last fall.
1 Another deserter from the camps below Freder
icksburg reports that Generals Dee, Jackson, and A.
F. Hill were present at a review on. Saturday. An
order was read reducing baggage and transportation,
and promising that the army would be in active ser
vice early in April. To this programme, it ia be
lieved, General Hooker will not object, but will say
to Dee, who seems so very anxious to fight, “Lay
on, Macduff.” MAXWELL.'
A Card from an Anonymous Correspondent
in the Dry Goods Business.
To the Editor of The Press:
We beg'leave respectfully to take moat positive
exception to the tenor of the enclosed portions of
your late money articles, and Say .that we have
every reason to believe there is not a word of truth
in either, nor do we think it the proper function of
a public journalist'to lend Mb infiuence.to disturb
the already (sufficiently) unsettled condition of the
market for ail kinds of merchandise, thereby render
ing it impossible to do any kind of legitimate Trade;
that there has been speculators, and always will be,
we admit, but mat, we opine, is no reason why news
papers should set up Buch a hue and cry, which the
whole country take up in turn to sueh an extent
that Trade bb a natural consequence becomes a per
fect dead letter no matter ho w correctly it may have
been managed, thus “ Trade” 1b made the Scape
Goat for acts of irresponsible people, for Capitalists
have, and will use their means just when, and where
they please, irrespective of the laws of legitimate
Business, or, public opinion. We have direct know
ledge that some of the largest holders, or (specula-,
tors) if you please) in the New York market have
already forced all of their : property thro” regular
channels into Jobbers hands, while they are now
busily engaged in hammering the market into a
panic (to wMch you seem to be lending efficient aid)
in order to buy at a decline, knowing they will be
able to take advantage of the necessities of the con
sumer thereby. Had you have taken pains to End
out what you might have known for a certainty, in
stead of that which at present is at beat but a chi
mera in the fertile brain of your Money Correspond
ent, you would have discovered that the large manu
factures Crozer & Sons, Kelly, Bancroft, below the
city “Jamisons Mill” at Norristown, & smaller
conserna here arc going to stop immediately unless
the present difficulty • abates speedily, They assert
that their Goods have been made out of Cotton at
much less figures than the present market rate of the
Staple Consequently the Mills must stop, & thou
sands of poor Operatives are compelled to . suffer
from an unnecessary panic caused in a great measure
by tboughtless or wicked persons, we suspect your
case 1b the former, or, rather hope so, While for
ourselves we are ready to get up . a remonstrance
among the Wholesale&Kc tail dealers in Dry Goods,
to pledge themselves to avoid
of false reports so well calculated to disturb all
legitimate operations in Trade. We regret the ne
cessity which compels us to take exception to a
Paper whlch.has always been' as tolerant & respect
able as “The Press” & earnestly hope forthe future
that it will avoid flippant assertien-where sub
stantial facts only should be the baßis of remark,
Bespy, &0y B. A. & Co.
Phida., March 31,1863.
Death of Hon. Hemy Carlcton.
To the Editor of The Press:
Sib: Out community has lost one of Its most
honored members, and our country a sterling patriot, ■
in the decease of Judge Oarleton, which occurred on
Saturday, the 28£h,pfMarch last, in the 77th year of ,
Ms age. ; ' -J.r. .. .
A native of Virginia and residentof Georgia ip
early life, lie emigrated from thence to Mississippi,
and at length established himself in K'dw. Orleans in
1814. In the campaign Which termifiatedso
lv by the repulse of the English bn ihe BQi of
January, IBis, he served with distinction 'under
General Jackson as a lieutenant of infantry. £•'* ,
Having become eminent by his literacy and Jegal
attainments, to which latter he devoted himself
assiduously, he was soon a man of mark in htf pro*
Session, and in 1832 was appointed by* General
• Jackson United States District Attorney for “the
Eastern district of Louisiana, vice John Slideii,re
moved. He was afterwards appointed & Judge of
•the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which post he re
signed on account of ill-health in 1839, having earned
by bis learning and strict integrity, both as a lawyer
and a judge, an enduring reputation. Having visited
Europe several times, and travelled much in his own
country, Judge Oarleton at length, about eight years
since, settled in Philadelphia, which he has every
since made his home, aha where, in the -scientific,
literary, and social circles which he found most con
genial to bis tastes, he will belong and affectionately
remembered, as well for the gentleness of his man
ners as for the vigor of his intellect.
'While his mind was of a philosophical arid meta
physical character, he became, in his retirement, a
greaf student of the£fble, and of biblical literature,
for which hiß thorough familiarity with the New
Testament in the original peculiarly fitted him, and
he died, as he had lived, a practical Christian. -Of
his literary labors this is not the place nor the oeoeF
Bion on which to speak, but it may be said of them,
they all bore tbe impress of an original mind,
fraught with rich stores of varied erudition.
. -'Judge Oarleton was twice married. His first wife,
long since dead, and by whom he has left descend
ants, was a creole lady of New Orleans, sister of the
wife of the late Hon. Xttward Livingston. Between
these.distinguished men always subsisted the most
cordial friendship. The estimable lady, from a
neighboring State, whom he last married, and with,
whom the closing years of his life were passed so
happily, survives him.- Necessarily brief and imper
fect as. tills notice must be, it would be unjust to
Judge Carleton’s memory not to refer here to his
unshaken and devoted loyalty to the Government of
his country, in it present struggle with armed trea
son. Neither the entreaties nor threats of the arch
conspirators could induce him to swerve from it.
■With,what admiration has the writer of these lines
heard the venerable patriot denounce the “bad
mm M who inaugurated this accursed rebellion!
Hlb property* which was chiefly in and
which the usurpers attempted to confiscate, he con
sidered as nothing, when put in the balance against
his doty to his country. Tbe same sentiments
which prompted him in early life to take up arms
against the foreign invader, animated his heartin'
fta latest pulsations, to pray for the confusion tfttd
overthrow of the domestic assassins of the nation’s
. peace.- m : b. -
jgr and tlie Hartford Convention,
s!«w&win«s tap.iof-todayinoDeof
“be Hartford Convention.” This
champi«> n oi Webster was not a mem
nn ll vS“of the Hertford Oinven tion. He
.. never read it* jour
h?d BOtbiogtodow together with Str.-Webster’*
naltu Tbeee fMiaitOs'j. j 0 f that Convention,
• lan., *tr, your* very truly,
April 4,1863. ■-
PHILADELPHIA, MONDAY* APRIL 6, 1863.
ITORY Of Till REBELLION,
DEPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN REVIEWED.
CAMPAIGNS IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA AND
MARYLAND.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG,
ftc., Ac., A&c.
Mr. Wade, from the joint Committee on the Con
duot of the War, submitted a report, of whtoh the •
following ie a synoptical summary, with reviews of,
the accompanying testimony: ■
ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC.
Soon after the battle of Bull Sun, in July, 1861,
General McDowell was superseded, and General
McClellan was called by the President to the com
mand of the Army of the Potomac. The campaign
In Western Virginia, the credit of which had been
generally ascribed to General McClellan j, the favor
with which it was understood he was regarded by
General Scott, then General-in-Chief of the army of
the United States; even his comparative youth
holding out the promise of aotive and- rlgorous'rpoa
sures—all theße considerations tended to imgbe hope
Into the public mind, and to remove the glßom and
despondency which had followed the disastrous issue
ofthe campaign just ended,. ..
ITS CONDITION, STRENGTH, AND DISOI
- PUNE.
Every energy of the Government" and ail the re
sources of a generous and patriotic people were free
ly and lavismy placed- at the disposal of General
McClellan to enable him to gather together another
army and put It to the most complete state" or etfl
cieDcy, bo that offensive operations might be resumed
at the earliest practicable moment. The Army of
thePotomao became the object of- special care to
every department of the Government, and aU other
military movements and organizations were made
subordinate to the one great purpose of oolleoting at
Washington, ami organizing there, an-army-which
should overpower the forces of the enemy, aud for
ever ciuyii out any hope of success which the rebels
might cherish. Even when the Army of the Poto
mac had attained dimensions never before contem
plated to the course of military operations upon this
continent, and-seldom, It ever; equalled In modern
times, no portion of ltß rapidly increasing numbers
was permitted to be diverted, even fora brief period,- ■
to the accomplishment of other- enterprises. The
generalß to charge of the various expeditions- from
time to time Inaugurated, and from which so mneh
benefit was anticipated—General-Butler, General
Sherman, General Burnside, and others*-were com
pelled to look elsewhere for the troops to compose
their commands, to rely- upon .the continued patriot
ism of the people, and the zeal of the executives of
the varioue.States for the raising of those regiments
'which would enable them to depart for* the fields of
duty assigned to them. No consideration was for a
moment allowed to diminish or impair the efficiency
of the Army of the. Potomac, and the unexampled
spectaolewas presented to other nations, who were-
Intently watching the course of events to this coun
try, of the largeat army of the present century being
raißed entirely by voluntary enlistments to the brief
period of a few months. •
When Congress assembled to this city, In the be
ginning of December, 1881, so successful had.been
the exeitions of the authorities, and so zealously
had the people responded to their country’s call,
that the consolidated morning reports, furnished
your committee -by the adjutant, general of. the
army, showed that, exclusive of the command of
General Dix, at Baltimore, the Army of the Poto
mac consisted of about 185,000 men.
From the testimony before y onr committee It ap
peared that the Army of the Potomac was well
afmed and equipped, and. had reached a high state
of discipline % the last of September or, the first of
October. The men were ready and eager to com
mence aotive operations. The generals to command
of the various divisions were opposed to going Into
winter quarters, and the most of them declared they
had no expectation of doing so.
gen. McClellan opposed to “ oorps-
ING” THE ARMY)
Tn reference to the proper organization of so large
an ai-my as that about Washington, in order that it
might be the better able to act most effectively in
theield, the testimony of the’.wttnesses examined
upon that point is remarkably unanimous. The
generals most familiar with the subject ace mod to
regard of the utmost importance the division of the
army into corps d’armde, and that, too, In time for
the Instruction of the troops in the movements ne
cessary to render such an organization the most
effective. Your committee deemed -it so vitaily
necessary that , they repeatedly brought the subject
to the’attention of the authorities, and urged its
immediate adoption with alt the argumenteriu their
power. The President and the Secretary of War con
curred with them in the necessity of such a measure;
but it did not seem to he regarded with much favor -
by General McClellan: Indeed, General McClellan
stated to your committee, at the time of their con
ference with him, that, although it inight at some
time be expedient to divide the army, into brmy
corps, the subject was one of great- difficulty. He
said it was a delicate matter to appoint major gene
rals before they bad been tried by actual service,
and had shown their fitness to be selected to com
mand 30,000 or 40,000 men. A major general could
not be stowed away in a pigeon-hole, if he should
prove incompetent, so easily as a brigadier general.
He proposed, therefore, to htmßelf manage this en- -
tire army in some battle or campaign, and then se
lect from the brigadier generals in it such as should
prove themselves competent 'for higher commands.
' Consequently, the division of the army irito army
corps was not cvcii ficgtin until attdr the tnoveirieiit"
of the army in March had commenced, and then only
in’pursuance' of the direct and repeatedjordersofthu
President. ■ " •
the pkesident i.ets him have his own
WAY.
General McClellan, however,' continued 06 oppose
the organization of the army into army.corps, as
will he seen from the following despatch to him
ftoia the Secretary of War, dated May 9,1862:
“The President is unwilling to have th/army corps
organization broken up, hut-also unwilling‘ that the
commanding general shall be trammelled and embar
rassed in actual skirmishing, collision with the enemy,
and on the eve of an expected great battle. Ton, there
fore, may temporarily suspend that organization in the
armv under' your immediate command, and adopt any
you see fit, until farther orders. He also writes you
privately. ”
Hie provisional corps of General Fife-John Por
ter and General Franklin were thereupon, formed
'by reducing the other corps from three to.two di
visions.
BLOCKADE OF THE POTOMAC.
TMb matter was thoroughly investigated by the
committee. It seems that Oaptaln Craven arranged
a plan for raising this blockade with his Potomac
flotilla and some four thousand troops. General
McClellan promised the men ftogt his army, but
never furnished them, giving, as his excuses. that
his engineer's were of opinion that such a body of
men could not be safely landed, and such a move
ment might bring on a general engagement. Mor
tified at this disappointment, Captain Craven threw
up his command on the Potomac, and aßked for Bea
service, which was immediately given him.
GENERAL ADVANCE ORDERED.
oil the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the
United States, as coinmander in-chlef of the army
and navy, issued orders for a general movement of
all the armies of the United Stateß, one result of
which was the series of victories at _Fort Henry,
Fort Donelson, to, which so electrified the country
and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the
land.' _ , . «
LINE OF OPERATIONS FOR THE ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC. ' . .
After this long period of inaction of the Army of
the Potomac, the President of the-United States, on
the 31st of January, 18®, issued the following order:
. ' ’ ‘Executive Mansion,
,"Wi shikutoh. January 31, 1862.
"President's Special War Order.
■ ‘Ordered, That all the disposable force ofthe Army of
the Potomac, after providing Safely fcr the defence of
Washington, he formed into an expedition for the imme
diate object of seizing and occupying a Pomt upontlie
railroad sonthwestward of wbat is known as Manassas
Junction; all details to be in the dlscretion.of the tieiie
ral-in-Ghiel and the expedition to mwe before or pn the
22d day of i*ehmary next. ASRAHAM-liINCOLHJ'
GEN. McOLELLAN OBJECTS.
To this order Gen. McClellan wrote an elaborate,
renlv of the Bame date, objecting to the plan therein
Indicated as involving “ the error of fividingour
army by a very difficult obotacle, (the OcqtKiuan,) and
by s distance too great to enable thetwo portions to
support each other, should either be attacked by the
maiwefs of the enemy, while the other is held in
cheek.” He then proceeded to argue in favor of a
movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress
Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahannock
route. He stated that thirty days would be rrauired
to provide the, necessary means of transportation.
He stated that he regarded “success ascertain;!*
all the chances of war,”;by the routehe proposed,
while it was “by no means certain that we eanbeat
them (the enemy) at Manassas.” .
■THE PRESIDENT ASKS SOME IMPORTANT :
1 QUESTIONS. . ' .
To this the-Presiderit made the following reply:
“Rxecuvivb Mansion, Wasrikoton, ,
“February 3, 1862. . . -
“My Dear Sir : Yon and 1 have
plans for a movement of the
'to be down the Chesapeake, np the.SapMhannocK *to
TJrbanna, and acroas land to the termlniUL o £% e i r
on York river; mine to move directly to> jwint <m the
railroad southwest of Manassas. If you A f oil
isatisfactory answers to the following questions I shall
® i “‘ i l> i oeB plan involve a greatly larger expen
diture of time and money than mine ? • • :
“ % 'Wherein is a victory more certain by yonr plan
“9 ID \V herein is a victory more valuable by your plan
than would it not be lees valuable in this, that
it would break no great line of tne enemy s communica
tion, while mitte would ? .
“6. In ease of disaster, would nota safe retreat b§ more
difflcnlt by yonr plan than by mine? - „„„
-"yours, truly. A.LINCOLN.
, “ Major General McCi.ELi.Ajr." -
NO DIRECT ANSWER IS GIVEN.
Your committee have no evidence, either oral or
documentary, of the discussions that ensued or thef
arguments that were submitted to the consideration
of the President that led him to relinquish his own
line of operations and consent to the one proposed
by General McClellan, except the result of a council
3 war held in February, 1862. That council, the
first, so far as yonr committee have been able to
ascertain, ever called by General McClellan, and
then by the direction of the President, was composed
of twelve generals, aB follows: M«Dowell, Sumner,
Heinizelman, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin,
W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter,
Barnard, and Naglee, (from General Hooker’s divi
sion.)
HEW PLANS SUGGESTED.
To them was submitted the question whether they
would endorse the line of operations which General
McClellan desired to adopt. The reshit of the de
liberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the -
movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down
the Chesapeake bay* up the Rappahannock, landing
at TJrbana, and across the country to Richmond,
The four generals who voted against the proposed
movement, were Generals McDowell, Sumner,
Heintzelman, and Barnard. General Keys voted for
it with the qualification -that ho change should be*
made until the enemy were driven from their bat
teries on the Potomac.
At this point it may be well to consider the princi
pal arguments) for and against the movement upon
Eichmond direct from Washington, and the move
meat byway of the lower Oneaapeake, Including
that fire* proposed by Way of the Rappahannock
river, and the one anally adopted by wpy of fortress
Monroe and the Peninsula. ' • i. ;
In expressing opinions -upon this mad other.sub
jects relating more Immediately to military opera
%obb in the field, your committee do not undertake
to form and express opinions of their own, but con
tent themselves with setting forth those expressed
in their testimony by military men whose education*
and experience entitle them to speak confidently
upon those subjects pertaining to their profession,
„• The arguments in favor of the direct, and against
the lower route to Richmond, were many and
■weighty. Some of them are moat tersely expressed
in the letter of the President to General
of February 3, 1662, before referred to. Besides
those,' the direct movement-enabled the larger
amount of troops to operate actively In the field, as
the. army, in its -movement, itamedthtely covered.
*Waslfihgton, and.thereby rendered of a
large ! iqrce here unnebessaryg By tUe adoption.of
.the lower route, a division of tiie army wM rendered
Imperative, in ordeffto provide for thdTj&fety of the
capital sgainst any Bttaoh-of the enemy. Thus, to
vise the language of General McOlellan himself, in
reference to the movement proposed against the
enemy while at Manaßßaa, “committing the error of
dividing,oar army by a very difficult obstacle, and
by a distance too great to v enable the two portions to
support each other, should either be attacked 1 by the
masses of the enemy while the other Ib, held 1 in
check.” - ,
The army; in moving direct from Washington,
avoided all the delava and disorder consequent upon :
the embarkation and.disembarkation of so .large a
force, with ail Its material. And by investing Kich
roona on tbe north and northwest, we cut them off
from lone of their great sources of supply, the She-:
nandoah valley, and at the same time prevented
their raids through that region of country, which so
paralyzed all efforts to send the few troops left in
■ Washington to the' assistance of the army on the
Peninsula. • - , ’
General McClellan states In hls.testimony that by
.adopting the route .by way of Annapolis and the
Rappahannock, he hoped,if propersecresy was pre
served, to be able to reach the-vicihity of Richmond ’
before .the rebel army at Manassas could be conceit*
-tfated there for its defence. Whatever probability
there may have been for the realization of ; such a
hope at the time the Rappahannock route wbb de
cided upon, it was entirely removed, when the ene
my evacuated Manassas, before any actual move
ment was made by oUr -army. 'And General Mc-
Clellan at once ‘relinquished the Rappahannock 1
route, and decided; with the concurrence of his corps
commanders,-to go,by way of Yorktown and the Pe
ninsula. • - * i -.t ■■ ■
One great objection to the Peninsula route, as in
dicated by the “testimony of all tbe witnesses who
testify upon that point, including General McClei
lan'himself, was the total want. of information-in
reference to the nature of the country there, the
kihdand conditions of the roads, the preparations
fordefence; &e. The difficulties and embarrassments
our army labored under from the .beginning of that
campaign, frdai-that want,oi|ihformation, are very
evident from the testimony. .
The CecisioD ot the council, of twelve generals in
February wesVto.w’dvd by way ot Annapolis and
thence to -Tiie-questionof ro
opening the nayigatton'cof the: Potomac,' by driving
the enemy fr'om ttiSr. batteries upon the river,-was
discussed. It was, however, Anally decided.that the
cruiiiy should be leftinpoßßessionoftheir,batteries,
and-the movement'should be made without dißturb
leg theta. ' . .
THE FIRST MOVEMENT ANTIOIPATEDBY
' THE ENEMY. . 1 - -
, Before the movement by way of Annapolis could
be 'executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries
upon the Fotomec, and evacuated their position at
Ontreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the
Rappahannock. V
. THE ADVANCETOMANASSAS.
’ When General McClellan, then in the city of
Washington, heard that the enemy-had evacuated,
Manassas, .he .proceeded across, the river and/or
deieda gen6ralmovement of thewhole the
direction of the position. lately occupied by the
enemy. The enemy moved on the morning-of the
lOih of’March,-the- greater. part of it proceeding no
further than Fairfax Court House. A .email force
of the cimyprbceeded to Manassas- and beyond to
the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the
enemy had retired -beyond that river’ and destroyed
the railroad bridge across it.
TBE MOVEMENT TO TKEPENINSUIA.
On the 11th or Match General McClellan ordered,
by teltgraphj the transports from Annapolis to
Washington, (Alexandria*) to embark; the army
fiom there, and informed the department that he
proposed to., occupy Manassas with a portion of
General Banks’command, and throw all the 1 force
he could concentrate upon the line previously de
terminedupon. Subsequent events in the valley of
the Shenandoah, terminating, for a tune, in the bat
tle of Winchester, of March 23d, prevented the force
underGenerM Banks from leaving that valley. -
On the 13th of March General McOlellan convened,
at Fairfax Court Bouse,a council of war, consisting
of four of the five commanders of army corps (Gen.
Banks informed them that he pro
posed to abandon hia plan of movement by way of
thoßappahanndck* and submitted to theminstead a
plan ot movement by way of the York and James
rivers.'-- ■
‘The results of this consultation, with reports, &c.,
hive been published in TAe Press. Amajorityof the
generals were in- favor of the movementj provided
that Washington should be left secure, &c,. This, it
seems, was not properly attended to.
CAMPAIGN ON THE PENINSULA
General Heintzelman, who commanded the- first
troops of the Army of the Potomac that lauded on
Peninsula, arrived; at Fortress Monroe on the 2Sd of *
March, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas,
Be had orders to encamp as near Fortress Monroe
as possible, in order that the enemy should -have no
idea of the direction in which the army was to mo je -
whether towards Y orktown or Norfolk. General
Heintzelman states that shortly after landing he
obtained information that the enemy had not more
than 10,000 troops at Yorktown and on the Penin
sula, and is satisfied that he could have advanced
and isolated Yorktown, in which case there would
have been no serious obstacle in’ the way of proceeds
ing directly to Richmond, On the-2?th of March*he
sent .out reconnoitring parties as far as Big Bethel
and Watt’s oreek. and- went near the Half-way
house, where about 400 of the enemy and a little-ar
tillery were seen; He telegraphed to General Ms-
Olefian what he was doing, and reeved a despatch
in reply, that he fGenerat MeClellan) hoped" that
nothing had s beebdbhe to give the enemy
tion of the line of operations of the army. The re
connoiasance wasthen withdrawn,
OTJE AND THAT OF THE RE
' ; BEES.;
Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe,
and on the 2d of April General McClellan himself
arrived,- On the 4th of April the army commenced
its movement in the direction of Yorktown, and oh
the enemy 5 slinks. General
r MCCSellah froni Forfcreas Qlon
- •• roo sooner thanheLotherndse.w'OiildJli.aye.dohe, upon.
hearing that the enemy were Bending down rein
forcements. , , . • '
i All the testimony-goes i;o prove that when our
’ first landed on the Peninsula the force of the
enem'y there consisted of BSagruaer’s command, va
riously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except
by General McClellan,.who estimates it from 15,000
to 20,000, The Hon, Lemuel J. Bowden, United
States Senator from Virginia, then living within
the rebel lines, hear 'Williamsburg* testifies thatthe
rebels did not determine to reinforce Magruder until
it was apparent that our forceß intended to atop be
fore Yorktown and commence a regular siege of- the
place.' it is now evident, whatever may have been
the opinion of our officers at the time, that our
forces, when they first appeared before Yorktown,
could have pierced the line of works across the
Peninsula there without much .difficulty, isolating
Yorktown and cutting off reinforcements, when, the
place must have fallen in a very short time. Some
of our generals expected nnd desired that that should
be done. General Heintzelman forwarded to Gen.
McClellan the application of General Hamilton,
commanding a division, for permission to force the
enemy’s lines. No answer was received to the appli
cation.
General McClellan, however, did not deem his
forces' sufficient, and objected very strongly to the
order of the President detaching. McDowell’s corps
-for the defence of'Washington, as “imperilling the
success of our cause.” He called again and again
for reinforcements, asking for Franklin’s and Mc-
Call’s divisions of McDowell’s corps, to be under
commend of Franklin; insisting that Franklin's di
vision, at least, should be sent to him. On the 11th
of April Franklin’s division was ordered to Alex
andria to embark for. Fort Monroe.. On the:l4th
General Franklin reported to General McClellan .
near Yorktown, but his troops-remained on board
the transports until after the enemy evacuated the
place, when they were ordered to- West Point.
Oh the 6th of April General McClellan telegraphed
to the President, “I have by no means the trans
portation I must have to move my army even a few
miles;” and asks that all his orders for wagon
. trainß, Ac., may at once be complied .with. All was
sent him as desired, until even General. McDowell
-found himself so stripped of the transportation de
signed for Ms. corps that, when he moved to Frede
ricksburg, it was with the greatest difficulty he
could move supplies for, his small fogpefrom Acquia
to Falmouth, until the railroad was completed. _
Ainonth waa spent before Yorktown,,our army, In,
the opinion of some of our ablest officers, becoming
more demoralized by the labors'of. a long Biege than
it would have been evertby an unsuccessful assault.
The returns in the Adjutant General’s office,
signed by General McClellan and Ms adjutant gene
rid,: show that, on the 30th of April, 1863,. the
forces on the Peninsula, under General Mc-
Clellan, amounted to 1131,392 present for duty.
On the Ist of May, the President telegraphs to
General McClellan-,“Your call for Parrott guns
from Washington, alarms me, chiefly because it
argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be
done!”
SEIGEAND EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN.
On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th
of May the enemy evacuated Yorktown without
loss. One of the witnesses testifies that General
McClellan was very much chagrined and mortified at
the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to
open from; Ms batteries on Monday, the 6th of May.
The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the
morning of the 4th. Between ten . and eleven
o'clock. General Stoneman, with the cavalry and
some light horse artillery, started In pursuit. About
one o’clock, General Hooker) with hi* division, left
Yorktown, with orders to Bupport General Stone
man. Generate Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes
also moved out-during the.day- with the whole or
-portions of their corps. . About, five miles from.
Yorktown the division of General Hooker was de
layed for some time in consequence of other troops,
another direction, getting into the road
meantime, General Stoneman had over
taken therdar of the enemy with Ms cavalry, and
followed them up closely, keeping up a running fire
all the lime, until the enemy reached- their works in
the neighborhood of WflJiamßlrarg, when the pur
suit was checked. Governor Sprague was sent back to
i hurry upthelhfantry support under Geh. Hooker.
After considerable delay, Adding It impossible to
pass the troops ahead of him, General Hooker turn
ed off and proceeded by another road)’of which he
had obtained information from some of the inhabi
tants; marched till 11 o'clock that night, renewed
the march at daylight, add came up to the advanced
works of the enemy a little after 7 o’clock, about a
half a mile from Fort Magruder, and at once engaged
the enemy. , .
There seems to have been great misapprehension
and confusion in relation to the management of the
troops at Williamsburg, When the pursuit first
commenced on Sunday, General* Heintzelman was
Instructed by General McClellan to take charge of
operations in front. On the morning of Mondaf
orders were sent to General Sumner to take the
command; General McClellan remained behlnd in
Yorktown to superintend the sending two divisions
up the York river to West Point. A heavy rain Bet
in on Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracti
cable for the passage of troops. The troops of the
different commands became mingled—divisions and
brigades, to some extent, were separated from each
other—and it seems to have been difficult to get the
troopß up in time. . .
BATTLE OF ■SjGX.EIAMBBUBG. :
During Monday forenoon, General Hooker, finding
himself hard pressed by the enemy; and understand
ing that General Sumner had 30,000 troops with him
sent repeatedly for reinforcements. So did General
Stone-man and-. General Heintzelman; but no-rein
forcements arrived. General Sumner states that,
having sent General Hancock to the right, he had at
the centre only about s.ooo Infantry—the cavalry
there not being fitted for operations against the ene
my, on account of the country being so wooded.
Upon receiving the call for reinforcemeiits to be sent
to the left to General Hooker,-he sent staff officera
to burryup troops from the own corps being
some ten miles off, and ordered Kearny to reinforce
Hooker. Reinforcements not coming up to General
Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the
Prince de JolnviUe and Governor Sprague went to
Yorktown to urge General McClellan to come up to
the front and take charge of matters there. Governor
Sprague arrived at Yorktown about lo’docfc, having
been about an hour in going down. He testifies that
when General McClellan was told the condition of
affairs at- the Dent, he remarked that he had sup-
Dosed “those in.front could'- attend to that little
matter.” After some time, General MoOlellan start
ed from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Wil
liamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.
By that time Gen. Kearny had readied the field
and reinforced Gen. Hooker, taking command, being
the senior in rank to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hancock
bad been engaged on the. right, but; upon being re
inforced, had succeeded in repulsing the enemy,
losing about forty men; The principal fighting was
done by the troops under Gen. Hookers Ms division
sustaining a lose of about 1 ,700 men. Before he was
>reinforced, his troops were obliged to hold their.posi
tlon with the-hayonet and-suon ammunition as the
%en could' obtain fromthebodies of those who had
fallen, the roads being so muddy that It was Impos
sible to bringup freshammunitfon.
. That night the enemy.evaouated their position at
WilhfditeVurg. Ojen.-jS[oOleUaaAt»testh»t aftet he
. __ field he was so satisfied that the
toelfhri 3* Beaten, and
Sat* that he conn ter mantled orders
fo tL Biobartson and Sedgwick, and
Ee Thc h Mxt a day°tJi° ,r purantt was continued ferar
shertdfstance by.
with a, amail bodv of isfantry. Several oftnfe geos*
at y had *He enemy been promptly ft# .
Wba«h
could have been followed* into Richmond
one of them says without Anns a gun,. Qen. Mo-
Olellan says that the'roßds»wew_so bad, in const:-
quench of the -rains, that itf waff impracticable 4®
makU a vigorous pursuit. ' 1
The battle of Williamsburg appears to hare been
fought under Many and sertous-disadvantages. No
thing was known of the nature of the country or, the
defensive wbrks of the enemy until our troops ar--
rlved before them; there was no*controlling mind
in charge of the movements ; there'was uncertainty
in regard to who was in oommatRl : ;; each general
fought as lie considered best: andV by t&e time the
general commanding appeared on tne 1 field, the prin
cipal part of the fighting was over. - , _
Some three oY four days were spent* at Williams
burg for the’ purpose of bringing up supplies, &c. f
and-then the liue of msa*h was taken; up for the
Chickahominys It was about the time -that the
army left Williamsburg that -Norfolk and
the Merrimac destroyed.. But pieparationffhad been
madebefore tlioße events occurred to have-BUpplies
sentup York* river instead of the James, and the
line follo wed was adopted.. The conse
quence was, that'theguhboats were or little'or no
service in the operations against Richmdnd f and re
mained entirely itfactrvAexcept in some operations
agamstFort Darling, until they were called ruponto
protect the army, when, in July, it. fell back to the
James river. _ , V
- ADVANCE TO' TOE.OHIOKAHOSCINY.
. The distance between ‘Williamsburg and the litre
of operations on the Ghlekahominy was from forty
to fifty miles, and the army was almost two weeks in
moving that distance. Th§ first troops ttmt
the Generahffittgea.
whidierosecd on 1 Vhe ay,follolvaaDy^the-'-'
corpaof.GeneralHemtzelmanon the 26th. ; t ;Thereat
ofour left bank'dfthe-OMcka
boniin y untiHh e battle of Fair Oaks, when the corpß
of General Sumner crossed. to the assistance of Ge
nerals Heintzelman and Eeyeß.
General McClellan continued calling for reinforoe
mentß, representing that the force, of the enemy in
his front was superior to his own,- and that the force
under General McDowell would? do more for the.pro
tection of. JYasbington, if sent to bis army, than- in
any other position,in which it could be placed. In a
letter written on the 21et of -May he asks that Gene
ral McDowell’s corps be sent to him by water rather
land,'■as the mbie'expeditious mode,and
that be and his forces be explicitly, placed under his
orders, *’in the ordinary way. ,r He clofiesliisletter
i by saying:' ‘
‘* I believe tliere is a great struggle before this army, v
i but lam neither dismayed nor discouraged, I wish to
; stienglhen i s force as much as I can; but, in any event*-
X sball figbt with all the skill, and caution* and deter
mination that I pdsseps. And 1 trust that the result may
. either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my Go
vernment or that it may close my career ”• >
In reply td the request of General McOlellan that
General McDowell should join his forces by water,
the President states, onthe2latof May; “ McDow
ell can reach you by land sooner than he could get
aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Freder
icksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which
case tbe force resisting him will not be confronting
you at Richmond. By land he willreach you in five
days after starting; whereas, by water, he would
not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experi
ence. Franklin’s single division did not reach you
in ten days after I ordered it.”
McDOWELE AND FREMONT ORDERED TO
REINFORCE McCLiEEDAN.
' Preparations were acccoidingly mhde for General
McDowell to leave Fredericksbuig on the 26th of
May to join General McClellan. Just at that time,
however, Jackson commenced hia expedition down
; the Shenandoah volley, and General McDowell, to
gether with General Fremont, froih ’Western Vir
ginia, was sent to the assistance of General Banks,
and to intercept Jackson in his retreat. Upon being
informed of this, General McClellan replied that the
movement of Jackson was probably intended to pre
vent reinforcements being sent to him. The Presi
dent replied, giving him full information as to the
condition of affairs in the valley,"and closed by say
ingt k
“If McDowell’s force was now beyond our reach we
should be utterly helploss. Appreheasione of something
like this, and nd.iawUlingDess tO'SUstain you; has al
ways been my reason for withholding McDowell’s force
from you. Please understand this, and do the best you
ean with the forces you now have. ” -
“SEVEN PINES” AND “FAIR OAKS.”
.On the Blßt of May and the Ist of June the battles
of Seven Pines ana Fair Oaks were fought. As
there has been so much controversy in regard to the
eonduct of Borne of the troops engaged in that battle,
your committee will refer more particularly to the
testimony of Gen. Casey; who commanded 1 the ad
vanced division, upon which the attack was , first
made. Gen. Casey stateß that when the campaign
of the Peninsula commenced hie division consisted
principally of raw and inexperienced troops* They
had suffered greatly from the labors and exposures
incident upon .the. siege of Yorktown and the acU
vance of the troopa lip the Peninsula., Some of them
had been for weeks without shelter, being compelled
to leave their camp equipage behind when ordered
on the pursuit of the enemy after the evacuation of
Yorktown. That division took the lead across the
Chickahominy, taking up a position at Seven Pines,
where it established itself by throwing up entrench
ments and cutting abatis.
A : few days before the battle of Seven Pines, con
trary to the Advice and opinion of General Keyes
and General Casey, the division was ordered three
quarters of a mile to the front, within six miles of
Kichmond, his pickets extending within five miles.
They had no support on their right or their left, the
remainder of the corps to which they, belonged
(Keyes’) belßg in their rear. once com
menced digging, rifle-pits and cnttlng abatis, the
pickets at night being attacked.by thjp enemy, who
were repulsed.■< About.ll
the'Slst; the pickets reportea Yhe en«sy approach
ing, and an aid of General Johnston-was captorgd
and brought in. with important papers upon him.
General Casey, with this aid and Ms general officer
of the day,* went to General Keyes and reported the
circumstances to him. General K4yes testifies
that, for some days before the ’attach he sent to
General McClellan reports of his condition, the
•threatening attitude of the enemy in his imme
diate vleinity, and urged that General Sum
ner be sent across to his support., This was
not done, however, until after the attack com
menced. Reports continued to come in of the ap
proach of the enemy. The : division' was called out
and formed, the working men called in, and prepa
rations made to meet the coming attack. Two lines
of battle were formed—one in the rifle-pits, and
another about one* third of a mile in advance—com*
posed of five or gix regiments -and four pieces of ar
tillery. A regiment had previously been Bent out to
support the pickets. About twenty minutes* to 1
o’clock the enemy commenced the attack in force,
supposed to amount to about 36,000 men, attacking,
in front and on both flanks. After fighting for Borne
time, the enemy continuing to come on in force, the
forces in front fell back to the rifle-pits, and fought
there until nearly surrounded. Reinforcements had
been promised, and General Casey had selected the
position to which they were-to be assigned; but no
reinforcements came up to his position until just
before he was forced to fall back from his second
line, when a single regiment arrived. After about
three hours* fighting, the division fell hack from its,
second line with a loss of 1,433 in killed, wounded,
and missing, In the course of an hour after Casey’s
division had been driver back, the remainder of our
forces were swept back from a mile and a half to
two miles from Casey’s first line, when the enemy
were checked, and the fighting ceased for the day.
During the battle General Sumner, whose corps
was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, was or
dered by General McClellan to hold his forces in
readiness to cross. General Sumner, not . only did
that, but at once called out his forces and moved
them-until the heads of the columns were at the
bridges, ready to croßß, thereby saving between one
and two hours. When the order came to cross he.
immediately moved his forces in the direction of the
field ofbattle, came up withand engaged the enemy,
and relieved the pressure upon the troops engaged
on his left.
The next day, the first of June, the enemy attacked
General Sumner at Fair Oaks. General Hooker,
who had been ordered forward the day before, by
General Heintzelman, with one-half of his division,
hearing the firing of . the . enemy upon General
Sumner’s forces, proceeded at once in that direction,
and engaged the enemy. In a short time the enemy
were repulsed, and fell back in confusion. There
was no 1 communication between the forces under
General Sumner and those under General Heintzel
man (Hooker’s), but each foughtas he deemed beat
under the circumstances, General McClellan was
with theihainpartof the armyon the leffc bank of
the Chickahominy. After the fighting was over he
came across to the right bank of the river.
On the momineof Monday General Heintzelman.
ordered General Hooker to make a reconnoissaace
in force, ■which he did, advancing to within four
miles oi Richmond, meeting with no resistance ex
cept a little from the enemy’B pickets. Upon being
informed by Generals Heintzieman of what he had
done. General McClellan ordered the troops to- be
recalled and occupy the position that had been held
by Caßey’s division. '
The officers engaged in that battle, whphave been
examined, testify .that the army could have pushed
right on to the oity ofßichmond with little resist
ance ; that the enemy were very much broken and
demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c.,
that might impede their flight. General McClellan
seems to have contemplated an immediate movement
upon Bicbmendj for, tne'day after the battle, - June 2,
he writes to the Secretary ofWar;:
‘‘The enemy attacked in force and.with great spirit
yesterday morning, but are everywhere most signally
repulsed with great loss. Our-troojs cfiargedCwqueoG
ly on both days, and uniformly broke the enfflhy. The
result is, that onr left is within four miles of Eichmoud.
I only wait for the river to fall to- croas wkh the rest of
the force and make a general attackv 'Should I find them
holdingfirmina very strong ffmay waif*for
what troops I can bring up from Fort Mouroe. Bat,the
morale of my troops is now such that I can venture
much. Ido not fear for odds af»«st The TichAy is
complete, and all-credit is due to the gallantry of onr
officers and me a. ” ; - " • ..
The movement was not made,kowever, as .Gen.
McOlellan states, because of the high stage ofcwater
S D On the etl/of *Jun e McCall’s division of General
McDowell’s corpß was ordered to join the Army of
the Peninsula. On the Bth of June General Mc-
Clellan telegraphs: «I shall be m peifect readiness
to move forward and take Richmond the moment
that McCall reaches here and the groMd jriU aandt
the passage of artillery.”' On the 10th or Uth of
June McCall’s troops commenced arriving, at the
continued to be loaclein Washington
tb' Bend down by land from PrederioksbuM the re
mainder of General McDowell’B corps,, he, being
directed to co-operate fully with General McClellan,
but retaining; an Independent command. This does
not appear to have been in accordance with General
McClellan’s wishes; for, on the 16th 1 of .Tune, he
telegraphs to the Secretary of War:
“it ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell
and Ms troops arc completely under my control I re
ceived a telegram from Mm.reauestlng that’McC&lle di
vision might be placed so as toijou.ta immediately
upon hts arrivul. That if-aneHtdoeHnotLrQatbethepro
per spirit; whatever troops come to memnit he disposed
of so as to do the roost good- Ido not.feol - that in such
circumstances as thoseto whlch I am now placed Gene
ral McDowell should wish the general interest to bo
sacrificed for tbo porposa ofincroMMK T hls commaiia.
If I cannot folly cOE trol all lns txoops l want none of
them, hut would prefer to fight the hattie with, what I
Pave! and Ut others be responsible for the remits.
THE ABTANCE OF JACKSON. : . ' _
On the 18th of June, General McOlellan tele
eranhs to the Secretary of War that he has received:
Information from deserters to the.efifeet that troops
haveTeft Richmond to
movement commenced on the Bth, trad th»Vif re
enforcements have gone to Jackson, they are proba-
SS less than 10.000 men; that he cannot vouch
for the truth of the statement, but that it seems,
nrett that it is believed in Richmond', and
tiSrrtiel troopß. To this the President re
|ties”o?tbe same
go s| theWmed^Gfen^y'StoOlX^tel^aphsto
-An every point areadiness to.meet ua.
Kf;sSMvhavoK?Stnimber«andextonslva works.
•EE* a, *n»™ thooFand roen have l»ft Richmond to re-
If ten or nroen tno. n.. 4tra , p? their strength and eont
droSS J Afie?to-monow we M
Providence will permit We shall await only a
favorahte condition of the earth and the comple
tion of some necessary, preliminaries. ,
The returns of General McOlellan to the Adjutant
General’s offloe give the IbUowing aa the strength
Sroearoy on t£e Peninsula on the Mth’of Junes
Present for duty, U5,M*; special duty.elok, and in
*££5712.226: absent, 29,611-total, 156,888.
Almut tM* time the rebel General Stuart, with
hie cavalry, made his celebrated raid, making the
entire cUcw oi? <m w»y wU»na ed, and diaoover.
THREE CENTS-
log the nature of our comnmnicstitms with the York
river.
On the 34th (Old 25th of June General McClellan
telegraphs the Secretory of Warthst he is informed,
by deserters »nr contrabands, that Jackson is con
templating an attack open his right and rear. As
.this despatch of General McClellan, and the erne of
the President in reply, are dated immediately pre
vious to the “seven? days’ battle,” they are given
here in fall:
“Have inst returned ftpm the field, and find yom?
tTespatS-in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands,
-hrat-iii jriV eimormattfl* 1 the snpposiuontiiat
mitsiiiS advance is at or near Hamver Court House,
power of pJanrto hold their pgsitiom’apd.rrpidae any^
and that ad* the' available means-ofjthr
shouldbe sohfcentra.tecl’ hero. ’I algeae
ral .can do With.' I honor to
command; smTifit la
bers, can at least’die with if and share But if
the result of tfcfe action .WbicUafeaH or
short
I cororrMhccdtSm,! have received bdaiHonal
intelligence eofcfittolnjp mo- supposition in'regar* to
Jackson’s movements *nd BfeatKegard. I shattprobilriy ‘
be attacked to-mOrrdw an® stow go to the oth&r siefeof
the Chick»hominy to* arrange l for ther defence’"on tfrat
side. I feel that jheVeisn:o , aae in my again aeffinggftar
reinforcements. S®>. B. Mc’lLkLlZfcN;
“ Major GcfleSr&L
“ Hon. B. M. F-rAirtSS? Secretary of War. ”
viCTosft* or< eefeat.
The answer of the Freeident» as foll®ws:'
June 26.
“Your three despatches of yesterday, io relatsetftd'-
the affair, ending with tEuySratemefc* that you completer
succeeded in making yourWbints.- »r& very gratifying/' j
/“The latter one of 6.153?. Ml , saggesting the protean'
s bllity' of yonr being overwbbijned by 200.000 men, aed ’
talkurg of whom. the responsibility will belong, paiate 1 -
me very much. 1 give you dill can,, ami acton the pro-'
: sumption that you willdo- can with
you have; while you continue? ungenerously, 1 think*
to* assume that 1 could give'yoh' move if I would, l
have omitted, I shall omit, no tt oppor.u«ity to send you
reinforcements whenever X possimy can*.
“ A. LINCOLN.
“Major General McCj.ei.law. ”
. BATTLE OF GAINES 5 lILL.
On the afternoon of the 28ttt ofJesne, between 2
and 3 o’clock, tbe enemy, inconsiderable' force,
made a vigorous attack upon the troopeof General
McCall’s division, stationed at Meehaniceviile, con
sisting of the two brigades of Seymour a»d Reynolds.
The action-lasted until nightfeH* when the enemy
were repulsed. Troops were sent up - by General
Porter to the assistance*of those engaged, bat they
were not in the battle, though some of them were in
position to Buppoi t the right of the line;
: About 12 . o’clock ■ that night the troops were
oidered to fall back to Gaines’ Mill, which was ac
complished without loss.
Ob the 27th the battle of Gaines’ Mill was fought,
principally by the troops under General Porter.
Our forees there engaged were from 27,000t0 30.000,
the force of the enemy being from two to three
times that number. The enemy were in such
: superior force that, although our troops-fbugtst with
exceeding bravery, they were driven back with a
loss of about 9,000 men, in killed, wounded, and
missing.
General McClellan was»questioned ae to the
policy of leaving the right wing, consiatingof only
about 30,000 men, to meet the attack of the superior
force of the enemy, instead of withdrawing; it to the
right bank of the Chickahominy before the battle of
Gaines’ Mill. His testimony on that point is as
follows: *
TESTIMONY OF GEN. McCLELEAN.
•"'Question. Whatever might have been the intention 8
of the enemy, as the attack was to have been made-by
him,-would it not have been better to have placed both
wings of our army on thr same side of the Chickahominy
prior to the battle of Games’ Mill ?
“Answer. Ido not think they ought to have be*Q
brought to the same side of the river before they actually
were. '
“Q. What advantage was gained by leaving the-right
wing of our army to he attacked by a greatly superior
force?
“A. It prevented the enemy from getting on our ffimk
and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw
the army and its material.
-“Q. Will you explain what was done by the-right
wing of our winy at or about the time the left was- en
gaged which saved our flank from attack and enabiedthe
army and its materialio be withdrawn?
“A. By desperate fighting they inflicted so great adoss
on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank
of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of
the way. ”
During the night after the battle of Gaines*' Mill
all our-forces were concentrated on the right* bank:
of the Chickahominy, and the next day the mover'
ment to the James river was determined upon.- Gem
Heintzelman testifies thatthe night after that battle
he was sent for by General McClellan; that he
found everything packed, ready to leave: that GRen.
McClellan-said there were two things to be
concentrate his forces and risk all on a battle, or to-
Withdraw, to the James 'river; that if he risked &
battle there, and was beaten, the army was destroyed.
General Heintzelman advised him not to risk a bat*
tie under such .circumstances, forif that army wa»
lost the cause would be lost; that it were better to
go. to tine James river and await reinforcements.
General McClellan replied that he was of'that opi
nion himself, and that was determined upon. That
night, at twenty minutes past twelve, A. M., Gen.
McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he
(General McClellan) is not responsible for the re
sult, but feelß that the Government has not sustained
’hfearmy. .... • .
Tothis the President replies, on the2Bfch: “.If you !
have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price i
we.pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We j
protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated
on you. Had we stripped Washington he would
have been upon us before the troops sent could have
got to you. Save your army at all events. Will -
send as fast as we can. Of course
theyjcannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next
day.”- - -
THE RETREAT TO HARRISON’S LANDING.
The 28th of June passed without any serious
fighting. Col. JB, S. Alexander testified that on the f
afternoon of that day he was sent for by General
McClellan, and went to his headquarters, at Sa
vage’s Station, arriving there about dark. Here-:
ceived instructions to proceed with an escort to the
James river, send back a sufficient number of men
to act as guides forthe different eolumns of the‘army,
communicate with the gunboats, and order supplies
to be brought up the river; to examine" both shores
of the James to the mouth of the Chickahominy,
and ascertain the landing places; proceed up the
Chickahominy to the head of navigation add ascer
tain the places where the army could or obb, in case
of necessity, and then return to headquarters and
report. He left Savage’s Station that night, and
reached the James river the next afternoon. By the
time he had completed his examination thearmy
had reached the James river at Malvern. . •*
While at headquarters, receiving his instructions,
he was shown, as he testifies, a printed order, not
then issued, directing the destruction of the baggage
of officers and men, and the camps, equipage,
and things of that kind; appealing to thearmy to
submit to this privation, as it would be only tempo
rary—“ only for a few days.” He remonstrated with
Gen. McClellan against issuing such an order; that
it would have abad-effect, would demoralize the
army, as it would be telling them, more plainly than
they could be told in any other way that they were
defeated and running for their lives. ,The order was
not issued, and Gen.: McClellan testifies that he has
no recollection of any such order.
.. The retreat to the James river having been decided
upon, the army took up its march, being attacked
by the enemy m the day time, and however success
ful in repelling those attacks, evacuating their po
sitions during the night The actions of Savage’s
Station, Glendale and Malvern were fought during
tbe.movement of the armyto the James, the enemy
being repulsed in each day’s fighting, and our army
falling back, tmder:orders, during the night.
It would appear, from all the information your
committee can obtain, that the battles were fought,
the troops handled, new dispositions made and old
ones changed, entirely by the corps commanders,
without directions from the commanding general.
He. would place the : troops in the morning, then
leave the field and xeek the position for the next
day, giving no directions until the close of the day’s
fighting, when the ,troops would be ordered to fell
back duringthe night tothe newposition selected by,
V him. In that maimer the army reached the James
river. : : : _
BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.
Tbe battle of Malvern HUI, of the Ist of July, wan
the most fiercely contested of any upon the Penin
sula. The troopßwere placed in the morning, under
direction of Gen.McUicllan, who then left the field,
returning to it again in the afternoon. The first
action of the day. commenced about 10 o’clock in the
forenoon, but dul not continue long. The principal ;
actioD,when the .enemy.attacked moat vigorously
and persistently, commenced late in the afternoon, I
and continued till.after dark, the enemy, being re- 1
pulsed and beaten at every point. Many of tbe offl-;
cera examined by yourcommittee are of the opinion
that the enemy were so severely punished on that I
day that they could have been' followed into Rich
mond had our army followed them up vigorously.
It is true that our army had beenseverely tried du
ring the preceding week, fighting, as.they did, nearly
every day, and .retreating .every night. The corps,
commanders and the troops under them fought most
bravely—no troops better., However disheartened
they may have become by what all must have re-,
garded sb a precipitate retreat-during tbe night, they
Btill fought with the most obstinate bravery when
attacked in the day time by an exultant andsuccesa-.
ful enemy.* ' |
' MCCLELLAN’S HOPES AND FEARS. 1
The commanding generahhowever, determined to |
fall back from Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwith
standing the.viotory won there,by. our army. He 1
seems to baye regarded his,army as entirely unfitted. I
to meet the enemy, for on the day of ;the battle, at
Malvern, evidently before .that battle took place,he
writes to tbe. adjutant general, of : the. army from ,|
Haxall’s plantation:
“Mymenare completely exhausted, and I dread tho
resnltifwe sro attacked io-da- by fresh troops. Ifpos
sibls. I shall retire to-nightto Harrison’s Bar. where the
? inboats can render more aid in covering our positiop.
ermit me to write that not an hour should..he lost in
.sending me fresh troops. More gunboats aremgen
needed. ” . , I
On the 2d, of July, the. President telegraphs to
General McClellan:,
“Tear despatch of yesterday, morning .induces me to
hope your army is havingaome rest, to this hope allow
me to reason with: yon for a moment when you asa
for 50,000 net to he promptly seot yen, you must surety
labor under some gross mistake of
sent papers showing yonr disposal of ferees mads law
spring for tbe de once of Washington, and advised are
tuto to than plan. I find included in and about Wash
ington7s.ooomen. 1 AUof
not memenoufth to, fill thatjyery planhrls,»
General Fremont’s in the Valley ; aU: of General Banss ,
all of General McDowell’s not with li2L>s? 4 if a tbey
Washington, taken together, do not R t»g
reach.UMA
i? ®^ l t Thus- the idea of
promptly, is simply absurd If, hyw hwswffi 1 ,
lion ofresponelbC%.J»“ had th «?‘^S’p”eSlm
blame you for not. doing more than .ymwsft p*»»“ !
yon°thin strong enough to take I^ch
mondjußtnow, Xdo_gitMkyon, at^ngthen
On the 3d of July, after the army had rewhedHar
i risonls Bar, General MoOlellaa writ** to the Secret
? twy of "Wars : • _ _ ,
t Jr um jn hopes.ihat tfed enemy is- a* oosaplefely worn
! “To accomplish the pea.rtaak Ridimond,
end Batting an end to this rebellion; -Touubreemsnts
should bo sent to me rather much tmrfchan less than,
mooo men. ” - ,
CHhBACTISR ©*" THE BETREAT.
The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrt- ,
bod’s" Bar was very precipitate. The troops upon
their arrival there huddled together in greatoonfu
sisn, .the entire army being collected within a Bpace
of about three miles along the river. No ordem
i were given the first day for occupying the heights
which commanded the position, nor were the troops
so placed sons to be sue to resist an attack In force
by the enemy. and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby
preventing the enemyfrom bringing up their artil
lery, saved the army there from destruction. The
enemydidsueeeed in'bringing up some of their ar
tillery, su'd threw feme shells into the camp, before
any preparations for defence had been made. On
the 3d of July the heights were taken possession of
by our troops and works of defence commenced, and
then, and not until then, was our army secure In
that position. . *
THE AttTWV AT HABEISON’S landino.
By reference to the teatimonypfMr. Tucker, A*
Blatant Secretary of War. lt will beßeenthat prior
lin’g dlvlrtop Of 'Qpnpral ftogovfell's corps, num-
TllE All
troBHSHM) -WEEK hr.)
THE WMI FeB«J tiriil bn „
mail (per femxtim in aAva.tt~a> sabaeribars fey
Five Coulee *• “ )Et
Ten •• •» *•
Twenty “ •■ ’• —• W-00
Lnmer Clnbe tKan TJrehly
tame rate, SLS9 per copy, sea 8,1 **•
3*fte money must always accompany the o-A*—
<« «u f»**ano. can these ten™ Be a, Sto
afford very htttle more than the cost of the vawf **
ttre mini* to act aa touts fi»
MSf To the Keiter-np ot the Club of ten or twenty aS
«3ttr» copy of tfee Paper will fee givea. r * °*
feting about 12,000 men, wte sent down. In the
early part of June General McCall's dlvietof of the
afeecorpyof about men was sent down, “
sMfe®f wits about 11,000 men from Baltimore and
Monroe, and about the last of June some
B.WWmen of Opera) Shields’ division were also eent
down. TWagMSOsoOmen.
sen? aCß ?, rdi ?£. fo ®* ret «f«
I- x.*‘9 Acjirtant Generate office bv General
McClellan, the Army of the Potbmao, under hie'
JJjSSI?“2; £ aB ’® B i olk>^ 8: Presear for Ate,
area?; *£*?t &*<* fo arrest, rtfiMl absent.
Jf ?79 ®, total,.- 16&,314e This included the corns of
o/fnSf, to 9 >"* *» <W
‘mJSSL* t ! a ¥ at rtm-inp tfef*
month of July ami a part of August. T&ehSSid in
Aoactive operats&na wnatevetand warslmaßten-'
tfrely unmolested IfttfieetfeW *w
|SHSE€^fg
true Mne of approach to Hich-sted* iZI IfJS.*??.
i should be reinforced tartsMeran
- against that place. the arSn
about thesth of July, KH nothing Wae thendsthSd'
upon • U C
* On th*|Sth of Jufe Gteheral Halts* visited’thfe
thegreaterporHon pf hie foifeer, to Forth*. Monroe
The J e r„?lu^^ r fy,S ,^togCtl;^'&M th 6
question of withdrawing theranuywaß submitted to
them. The coundLwas of ratter an informal cha
racter. The majority of the ofiteete expressed them
selves M>ftvotof a wltMrawaH>Fthe army. General
Burnside teßtSflesthat, ashe Understood from the
sß^a^sa^sgssmssss
without thelter ajjd’coeking niSteiU, and many of
the men were withoutarros. Tai eeneral opinion
expressed bythe heading officers WKs.thaf the-men
; had bpdpme vary much enervated, ©neof the lead
ing officers Bafcdthat his command troufd not, in hia
opinion,-gparcXf three miles and flgWa battle.' This
Wnditia&pf tjhjr/tjoopß was one . of the reasons
assigned fm.tteyßifl Withdrawal of the army from
) IfSe Fenin«SHCj*[fc Ir. . ■ • ,
1 General Tor fa'.itiO feiiiforce
irt-fnts tore able him to reßume activ# r op£ rations.
:GeteraPH)Ule«!fesw|«i :lie vfsiled t3fe. army, io
- formed' General MoChdlan that the Government
jcoali-ftirnieh Mnoepaly 20,0c6 additional troops.
General McClellan coneented to renew Tiperations ,
with that number of reinforcements, aod tioneral
! Halleei left, with that! understanding. BSt the day
tbet he left General McCMian wrote to hibr, asking
loVJR0» or 20,000 troop, from the Western-hrmy, in
addition to those promised to him, urgJSg very
strongly that they should be brought hero'-peni po
rarily, to-be returned to the West after Richmond
sboßld have been taken; As this could not be’done,
theOTdcrwaß given for the withdrawal of the r.rniy.as
rapidly as possible, in order to cooperate with’ the
forcEß.under General Pope, then in the presence of
a superior rorce of the enemy.
General-Pope’s campaign 1b reviewed at length" at
this polnkof the report. Many instances of disobe
dience of orders are cited* on the part of General.
McClellan and his subordinates, but most or the
facts elicited in the testimony are familiar to the
public. The same SlowneßS ef movement and call
ing for reinforcements is daily evident from the tele
grams puMished. -
THE CAMPAIGN IN MAEYLAND.
Of the Maryland campaign the committee make
out a brief- if we except the official docu
ments and most offwhich have been pub
lished. Tblsportien of the report concludes with
the order of the War Departments relieving Mc-
Clellan from the eommand of the Army of the
Potomac. ■
OPEEATKONS OF GEN. BURNSIDE.
Upon aflsnming oommand of the Army of the Pck
temae, Geo.' Burnside at once determined to follow
the line of operations which he had previousiy sug
gested to Gen. McClellan ; that is, to make Fre
dericksburg the base of his operations. He assumed
command on the 7th- or Bth of November, and on the
9th forwarded to Washington bis proposed plan of
operations. On the 13th of November Greet. Halfeck
came- to Warren ton, and, with Gen. Meigs, had a
conversation with Gen. Burnside upon the future
movements of the army. .
Gen. Burnside stated that hia plan was “to con
centrate the army in the neighborhood of Warren
ton ; to make a small-movement across the Rappa
hannock, as a feint, with a view to divert the atten
tion-of the enemy,' and lead them to believe that we
were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville,
and'then a rapid movement of the whole
army to Fredericksburgfor the reason that u we
wotud all the time be as near Washington as wnnTd
the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg we
would be at a point" nearer to Richmond than we
wouldbe even ii*we. should' take Gordonsville.”
General Burnside desired te have provisions and
forage, together with pontoons to enable the army
to cross the -Rappahannock. General Meigs test**
ties that while at Warrenton he wrote an order to
General Woodbury, in Washington,- to call on the
quartermaster at Washington fortransportafton for
the pontoons to Acotiia creek, which order General
Balleck signed, and it wae sent off to the telegraph
office.
THE “PONTOON* BELAY.
On the 16th of November Generali Burnside started
the columns of his army from Warrenton to Frede
ricksburg, not having heard any thing of the delay of
tbe pontoons from Washington. The telegram an
nouncing the delay did not? reach General Burnside
until the 19th of November. The corps of General
Srunner. was in the advance, and it was the inten
tion that be should cross over to Fredericksburg and
take possession of the place. But the non-arrival of
the pontoons in time prevented the movement which
had been contemplated, and necessitated, the adop
tion of other measures.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
General Burnside then began to make prepara
tions for another movement, bringing up the pon
toons as rapidly as possible, to enable his forces to
cross th£ river. • • '
Theidsn determined upoa-waato cross the river
at. j fhe^fight^wJng'td eross opposite
Fredericksburg, and the left wisgto eross from three
to four miles Below the oity. The left Wing was
composted of the left, grand- division, with a corps
from the centre grand division, making a force of
from 60,C00 to 60,000 men, .the whole being under
command of Major General Franklin. The crossing
was made successfully at both points, but with much
opposition from sharpshooters-on the right.
PLAN OF ATTACK.
General Burnside states- tins following in regard
to his plan of attack'::
“The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the
line of heights where wemad'e otrr attack, by means of
Which they connected the two wings of their army, and
avoided a long detour around' through a. bad eonntry.
I obtained from a colored'man,.from-tae other aide of the
town, infoimation in regard- to this new road, which
proved to he correct. I wanted to obtain possession of
that new road, and that* was my reason for making an
attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the
attack on the right until that position had been takes,
which 1 supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting
their tine in two; and then' I proposed to make a direct
attack on their front and drive them out of their works.’*
GEN. FRANKLIN* 8 ORDERS.
The following is the order to General Franklin,
Who commanded the left r
‘ * HEAIX3UABTEBS A3MT OP THE POTOiTA-C,
“December 13, 5.55 A. Et.
* * General H&rdie will carry this despatch to you, and
remain with yon during the day. The general com
manding directs that you keep your whole command in
position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond
road, and yon will send out at once a division, at
to pass below Smith-field* to seize, if possible; tbeheighta
near Captain Hamilton's, on this-side of the Sfassaponax,
taking care to keep it well supported and its Hue of re
treat open'. He has ordered another column of a divi
sion or more to be moved from General Sumners com
mand up the plank road to* its intersection of tbe tele
graph road, where they will divide, with a view to
seizing the heights on both of those roads. rHoldingtbeae
heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will,
I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge
between these points. He makes these moves by co
lumns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding
the possibility of a collision of our own-forces, which,
might occur in a general movement.during the fog. Two
of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the
• hridges/and will remain there as support*. Copies of
instructions • to Generals Sumner and. Hookerwtll be
forwarded to yon by an orderly very soon. Ton writ
keep your whole command m readiness to move at
once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword which, if
possible, should be given to every Company, will be
*- ■ Scott ”
“Ibavetbe bODor tobe, generafi-very rmspaotfally.
your obedient servant, 30 Hl? f^PAKKB,^
“ Major General Txsmmx,- ■ . . ,
“Comroanevug Department, Grand Division Army of
Potomac.”
' HOW THEY WERE -OBEYED.
General Franklin states, when last, examined,
that he received the above order at about half past
seven A. 31., and that be at once took measures to
carry out what he eonsideredto be the meaning of
the order, that is, “an armed, observation to ascer
tain .where the enemy was.”; ■ In-his .testimony,
riven when your committee, were , at Falmouth, he
says: “ I put in ail the troops that I-thought it pro- .
per and prudent to put in. I fought the whole
strength of my command, as far as I could, and at
the same time keep my connection with the river
open.-” ■
From the testimony it would appear that the at
taek was in reality made by one ofthesmallest divi
sions in General Franklin’s command—the division
of General Meade, numbering about 4,500 men.
This division was supported on its right by General
Gibbon’s division'of about 6,000. men. On. the. left
was GeneralDonbleday’s division, forming the ex
treme left of our line, nearly at right angles with
General Meade’s 'division, and ..extending to the
liver. Just as General Meade’s division advanced
to the attack, General Birney’s division, of General
Stoneman’s corps, numbering about 7,000, came up
and took position immediately, in rear of General
Sleade. • . .
The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing
the Bret line of the enemy, and gaining the crest of
the hill. . Gen. .Gibbon, seeing Gen. Meade ad
vancing to the attack, ordered his division forward.
After his last, brigade had advanced, driving the .
enemy with the . bayonet, and he was preparing Ms
batteries to openupona rebel regiment that made .
their appearance on his left, Gen. Gibbon was,.
woundedt and taken from the Gen- Meadms ,
division having reached the crest of the hill,.formed ,
themselves In the presence of the reserves ef .tug
enemy, who opened fire upon them in front, and -
they also »ceived a fire upon their flank. Jhe.sur,
neriority of the enemy was ho overwhelming that.
Meade’s division was forced back, as was also Gib-,
bon’s division. The enemy pursued until cheeked.-
bv Birney’s division. Our forces continued to hold -
their pontoon, without renewing the, attack, until
they were ordered to withdraw across the.river.
The losses sustained' in the attack, in killed,
wounded, and missing, were-as follows : Meade’s,
division, 1,760$ Gibbon’s division, 1,243 ; Bimeyis,
division, 961, •
General Burnside, upon hearing of the small -
force ordered to attack the enemy, sent an order to.
General Franklin to make a vigorous attack with,
his whole force. Several of the witnesseß.teßtify
that had Die attack, been renewed with all the.
available force under General FrahhJin’a command,
it would have been successful. General .Franklin,
testifies thatlt waa not an order, hut a rowgat, and
that when he. received it it was too late to renew
the attack, and, therefore, he did not do it. •
THE BEAL CAUSE OF OT3B. MISFOBTHNES.
The testimopy of all Die witnesses befo»your>
committee proves' most conclusively, that, had the
attack been made upon the left with-all the force
which General Franklin could have used, for that
purpose, tha plan of General Burnside, w.ould have
been completely successful, trad our aiaaywouldhavfe
achieved a.most brilliant.victory.
•After the attack on Satmday our army remained
in position untilMondaynighVwhen it was with
drawn across the river without loss. ..
tom committee have not considered it essenaal
to report upon ..the oneraDons Ot the rightwing or
our army in-tfais battle, for the resaoh.thatthe suc
cess of the movement evidently dependadto
great extent; upon the successful operation ojrno
left. Although our. troops en ft*®.
gallantly, making repeated attaota- the of
the enemy’s position waa such that our 8BW»we»
compelledto retire. . .
General Burnside made up another plan to attack
: the enemy across the <to
tails were discovered by rebel ln
Washington and forwarded South. It waa Dina
BELIEVED FEOM COM*
MAUBe
oeneral Burnside, state* that, besides the in
clemency of the weather, there was anotherpower
ful reason for abandoning, the movement, _ vis: the
almost universal feeling" among his.general ".officer*
seainßt it." Some of those officers freely gave veal
to their feelings in thepresenceof their inferior*..
In eonsepuenoeof-this, ahdalso what, bad UK*
place during the battieof Krederfaksburg,*£,;(«*-
bumsidedlrected an order to be Issued, whioh aa
6t s , hat g ori« l dißSßMd" somepHam*
vice, subject tothc