I 1 jar Advertisement! Insetted at the usual rates. 81* * L in«s constitute a equate. THK TRI-WBEKhY PRESS, Mailed to Buhsorlberfl out of the City at tnaa DotLAae [pga AJinrmt, la advance. YARNS, BATTING, * A. H. FRANOISOUS, No. 488 MARKET, No. 5 NORTH FIFTH STREET, , l Had store the largest stock in tWs City.of arnb, batting, wadding, tarns batting, wadding, (•arns BATTING, wadding, tarns BATTING, ARNS BATTING, WADDING, -ARNS- BATTING, WADDING, Cotton Batting, Wadding, Carpet Chain, Cotton Yarn, Twines, Wicking, Ropes, &o. Goods Sold at lowest Cash Prices. WOODEN AND WIMLOW WARE. A. H. FRANOISOUS, *3 MARKET, and 5 North FIFTH Street, Calls the attention of dealers to his IMMENSE STOCK WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOODEN AND "WILLOW WARE, I WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOO„DEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, WOODEN AND WILLOW WARE, BUCKETS, TUBS, CHURNS, •BRUSHES, BASKETS, BROOMS, LOOKING-GLASSES, table and-floor oil-cloths, WINDOW-SHADES. . CLOCKS, FANCY BASKETS, ' "«* *““•*• R I B B ON S MILLINERY goods. IL. DANNBNBAOM & 00., Ho. • im sow open a large «■*' admlrably-aasorted eta* itUeabovegood*. * • - _> ' KEBOHAirrS and MHUaISES - H Sad Inducements la states sai prices unequalled l ]! ' Market. SPB I N G WOOD <6 OABY. No. 125 CHESTNUT STREET, tars now ttt«ter»* complete stock of ( 'HAW ; AN© MTLUNBBY GOODS, > ' nbunm •AW HASS ADD BOKHBTB. ' misSm* 'o vhioh.-tlior B»wi«tfljllrlJiTU« Uw attention of M«- Uld)|9)|jUfi^:' wapwtftßir’gWtai .tfle-»ttedtldn ; - ■ SPRING 1863. 1863. DRY GOODS. HOOD, BONBRIOHT, <6 00. WHOLESALE BEALSES IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC DM 6QO D S, NO. 433 MABKETSTBBET, PHILADELPHIA. The attention of the TRADE is invited to their large Stock of STAPLE AND FANCY 600DS, Among which are choice brands of Sheet ing and Shirting Mußlins, Madder Prints, De Lalnes, .Ginghams, Lawns, and Newest Styles Dbess Goods. MEN’S WEAR . I2TGERKAT VAKI2TY. * GREAT INDUCEMENTS OFFERED TO CASH BUYERS. mM3-2m JAMES R, CAMPBELL & 00., IStPOETEES, JOBBERS, AND RETAINERS OB DRY GOODS. 727 CHESTNUT STREET. Invite the attention of Oash Buyers to their FULL AND COMPLETE STOCK, Embracing the most desirable styles of SILKS AND DRESS ROODS, IN ANY MARKET, MODERATE PRICES. jnk7-tap26 pAVID ROGERS, BOOTH FOURTH STREET, Importer and Jobber of MEN AND BOYS’ WEAR, LADIES’ CLOAKINGS, &a jnh23-2m* gPRING STOCK fiTLK AND FANCY DRESS GOODS. A. W. LITTLE «B 00., BM-2m No. 3SS MARKET STREET. 1863. spring. 1863 . RIEGEIi, WIEST, Os ERVIN. IMPORTERS AND JOBBERS DRY GOODS, No. 47 NORTH THIRD STREET, PHILADELPHIA. Merehants visiting tW» olty to purchase Dkt Goods will find our Stock large. and' admirably assorted, and at Low Fiqokbs. In certain classes ol Goods we offer Inducement* to purchasers unequalled by any other house In Philadelphia. teUMtm JAMES, KENT. SANTEE, A. 00., imposters and jobbers on . DRY GOODS, KOI. 3139 andiMJN. THIRD STREET, ABOVE RACE. pTTTT. * niiT.Pm A. Hsve now open their usual LARGE AND COMPLETE STOCK oy yOBEIW AMD DOMESTIC DRY GOODS. Wn. Which will be found a more than usually attrs*- tive variety of , LADIES’ DBEBS GOODS; Albo, a fall assortment of HUUWTMAQg AITO COCHECO PRINTS, and FHILADBLPHIA-MADEaOODB. To which they invite the special attention of cash buyers. fe!B-2m gPBING, 1863. YARD,eiLLUOBE, «i 00., Importers and Jobbers of BILKS and FANCY DRY GODDS, UOS. OHESTNTJT AND 814 JAYNE STS., Store nowopen, at THEIR OWH IMPORTATION, a LARGE and handsome stock ; * . . OF .?'■■■ SPRING- GOODS. ;coMPßisiHa BBESS GOODS, BHAWI.6, EIBBOWB. GLOVES, &a . mmrtrnent of mnasrs, poehishiho goods, BH. 1 bboidbbies, and lacks To* . ATTRACTIVE STOCK DRESS goods. Idaptedtothe Seaaon. Also. WHITB GOODS, RIBBONS, GLOVES, SHAWIS,&o. f Whleh tharMfer * - rtASHBCYEKB • „ , Are ~rtl n oi Webster was not a mem nn ll vS“of the Hertford Oinven tion. He .. never read it* jour h?d BOtbiogtodow together with Str.-Webster’* naltu Tbeee fMiaitOs'j. j 0 f that Convention, • lan., *tr, your* very truly, April 4,1863. ■- PHILADELPHIA, MONDAY* APRIL 6, 1863. ITORY Of Till REBELLION, DEPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN REVIEWED. CAMPAIGNS IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, ftc., Ac., A&c. Mr. Wade, from the joint Committee on the Con duot of the War, submitted a report, of whtoh the • following ie a synoptical summary, with reviews of, the accompanying testimony: ■ ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Soon after the battle of Bull Sun, in July, 1861, General McDowell was superseded, and General McClellan was called by the President to the com mand of the Army of the Potomac. The campaign In Western Virginia, the credit of which had been generally ascribed to General McClellan j, the favor with which it was understood he was regarded by General Scott, then General-in-Chief of the army of the United States; even his comparative youth holding out the promise of aotive and- rlgorous'rpoa sures—all theße considerations tended to imgbe hope Into the public mind, and to remove the glßom and despondency which had followed the disastrous issue ofthe campaign just ended,. .. ITS CONDITION, STRENGTH, AND DISOI - PUNE. Every energy of the Government" and ail the re sources of a generous and patriotic people were free ly and lavismy placed- at the disposal of General McClellan to enable him to gather together another army and put It to the most complete state" or etfl cieDcy, bo that offensive operations might be resumed at the earliest practicable moment. The Army of thePotomao became the object of- special care to every department of the Government, and aU other military movements and organizations were made subordinate to the one great purpose of oolleoting at Washington, ami organizing there, an-army-which should overpower the forces of the enemy, aud for ever ciuyii out any hope of success which the rebels might cherish. Even when the Army of the Poto mac had attained dimensions never before contem plated to the course of military operations upon this continent, and-seldom, It ever; equalled In modern times, no portion of ltß rapidly increasing numbers was permitted to be diverted, even fora brief period,- ■ to the accomplishment of other- enterprises. The generalß to charge of the various expeditions- from time to time Inaugurated, and from which so mneh benefit was anticipated—General-Butler, General Sherman, General Burnside, and others*-were com pelled to look elsewhere for the troops to compose their commands, to rely- upon .the continued patriot ism of the people, and the zeal of the executives of the varioue.States for the raising of those regiments 'which would enable them to depart for* the fields of duty assigned to them. No consideration was for a moment allowed to diminish or impair the efficiency of the Army of the. Potomac, and the unexampled spectaolewas presented to other nations, who were- Intently watching the course of events to this coun try, of the largeat army of the present century being raißed entirely by voluntary enlistments to the brief period of a few months. • When Congress assembled to this city, In the be ginning of December, 1881, so successful had.been the exeitions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their country’s call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your committee -by the adjutant, general of. the army, showed that, exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the Army of the Poto mac consisted of about 185,000 men. From the testimony before y onr committee It ap peared that the Army of the Potomac was well afmed and equipped, and. had reached a high state of discipline % the last of September or, the first of October. The men were ready and eager to com mence aotive operations. The generals to command of the various divisions were opposed to going Into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they had no expectation of doing so. gen. McClellan opposed to “ oorps- ING” THE ARMY) Tn reference to the proper organization of so large an ai-my as that about Washington, in order that it might be the better able to act most effectively in theield, the testimony of the’.wttnesses examined upon that point is remarkably unanimous. The generals most familiar with the subject ace mod to regard of the utmost importance the division of the army into corps d’armde, and that, too, In time for the Instruction of the troops in the movements ne cessary to render such an organization the most effective. Your committee deemed -it so vitaily necessary that , they repeatedly brought the subject to the’attention of the authorities, and urged its immediate adoption with alt the argumenteriu their power. The President and the Secretary of War con curred with them in the necessity of such a measure; but it did not seem to he regarded with much favor - by General McClellan: Indeed, General McClellan stated to your committee, at the time of their con ference with him, that, although it inight at some time be expedient to divide the army, into brmy corps, the subject was one of great- difficulty. He said it was a delicate matter to appoint major gene rals before they bad been tried by actual service, and had shown their fitness to be selected to com mand 30,000 or 40,000 men. A major general could not be stowed away in a pigeon-hole, if he should prove incompetent, so easily as a brigadier general. He proposed, therefore, to htmßelf manage this en- - tire army in some battle or campaign, and then se lect from the brigadier generals in it such as should prove themselves competent 'for higher commands. ' Consequently, the division of the army irito army corps was not cvcii ficgtin until attdr the tnoveirieiit" of the army in March had commenced, and then only in’pursuance' of the direct and repeatedjordersofthu President. ■ " • the pkesident i.ets him have his own WAY. General McClellan, however,' continued 06 oppose the organization of the army into army.corps, as will he seen from the following despatch to him ftoia the Secretary of War, dated May 9,1862: “The President is unwilling to have th/army corps organization broken up, hut-also unwilling‘ that the commanding general shall be trammelled and embar rassed in actual skirmishing, collision with the enemy, and on the eve of an expected great battle. Ton, there fore, may temporarily suspend that organization in the armv under' your immediate command, and adopt any you see fit, until farther orders. He also writes you privately. ” Hie provisional corps of General Fife-John Por ter and General Franklin were thereupon, formed 'by reducing the other corps from three to.two di visions. BLOCKADE OF THE POTOMAC. TMb matter was thoroughly investigated by the committee. It seems that Oaptaln Craven arranged a plan for raising this blockade with his Potomac flotilla and some four thousand troops. General McClellan promised the men ftogt his army, but never furnished them, giving, as his excuses. that his engineer's were of opinion that such a body of men could not be safely landed, and such a move ment might bring on a general engagement. Mor tified at this disappointment, Captain Craven threw up his command on the Potomac, and aßked for Bea service, which was immediately given him. GENERAL ADVANCE ORDERED. oil the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as coinmander in-chlef of the army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United Stateß, one result of which was the series of victories at _Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, to, which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land.' _ , . « LINE OF OPERATIONS FOR THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ' . . After this long period of inaction of the Army of the Potomac, the President of the-United States, on the 31st of January, 18®, issued the following order: . ' ’ ‘Executive Mansion, ,"Wi shikutoh. January 31, 1862. "President's Special War Order. ■ ‘Ordered, That all the disposable force ofthe Army of the Potomac, after providing Safely fcr the defence of Washington, he formed into an expedition for the imme diate object of seizing and occupying a Pomt upontlie railroad sonthwestward of wbat is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the dlscretion.of the tieiie ral-in-Ghiel and the expedition to mwe before or pn the 22d day of i*ehmary next. ASRAHAM-liINCOLHJ' GEN. McOLELLAN OBJECTS. To this order Gen. McClellan wrote an elaborate, renlv of the Bame date, objecting to the plan therein Indicated as involving “ the error of fividingour army by a very difficult obotacle, (the OcqtKiuan,) and by s distance too great to enable thetwo portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the maiwefs of the enemy, while the other is held in cheek.” He then proceeded to argue in favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that thirty days would be rrauired to provide the, necessary means of transportation. He stated that he regarded “success ascertain;!* all the chances of war,”;by the routehe proposed, while it was “by no means certain that we eanbeat them (the enemy) at Manassas.” . ■THE PRESIDENT ASKS SOME IMPORTANT : 1 QUESTIONS. . ' . To this the-Presiderit made the following reply: “Rxecuvivb Mansion, Wasrikoton, , “February 3, 1862. . . - “My Dear Sir : Yon and 1 have plans for a movement of the 'to be down the Chesapeake, np the.SapMhannocK *to TJrbanna, and acroas land to the termlniUL o £% e i r on York river; mine to move directly to> jwint i oeB plan involve a greatly larger expen diture of time and money than mine ? • • : “ % 'Wherein is a victory more certain by yonr plan “9 ID \V herein is a victory more valuable by your plan than would it not be lees valuable in this, that it would break no great line of tne enemy s communica tion, while mitte would ? . “6. In ease of disaster, would nota safe retreat b§ more difflcnlt by yonr plan than by mine? - „„„ -"yours, truly. A.LINCOLN. , “ Major General McCi.ELi.Ajr." - NO DIRECT ANSWER IS GIVEN. Your committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or thef arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by General McClellan, except the result of a council 3 war held in February, 1862. That council, the first, so far as yonr committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General McClellan, and then by the direction of the President, was composed of twelve generals, aB follows: M«Dowell, Sumner, Heinizelman, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, Barnard, and Naglee, (from General Hooker’s divi sion.) HEW PLANS SUGGESTED. To them was submitted the question whether they would endorse the line of operations which General McClellan desired to adopt. The reshit of the de liberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the - movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake bay* up the Rappahannock, landing at TJrbana, and across the country to Richmond, The four generals who voted against the proposed movement, were Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Barnard. General Keys voted for it with the qualification -that ho change should be* made until the enemy were driven from their bat teries on the Potomac. At this point it may be well to consider the princi pal arguments) for and against the movement upon Eichmond direct from Washington, and the move meat byway of the lower Oneaapeake, Including that fire* proposed by Way of the Rappahannock river, and the one anally adopted by wpy of fortress Monroe and the Peninsula. ' • i. ; In expressing opinions -upon this mad other.sub jects relating more Immediately to military opera %obb in the field, your committee do not undertake to form and express opinions of their own, but con tent themselves with setting forth those expressed in their testimony by military men whose education* and experience entitle them to speak confidently upon those subjects pertaining to their profession, „• The arguments in favor of the direct, and against the lower route to Richmond, were many and ■weighty. Some of them are moat tersely expressed in the letter of the President to General of February 3, 1662, before referred to. Besides those,' the direct movement-enabled the larger amount of troops to operate actively In the field, as the. army, in its -movement, itamedthtely covered. *Waslfihgton, and.thereby rendered of a large ! iqrce here unnebessaryg By tUe adoption.of .the lower route, a division of tiie army wM rendered Imperative, in ordeffto provide for thdTj&fety of the capital sgainst any Bttaoh-of the enemy. Thus, to vise the language of General McOlellan himself, in reference to the movement proposed against the enemy while at Manaßßaa, “committing the error of dividing,oar army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to v enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked 1 by the masses of the enemy while the other Ib, held 1 in check.” - , The army; in moving direct from Washington, avoided all the delava and disorder consequent upon : the embarkation and.disembarkation of so .large a force, with ail Its material. And by investing Kich roona on tbe north and northwest, we cut them off from lone of their great sources of supply, the She-: nandoah valley, and at the same time prevented their raids through that region of country, which so paralyzed all efforts to send the few troops left in ■ Washington to the' assistance of the army on the Peninsula. • - , ’ General McClellan states In hls.testimony that by .adopting the route .by way of Annapolis and the Rappahannock, he hoped,if propersecresy was pre served, to be able to reach the-vicihity of Richmond ’ before .the rebel army at Manassas could be conceit* -tfated there for its defence. Whatever probability there may have been for the realization of ; such a hope at the time the Rappahannock route wbb de cided upon, it was entirely removed, when the ene my evacuated Manassas, before any actual move ment was made by oUr -army. 'And General Mc- Clellan at once ‘relinquished the Rappahannock 1 route, and decided; with the concurrence of his corps commanders,-to go,by way of Yorktown and the Pe ninsula. • - * i -.t ■■ ■ One great objection to the Peninsula route, as in dicated by the “testimony of all tbe witnesses who testify upon that point, including General McClei lan'himself, was the total want. of information-in reference to the nature of the country there, the kihdand conditions of the roads, the preparations fordefence; &e. The difficulties and embarrassments our army labored under from the .beginning of that campaign, frdai-that want,oi|ihformation, are very evident from the testimony. . The CecisioD ot the council, of twelve generals in February wesVto.w’dvd by way ot Annapolis and thence to -Tiie-questionof ro opening the nayigatton'cof the: Potomac,' by driving the enemy fr'om ttiSr. batteries upon the river,-was discussed. It was, however, Anally decided.that the cruiiiy should be leftinpoßßessionoftheir,batteries, and-the movement'should be made without dißturb leg theta. ' . . THE FIRST MOVEMENT ANTIOIPATEDBY ' THE ENEMY. . 1 - - , Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be 'executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries upon the Fotomec, and evacuated their position at Ontreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the Rappahannock. V . THE ADVANCETOMANASSAS. ’ When General McClellan, then in the city of Washington, heard that the enemy-had evacuated, Manassas, .he .proceeded across, the river and/or deieda gen6ralmovement of thewhole the direction of the position. lately occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning-of the lOih of’March,-the- greater. part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court House. A .email force of the cimyprbceeded to Manassas- and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired -beyond that river’ and destroyed the railroad bridge across it. TBE MOVEMENT TO TKEPENINSUIA. On the 11th or Match General McClellan ordered, by teltgraphj the transports from Annapolis to Washington, (Alexandria*) to embark; the army fiom there, and informed the department that he proposed to., occupy Manassas with a portion of General Banks’command, and throw all the 1 force he could concentrate upon the line previously de terminedupon. Subsequent events in the valley of the Shenandoah, terminating, for a tune, in the bat tle of Winchester, of March 23d, prevented the force underGenerM Banks from leaving that valley. - On the 13th of March General McOlellan convened, at Fairfax Court Bouse,a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps (Gen. Banks informed them that he pro posed to abandon hia plan of movement by way of thoßappahanndck* and submitted to theminstead a plan ot movement by way of the York and James rivers.'-- ■ ‘The results of this consultation, with reports, &c., hive been published in TAe Press. Amajorityof the generals were in- favor of the movementj provided that Washington should be left secure, &c,. This, it seems, was not properly attended to. CAMPAIGN ON THE PENINSULA General Heintzelman, who commanded the- first troops of the Army of the Potomac that lauded on Peninsula, arrived; at Fortress Monroe on the 2Sd of * March, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas, Be had orders to encamp as near Fortress Monroe as possible, in order that the enemy should -have no idea of the direction in which the army was to mo je - whether towards Y orktown or Norfolk. General Heintzelman states that shortly after landing he obtained information that the enemy had not more than 10,000 troops at Yorktown and on the Penin sula, and is satisfied that he could have advanced and isolated Yorktown, in which case there would have been no serious obstacle in’ the way of proceeds ing directly to Richmond, On the-2?th of March*he sent .out reconnoitring parties as far as Big Bethel and Watt’s oreek. and- went near the Half-way house, where about 400 of the enemy and a little-ar tillery were seen; He telegraphed to General Ms- Olefian what he was doing, and reeved a despatch in reply, that he fGenerat MeClellan) hoped" that nothing had s beebdbhe to give the enemy tion of the line of operations of the army. The re connoiasance wasthen withdrawn, OTJE AND THAT OF THE RE ' ; BEES.; Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe, and on the 2d of April General McClellan himself arrived,- On the 4th of April the army commenced its movement in the direction of Yorktown, and oh the enemy 5 slinks. General r MCCSellah froni Forfcreas Qlon - •• roo sooner thanheLotherndse.w'OiildJli.aye.dohe, upon. hearing that the enemy were Bending down rein forcements. , , . • ' i All the testimony-goes i;o prove that when our ’ first landed on the Peninsula the force of the enem'y there consisted of BSagruaer’s command, va riously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except by General McClellan,.who estimates it from 15,000 to 20,000, The Hon, Lemuel J. Bowden, United States Senator from Virginia, then living within the rebel lines, hear 'Williamsburg* testifies thatthe rebels did not determine to reinforce Magruder until it was apparent that our forceß intended to atop be fore Yorktown and commence a regular siege of- the place.' it is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that our forces, when they first appeared before Yorktown, could have pierced the line of works across the Peninsula there without much .difficulty, isolating Yorktown and cutting off reinforcements, when, the place must have fallen in a very short time. Some of our generals expected nnd desired that that should be done. General Heintzelman forwarded to Gen. McClellan the application of General Hamilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy’s lines. No answer was received to the appli cation. General McClellan, however, did not deem his forces' sufficient, and objected very strongly to the order of the President detaching. McDowell’s corps -for the defence of'Washington, as “imperilling the success of our cause.” He called again and again for reinforcements, asking for Franklin’s and Mc- Call’s divisions of McDowell’s corps, to be under commend of Franklin; insisting that Franklin's di vision, at least, should be sent to him. On the 11th of April Franklin’s division was ordered to Alex andria to embark for. Fort Monroe.. On the:l4th General Franklin reported to General McClellan . near Yorktown, but his troops-remained on board the transports until after the enemy evacuated the place, when they were ordered to- West Point. Oh the 6th of April General McClellan telegraphed to the President, “I have by no means the trans portation I must have to move my army even a few miles;” and asks that all his orders for wagon . trainß, Ac., may at once be complied .with. All was sent him as desired, until even General. McDowell -found himself so stripped of the transportation de signed for Ms. corps that, when he moved to Frede ricksburg, it was with the greatest difficulty he could move supplies for, his small fogpefrom Acquia to Falmouth, until the railroad was completed. _ Ainonth waa spent before Yorktown,,our army, In, the opinion of some of our ablest officers, becoming more demoralized by the labors'of. a long Biege than it would have been evertby an unsuccessful assault. The returns in the Adjutant General’s office, signed by General McClellan and Ms adjutant gene rid,: show that, on the 30th of April, 1863,. the forces on the Peninsula, under General Mc- Clellan, amounted to 1131,392 present for duty. On the Ist of May, the President telegraphs to General McClellan-,“Your call for Parrott guns from Washington, alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done!” SEIGEAND EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN. On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of May the enemy evacuated Yorktown without loss. One of the witnesses testifies that General McClellan was very much chagrined and mortified at the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to open from; Ms batteries on Monday, the 6th of May. The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the morning of the 4th. Between ten . and eleven o'clock. General Stoneman, with the cavalry and some light horse artillery, started In pursuit. About one o’clock, General Hooker) with hi* division, left Yorktown, with orders to Bupport General Stone man. Generate Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes also moved out-during the.day- with the whole or -portions of their corps. . About, five miles from. Yorktown the division of General Hooker was de layed for some time in consequence of other troops, another direction, getting into the road meantime, General Stoneman had over taken therdar of the enemy with Ms cavalry, and followed them up closely, keeping up a running fire all the lime, until the enemy reached- their works in the neighborhood of WflJiamßlrarg, when the pur suit was checked. Governor Sprague was sent back to i hurry upthelhfantry support under Geh. Hooker. After considerable delay, Adding It impossible to pass the troops ahead of him, General Hooker turn ed off and proceeded by another road)’of which he had obtained information from some of the inhabi tants; marched till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at daylight, add came up to the advanced works of the enemy a little after 7 o’clock, about a half a mile from Fort Magruder, and at once engaged the enemy. , . There seems to have been great misapprehension and confusion in relation to the management of the troops at Williamsburg, When the pursuit first commenced on Sunday, General* Heintzelman was Instructed by General McClellan to take charge of operations in front. On the morning of Mondaf orders were sent to General Sumner to take the command; General McClellan remained behlnd in Yorktown to superintend the sending two divisions up the York river to West Point. A heavy rain Bet in on Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracti cable for the passage of troops. The troops of the different commands became mingled—divisions and brigades, to some extent, were separated from each other—and it seems to have been difficult to get the troopß up in time. . . BATTLE OF ■SjGX.EIAMBBUBG. : During Monday forenoon, General Hooker, finding himself hard pressed by the enemy; and understand ing that General Sumner had 30,000 troops with him sent repeatedly for reinforcements. So did General Stone-man and-. General Heintzelman; but no-rein forcements arrived. General Sumner states that, having sent General Hancock to the right, he had at the centre only about s.ooo Infantry—the cavalry there not being fitted for operations against the ene my, on account of the country being so wooded. Upon receiving the call for reinforcemeiits to be sent to the left to General Hooker,-he sent staff officera to burryup troops from the own corps being some ten miles off, and ordered Kearny to reinforce Hooker. Reinforcements not coming up to General Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the Prince de JolnviUe and Governor Sprague went to Yorktown to urge General McClellan to come up to the front and take charge of matters there. Governor Sprague arrived at Yorktown about lo’docfc, having been about an hour in going down. He testifies that when General McClellan was told the condition of affairs at- the Dent, he remarked that he had sup- Dosed “those in.front could'- attend to that little matter.” After some time, General MoOlellan start ed from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Wil liamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. By that time Gen. Kearny had readied the field and reinforced Gen. Hooker, taking command, being the senior in rank to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hancock bad been engaged on the. right, but; upon being re inforced, had succeeded in repulsing the enemy, losing about forty men; The principal fighting was done by the troops under Gen. Hookers Ms division sustaining a lose of about 1 ,700 men. Before he was >reinforced, his troops were obliged to hold their.posi tlon with the-hayonet and-suon ammunition as the %en could' obtain fromthebodies of those who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that It was Impos sible to bringup freshammunitfon. . That night the enemy.evaouated their position at WilhfditeVurg. Ojen.-jS[oOleUaaAt»testh»t aftet he . __ field he was so satisfied that the toelfhri 3* Beaten, and Sat* that he conn ter mantled orders fo tL Biobartson and Sedgwick, and Ee Thc h Mxt a day°tJi° ,r purantt was continued ferar shertdfstance by. with a, amail bodv of isfantry. Several oftnfe geos* at y had *He enemy been promptly ft# . Wba«h could have been followed* into Richmond one of them says without Anns a gun,. Qen. Mo- Olellan says that the'roßds»wew_so bad, in const:- quench of the -rains, that itf waff impracticable 4® makU a vigorous pursuit. ' 1 The battle of Williamsburg appears to hare been fought under Many and sertous-disadvantages. No thing was known of the nature of the country or, the defensive wbrks of the enemy until our troops ar-- rlved before them; there was no*controlling mind in charge of the movements ; there'was uncertainty in regard to who was in oommatRl : ;; each general fought as lie considered best: andV by t&e time the general commanding appeared on tne 1 field, the prin cipal part of the fighting was over. - , _ Some three oY four days were spent* at Williams burg for the’ purpose of bringing up supplies, &c. f and-then the liue of msa*h was taken; up for the Chickahominys It was about the time -that the army left Williamsburg that -Norfolk and the Merrimac destroyed.. But pieparationffhad been madebefore tlioße events occurred to have-BUpplies sentup York* river instead of the James, and the line follo wed was adopted.. The conse quence was, that'theguhboats were or little'or no service in the operations against Richmdnd f and re mained entirely itfactrvAexcept in some operations agamstFort Darling, until they were called ruponto protect the army, when, in July, it. fell back to the James river. _ , V - ADVANCE TO' TOE.OHIOKAHOSCINY. . The distance between ‘Williamsburg and the litre of operations on the Ghlekahominy was from forty to fifty miles, and the army was almost two weeks in moving that distance. Th§ first troops ttmt the Generahffittgea. whidierosecd on 1 Vhe ay,follolvaaDy^the-'-' corpaof.GeneralHemtzelmanon the 26th. ; t ;Thereat ofour left bank'dfthe-OMcka boniin y untiHh e battle of Fair Oaks, when the corpß of General Sumner crossed. to the assistance of Ge nerals Heintzelman and Eeyeß. General McClellan continued calling for reinforoe mentß, representing that the force, of the enemy in his front was superior to his own,- and that the force under General McDowell would? do more for the.pro tection of. JYasbington, if sent to bis army, than- in any other position,in which it could be placed. In a letter written on the 21et of -May he asks that Gene ral McDowell’s corps be sent to him by water rather land,'■as the mbie'expeditious mode,and that be and his forces be explicitly, placed under his orders, *’in the ordinary way. ,r He clofiesliisletter i by saying:' ‘ ‘* I believe tliere is a great struggle before this army, v i but lam neither dismayed nor discouraged, I wish to ; stienglhen i s force as much as I can; but, in any event*- X sball figbt with all the skill, and caution* and deter mination that I pdsseps. And 1 trust that the result may . either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my Go vernment or that it may close my career ”• > In reply td the request of General McOlellan that General McDowell should join his forces by water, the President states, onthe2latof May; “ McDow ell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Freder icksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case tbe force resisting him will not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he willreach you in five days after starting; whereas, by water, he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experi ence. Franklin’s single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it.” McDOWELE AND FREMONT ORDERED TO REINFORCE McCLiEEDAN. ' Preparations were acccoidingly mhde for General McDowell to leave Fredericksbuig on the 26th of May to join General McClellan. Just at that time, however, Jackson commenced hia expedition down ; the Shenandoah volley, and General McDowell, to gether with General Fremont, froih ’Western Vir ginia, was sent to the assistance of General Banks, and to intercept Jackson in his retreat. Upon being informed of this, General McClellan replied that the movement of Jackson was probably intended to pre vent reinforcements being sent to him. The Presi dent replied, giving him full information as to the condition of affairs in the valley,"and closed by say ingt k “If McDowell’s force was now beyond our reach we should be utterly helploss. Appreheasione of something like this, and nd.iawUlingDess tO'SUstain you; has al ways been my reason for withholding McDowell’s force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you ean with the forces you now have. ” - “SEVEN PINES” AND “FAIR OAKS.” .On the Blßt of May and the Ist of June the battles of Seven Pines ana Fair Oaks were fought. As there has been so much controversy in regard to the eonduct of Borne of the troops engaged in that battle, your committee will refer more particularly to the testimony of Gen. Casey; who commanded 1 the ad vanced division, upon which the attack was , first made. Gen. Casey stateß that when the campaign of the Peninsula commenced hie division consisted principally of raw and inexperienced troops* They had suffered greatly from the labors and exposures incident upon .the. siege of Yorktown and the acU vance of the troopa lip the Peninsula., Some of them had been for weeks without shelter, being compelled to leave their camp equipage behind when ordered on the pursuit of the enemy after the evacuation of Yorktown. That division took the lead across the Chickahominy, taking up a position at Seven Pines, where it established itself by throwing up entrench ments and cutting abatis. A : few days before the battle of Seven Pines, con trary to the Advice and opinion of General Keyes and General Casey, the division was ordered three quarters of a mile to the front, within six miles of Kichmond, his pickets extending within five miles. They had no support on their right or their left, the remainder of the corps to which they, belonged (Keyes’) belßg in their rear. once com menced digging, rifle-pits and cnttlng abatis, the pickets at night being attacked.by thjp enemy, who were repulsed.■< About.ll the'Slst; the pickets reportea Yhe en«sy approach ing, and an aid of General Johnston-was captorgd and brought in. with important papers upon him. General Casey, with this aid and Ms general officer of the day,* went to General Keyes and reported the circumstances to him. General K4yes testifies that, for some days before the ’attach he sent to General McClellan reports of his condition, the •threatening attitude of the enemy in his imme diate vleinity, and urged that General Sum ner be sent across to his support., This was not done, however, until after the attack com menced. Reports continued to come in of the ap proach of the enemy. The : division' was called out and formed, the working men called in, and prepa rations made to meet the coming attack. Two lines of battle were formed—one in the rifle-pits, and another about one* third of a mile in advance—com* posed of five or gix regiments -and four pieces of ar tillery. A regiment had previously been Bent out to support the pickets. About twenty minutes* to 1 o’clock the enemy commenced the attack in force, supposed to amount to about 36,000 men, attacking, in front and on both flanks. After fighting for Borne time, the enemy continuing to come on in force, the forces in front fell back to the rifle-pits, and fought there until nearly surrounded. Reinforcements had been promised, and General Casey had selected the position to which they were-to be assigned; but no reinforcements came up to his position until just before he was forced to fall back from his second line, when a single regiment arrived. After about three hours* fighting, the division fell hack from its, second line with a loss of 1,433 in killed, wounded, and missing, In the course of an hour after Casey’s division had been driver back, the remainder of our forces were swept back from a mile and a half to two miles from Casey’s first line, when the enemy were checked, and the fighting ceased for the day. During the battle General Sumner, whose corps was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, was or dered by General McClellan to hold his forces in readiness to cross. General Sumner, not . only did that, but at once called out his forces and moved them-until the heads of the columns were at the bridges, ready to croßß, thereby saving between one and two hours. When the order came to cross he. immediately moved his forces in the direction of the field ofbattle, came up withand engaged the enemy, and relieved the pressure upon the troops engaged on his left. The next day, the first of June, the enemy attacked General Sumner at Fair Oaks. General Hooker, who had been ordered forward the day before, by General Heintzelman, with one-half of his division, hearing the firing of . the . enemy upon General Sumner’s forces, proceeded at once in that direction, and engaged the enemy. In a short time the enemy were repulsed, and fell back in confusion. There was no 1 communication between the forces under General Sumner and those under General Heintzel man (Hooker’s), but each foughtas he deemed beat under the circumstances, General McClellan was with theihainpartof the armyon the leffc bank of the Chickahominy. After the fighting was over he came across to the right bank of the river. On the momineof Monday General Heintzelman. ordered General Hooker to make a reconnoissaace in force, ■which he did, advancing to within four miles oi Richmond, meeting with no resistance ex cept a little from the enemy’B pickets. Upon being informed by Generals Heintzieman of what he had done. General McClellan ordered the troops to- be recalled and occupy the position that had been held by Caßey’s division. ' The officers engaged in that battle, whphave been examined, testify .that the army could have pushed right on to the oity ofßichmond with little resist ance ; that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c., that might impede their flight. General McClellan seems to have contemplated an immediate movement upon Bicbmendj for, tne'day after the battle, - June 2, he writes to the Secretary ofWar;: ‘‘The enemy attacked in force and.with great spirit yesterday morning, but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our-troojs cfiargedCwqueoG ly on both days, and uniformly broke the enfflhy. The result is, that onr left is within four miles of Eichmoud. I only wait for the river to fall to- croas wkh the rest of the force and make a general attackv 'Should I find them holdingfirmina very strong ffmay waif*for what troops I can bring up from Fort Mouroe. Bat,the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. Ido not fear for odds af»«st The TichAy is complete, and all-credit is due to the gallantry of onr officers and me a. ” ; - " • .. The movement was not made,kowever, as .Gen. McOlellan states, because of the high stage ofcwater S D On the etl/of *Jun e McCall’s division of General McDowell’s corpß was ordered to join the Army of the Peninsula. On the Bth of June General Mc- Clellan telegraphs: «I shall be m peifect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment that McCall reaches here and the groMd jriU aandt the passage of artillery.”' On the 10th or Uth of June McCall’s troops commenced arriving, at the continued to be loaclein Washington tb' Bend down by land from PrederioksbuM the re mainder of General McDowell’B corps,, he, being directed to co-operate fully with General McClellan, but retaining; an Independent command. This does not appear to have been in accordance with General McClellan’s wishes; for, on the 16th 1 of .Tune, he telegraphs to the Secretary of War: “it ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and Ms troops arc completely under my control I re ceived a telegram from Mm.reauestlng that’McC&lle di vision might be placed so as toijou.ta immediately upon hts arrivul. That if-aneHtdoeHnotLrQatbethepro per spirit; whatever troops come to memnit he disposed of so as to do the roost good- Ido not.feol - that in such circumstances as thoseto whlch I am now placed Gene ral McDowell should wish the general interest to bo sacrificed for tbo porposa ofincroMMK T hls commaiia. If I cannot folly cOE trol all lns txoops l want none of them, hut would prefer to fight the hattie with, what I Pave! and Ut others be responsible for the remits. THE ABTANCE OF JACKSON. : . ' _ On the 18th of June, General McOlellan tele eranhs to the Secretary of War that he has received: Information from deserters to the.efifeet that troops haveTeft Richmond to movement commenced on the Bth, trad th»Vif re enforcements have gone to Jackson, they are proba- SS less than 10.000 men; that he cannot vouch for the truth of the statement, but that it seems, nrett that it is believed in Richmond', and tiSrrtiel troopß. To this the President re |ties”o?tbe same go s| theWmed^Gfen^y'StoOlX^tel^aphsto -An every point areadiness to.meet ua. Kf;sSMvhavoK?Stnimber«andextonslva works. •EE* a, *n»™ thooFand roen have l»ft Richmond to re- If ten or nroen tno. n.. 4tra , p? their strength and eont droSS J Afie?to-monow we M Providence will permit We shall await only a favorahte condition of the earth and the comple tion of some necessary, preliminaries. , The returns of General McOlellan to the Adjutant General’s offloe give the IbUowing aa the strength Sroearoy on t£e Peninsula on the Mth’of Junes Present for duty, U5,M*; special duty.elok, and in *££5712.226: absent, 29,611-total, 156,888. Almut tM* time the rebel General Stuart, with hie cavalry, made his celebrated raid, making the entire cUcw oi? . B. Mc’lLkLlZfcN; “ Major GcfleSr&L “ Hon. B. M. F-rAirtSS? Secretary of War. ” viCTosft* or< eefeat. The answer of the Freeident» as foll®ws:' June 26. “Your three despatches of yesterday, io relatsetftd'- the affair, ending with tEuySratemefc* that you completer succeeded in making yourWbints.- »r& very gratifying/' j /“The latter one of 6.153?. Ml , saggesting the protean' s bllity' of yonr being overwbbijned by 200.000 men, aed ’ talkurg of whom. the responsibility will belong, paiate 1 - me very much. 1 give you dill can,, ami acton the pro-' : sumption that you willdo- can with you have; while you continue? ungenerously, 1 think* to* assume that 1 could give'yoh' move if I would, l have omitted, I shall omit, no tt oppor.u«ity to send you reinforcements whenever X possimy can*. “ A. LINCOLN. “Major General McCj.ei.law. ” . BATTLE OF GAINES 5 lILL. On the afternoon of the 28ttt ofJesne, between 2 and 3 o’clock, tbe enemy, inconsiderable' force, made a vigorous attack upon the troopeof General McCall’s division, stationed at Meehaniceviile, con sisting of the two brigades of Seymour a»d Reynolds. The action-lasted until nightfeH* when the enemy were repulsed. Troops were sent up - by General Porter to the assistance*of those engaged, bat they were not in the battle, though some of them were in position to Buppoi t the right of the line; : About 12 . o’clock ■ that night the troops were oidered to fall back to Gaines’ Mill, which was ac complished without loss. Ob the 27th the battle of Gaines’ Mill was fought, principally by the troops under General Porter. Our forees there engaged were from 27,000t0 30.000, the force of the enemy being from two to three times that number. The enemy were in such : superior force that, although our troops-fbugtst with exceeding bravery, they were driven back with a loss of about 9,000 men, in killed, wounded, and missing. General McClellan was»questioned ae to the policy of leaving the right wing, consiatingof only about 30,000 men, to meet the attack of the superior force of the enemy, instead of withdrawing; it to the right bank of the Chickahominy before the battle of Gaines’ Mill. His testimony on that point is as follows: * TESTIMONY OF GEN. McCLELEAN. •"'Question. Whatever might have been the intention 8 of the enemy, as the attack was to have been made-by him,-would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on thr same side of the Chickahominy prior to the battle of Games’ Mill ? “Answer. Ido not think they ought to have be*Q brought to the same side of the river before they actually were. ' “Q. What advantage was gained by leaving the-right wing of our army to he attacked by a greatly superior force? “A. It prevented the enemy from getting on our ffimk and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the army and its material. -“Q. Will you explain what was done by the-right wing of our winy at or about the time the left was- en gaged which saved our flank from attack and enabiedthe army and its materialio be withdrawn? “A. By desperate fighting they inflicted so great adoss on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of the way. ” During the night after the battle of Gaines*' Mill all our-forces were concentrated on the right* bank: of the Chickahominy, and the next day the mover' ment to the James river was determined upon.- Gem Heintzelman testifies thatthe night after that battle he was sent for by General McClellan; that he found everything packed, ready to leave: that GRen. McClellan-said there were two things to be concentrate his forces and risk all on a battle, or to- Withdraw, to the James 'river; that if he risked & battle there, and was beaten, the army was destroyed. General Heintzelman advised him not to risk a bat* tie under such .circumstances, forif that army wa» lost the cause would be lost; that it were better to go. to tine James river and await reinforcements. General McClellan replied that he was of'that opi nion himself, and that was determined upon. That night, at twenty minutes past twelve, A. M., Gen. McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he (General McClellan) is not responsible for the re sult, but feelß that the Government has not sustained ’hfearmy. .... • . Tothis the President replies, on the2Bfch: “.If you ! have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price i we.pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We j protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Save your army at all events. Will - send as fast as we can. Of course theyjcannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day.”- - - THE RETREAT TO HARRISON’S LANDING. The 28th of June passed without any serious fighting. Col. JB, S. Alexander testified that on the f afternoon of that day he was sent for by General McClellan, and went to his headquarters, at Sa vage’s Station, arriving there about dark. Here-: ceived instructions to proceed with an escort to the James river, send back a sufficient number of men to act as guides forthe different eolumns of the‘army, communicate with the gunboats, and order supplies to be brought up the river; to examine" both shores of the James to the mouth of the Chickahominy, and ascertain the landing places; proceed up the Chickahominy to the head of navigation add ascer tain the places where the army could or obb, in case of necessity, and then return to headquarters and report. He left Savage’s Station that night, and reached the James river the next afternoon. By the time he had completed his examination thearmy had reached the James river at Malvern. . •* While at headquarters, receiving his instructions, he was shown, as he testifies, a printed order, not then issued, directing the destruction of the baggage of officers and men, and the camps, equipage, and things of that kind; appealing to thearmy to submit to this privation, as it would be only tempo rary—“ only for a few days.” He remonstrated with Gen. McClellan against issuing such an order; that it would have abad-effect, would demoralize the army, as it would be telling them, more plainly than they could be told in any other way that they were defeated and running for their lives. ,The order was not issued, and Gen.: McClellan testifies that he has no recollection of any such order. .. The retreat to the James river having been decided upon, the army took up its march, being attacked by the enemy m the day time, and however success ful in repelling those attacks, evacuating their po sitions during the night The actions of Savage’s Station, Glendale and Malvern were fought during tbe.movement of the armyto the James, the enemy being repulsed in each day’s fighting, and our army falling back, tmder:orders, during the night. It would appear, from all the information your committee can obtain, that the battles were fought, the troops handled, new dispositions made and old ones changed, entirely by the corps commanders, without directions from the commanding general. He. would place the : troops in the morning, then leave the field and xeek the position for the next day, giving no directions until the close of the day’s fighting, when the ,troops would be ordered to fell back duringthe night tothe newposition selected by, V him. In that maimer the army reached the James river. : : : _ BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. Tbe battle of Malvern HUI, of the Ist of July, wan the most fiercely contested of any upon the Penin sula. The troopßwere placed in the morning, under direction of Gen.McUicllan, who then left the field, returning to it again in the afternoon. The first action of the day. commenced about 10 o’clock in the forenoon, but dul not continue long. The principal ; actioD,when the .enemy.attacked moat vigorously and persistently, commenced late in the afternoon, I and continued till.after dark, the enemy, being re- 1 pulsed and beaten at every point. Many of tbe offl-; cera examined by yourcommittee are of the opinion that the enemy were so severely punished on that I day that they could have been' followed into Rich mond had our army followed them up vigorously. It is true that our army had beenseverely tried du ring the preceding week, fighting, as.they did, nearly every day, and .retreating .every night. The corps, commanders and the troops under them fought most bravely—no troops better., However disheartened they may have become by what all must have re-, garded sb a precipitate retreat-during tbe night, they Btill fought with the most obstinate bravery when attacked in the day time by an exultant andsuccesa-. ful enemy.* ' | ' MCCLELLAN’S HOPES AND FEARS. 1 The commanding generahhowever, determined to | fall back from Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwith standing the.viotory won there,by. our army. He 1 seems to baye regarded his,army as entirely unfitted. I to meet the enemy, for on the day of ;the battle, at Malvern, evidently before .that battle took place,he writes to tbe. adjutant general, of : the. army from ,| Haxall’s plantation: “Mymenare completely exhausted, and I dread tho resnltifwe sro attacked io-da- by fresh troops. Ifpos sibls. I shall retire to-nightto Harrison’s Bar. where the ? inboats can render more aid in covering our positiop. ermit me to write that not an hour should..he lost in .sending me fresh troops. More gunboats aremgen needed. ” . , I On the 2d, of July, the. President telegraphs to General McClellan:, “Tear despatch of yesterday, morning .induces me to hope your army is havingaome rest, to this hope allow me to reason with: yon for a moment when you asa for 50,000 net to he promptly seot yen, you must surety labor under some gross mistake of sent papers showing yonr disposal of ferees mads law spring for tbe de once of Washington, and advised are tuto to than plan. I find included in and about Wash ington7s.ooomen. 1 AUof not memenoufth to, fill thatjyery planhrls,» General Fremont’s in the Valley ; aU: of General Banss , all of General McDowell’s not with li2L>s? 4 if a tbey Washington, taken together, do not R t»g reach.UMA i? ®^ l t Thus- the idea of promptly, is simply absurd If, hyw hwswffi 1 , lion ofresponelbC%.J»“ had th «?‘^S’p”eSlm blame you for not. doing more than .ymwsft p*»»“ ! yon°thin strong enough to take I^ch mondjußtnow, Xdo_gitMkyon, at^ngthen On the 3d of July, after the army had rewhedHar i risonls Bar, General MoOlellaa writ** to the Secret ? twy of "Wars : • _ _ , t Jr um jn hopes.ihat tfed enemy is- a* oosaplefely worn ! “To accomplish the pea.rtaak Ridimond, end Batting an end to this rebellion; -Touubreemsnts should bo sent to me rather much tmrfchan less than, mooo men. ” - , CHhBACTISR ©*" THE BETREAT. The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrt- , bod’s" Bar was very precipitate. The troops upon their arrival there huddled together in greatoonfu sisn, .the entire army being collected within a Bpace of about three miles along the river. No ordem i were given the first day for occupying the heights which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed sons to be sue to resist an attack In force by the enemy. and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemyfrom bringing up their artil lery, saved the army there from destruction. The enemydidsueeeed in'bringing up some of their ar tillery, su'd threw feme shells into the camp, before any preparations for defence had been made. On the 3d of July the heights were taken possession of by our troops and works of defence commenced, and then, and not until then, was our army secure In that position. . * THE AttTWV AT HABEISON’S landino. By reference to the teatimonypfMr. Tucker, A* Blatant Secretary of War. lt will beßeenthat prior lin’g dlvlrtop Of 'Qpnpral ftogovfell's corps, num- TllE All troBHSHM) -WEEK hr.) THE WMI FeB«J tiriil bn „ mail (per femxtim in aAva.tt~a> sabaeribars fey Five Coulee *• “ )Et Ten •• •» *• Twenty “ •■ ’• —• W-00 Lnmer Clnbe tKan TJrehly tame rate, SLS9 per copy, sea 8,1 **• 3*fte money must always accompany the o-A*— <« «u f»**ano. can these ten™ Be a, Sto afford very htttle more than the cost of the vawf ** ttre mini* to act aa touts fi» MSf To the Keiter-np ot the Club of ten or twenty aS «3ttr» copy of tfee Paper will fee givea. r * °* feting about 12,000 men, wte sent down. In the early part of June General McCall's dlvietof of the afeecorpyof about men was sent down, “ sMfe®f wits about 11,000 men from Baltimore and Monroe, and about the last of June some B.WWmen of Opera) Shields’ division were also eent down. TWagMSOsoOmen. sen? aCß ?, rdi ?£. fo ®* ret «f« I- x.*‘9 Acjirtant Generate office bv General McClellan, the Army of the Potbmao, under hie' JJjSSI?“2; £ aB ’® B i olk>^ 8: Presear for Ate, area?; *£*?t &*<* fo arrest, rtfiMl absent. Jf ?79 ®, total,.- 16&,314e This included the corns of o/fnSf, to 9 >"* *» ftvotof a wltMrawaH>Fthe army. General Burnside teßtSflesthat, ashe Understood from the sß^a^sa^sgssmssss without thelter ajjd’coeking niSteiU, and many of the men were withoutarros. Tai eeneral opinion expressed bythe heading officers WKs.thaf the-men ; had bpdpme vary much enervated, ©neof the lead ing officers Bafcdthat his command troufd not, in hia opinion,-gparcXf three miles and flgWa battle.' This Wnditia&pf tjhjr/tjoopß was one . of the reasons assigned fm.tteyßifl Withdrawal of the army from ) IfSe Fenin«SHCj*[fc Ir. . ■ • , 1 General Tor fa'.itiO feiiiforce irt-fnts tore able him to reßume activ# r op£ rations. :GeteraPH)Ule«!fesw|«i :lie vfsiled t3fe. army, io - formed' General MoChdlan that the Government jcoali-ftirnieh Mnoepaly 20,0c6 additional troops. General McClellan coneented to renew Tiperations , with that number of reinforcements, aod tioneral ! Halleei left, with that! understanding. BSt the day tbet he left General McCMian wrote to hibr, asking loVJR0» or 20,000 troop, from the Western-hrmy, in addition to those promised to him, urgJSg very strongly that they should be brought hero'-peni po rarily, to-be returned to the West after Richmond sboßld have been taken; As this could not be’done, theOTdcrwaß given for the withdrawal of the r.rniy.as rapidly as possible, in order to cooperate with’ the forcEß.under General Pope, then in the presence of a superior rorce of the enemy. General-Pope’s campaign 1b reviewed at length" at this polnkof the report. Many instances of disobe dience of orders are cited* on the part of General. McClellan and his subordinates, but most or the facts elicited in the testimony are familiar to the public. The same SlowneßS ef movement and call ing for reinforcements is daily evident from the tele grams puMished. - THE CAMPAIGN IN MAEYLAND. Of the Maryland campaign the committee make out a brief- if we except the official docu ments and most offwhich have been pub lished. Tblsportien of the report concludes with the order of the War Departments relieving Mc- Clellan from the eommand of the Army of the Potomac. ■ OPEEATKONS OF GEN. BURNSIDE. Upon aflsnming oommand of the Army of the Pck temae, Geo.' Burnside at once determined to follow the line of operations which he had previousiy sug gested to Gen. McClellan ; that is, to make Fre dericksburg the base of his operations. He assumed command on the 7th- or Bth of November, and on the 9th forwarded to Washington bis proposed plan of operations. On the 13th of November Greet. Halfeck came- to Warren ton, and, with Gen. Meigs, had a conversation with Gen. Burnside upon the future movements of the army. . Gen. Burnside stated that hia plan was “to con centrate the army in the neighborhood of Warren ton ; to make a small-movement across the Rappa hannock, as a feint, with a view to divert the atten tion-of the enemy,' and lead them to believe that we were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville, and'then a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburgfor the reason that u we wotud all the time be as near Washington as wnnTd the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg we would be at a point" nearer to Richmond than we wouldbe even ii*we. should' take Gordonsville.” General Burnside desired te have provisions and forage, together with pontoons to enable the army to cross the -Rappahannock. General Meigs test** ties that while at Warrenton he wrote an order to General Woodbury, in Washington,- to call on the quartermaster at Washington fortransportafton for the pontoons to Acotiia creek, which order General Balleck signed, and it wae sent off to the telegraph office. THE “PONTOON* BELAY. On the 16th of November Generali Burnside started the columns of his army from Warrenton to Frede ricksburg, not having heard any thing of the delay of tbe pontoons from Washington. The telegram an nouncing the delay did not? reach General Burnside until the 19th of November. The corps of General Srunner. was in the advance, and it was the inten tion that be should cross over to Fredericksburg and take possession of the place. But the non-arrival of the pontoons in time prevented the movement which had been contemplated, and necessitated, the adop tion of other measures. BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. General Burnside then began to make prepara tions for another movement, bringing up the pon toons as rapidly as possible, to enable his forces to cross th£ river. • • ' Theidsn determined upoa-waato cross the river at. j fhe^fight^wJng'td eross opposite Fredericksburg, and the left wisgto eross from three to four miles Below the oity. The left Wing was composted of the left, grand- division, with a corps from the centre grand division, making a force of from 60,C00 to 60,000 men, .the whole being under command of Major General Franklin. The crossing was made successfully at both points, but with much opposition from sharpshooters-on the right. PLAN OF ATTACK. General Burnside states- tins following in regard to his plan of attack':: “The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where wemad'e otrr attack, by means of Which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour around' through a. bad eonntry. I obtained from a colored'man,.from-tae other aide of the town, infoimation in regard- to this new road, which proved to he correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that* was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been takes, which 1 supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their tine in two; and then' I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of their works.’* GEN. FRANKLIN* 8 ORDERS. The following is the order to General Franklin, Who commanded the left r ‘ * HEAIX3UABTEBS A3MT OP THE POTOiTA-C, “December 13, 5.55 A. Et. * * General H&rdie will carry this despatch to you, and remain with yon during the day. The general com manding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and yon will send out at once a division, at to pass below Smith-field* to seize, if possible; tbeheighta near Captain Hamilton's, on this-side of the Sfassaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its Hue of re treat open'. He has ordered another column of a divi sion or more to be moved from General Sumners com mand up the plank road to* its intersection of tbe tele graph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. rHoldingtbeae heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these moves by co lumns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own-forces, which, might occur in a general movement.during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the • hridges/and will remain there as support*. Copies of instructions • to Generals Sumner and. Hookerwtll be forwarded to yon by an orderly very soon. Ton writ keep your whole command m readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword which, if possible, should be given to every Company, will be *- ■ Scott ” “Ibavetbe bODor tobe, generafi-very rmspaotfally. your obedient servant, 30 Hl? f^PAKKB,^ “ Major General Txsmmx,- ■ . . , “Comroanevug Department, Grand Division Army of Potomac.” ' HOW THEY WERE -OBEYED. General Franklin states, when last, examined, that he received the above order at about half past seven A. 31., and that be at once took measures to carry out what he eonsideredto be the meaning of the order, that is, “an armed, observation to ascer tain .where the enemy was.”; ■ In-his .testimony, riven when your committee, were , at Falmouth, he says: “ I put in ail the troops that I-thought it pro- . per and prudent to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command, as far as I could, and at the same time keep my connection with the river open.-” ■ From the testimony it would appear that the at taek was in reality made by one ofthesmallest divi sions in General Franklin’s command—the division of General Meade, numbering about 4,500 men. This division was supported on its right by General Gibbon’s division'of about 6,000. men. On. the. left was GeneralDonbleday’s division, forming the ex treme left of our line, nearly at right angles with General Meade’s 'division, and ..extending to the liver. Just as General Meade’s division advanced to the attack, General Birney’s division, of General Stoneman’s corps, numbering about 7,000, came up and took position immediately, in rear of General Sleade. • . . The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing the Bret line of the enemy, and gaining the crest of the hill. . Gen. .Gibbon, seeing Gen. Meade ad vancing to the attack, ordered his division forward. After his last, brigade had advanced, driving the . enemy with the . bayonet, and he was preparing Ms batteries to openupona rebel regiment that made . their appearance on his left, Gen. Gibbon was,. woundedt and taken from the Gen- Meadms , division having reached the crest of the hill,.formed , themselves In the presence of the reserves ef .tug enemy, who opened fire upon them in front, and - they also »ceived a fire upon their flank. Jhe.sur, neriority of the enemy was ho overwhelming that. Meade’s division was forced back, as was also Gib-, bon’s division. The enemy pursued until cheeked.- bv Birney’s division. Our forces continued to hold - their pontoon, without renewing the, attack, until they were ordered to withdraw across the.river. The losses sustained' in the attack, in killed, wounded, and missing, were-as follows : Meade’s, division, 1,760$ Gibbon’s division, 1,243 ; Bimeyis, division, 961, • General Burnside, upon hearing of the small - force ordered to attack the enemy, sent an order to. General Franklin to make a vigorous attack with, his whole force. Several of the witnesseß.teßtify that had Die attack, been renewed with all the. available force under General FrahhJin’a command, it would have been successful. General .Franklin, testifies thatlt waa not an order, hut a rowgat, and that when he. received it it was too late to renew the attack, and, therefore, he did not do it. • THE BEAL CAUSE OF OT3B. MISFOBTHNES. The testimopy of all Die witnesses befo»your> committee proves' most conclusively, that, had the attack been made upon the left with-all the force which General Franklin could have used, for that purpose, tha plan of General Burnside, w.ould have been completely successful, trad our aiaaywouldhavfe achieved a.most brilliant.victory. •After the attack on Satmday our army remained in position untilMondaynighVwhen it was with drawn across the river without loss. .. tom committee have not considered it essenaal to report upon ..the oneraDons Ot the rightwing or our army in-tfais battle, for the resaoh.thatthe suc cess of the movement evidently dependadto great extent; upon the successful operation ojrno left. Although our. troops en ft*®. gallantly, making repeated attaota- the of the enemy’s position waa such that our 8BW»we» compelledto retire. . . General Burnside made up another plan to attack : the enemy across the