The press. (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1857-1880, December 24, 1862, Image 2

gi j t 4rt55.
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 24. 1862
The Attitude of New York. •
It is impossible to resist the conviction
that a bold effort is about to be made to
place the State of New York in a position
of apparent antagonism to the Federal au
thority. The Democratic journals abound
with hints and allusions for the apparent
purpose of testing the public mind. A few
days ago we had occasion to comment upon
the declaration of the Lieutenant Governor
elect of New York, DAVID R. FLOYD JONES,
in which he professed to give a synopsis of
the forthcoming message of Governor REY
idouß. The tone of his allusions was in har
mony with the general idea now pervading
the Democratic press. The • Democratic
organs of New York city are more emphatic
than the Lieutenant Governor. They bold
ly declare it to be the purpose of Governor
SEYMOUR to precipitate a conflict with the
President. The Brorld, in its wild rhetoric,
speaks of "raising a tempest," while the
uncouth and rude Expresa abounds in large
capitals, and emphasized sentences, and re
peats the cant phrase : " Either the Ad
ministration dies, or the Government dies."
A correspondent of the Baltimore Sun as
serts that " Governor SEYMOITR will allow of
no more arbitrary:arrests. Upon that point
and some others, be is deeply pledged,"
The New York correspondent of the Phila
delphia Ledger confirms this state
ment, and adds tluA Governor SEY
MOUR will declare a determination to
" permit no draft in the State of
New York, unless the Federal Adminis
tration recedes from its emancipation po-.
lley." "Mr. SEvatou - n's Idea," continues
this correspondent, after vouching for his
authority "as reliable as that of the Go
vernor himself," " is, that it is not within
the strict line of his duty to his constituents,
nor to the country at large, to permit white
men to be taken from their families-here to
free negroes Sotith." This last statement is
the most explicit declaration we have yet
seen as to the intentions of Gov. SEYMOUR,
and as Its author is known to be an em
ployee of the New York Erpresa, we aceept
his declaration as authoritative.
As to any disposition on the part of Go
vernor SEYMOUR to array himself against the
President in his new station as Governor of
New 'York, we are not prepared to express
an opinion. We do not trust him as a poli
tician, and we have no reason to trust him
as a Governor. Were ho a truer man than
his record has proved him to be, we should
have little faith in his ability to sustain the
Government, for he is in the hands of bad
men. It is a remarkable fact that since the
beginning of this rebellion not one of the
leading friends of Governor Suvarpun has
taken any active part in favor of the Ad
ministration. They left that duty to loyal
Democrats like General Drs and Jews
WADSWORTH, and to the Republican party.
Mr. FERNANDO WOOD, with his vast influ
ence over a New York mob—Mr. KERET
-OA2C, with his sad record as a soldier—Mr.
CHARLES O'Corton, with his notorious sym
pathies for the South—the New York hotel
clique and its newly-purchased organ, The
World—have all been silent in the hour
of danger. They clamored earnestly against
coercion until the clamor was hushed by the
roar of Fort Sumpter's cannon. They are
now active and persistent in opposition to
the Government, because they hope to pro
fit by its embarrassment and ; seize the reins
of power. If Governor SEYMOUR can be
driven to consent, the effort will be tried.
The more closely we examine the course of
these men, the more thoroughly we are
convinced of the justice of our suspicion:
It might have been done more effectively
had a popular general been induced to take
the lead, and we have no hesitation in de
claring that nothing but the moral purpose,
the virtue and the patriotism of General
McCLF.I.I.AN, kept him from bei t ng their in
strument and victim. There has a hope
that General Bunlismu might be available,
but the high tone and courage of that re
markable man, as manifested in the
report we printed yesterday, and in
the evidence we print this morning, shows
that he is made in the mould of CINCINNA
TUI3 and WASIUNGTON, and is far above
their cabals. Governor SuvAroun is their
last selection, and he is to open the counter
revolution by denying the right to execute
the draft in New York, unless the President
surrenders his policy and annuls his procla
mation of Emancipation! •
With a patriotic army and a patriotic
people, and a Government of their choice
and affection, we can well afford to laugh to
scorn the efforts and intrigues of these ambi
tious bad men. It will be sad thing for our
sister State of New York, if she is to be de
livered to the mercies of a State Government
that goes into power as the antagonist of
the General Government. We may be
doing wrong to anticipate any such • contin
gency, but this matter has been threatened
so frequently, and with so much earnestness
and passion, that we might as well look it
in the face. . The course of the Administra
tion in arresting traitors will be governed
by the circumstances that controlledit in
other times. If the danger should again
demand the summary arrest of traitors in
New York, they will be arrested. If the Pre
sident deems it proper to order a draft, the
draft will be made ; and if Governor SEY
moult dares to oppose it on any pretext, he
will be held to a strict and unrelenting ac
countability. The time has passed when any
State, or the authorities of any State, can
threaten the General Government; and the
time will never come, when an ambitious
and unfriendly Governor will be allowed to
assail the Supreme Executive with impunity.
This may as well be understood. We Omit
that Governor SEYMOUR will act as the Go
vernor of a great, good, loyal, and devoted
State should act in his dealings with the Ad
ministration; that he will disappoint the men
who are seeking to make him an instrument
of sedition and mischief. It will be well for
himself and his fame if he heeds the advirn
thus frankly given.
Broad Street.
It seems that the speculators and opera
tors, who are interested in the building of
the freight railroad on Broad street, have
entered into a nice with the Court of Com.
mon Pleas, and are determined to have the
road built berme the honorable members of
that Court rendez' their decision. Broad
street has suddenly become a sort of ex
tended lumber yard, and along its inhabited
length we see piles of logs. The next step
will be to tear np the stones, and accompany
the logs with heaps of gravel. Then we
shall have gangs of busy laborers working
night and day, and in a few days the new
railroad. The rails once on the earth, it
will be a difficult and tedious matter to tear
them out; and the prospect is, that we shall
be inflicted for another generation with
hourly processions of coal teams, freight
cars, and locomotives. Broad street will
then become a choked and unsightly avenue
of trade—a thoroughfare for butchers, dray
men, coal-heavers, and mules. For every
pleasant and beneficial purpose, it will be
ruined, and Philadelphia will be compelled
to do without an avenue worthy of its taste
and fame until two or three generations
bring the Schuylkill into the heart of the
city.
Honor the Brave.
Mr. HVTCnINS, of Ohio, ha% introduced a
resolution into the House to give fine gold
niedals to the brave volunteers who crossed
the Rappahannock as the advance guard.
We are glad to record this action on the part
of the Representative from Ohio. Congress
should do something in acknowledgment of
their bravery, and it is of little moment
whether It takes the form of medals or not.
But there are other and more material me
thodsr of acknowledging the devotion of
these tnnve men, and thit is to promote tam
to higher positlous. Merit •should be tie
cause for advimeenicut, and Who have befri
more meritorious than the gallant four hop
tired
k1..A1E...a1.r, I .) 6 U e■ A 1 I . 2 ..)h fi e . I I
Special Despatches to 44 The Press."
Wasmatvrent, December 23, 1882.
• The Ministerial Troubles.
There are no facts, or even rumors, concerning the
Cabinet worth repeating, and the late excitement
has quite subsided.
A Memorial from Tenneseee about the
Proclamation.
Hon. EMERSON ETHER/DOE this morning pre
sented to the President a memorial signed by Gov.
Aramsw JOHNSON, Ex-Governor Wst. B. CAMP
BELL, WM. B. STOKES, Colonel of the let Middle
Tennessee Cavalry, ALLEN A. HALL, Judge BET E\,
JORDAN STOKES, A. V. S. LINDSLEY, Postmaster
at Nashville, and other prominent Tennesseans, urg
ing the President, for reasons therein specified, to ex
empt Tennessee from the operation of any proclama
tion which he may hereafter issue - declaring all
slaves in certain rebellions districts free. It is un
derstood that the memorialists do not object to Its
application to the cotton States of the South, or, in
deed, any other rebellious State.
Unpublished Correspondence.
The Secretary of State has communicated to Con
gress unpublished correspondence between the State
Department and the minister to Russia, r.clative to
the telegraphic line from Moscow eastward to the
Amoor river and the Asiatic coast, and thence, by
the joint effort of Russia and the United States, to
San Francisco. Portions of the line In the Russian
empire have already been completed. Mr. BAYARD
TAYLOR writes that our agent, Mr. COLLINS, is
awaiting the answer of the Emperor to the propo
sition to extend the line eastward from the Amoor
river.
The McDowell Court of Inquiry.
General Sigel was cross-examined to-day. This
examination had reference more particularly to the
causes of the prejudice which he might be supposed
to have against General McDowell, in connection
with the remark that officer is alleged to have made
to one of his (Sigel's) staff.
The witness acknowledges this remark to be his
chief reason of complaint, but there were others, it
being a personal dispute which he did not wish to
mention. One was, that having sent an aid-de
camp to General McDowell, during the march from
Gainesville to Manassas, to make a report and in
quire the cause of a thing heard on their left, the
officer was grossly insulted by him, in presence . 0r
his (McDowell's) staff, hut he (Sigel) did not so
much regard this as an affront to himself as to a
member of his staff.
General Sigel next recounted, in the order of date,
the movements wherein he thought General Mc-
Dowell had been tardy in co-operating—for instance,
when Jackson was allowed to overcome Shields,
escape Fremont, and to rejoin the main army of the
rebels contending against McClellan near Richmond.
He. also accused McDowell of leaving Banks 'at
the battle of Cedar Mountain with only 9,000 men,to
withstand, alone, 25,000 of the enemy, even after
both McDowell and Pope had been advised of their
approach. The court then adjourned.
The Porter court did not meet to-day.
Indian Annuities.
It i* ascertained that $38,100 of the annuity of
the Miami Indiana for 1854 and 1855 was carried to
the surplus fund, and has not been paid.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
Special Report of the Congressional Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War—Depo
pitfalls of Gene. Halleck, Burnside, Helga,
Hooker, Sumner Franklin, Woodbury,
and Ilnupt —An Itsportniat Official History
of the Present Campaign In Northern Vir
ginia.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23.—The Joint Committee on
the Conduct of the War to-day made a report in
answer to a resolution of the Senate, passed on the
18th inst., calling on that committee to inquire into
the facts relating to the recent battle at Fredericks
burg, Vo., and particularly as to what officer or offi
cers are responsible for the assault. They say that
they proceeded to the headquarters of the Army of
the Potomac and took the depositions of Major
Generals Burnside, Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker,
and Brigadier Generals Woodbury and Haupt, and,
on the return to Washington, those of Major
General ialleck and Brigadier General Meigs.
All the facts relating to the movements of the
army under General Burnside, the forwarding of
pontoons and supplies, and the recent battle at Fre
dericksburg, are so fully and clearly stated in deposi
tions herewith submitted, that the committee report
the testimony without comment :
Testimony of General Burnside.
major General Ambrose E. Burnside was sworn
by the chairman :
Q. You have Been the resolution of the Senate
under which the committee are now acting. Will
you now go on, and in your own way, without
questioning, give such account of the matters em
braced in that resolution as you may consider neces
sary and proper.
A. In order that the whole matter may be entirely
understood, it may be well to go back a little.
Q. Very well—make your statement in your own
way.
A. When, after the battle of Antietam, General
'McClellan decided to cross the Potomac, I said to
him that, in my opinion, he would never be able to
take this army on that route beyond the Rappa
hannock unless he succeeded in fighting the enemy
at some place on this side ; that if he proposed to go
to Richmond by land he would have to go by the
way of Fredericksburg, and in that he partially
agreed with me. After we had started, we had
another conversation on that subject, and several
other officers were present. On the 6th of November,
after the conversation, General McClellan gave an
order to Captain Drum, his chief engineer, to have
all the pontoon bridges at Berlin, and in that neigh
borbood, that could be spafed,taken up and sent
down to Washington with a view of getting them
down to this town, in case he decided to go by way
of Fredericksburg. The letter conveying that order
was written on the 6thof November, but, as I under
stand, was not received until the 12th of November.
On the 7th or Bth of November I 'received an order
from the President of the United States, directing
me to take command of the Army of the Potomac,
and also a copy of the order relieving General Mc-
Clellan from that command. This order was con
veyed to me by General Buckingham, who was ate
tached to the War Department. After getting over
my surprise, the shock, &c., I told General Bucking
ham that it was a matter that required my serious
thought; that I did not want the command; that it
had been offered to me twice before, and I did not
feel that I could take it. I counseled with two of
my staff officers in regard to it, for, I should think,
an hour and a half. They urged upon me that I had
no right, as a soldier, to disobey the order, and that
I had already expressed to the Government niy un
willingness to take the command. I told them what
my views were, with reference to my ability to ex-'
ercise such a command, which views were those I
had always, universally expressed, that I was not
competent to command such a large army as this. X
bad said the same over and over again, to the Presi
dent and Secretary of 'War; and also, that if mat
ters could be satisfactorily arranged with General
Mcialelltue I thought he could command the Army
of the Potomac better than any other general in it.
But they had studied the subject more than I had,
and knew more about their objections to General
McClellan than I did. There had been some conver
sation with regard to this removal of Gen. McClel
lan when he was bringing his army from before Rich-
Mond. The first of these conversations with the
President and Secretary of War occurred at that
time ; and then, after Gen. McClellan had got back to
Washington, and before the commencement of the
Maryland campaign, there was another conversation
of the same kind, and on both of these occasions I
expressed to the President the opinion that 1 did
not think there was any one who could do as much
with that army as Gen. McClellan could, if matters
could be so arranged as to remove their objections to
him.
After I had conversed with my staff officers, I went
to see Gen. McClellan himself, and agreed with them
that this was an order which I, lulls soldier, had to
obey. He said that he could not retain the com
mand, for he, as a soldier, would have to obey the
order directing him to give up that command. It was
in the midst of a violent snow storm, with the army
in a position that' I knew but little of. I had previ
ously commendee,but one corps upon the extreme
right in the advance, since the campaign had begun.
I probably knew less than any other corps-com
mander of the positions and relative strength of the
several corps of the army.
General McClellan remained some two or three
days to Arrange his affairs, and came with are as far
as Warrenton, and then left, having given me all the
information he could in reference to the army.
General lialleck came down to see are on the 11th
of November. On the 9th, I made out a plan of
operations, In accordance with the order of General
Helleck, which directed me not only to take com
mand, but also to state what I proposed to do with
it. That Arlan I wrote on the morning of the 9th of
November, and sent it by special messenger to
Washington. 1 can furnish the committee a copy of
that plan, if they desire it. I do not have it here
now.
Q. State the substance of it, if you please ; that
may do as well.
A. I 'stated, in substance, that I thought it advise.-
We to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of
Warrenton, to make a small movement across the
Rappahannock as a feint, with a view to divert the
attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe we
were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville,
and then to make a rapid movement of the whole
army to Fredericksburg on this side of the Reppa-
I hannock. As my reasons for that, I stated that the
further we got into the interior of Virginia, the
longer would be our line of communication, AM! the
greater would be the difficulty we would have in
keeping them open, as the enemy had upon our right
flank a corps that almost at any time could, by a
rapid movement, seriously embarrass us. If we were
caught by the elements so far from our base of sup
plies, and, at the same time, in the enemy's country,
Where they had means of getting information that
We had not, it might, I thought, prove disaatrous to
the army, as we had but one line of railway by
which to supply it.
1n moving upon Fredericksburg we would all the
time • be as near Washington as would the enemy,
sad after arriving at Fredericksburg we would be at
a point nearer to Richmond than we would be even
if we should take Gordonsville. On the Gordons
ville lice the enemy, in our opinion, would not give
us a decisive battle at any placethis side of Rich
mond. They would defend Gordonsville until such
time as they felt they had given us a'elteek, and then,
with so many lines of railroad open to them, they
would move upon Richmond or upon Lynchburg,
and in either case the difficulty of following them
would he very great. In connection with this move
ment, I requested that barges filled with provisions
and forego should be floated to Acquia creek, where
they cuitki easily be landed ; that materials be col
lected for the reconstruction of the wharves there,
and that all the wagons in Washington that could
possibly he spered should be Riled with hard bread
and small Commissary stores, and, with a large noel
; her of beef cattle, started down to Fredericksburg
on the road by way of Dumfries . ; and thatthis wagon
train and load of cattle should be preceded by
a pontoon train large enough to span the
Rappahannock twice. I stated that this wagon
train could move in perfect safety, because it would
be all the time between our army and the Potomac ;
or, In other words, our army would be all the time
between the enemy and that train. But at the same
time, I said that if a cavalry escort could not be fur
nished from Washington,l would send some of my
cavalry to guard the trai.
On the morning of the 14th of November,feeling
uneasy with reference to the pontoons , as Ihad mat
heard of their starting, I directed my.obief engineer
to telegraph again in reference" to them.
(t. To whom did he telegraph?
A. Ile telegraphed to. Gan, Woodbury or.to Makes
Spaulding. It subsequently appeared that ttukt weethe
tint they ever had heard of any wish totteVathe pen
THE FBESS.--PHILADELPFILA.. WEDNESDAY. DECEMBER 24. 1862.
toontrain started down to Fredericksburg, although
thetauthorities in Washington had had my piano sent
tot hem on the ath of November; and it had also been
discovered by Gen lialleek and Gen. Meigs, at my
headquarters, on the night of the 11th and 12th of
November ; and after discovering it fully there, they
sat down and sent telegrams to Wtuihington, which,
as I supposed, fully covered the case, and would
secure the starting of the pontoon trains at once. I
supposed, of course, that those portions of the plan,
which required to be attended to in iVashington,
would be carried out there at once. I could hinve
sent °Meer& of my own there to attend to those
matters, and perhaps made a mistake in not
ic doings°,
ns General Ballet afterwards told me thatl ought
to have trusted to them in Washington for the de
tails. In reply to the telegram I had ordered to be
sent, General Woodbury telegraphed back that the
pontoon train would start on Sunday morning, pro
bably, and certainly' on Monday morning, which
would have been on the 16th or 17th of November,
and would have been in time. They did not, how
ever, start until the 19th, and on that day it com
menced raining, which delayed them so much, and
the roads became so bad, that when they got to Dum
fries they floated the pontoons off the wagons. We
then . sent to Washington for a steamer, and'
carried them down to Acquia creek by water,
sending the wagons around by land. The pontoons
did not get here until the 22d or Wad of November.
On the 16th of November I started the column down
the road to Fredericksburg, not knowing anything
about the delay in the starting of the pontoons, be
cause the telegram announcing the delay did not
reach Warrenton Junction until I had left to come
down here with the troops ; and that telegram did
not reach me until I arrived here, on the morning of
the 18th, when it was handed to me by an orderly
who had brought it down to Warrenton Junction.
After reaching here, I saw at once that there was
no chance for crossing the Rappahannock with the
army at that time. it commenced raining, and the
river began to raise, not to any great extent, but I
did not know how much it might rise. There were
no means of crossing except by going up to the
fords, and it would be impossible to do that, because
of the inability to supply the troops after they
should cross.
General Sumner, with hie command, arrived here
in advance. He sent to me asking if he should cross
the river. He was very much tempted to take his
own men across, to Fredericksburg, by a ford near
Falmouth, as there was no enemy there except 'a
very small force. I did not think it advisable that
he should cross at that time. The plan I had in
contemplation was, if the stores and those bridges
bad come here as I expected, to throw Sumner's
Whole corps across,the Rappahannock, fill the
wagons with as many small stores as we could, and,
having beef cattle along for meat, then to make a
rapid movement down in the direction of Richmond,
and try to meet the enemy and fight a battle before
Jackson could make a junction there. We knew
that :Jackson was in the valley, and felt confident
that there was force enough on the Upper Rappa
hannock to take care of him. We felt certain that
as soon as the enemy knew of our crossing down
here, the force of Jackson would be recalled, and we
wanted to meet this force and beat it before Jackson
could comedown on our flank, and perhaps cripple us.
I had recommended that some supplies should be
sent to the mouth of the Rappahannock, with a view
of establishing a department at Port Royal. Aftor
we had advanced to Fredericksburg, and after
the first delay in starting the pontoons, I
think they were sent as quickly as they could
have been, and the supplies and quartermasters'
stores have been always in as great abundance as
we could have expected, for after the 19th of Novem
ber the roads were particularly bad. Horses and
mules were sent down to us, so that our cavalry
and teams were in very good condition. After it
was ascertained that there must be a delay!hnd
that the enemy had concentrated such a force as to
make It very difficult to cross, except by a humber
of bridges, we commenced bringing up from Acquia
creek all the pontoons we could. After enough of
them had been brought up to build the bridges, I
called several councils of war to decide about cross
ing the Rappahannock. It was at first decided to
cross atShenker's Neck, about twelve miles below
here, but our demonstration was simply for the pur
pose of drawing down there as large a force of the
enemy as possible. I then decided to cross hers, be
cause, in thC first place, I felt satisfied that they did
not expect us to cross here but down below. In the
next place, I felt satisfied this was the place to fight
the moat decisive battle, because if we could divide
their forces byinetrating their lines at one or two
points, separa their left from their right, then
a vigorous attao with the whole army would suc
ceed in breaking their army In pieces. The enemy
had cut a road along on the rear of the line of .
heights - where we made our attack, by means of
which they connected the two wings of their
army, and avoided a long detour round
through a bad country. I obtained from a
colored man from the other side of the town infor
mation in regard to this new road, which proved to
be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of the new
road, and that was my reason for making an attack
on the extreme left. I did not intend to make an at
tack on the right until that position had been taken,
which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting
their lines in two,and then I proposed to make a direct
attack on their front and drive themout of the works.
I succeeded in building six bridges and taking the
whole army across the river. Two attacks were
made, and we were repulsed, still holding a portion
of the ground we had fought upon,
but not our ex
treme advance. That night I went all over the field
on our right. In fact I was with the officers and
men until - neer daylit. finand the feeling to be
rather against the at tack the next morning. In fact,
it was decidedly against it. I returned to my head
quarters, and, after a oonversation, with Gen. Sum
ner, told him that I wanted him to order the Ninth
army corps, which was the corps I originally com
manded, to form. the next morning a column of at
tack by regiments. It consisted of some eighteen
old regiments, and some new ones. I desired the
column to make a direct attack upon the enemy's
works. I thought that those regiments, by arriving
quickly up after each other, would be able to carry
the stonewall and the batteries in front, throwidg
the enemy into their next line ; and, by going in
with them, they would not be able to tire upon us to
any great extent. I left Gen: Sumner with that
understanding, and di; ected him to give the order.
The order was given, and the order of attack was
formed.
The next morning, just before the column was to
have started; General Sumner came to me, and said
"General, I hope you will desist from this attack. I
do not know of any general officer who approves of
it, and I think it will prove disastrous to the
army." Advice of that kind from General Sum
ner, who has always been in favor of our ad
vance whenever it was • possible, caused • me to
hesitate. I kept the column of' attack formed,
and sent over for the division and corps commanders
and consulted with them. They unanimously voted
against the attack. I then'went over to see the other
officers of the command on the other aide, and found
that the same opinion prevailed among them. I
sent for General Franklin, who was on the left., and
he was' of exactly the same opinion. This causel• me
to decide that I ought not to make the attack I had
contemplated ; and, besides,cinaarnueh as the Presi
dent of the United States had told me to be
in no haste in making the attack—that he
would give me all the support he could, but he
did not want the army of the Potomac destroyed—l
felt that I could not take the responsibility of order
ing the attack, notwithstanding my own belief at
the time that the works of theenemy could be car
ried. On the afternoon of that day I again saw the
officers, and told them that I had decided to with
draw to this side of the river all our force, except
enough to hold the town and the bridge-heads, but
should keep the bridges there for future operations,
in case we wanted to cross again. I accordingly
ordered the withdrawal, leaving General Hooker
to conduct the withdrawal of our foroes, and sent
Franklin to conduct it on our left, During thateve
ning I received from Gen. Hooker a note, and at
about 10 o'clock at night (}en. Butterfield came over
with a message from Gen. Hooker, stating that he
(Gen. Hooker) felt it his duty to represent to me the
condition in which I was leaving the town, and the
troops in it. After a long conversation on the sub
ject with General Butterfield, I felt that the troops
I proposed to leave behind would not be
able to hold the town. I then partially
decided to withdraw the whole command, which was
a still more perilous operation. It commenced rain
ing, which, to so extent, was an assistance to us,
but a very had t IT in the moving of troops. _I
thought over the matter for about two hours, and
about I o'clock I sent over an order to withdraw the
whole force, which was successfully accomplished.
There had been a great deal of division of opinion
among the corps commanders as to the places of
crossing, but after all the discussion upon the subject,
the decision to cross over here, I understood , was well
received by all of them. While on his way here, Gen.
Hooker, on the morning of the 20th of November,
wrote me a note which I received on the 21st, in
which he suggested that he should cross his force
over the Rappahannock, at the ford nearest the
town—Richards' ford—and move rapidly down to
Saxton's Station, and take a position there. He
stated that he had three days' provisions, and
thought he could meet any force of the enemy in front
of him. I replied to him that I was always very glad
to take the advice of my general Officers, and should
always be loth to make a move without consulting
them, but I could not approve of the move he had
suggested, because, in the first place, he Would have
to march some thirty-six miles to get to Saxton's
Station. It was then raining, and he would have to
ford two rivers, which might rise and Out him off'
from the main body oft he command; rand as I had
no means of crossing at Fredericksburg, I would be
prevented from sending him supplies and assistance.
And although he might reach Saxton's, and not
meet any force of the enemy at that time, yet it
would be a very hazardous movement to throw a
column like that beyond the reach of the proper sup
port. This reply I sent to General Hooker by an
aide-dc-camp. He thanked me and said that he had
only made it as a suggestion, and the weather, as it
was then raining, of course rendered it impossible to
make the movement lie had suggested.
Q. What reasons do you assign for the failure of
your attack here!
A. It Wag found to be impossible to get the men
to the works. The enemy's fire was too hot for
them. The whole ecte;imand fought most gallantly.
The enemy themselves say they never saw our men
fight as hard se on that day.
C.l. Were the enemy's works very strong l
A. Their works are not strong works. but they oc
cupy very strong positions. It is possible that the
points of attack were wrongly ordered. If such was
the case I can only say that I did it to the best of
my ability. It is also possible that it would have
been better to have crossed at Kinker's Neck; but
for what I supposed to be good reasons, I felt that
we had better cross here; that we would have a
more decisive engagement here, and that, if we suc
ceeded in defeating the enemy here, we would break
up the whole of their army here, which, I think, is
now the most desirable thing, not even second to the
capture of Richmond, for if thbil army was broken
up, though they mightdefend Richmond for a while,
they could not make any effort then.
By Tlr. Gooch—Do I understand you to say that
it was your understanding that Gen. Halleck and
General lileigs, while at your headquarters in War
renton, and before you commenced the movement of
your nrmy, sent orders to Washington for the pon
toons to be immediately forwarded to Falmouth l
A. That was my understanding, certainly.
Q. In your judgment, could the pontoons have
been forwarded to you in time for you to have '
erosFed the Rappahnunock when you expected, if all,
possible efforts had been made by those changed with
that duty.
A. Yes, sir; If they had received their orders in
thuel
Q. Did the non-arrival of these pontoons at the
time you expected prevent your crossing when you
expected to cross, and interfere with the success of
your planet
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Since you have assumed the command of the
Army of the Potomac, have all Its movements been
made according to your own judgment or have some
of them been decided by the General-in-Ohief, the
Secretary of War, or the President of the United
States!
A. They have all been made in accordance with
my ownjudgtnent. In some cases I have Submitted
ril l
my views, w ich haapproved.
Q.
been
Q. Who " you Understand was responsible for
the fotwa gof the pontoons to Falmouth 1
A. I understand that Gen. Ilalleck was to give
the necessary orders, and that the officers who should
receive the orders were the ones responsible for the
pontoons not coming here. I could have carried out
that part of my plan through officers of my own, but
having just taken the command of the army, with
which I was but little acquainted, it was evident it
was as much as I could attend to, with the assist
ance of all my officers, to change the army from
Warrenton to Fredericksburg. And I felt indeed I
expected, that all the parts of the p 1 which were
to be executed in Washington would EP attended to
by the officers at that place, under the direction of
the different departments to which those parts of
the plan appertained.
Q. Did you or did you not understand that you
were to be responsible for seeing that these orders
were carried outs
A. I did not. I never imagined for a moment that
I had to carry out anything that required to be
done at - Washington. General Moles told me dis
tinctly, several days ago, in Washington, that he
never saw my plan of operations until I showed it
to him on that day.
Q. Do I understand you to say, in our state.
rnent, that you expected General I to carry
the point at the extreme left of the ridge in the rear
of the town, and thereby enable our troops to storm
and carry• their fortificationst
A. I did expect him to carry that point, which
being done, would have placed our forces in the rear
of their extreme left, and which I thought at the
time would take their forts on the ridge to such an
extent that the position in front could be easily
stormed and carried.
Q. To what do you attribute his failure to accom
plish that I
A. To the great strength of the position, and - Ur
accumulation of the dnemrs forces there ; I ex
pected that the bridges would be built in tido
or three hours after they were landed, whlah
was about daylight; instead of that, those on
the tight were not built Until three o'clock
in the afternoon, and I had only the means of
getting across one division over the bridges on the
right. lien. Franklin's bridges were built at about
noon, and were held by our troops on the opposite
bank. This gave the enemy time to accumulate
their forces, which were strengthened along the
river from Port Royal up to the battle-field and be
fore / was able to order the attack. Whilst the
men here were undoing the bridges and putting
them into the water,
the enemy's sharpshooters
opened a very heavy fire from the town, and our
batteries opened upon the town with a view of si
lencing them. In this manner the bridges were built
about two-thirds of their lengths. At which time
the bridge builders were driven oft; and had to take
shelter under the bank. Repeated iffibrts were made
to get these bridges built out to the ends of the
bridges with the necessary material, but they all
failed. -It waa.then reported to me that it was im
possible to build the bridges under that fire, and that
the sharpshooters could not be driven out of the
town by the, artillery. We had one hundred
end forty.thrie guns in position, the eI
portion of which were playing upon the town.
said to the officers who had reported to me that it
was impossible to build the bridges, that they must
be built--that some plan must be devised for getting
those sharpshooters out of the way, so that our
men could get to march. Upon consulting with
Gee. Hunt, Chief of Artillery, and Gen. Woodbury,
of the Engineers, it was agreed to fill the boats with
our own men, run them quickly across under tire,
throw them on the bank, and let them go up into
the stores and houses and drive the sharpshooters
away. This plan was successfully carried out, and
in fifteen minutes after the first detachment of troops
had reached the opposite bank our men began build
ing the bridges, and in a half hour more they were
completed.
Q. What was the conduct of the officers and men
durtn • the attack I
- - - - -
A. 'lth the exception Of a single regiment, it was
excellent.
Q. Wlll you state, as nearly as possible, the whole
number engaged 1
A. We had about men on the other aide of
the river.
Q, What part of that number were actually en.
gaged In the battle!
A. Every single man of them was under artillery
fire, and about half of them were at difftrent•points
formed in columns of attack. Every man was put
in column of attack that could be got in.
Q. Rave you any knowledge as to the force of the
enemy beret
A• It is estimated all the way from 100,000 to 200,-
000. I think myself that it was leas than 100,000.
Q. What was the extent of the casualties' on our
side resulting from the fighting!
A. It will not be far from ten thousand killed,
wounded and missing.
Q. What is the present condition of our troops
herel
A. As far as my knowledge and information goes,
it is good.
Q. Do you or do you not consider yOUr troops de.
moralized, or the efficiency of our army impaired,
except so far aa it has been from the less of so many
meal
A. I do not. I would add here that, although at
the time I ordered the column of attack to be form
ed, on the morning after the battle, I thought the
enemy's works could be carried, and adverted to
that opinion during the day. I afterwards became
convinced that that could not have been done, owing
to the great strength of the enemy, the time given
them.for reinforcing, and the belief also of our officers
that it could not be done, I accordingly telegraphed
to the Preiddent of the United States that I with
drew our army, because I felt that the enemy's po
sition could not be carried.
Testimony of Major Geu. Sumner.
Major General E. V. Sumner, sworn and-examined
by the chairman.
Q. What Is your position in the Army of the Po
tomac 9 .
A. I command the right grand division of that
army, consisting of the Second and Ninth corps
d'arrnec.
Q. Of how.many men does your grand division
consist?
A. Before the late action it consisted of about
-- men. It is being increased by new troops as
they come to us It was originally intended to be
something over men.
Q. Would it have been better, in your judgment,
to have crossed the river 'and engaged the enemy
earlier than you did, and, if so, why was it not
donel
A. When General Burnside was Ordered to take
command of this army, he told me what he pro
to do, that is, to march on Fredericksburg
stead of on Culpeper; I thought that was the
wisest plan, for these reasons : If we had marched
on Culpeper, according to the former plan, even if
we had been successful, we would have had to
fall back for supplies, whereas by coming on this line,
on reaching Fredericksburg, I confidently expected
to take the neights in the rear of it before the army
of the enemy would come from Culpeper, and I
thought the chance of making Richmond watt much
better than by going the other way; because, if the
pontoons had been here on my arrival, and in time
for me to have crossed and occupied the heights in the
rear of Fredericksburg before the enemy could mask
them, we should 'have kept pursuing the enemy or
from this line of railroad, keeping it in our possession.
If we could not have precedmithenvinto Richmond we
could havekept so close to them that they would
have bad no time to build fortifications. These were
the reasons why I thought it a very judicious mea
sure on the part of Gen. Burnside to change the base
of 'operations instead of advancing on Culpeper,
which I believe Gen. McClellan intended to have
done. On my arrival here on the loth of November,
A battery of artillery on the other side of the river
opened upon us the moment a portion of my troops
appeared on the ridge back of Falmouth. I imme
diately put a battery into position, and, I think, in
not less than fifteen minutes they drove every
man on the other aide from the guns, and they
ran off and left four of the guns on the field. My
orders were to advance and hold Falmouth, but not
to crone. But the temptation was so strong to go
over and take those guns the enemy had left, that at
one time I actually gave the order to cross the ford
at all events, and seize the guns, and occupy the
city ; but, on reflection, I concluded I was rather too
old a soldier to disobey a direct order, and there was
another reason, too. I had had a little too much expe
rience on the Peninsula of the consequence of getting
astride of a river to wish it here. For these reasons
I revoked my order that night. That same night I
sent a note to General Burnside, who was some
eight or ten miles distant, asking him if I should
take Fredericksburg in the morning, should I be
able to find a practicable ford—which, by the way, I
knew when I wrote the note that I could find.
The General replied through his chief of staff,
that he did not think it advisable to occupy Freder
icksburg until hie communications were established,
and on reflection I myself thought he was t :S;
that it was prudent and proper to have the bridges
ready before we occupied Fredericksburg. I I
could have taken that city, and the heights on the
other side of it, any time within three days after my
arrival here, if the pontoons had been here, for I do
not think there was much force of the enemy here
up to that time. With regard to the delay in melting
the attack, I do not think. that the movement could
have been made sooner than it was made. It will
be recollected that no preparations had been made
at Acquia Creek. When we came across here there
were no means at Acquit Creek for landing any
thing there. All those things had to be prepared
afterwards ; the railroad had to be completed before
we [could get up supplies for this great army.
It takes an enormous amount of transportation to
supply an army of 100,000 men and I do not think'
the General could have made his prepara
tions, or could have done all that was necessary
to be done sooner than he did after the arrival here
of the pontoons. The first proposition to cross the
river was to cross at Skenker's neck. It seemed to
me that you could scarcely cross a river In the
face of an enemy of equal or superior force
except by surprise. Therefore, after the pre
parations were made to cross at Skenker's Neck,
after a large number of wagons had been sent by
the General down there in order to deceive the enemy,
I was decidedly in favor of throwing the bridges over
here and carrying the town as we &dean, - it—which
washy surprise—as the enemy were massing their
troops down below, expecting we were going
to cross down there. I was in favor of crossing
the Rappahannock, because neither our Govern
ment nor our people would be satisfied to have our
army to retire from this posit - km or go into whiter
quarters untilwc knew the force that was on the other
side of the river, and the only way in which:We
could have that was by going over there and feeling
them. I think it was necessary to have madeghe
attack on that day, (on Saturday), and it was neem.
eery, therefore, to attack them in their strong works ;
and the repulse was what frequently happens in
campaigns. The works were stronger than webe
lieved them to be. I knew it was a very hazard
ous movement, but I did believe that we could carry
the enemy's works. The attack failed, owin to
the enemy's fortifications being much more term -
Me than we had supposed them to be.
Q. Will you describe these fortifications ?
A. I cannot describe them any better than this -
they were tier upon tier, for two or three tiers, If
we had carried the first tier, we could not have held
it, for their next tier was a much more formidable
row of fortifications, only a mile distant, and oh a
higher position still, and no doubt large masses of
infantry were between the two crests ; and having
got on the top of one crest we would have been
compelled to contend with masses of fresh
troops over whom their own batteries could
fire. t was ordered by the general commanding
to select the corps to make the attack. I seleafted
the corps of Generals lerenck and Hancock, two
of the most gallant officers in our army, and two
corps that had neither of them ever turned their
backs to the enemy. They made repeated assaults,
but were driven back in spite of all the efforts that
could be made by their officers. The principal ob
stacle that they found was a long stone wail, which
was the outwork of the enemy. That wall was some
four or live hundred yards' in length, as represented
to me, and had been raised and strengthened.
The enemy had artillery that enfiladed that wall on
both sides. They held their fire until our troopiar
rived at at certain point, when they rose and poured
a perfect volley over this wall, their artillery en
filading our column at the same time. No trobps
could stand such a fire as that. Ido not think it a
reproach to these two divisions that they did not
carry that position • they did all that men could
do. I had Genera? Howard's division in resdlL
nem to support those two, and one strong ' di
vision of Wilcox's corps. The Ninth corps,
(Gen. Burnside's) old corps, war; detached to keep
open communication with Gen. Franklin's r . t.
That division was not under lire during the y.
Some of the other divisions re of the Ninth corps re
It
me or less engaged. Gen. Hooker hail apa of
• his grand division in the town, and one of his corps,
under Gen. Humphreys, was engaged. They made
a gallant attack, but were driven back. The fight
was continued on the left, but I was so remote from
that that I cannot give any description of it at laill.
The general commanding directed me to establish,eny
. headquarters at the Lacy House, so that I Gould
superintend the operations of both my eorpe. I
was there while the general commanding was at, the
Phillips House during the action. During an action
there is a constant running for orders for reinforce.
meats—artillery troops at different points , ammuni
tion, &c. I consider the crossing of the river, under
the circumstances, a very creditable thing, and I
also consider the retreat, under the ciamenastanties,
as very creditable. There was not a gun or any
thing On host; the entire army returned without an
accident. I would like to add here, because it War
almost the only occasion when the general com
manding and myself have differed in regard to any
point, that I did not wish to relinquish Frede
ricksburg; I thought we could have held it wits a
single division by posting our batteries right.
'lt would not have been giving up an ex
pedition, but simply a change of tactics. That
is the way in which I viewed it. That we would
just be drawing back a little in order to try it again.
I was therefore strongly in favor of holding Frede
ricksburg. Others were not. Perhaps I was the
only general officer of rank *ho was of that opiniOn.
I thought it would present a better and a different
appearance if we continued to hold the town; ,we
could have commanded It any time with our ar
tillery, and we can do so now. Ido not think there
was any danger of difficulty in holding it; but I may
have been mistaken.
Q. Do you know any reason why the pontoon
bridges did not arrive earlier 1 1
A. I do not.
Q. You know nothing on that sultieett
A. I do not. I expected, as a matter of course,
to find them here when I came, or very soon aid:T.
wards.
(t. If you had found them here, as you expected,
what would, in your opinion, have been the resUltl
A. I should have taken the enest in the rear of the
town on that night or the following day, not ebn
aidering FrederiCksbutg aa being of any consequerice,
except as being on the road to Richmond. I shoul d
have passed through the town and taken possession
of the crest.
Q. Are there any fords above here which might
have been crosseat
A. There are several fords on this river, and:in
summer time two or three of them would be practi
cable perhaps. "
Q.'l mean, we 's^^ an practicable fords . at
the time you did cro r ace so, where were they 1
A. There is a rou t rßETc rii ford down by the
upper bridge, at Falm 204 so n g, horsemen some
times go over, but that ...anon the tide,
which rises above this t TARD.—Pl.3Awhen
I arrived here, which w tard, for sale In sto he
tide was then receding, an it
would not be possible to ES S. CARSTAI id
until after dark. That fo 2,11 WALNUT Str a s
being a deep ford, having dee
skip from rock to nick ; a fel.
there are occasionally deep holt
feet deep._ Such a ford would .
practicable for marching troops
Q. What reason do you assigi
either above or below where the
Red I
ro . racerN
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wg.TEMSire
A. The reason was this we did
turn their left flank, because there is 1
water navigation, taken out of the rii's
miles Above here, and brought with the basin at the
l a tgr r; ii e s t; a d n u c i e tl f i r t o .
in to t i l t i a tt i t ,p ru o t i t ft s: n l o o a nkt . at or consider-
General Sumner, in answer to a question as
to the demoralization of the army, said he be ,
lief ed there was a great deal too much croslifkig.
There was not sufficient confidence. He es
timated that 10,000 men would cover our whole
loss, lie did not, As a military man, think there
were any faults or mistaken in bringing on or con
ducting the attack. lle would have made but a
single attack, instead Of two attacks, massing every
thing upon one point. He considered that, with
sufficient exertion, the army will be in excellent
order again in a few days.
Testimony . of Major Gan. Franklin.
• •
Major General Wm. 13. Franklin was sworn. lie
testified as to the delay in the pontoon bridges. He
thought. the arrangements fur the encasing were all
well made. At the same Hine he alweys doubted
our power to cross. The enemy could have pre
vented our crossing if he had-chosen todo so. If
the enemy had opened upon us at any moment with
the guns they had bearing upon us, in the course of
an our - our men would have been so scattered
that it would have been impossible to rally them.
In the tight of the 13th inst. he fought the whole
strength of his command as far as he could, and at
the same time keep his communications with the
river open. The reason that we failed was that we
had not troops enough to carry the points under the
orders that were given. After we were pressed
hack, I directed that a position should be
held as • far In advance as It was POSSI
bIe to hold it, and I brought up all the troops
in reserve to hold that position. I held it until I
was ordered to recross the river, and from what I
know of our want of success on the right, and
the demoralized condition of the troops on the
centre as represented to me by their comman
ders, I confess that I believe that the order to
morose the river was a very proper one. Had the
pontoons arrived in time, the probable result
would have been that the arm would .have occu
pied these very heights. So far
as his wing was
concerned, the army was not at all demoralized. He•
believed we would have carried the heights by a con
centration of our whole force on the left, with a
feint upon the right. He did not mean to say that
The carrying of the heights would have been a suc
cess. He did not know the force of the enemy,
except that wherever we appeared we found a
great many more men than we had. He would
like to impress as firmly upon the committee as
possible, the fact that this whole disaster has re
stilted fronithe delay in the arrival of the pontoon
bridges. Whoever is responsible for that delay is
responsible for all the disasters which have fol
lowed.
Testimony of Major Gen. Hooker.
Major General Hooker's testimony was to the fol
lowing effect. Whenthe change of thebase of ope
rations• was discussed on the 11th of November,
either General Halleck or General Meigs said that
they thought they could have everything ready, on
this side, in three days—that they could have
the pontoons ready, the stores ready, and every
thing in readiness to advance. But he thought it
was not within the range of human possibillty. to
do that. 'He thought it would have been better to
have held the line whemwe were, but retaining suf
ficient force there to threaten the enemy and keep
them up ;to their works at Culpeper and Gordons
ville; but instead of that, we withdrew every man,
and even burned the bridges, thus exposing our plan
to the enemy.
General Hooker defended his proposed movement,
mentioned in General Burnside's evidence. He was
preparing to march down through Caroline county . ,
where the people had just gathered their crops, and
would have got plenty of forage and provisions
enough for a week or a fortnight.
At Bowling Green he could have drawn his sup
plies from Port Royal as early as he could get them
where he was at Hartwood. He knew that henouhl
have taken a position with 40,000 nren that the
whole rebel army could not have moved him from.
He could have taken the heights of Fredericksburg,
and put them in a condition of defence.
Brig. Gen. Woodbury
Was sworn. He testified to receiving. a .deepatch
from Gen. Halleck on the 12th of November, order
ing him to transport all his pontoons and bridge ma
terials to Armin. creek. On the 15th, he sent down
three companies to build some temporary wharves
there. There were no pontoons to send with them,
but some arrived before night of that day. On the
IGtb, eight companies started with forty-eight pon
toons, which arrived at Belle Plain on the afternoon
of the 19th—the transport having been aground for
twenty-four hours.
On the 19th, fearing that the land train would not
arrive in time, he had thirty pontoon bridges ship
ped for Belle Plain. These were delayed by rough
weather and did not arrive till the 22d. He never
received any information as to the time when Gen.
Pturnsidets - movement to 'Fredericksburg would be
made. Fearing that the movement would be precipi
tate, he went to General lialleck's Office, and urged
him to delay the movement some few days,
in order that the necessary preparations might
be made. He replied that he would do no
thing to delay for an instant the advance of
this. army upon Richmond. I replied that my
a r u atlfr ea l ' o ion
prevent it. ot i'ltfelideliatc?licaadmtl7e delay, but
would have seized teams, teamsters, and wagon
masters, for instant service,: wherever he could have
found them. Then,with good weather, they might
have got through. But such measures could -only
have been carried out, by authority' of the General
in-Chief. The Quartermaster's Department was
very scantily, supplied. He did not think Gen.
Mews' department wasjustly to blame in this mat
ter. His requisitions for horses were answered
Immediately.
Testimony of General Ilalleek.
General Halleck's testimony showed that the
troops at Washington were under the command of
Gen. Burnside—having been transferred to him on
McClellan's retirement. When General Burnside
spoke lo him on the twelfth of November about
the pontoon horde and things that he required
from here, he repeated to him that they were all
subject to his (Burnside's) order. General Wood
bury on my return told me he had received the order
relative to the pontoon bridges. I told him that in
all these matters he was under General Burn
side's directions. He spoke of the delay in their
transportation by the steamers getting aground, and
the difficulty to the land train on account or the
roads and the inexperience perhaps of the officers in
command. He considered, from the reports he re
ceived, that these delays resulted mainly from acci
dent and the elements that no man had any control
over. General Burnside telegraphed to him in
relation to General Woodbury, thinking that he
bad not used diligence, but afterwards told him
that he was perfectly satisfied with what Gen.
Woodbury had done, and that he did not know but
that the commanding officer of the titan that went
down had done his duty ,• also, that he was disposed
to make no further investigation of the matter, being
pretty well satisfied. There was no arrangement
or understanding between General Burnside and
General Halleck that the pontoons and army stores,
or either of them, should be furnished to him (Gene
ral Burnside) by the authorities at Washington
without his looking after them himself. He (Gene
ral Halleck) told Burnside not to rend him any requi
sitions, but to make them to the proper heads
of departments, and if they did not do their duty,
then immediately report it to him. It was not de
termined when 1 was at Warrenton that the move
ment to Fredericksburg should be made. It was
left to the President to assent to it. General
Halleck did not remember that General Wood
bury bad requested him to postpone the movement
of General Burnside's army. Since Gen. Burnside
has been in command of the Army of the Potomac,
all its movements haVe been made entirely accord
ing to his judgment and direction. In answer to a
question whether he was not requested to repair
this road before Gen. McClellan's army left Hae
per's Ferry, he said that he did not remember. He
was told that one of General McC.'s staff officers
had requested itto be repaired, and he immediately
answered that he could not do anything then until
he took possession of the road. He did not know
he (McClellan) was going there, for he did not in
form him (Halleck) as to where he intended to go.
Testimony of General :Wags.
In answer to a request for explanations of any
thing recurring to him relative to the battle of Fre
dericksburg, General Meigs says that as he pre
sumes the inquiry arises principally from the excited
state of the public mind and the public press, and as
the statements published show a misapprehension
of the true facts of the case, and as the press In some
degree holds him responsible for certain failures with
the pontoon train and supplies, and the Quartermas
ter's Department has been held responsible for certain
failures, he will explain the facts of the ease.
He said that he remembers writing on the back of
the telegraphic despatch relative to repairs to the
railroad to the Richmond, that they would depend
upon its being occupied by the troops of the United
States. It was at that time in the possession of the
enemy. He refers to the destruction of the wharf he
constructed at Acquia Creek after General Burn
side's corps had moved to the Rappahannock and
Rapidan. After Gen. Burnside took command of
the army he promised to have supplies at Acquia
Creek by the time he got there. He had not seen
General Burnside's letter containing his plan of
operations at this time. He had taken several
precautions to accommodate the army, and in anti
cipation of its wants. He thought the engineer bri
gade landed at Acquia Creek before General Burn
side reached Falmouth, and, on their landing, the
enemy's pickets ran away, and their operations
commenced.
G en. Meigs' statement shows that he did his best
to conform with the movements of the army, and
explains the delay in the transportation -of the,pon
toon bridges from the condition of the roads and the
state of the weather. Any expectation that a pon
toon bridge should be at Falmouth when the
army arrived there, would, in his opinion,
necessarily be disappointed. No pontoon train could
go to Falmouth without a sufficient guard to drive
out the enemy's pickets, and if it got there before
the - army, the enemy would have captured it. The
Quartermaster's Department was no more respon
sible for the march of the pontoon train than for the
march of a battery of artillery or a regiment of
infantry. Its business. is to provide material for
the transportation of the army and it has done so.
General Burnside acknowledged to him that he had
no complaint to make againstthe Q,uartermaster or
Commissary Departments, but was surprised that
they had been able to accomplish so much.
Q. Who would be responsible for that particular
duty of getting the pontoons over?
A. General Woodbury. II Gen. W. had orders
from General Burnside he was responsible for carry
ing them out, or making him Understand thtk It was
impracticable.
'l ho march of an army is to be managed by its
commander. )Vhen a general, undertakes a move
ment, he must give his orders himself, as General
Halleck has, told you.
Every order that General Burnside requested from
me—every requisition that was made upon me=-he
says, himself, was fully and promptly satisfied. If
you want my opinion, I have an opinion on the sub
ject—not as to anybodyls being to blame, but as to
what the facts were.
I think there was a mistake made in expecting the
pontoons, which 1 believe at the time were at Ber
lin, to he got to Falmouth while the army made a
two-and-a-lialf day's march. I do not think It a
practicable march for a pontoon train of a hundred
miles.
From what I heard of the diseussionbetweezi Gen
eral Bailee& and General Burnside, I expected
that 'a porton of General Burnside's army would
moss above Fredericksburg, and I alttb think he
used the expression that within twenty-four
or forty-eight hours after he got permission to more,
his cavalry would be in Fredericksburg, the main
body of his army, however, not crossing above, but
°Loosing at Falmouth.
. Gen. Haupt's testimony was taken, but was not
submitted with the report.
FROM CAIRO.
CHICAGO, Dec. 23.—A special despatch from Cairo
gives the following additional news in regard to the
rebel raid :
The force consisted of a full brigade and six pieces
of artillery. They first crossed the Tennessee at
Clifton, 48 miles from Jackson, and marched direct
to Lexington, when they were met on the 18th by
two, Federal cavalry regiments, with two pieces of
artillery, under Col. Ingersoll, who had been sent
from Jackson against them.
A battle of three hours ensued, when the Federals
were forced to give way. Our loss was 7 killed, 10
wounded, and 12.4 captured.
-
• The rebel loss was 35 killed and wounded. They
captured our artillery.
During the rebel march northward, they leer.. at
tacked several times from the south by a force which
Is supposed to have been comiosed of those who es
caped from Lexington.
Last night the rebels commenced to retreat, haying
approached within seven miles of Columbus. The
damage done to the road was not as great as was
supposed.
:Several bridges were burned, but the trestles ark
all safe. The damage will probably be repaired in
two weeks.
Movements of the Alabama.
NEW YORK, Dee. 23.—The schooner Mary E.
Mangheny arrived at this port to-eight from. Do
rrdnicaond reporta thaton the 27th ult., while en
tering the port Of Rosman; Doodnica;fthe was fired
Into twice by the , pirate Alabama. On the'night of
Deceruber cwhpri. pursing the island of Gututaloope.
she paw the pirate making signals to the Shore, mat
saw her the nett day close' in shore receiving 'pro.
visions.
ARMY OF THE POTOTMIAC,
Despntch front Gen. Durnstdie — Our Loss
Much. Less than Previcntsly Iteported—
Thanks orthe President terthe Army.
Wssiiiso.roN, Dec. 23.—The following has been
received at headquarters.:
HEAtajrARTESIG AnTIT 04 , THE
P9TONS AC, Dec. 2.3, 1862.
To Major General Ilalleck, Generalen-Chief:
In my report to you of the 19th inst., the number
of our wounded was stated at about nine thousand,
and the number receiving hospital treatment as sin
teen hundred and thirty. Both of these amounts
were wrong. •
Qn the authority of Dr. Letterman, our Mcßee
Dirt etor, I learn thut the whole number of wounded
is . between 6,000 and 7,000, and about one-half of
these are receiring treatment in the hospitals.
A. E. BURNSIDE,
Major General, Army of the Potomac.
THE PRESIDENT'S THANKS TO THE ARMY
OF THE POTOMAC,
WAsnimerox, Dee. 23,—The President has issued
the following :
EXECrTITE, MANSIOX, WASIIINGTON, Dee. 22.
To THE AP,MT OF THE POTOMAC: I have just read
your commanding general's report of the battle of
Fredericksburg,
Although you were net successfu,l the attempt
was not an error, nor the failure other than an acci
dent. The courage with which you, in an open
field, maintained the contest against an entrenched
foe, and the consummate skill and success with
which you crossed and reeroseed the river in the
fact of the enemy, show that you possess all the
qualities of a great army, which will yet give vic
tory to the cause of the•country and of the popular
Government
Condoling with the mourners for the dead, and
sympathizing with the severely wounded, I congra
tulate you that the number of both is comparatively
so small. I tender to you, officers and soldiers, the
thanks of the nation. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
THE HORSES OF THE ARMY OF THE PO-
TOMA ,
REPORT OP BORN A. BARRY TO , OENEP.A.L RALLECE.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23.—The• following has been
received at the headquarters of tire army :
WASHINGTON,: Dec, 19.—Gxxxitar.: Pursuant to
your orders, I visited the Army of the Potomac on
the 12th inst., to inspect the horses and mules in the
cavalry, artillery, and teams of the army.
The movement of troops on that day, and the en
gagement at 'Fredericksburg that followed, during
the six days that I remained with the army, gave
me but little opportunity to see the management of
the horse department in detail, though I had an op•
portunity to seethem on duty. Having gone there
very unfavorably impressed with accounts drawn
from the dark side of the picture by those taking the
rejected and disabled horses of the army as their
stand-point, I found these anima/sill better condi
tion than I had expeeted. The mule teams, with
some exceptions,, were in good condition, and I
doubt if ever &wormy under similar circumstances
was better provided for in this respect.
The cavalry horses suffer most,• many of them thin
and scarcely St for service. The duties that they
have toperform—excursions, thatsometimes require
from twenty-four to thirty-six hours without food
or rest—the heavy weight they have and
the unskilful manner in which they are ridden,
make it almost impossible to be otherwise, except
they were treated with the greatest care. The ar-
tillery suffer much, but are a grade better than the
cavalry.
The greatest - abuse and destruction of the horses
in the army is, I believe, the want of skill, judgment,
and care of the individual man to his i ndividual
horse. '
A more diligent looking after of this detail by offi
cers in chargF would be highly beneficial, the good
elitet of which is seen in some instances where the
diligence has been exercised with judgment by
officers attending to this important but much
neglected duty.
Every man who is permitted to ride a horse should
be compelled by duty, if he has not the humanity and
moral principle, to see that the horse has every care
in his power to give—that he is properly groomed,
watered, and fed.
The manner in which food is given, where only a
sufficiency is allowed, is highly important, as much
is wasted and trampled under foot.
I believe, for the cavalry service, on a winter cam
paign, a saddle-blanket, to cover the back and loins
of the- horse, to be left off when the saddle is re
moved, would be of great service. The Arabs, who
live more with the horse than any other people, and
who are older in horsemanship than any other na
tion in the world, never remove the saddle from the
horse's back when on a longjourney. Their saddles
have always blankets attached, that cover the back
and loins of the horse. They argue that this vital
po
r eel a the effe when heated
of bycold. riding, should never be made
tcts
As one who loves the horse, who appreciates his
intelligence and keen sensibilities, and can antic-
pate his wants, I do most deeply deplore the dejec
tion of spirit, suffering, and loss of life consequent
upon the exigencies of war; but while war rages
this law must continue.
In an army of fifty thousand horses, subjected to
the service and exposure of the army, there must
necessarily be a large percentage of disabled and
diseased horses constantly accumulating.
It is even so with the soldiers of the army, who
are gifted with intelligence end reason, and whose
first law of nature id self-preservation, and for the
comfort and welfare of whom the greatest energies
of the people and officers of the army are exerted.
How can it be otherwise with the horse! He is
not invincible to expoture, which he can scarcely
bear as well as man, and with whom he must suffer
alike, if not more, in time of war.
I run happy to see the extensive hospitals lately
erected in the city to restore disabled horses. I be
lieve they are conducted 012 the best and most eco
nomical principle, and will, I have no doubt, be
the means of restoring thousands of horses to the
army, that will be better on their second service
than they were on their first.
Hoping the Government will, as an act of huma
nity as well as economy, use every effort in its
power for the protection of this noble animal,
I remain, General, very truly, your obedient ser
vant, JOHN S. RAREY.
To Major General Halleck, Commander-in-Chief
United Stges Army, Washington, D. Cl.
DEPARTMENT.OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Despatch front Gen. Foster--Four Brintsnt
Irtetortes for the Union Troops—Three
TOWILIS Captured —The Southern Brain
Line of Railroad Destroyed—Capture of a
'Betel Battery, numerous Prisoners, large
•Quantity of Stores, &e.
O.V.E.LCIAL DESPATCH FROM GEN. FOSTER.
W..kaarnomosz, Dec. 23.—The following lute been
received at the headquarters of the army :
IrEADQUA_RTERS, DEPT ON NORTH OAEOLMA,
December 23,1862.
,To Major General Hallea, General-in-Chief: •
My expedition was a perfect success. I burned
the railroad bridge at Goldsboro and Mount Olive,
and tore up several miles of the track of the Wil
mington and Weldon railroad.
We'fought four engagements, viz :—At Southwest
Creek, Kingston, White Hall, and Goldsboro, and
whipped them handsomely each time.
3. G. FOSTER,
Brigadier General.
FURTHER FROM NORTH CAROLINA.
Nr.wnErm, N. C., Dec. 17, vla Fortress Monroe,
Dec. 22.—1 n the engagement at Kingston, on the 14th
inert., Company K, 3d New York Cavalry, Captain
Cole, which was in the advance, charged over four
deep ditches, eight feet wide, and captured seven
pieces of rebel artillery and brought them off in
triumph.
Bev. Nr. Mellen, chaplain of the 24th Massachu
setts regiment, who was court-martialed for prefer
ring serious charges; through the Boston Jou r na l,
against Governor Stanly, has been honorably ac
quitted.
Gen. Foster's forces were to reach Goldsboro' to
day, and, as cannonading has been distinctly heard
here, the probability is that the battle has been
fought and that that important point is in our pos
session. The army will immediately move from
there to another point.
There are two candidates for Congress in this dis
trict,' ond on the platform of free labor and the other
in opposition to the confiscation and emancipation
acts. The latter - receives the active support and aid
of Gov. Stanly, and will, doubtless, be elected.
Six rebel prisoners were brought to Fortress Mon
roe from Yorktown, who were captured at Glouees
ter.
XXXVIIth CONGRESS—Third Session.
WASIONGTOti, December 1862.
SENATE.
Comnannicatians—A Message.
The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a
.cont
munication front Out Secretary of the Interior; tram
miffing his annual thmucial report. Also, a communica
tion in regard to the amounts doe the Chippewa, Ottawa,
and Pottowatomie Indians. Also, a 11703,tage trout the
President. transmitting the report of the Ron. Reverdy
Johnson, United States commissioner at New Orleans.
The Holidays.
The concurrent resolution from the Nouse, that the
Mouse adjourn from Tuesday, the 23d, to the first Mon
thy in 7am1ary."041.3 then taken tin.
.
Mr. M
r. SAERAN Ulm). of Ohio. moved to amend so as
to make it a joint resolution, adjourning both Houses un
til the first Monday in January. The amendment Was
adopted, and the resolution, as amended, agree 4 to;
Oir YEAS.
'Tanis (R.)
Howard (It.)
Kennedy (IL)
Kiev (R.)
Lane (11.) Ind.
Lane (R.) Karnali
Mobouga II (D.)
N a
o esmith l.)
Pmeroy (R.)
NAYS.
ITitle (R.)
Harlan (IL)
Rowe (B.)
Latham (D.)
Aknola (IL)
1323 - sard (1).)
Bruwning (R.)
Chandler (R.)
COWall (R.)
Davi., (U.)
Field (U.)
Foot (IL)
liardlug (U.)
Clark (R.)
Coflamer (R.)
Vessendeu (11,)
Foster (II)
Grimes (R.)
African Regiments.
Mr. LANE (Rep.), of Kansas, gave notice of his inten
tion to introduce a hilt to authorize the President to
raise two hundred regiments of infantry, composed of
persons of African descent.
' The Fredericksburg Battle.
Mr. WADE (Rep.), of Ohio, from the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, Made a report relative to the late
battle at Fredericksburg, which .was ordered to be
printed.'
Amendments. •
Mr. OOLLAMER (Rep.), of Verinont, offered an amend
ment, exempting municipal corporations from that
provision of the bill as proposed by Mr. Hale. Adopted.
Also, an amendment to exempt literary, religions, and
eleemosynary institutions.
Mr, }LILE objected to exempting charitable inlttlin
tions, for he thought that no such instittltiMlB ought to
get in debt in order to give charity.
- The amendment was agreed to.
The Senate then went into executive session, and sat
scoueutly adjourned to Tan. oth.
nousE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Habeas Carpus Protest.
Mr. PENDLETON (Dem.) of Ohio, rising to a privi
leged question, Moved that the protaa he offered, yester
day., against the passage of the bill to indemnify the Pre
sident and others for arrests under the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus be entered upon thejournaL This,
he said, Was embodied in his resolution, a part of which
only appeared on the journal.
The SPEAKER recalled attention to the fact that the
Rouse had refused to eater the protest nu tbelournad,
and cited fanner precedents in support of his decision.
From which Mr. PENDLETON appealed.
The Speaker was sustained—yens 74. nays 20.
-' Appropriation Bill.
Mr. STEVENS (De p.), of Pennsylvania, from the Com
mittee of 'Ways and Means, reported a bill tasking appro
priations Mr legislative, jbdicial, and executive exPensat
'for the year ending. With June, 1861. it was made the
special order for the sth of dranuary..
41aljottirisinteut.
The House concurred in the Semite's johdtwointion,
that when the House- adjeuth to-day it 130 tilt the first
Newby in January.
Franking Privilege.
Mr. COLFAX (Rep.). of Indiana, front the Coltuniliqe
on Post Offices, made an tolverse report . on Me resolution
to inquire into the, expediency- of g. , ,ty:ug the frankingprivilege to assessors; under the internal revenue law.
Postal Service , .
Btr. - BLARE tree J of Ohio. from rho same committei,
rejoined a bill authorizing the Postmaster ()letters' do,
eStublish a postal-money-order system. It Proposes *Y,
charge five cent. on ten dollars : snore runt& ten and
thllll twenty. ten cents ; and for all additional stuns f
ten or less dollars, five cents. Duplicates: to be msu
w ben orders ace kg_
The hilt Was 1)104W- -
• Negroes in Illinois, i
•EF unanimous consent, the 'licence went lute. Commit,
tee of the Whole for.the purpose of debate, being un,-
der snutd II business Should betranSacted.
lily; ALLEN (Dem.), of iiiiuuts, neentned itin
hail-
ii
cp.'c naninsttim. tending of treed negroes lent llli
twis against the organic law of the State.
The Itowe then adjourned mail the hick of January.
Equrs•rni,v_c STArCEOV GM:Vt....3IAL DICCI.ELLA.N.
—For several days past, the finely-executed eques
trian statue of General George B. McClellan, exhi
bited in Messrs. Bailey & Co.'s window, the jewelers
Of Chestnut street, has attracted general attention.
Independent of the personal interest of the subject
to many of our citizens, the merits of this statue as
a work of art are universally acknowledged. The
modeling of the horse would not do violence to the
taste of a Rosa Bonheur, and the ease and petfectly
natural attitude of the rider cannot fail to strike
every observer, whilst the likeness of the General is,
we understand,• pronounced by niembersof his
to be the most faithful that has yet been Made._
This statue was executed by Mr. J. A. Baldly, (sculp
tor of the colossal Franklin which adorns the Tenth
street market,) having been modeled at his studio,
at Mr. Struthers', No. WV. Market street. A. con
siderable number of copies, at forty dollars each,
have already been ordered for 'presentation, and to
the admirers of General , McClellan, we cannot con
ceive of a more acceptable or tasteful gift. Mr.
Bailly is an artist of undoubted genius, and welbde
serves the encouragement he is receiving.
CHEISTMAFA BOOKS.—In our "Holiday Directo
ry P , yesterday we omitted to , mention the house of
Messrs. J. B. Lippincott & Cianpany, Nos. 22 and
North Fourth street, as having a splendid assort
ment of elegant and valuableboolse suitable for gifts.
Their "Army of the PotomaciP by Prince de Join
ville, translated by Wm. Henry Herbert, with Notes
and a Map, advertised in another column of:our paper
this morning, ought to have a large sale for presenting:
purposes.
DIA,GICIFICT:riT STOCK OF GENTLENEN'Ei .
DnessiTio Gowns.—We yesterday visited the popu
lar old house of Pgr. John C. Arrison, Nos. 1 and 3
North Sixth street, first door above Market, for
merly J. Burr Moore's, and were amazed at the
extent and variety. of elegant Dressing Gowns for
gentlemen which his stock presentsosotwithertanding
the immense demand for them for several days past.
Ife has a large force engaged in the manufacture of
these beautiful garments, and ladies wishing to make
a half &mate present to their gentlemen friends should
not fail to visit Arrison's -to-day.
FINE READY-MADE CLOTHING.—Messrs.
C. Somers h.- Son, No. 625 Chestnut street, under
Jayne's Hall, so far as we have been able to ascer
tain from observation, are doing the largest Christ
mas trade, in the sale of line Ready-made Clothing,
of any house in the city. Their stock is not only
magnificently assorted, and made up of the choicest
and most desirable labrics, but they have wrought a
healthy reforin in the matter of prices. They are
furnishing the most elegant quality of suits at
very moderate prices.
DRIVING AN ACTjra TEADE.—Messrs.
Charles Oakford 6 Son, Nos. 834 and 836 Chestnut
street, under the Continental Hotel, have, - during
the last few days, been doing the largest business in
the way of Ladies' Fancy Pius probably ever
realized by any single house in. the country. The
reasons for this are that their stock is the most
magnificently-got-up, embracing a greater variety
of choice dressy articles in the Fur line, their prices
more reasonable, and their assortment unbroken:
A gentleman well "booked " in. such.makters infers
that - their sales in this department alone toldiry will
exceed twenty thousand dollarsi.
FINE CHRISTMAS FRUITS.—Mr. C. H.
Nattson, dealer in One family groceries, Arch and
Tenth streets, has now in store, expressly for holiday
use, the choicest assortment of Prune. iuthis city,
such as raisins, almonds, citron, lemons, oranges,
fine white "Almeria" grapes (at 50•centsper pound),
beautiful colored Lady Apples, large- elegant eating
apples, canned fruits in great perfection—peaches,
corn and tomatoes—together with all the choicest
articles in the fine grocery line, both foreign and do
mestic.
AN ELEGANT STOCK OF CIERISTMAS
Goons.—Messrs. Witters lr C 0,,„ No. 35 North
Eighth street, corner of Filbert, have not only one of
the most attractive Christmas. stocks in the city, but
they are selling at greatly below the usual prices.
Their fine quality Silver-Plated Ware, Britannia
Ware, and Fancy Goods of every description, together.
with their elegant assortment of ornamental lamps
for,biuning Kerosene oil, render this _Stock one of
the most desirable to select from in the city.
ELEGANT STOCK OF LADIES' FANCY FURS.
—Mr. John A. .Stambach, No. 82.6. Arch street, not
withstanding the immense demand upon his stock
during the past few weeks, has still in store a mag
nificent assortment - of Ladles' Fancy Furs, beauti
fully adapted for Christmas and New-Year presents.
He has all the finest and most costly Furs imported,
manufactured in the very best and most stylish man
ner, yet sells at prices decidedly lower than are usu
ally charged for the same quality of goods.
FINE MILITARY GOODS for Presents to
Army and Navy officers can be had in greatest
Variety and in best style at Oakford C Son's, under
the Continental Hotel.
TREAT TOIIR WTFE OR SWEETHEART TO
a new Bonnet, by going to Messrs. Wood Ec Ours
to-day, No. 725 Chestnut street, and selecting one of
their exquisite new style Winter Hats. Their
prices have been greatly reduced in anticipation of
the close of the season.
THE RITPTHRE ne TH:E CABWET.—The
resignations of Secretaries Seward and Chase
having at the request of the President been with
drawn, the aftairtrof the nation, at the seat of GO
vernment, it is supposed, will now- again pursue the
even tenor of their way—precisely as that prince of
coal merchants, Air. W. W. Alter, is pursuing the .
even tenor of his way, at his coal yard, Ninth street,
above Poplar, in the noble work of supplying the
public with the best coal in the market, at the very
lowest prices. Everybody should use his coal, in
preference to any other, from motives of economy,
if from no other.
MAi s Y 01712 BEST Bow.--Politeness costs
nothing. It is very agreeable to other people. More
than this—it pays. Wherever any one goes, he
should make his best bow—look as well as he can ;
be as attentive to others as is consistent with mo
desty and dignity; and, by so doing, he will gain
friends. Give a man friends enough and his fortune
is made. So make your best bow—and in order to
look as attractive as possible, wear the neat and
fashionable clothing manufactured at the palatial
establishment of Granville Stokes, No. 609 Chest
nut street, where one price only is asked, and that
exceedingly moderate.
WHERE TO GET A FINE PICTURE OF
re:7IURSELF TO-DAT--At Ripple's, No. MO Arch
street. His elegant ground-floor gallery was crowd
ed all day yesterday with applicants for sittings, and
all who visit his rooms are gratified with the mark
ed success of his pictures. His room of specimens,
all of his own taking, will convince the best critique
that his pictures have more than ordinary merit.
HOLIDAY PREgENTS.—George Steck's Pi.
anonfor sale by J. E. Gould, Seventh and Chest
nut. de2o-4t
EUGENIE'S WINTER BONNET.--The Em
press Eugenie's Winter Bonnet is described in the
latest Paris "Fashions" as a gem 5 it is of black
velvet, and a tentacle of ponceau velvet in the form
of a diadem in the inside; the edge of the bonnet is
a band of sable, very line and very dark. and which,
with black velvet dress, and a mantle tr immed with
fur, completes the toilet. To see a real genuine
"Gem" it is only necessary to inspect a winter suit
for either adult or youth, made at the Brown Stone
Clothing Rail of Rocklin]. Sr. Wilson, .Nos. 60.3
and" 605 Chestnut street, above Sixth.
-
TiE SUPERB GEORGE STECK PIA.NVS,for
Christmas presents. J. E. Gould, Seventh and
Chestnut. de2o-it
A remtLY declining Housekeeping, Will
dispose of a magnificent 7-octave Rosewood Piano,
elegantly carved case and legs, grand action, over
stating baris, sweet and powerful tone, made to order
live months ago, by one of the best New York
makers. Cost $6OO, will be sold for $250.
To be seen in Spruce street, the third door below
Eighth, north side. de2o-4to
CaftivrmAs PaEsEivra i—Get beadiful
Steck Piano of 3. E. Gould, corner of Seventh and
Chestnut streets. - de4-ti
CHRISTMAS PRESENTS.—Bronze - Match
Safes, Cigar Boxes, and Ash Pans, Porcelain Lan- -
terns, Drop Lights, and many other useful articles
On hand, at Warner, Miskey, & Merrill's, No. 718
Chestnut. de:WA
_
EBWitltD P. KELLY, Tailor, 142 S. Third
sheet, formerly principal of Kelly & Brother, and of
Lukens, Kelly, .& Bro., has on hand a large . assort
ment of choice Winter Goods; also, Pattern Over
coats and Business Coats, of all the fashionable
styles. Terms cash, at low prices. del!-12t
J. GOVLD, corner of Seventh and
Chestnut streets, is the only one InPhiladelphia who
keeps-the popular and truly beautiful Geo. -Steck
Pianofortes. de4-tf
A NEW ARTICLE OF , EXPORTATION.—
Steinway & Sons' grand square and upright Pianos
took twenty-six first premiums (gold and silver me
dals) at the principal fairs held in this country with
in the last seven yeas, and in addition thereto they
were awarded the First Prize Medal at the great
International Exhibition, at London, in 1882, for
"powerful, clear, brilliant, and sympathetic tone,
with excellence of workmanship, as shown in Grand
and Square Piano _ s." This greatest triumph of Ame
rican Pianos in England has caused a sensation in
musical circles throughout the continent, and, as a
result, the Messrs. Steinway are in constant receipt
-of orders from Europe, thus inaugurating a new
phase in the history of American pianos by creating.
in them an article of export.
Warerooms at Blasius Brow., 1006 Chestnut street.
Powell (DJ
Saulsbury (D.)
Sherman (DO
Sumner (R.)
Ten Ryek (11)
Wilkinson (IL)
Ito
Trumbull (R.)
Willey (IT.)
'Wilson (IL) Mass
Wright (U.)
de23-St •
PIANOS MADE BY GEORGE STECK for sale
only by J. E. Gould, Seventh and Chestnut. dao-4t
CHRISTMAS PUESENTS.---Singer's Family
Sewing Machines with Hemmer and Braider at
tached, is the best and most useful of all maeldnes
now in use. Those wishing to make a truly valua
ble Christmas present, and one that will keep -the
giver ever fresh in the kind remembrance of the re
ceiver, will do well to buy one of these machines to
present as a seasonable token of real friendship.
The price is $5l. Call and make yotir selections at
I. M. Singer .k-Co.'s, No. 810 Chestnut street. d24-5t
CuBTAINS, CURTAINS, CURTAINS, CUR
TAINS.
Curtains, Curtains, Curtains, Curtains.
Curtains, Curtains, Curtains, Curtains.
Curtains, Curtains, Curtains, Curtains.
Lace Curtains, Lace Curtains.
Muslin Curtains, Muslin Curtains.
Damask Curtains, Damask Curtains.
De Laine Curtains, De Labia Curtains.
Satin Curtains, Satin Curtains.
Broeatelle Curtains, Brocatelle Curtains.
Reps Curtains, Reps Curtains.
New Styles, New Styles, New Styles.
New Styles, New Styles, New Styles.
New Styles, New Styles, New Styles. ; ;
Low prices, Low prices, Low prices.
pricesiLow prices; Low prises. • 4
Low prices, Low priees,'Low prices.
_ . &. Co. sai) Chestnut street.
STISCK Tl4.lioo;— ,, Titebe ehiaht iniggi
ments.for E. ;Gould, Seventh and Chest
nut. deZO4t
CITY ITEMS.
CURTAIN MATIOtTALO ow SALE AT Vr .
H. CARRYL'S CURTAIN STORE, 7t9 CHRETNI/T 3it. •
French Crimson Wool Reps.
French Blue Wool Reps.
Green French Imperial Reps.
Drab All-Wool Reps. "
Crimson French Terry.
Wide French Satins.
Wide French Broeatelles.
Wide French Satin de Lathe.
Wide Worsted Damask.
Wide Union Damask.
Wide Moquette, for Railroad Cers.
French Flushes, for Railroad Oars,
Gilt Cornices and Bands.
Cords, Gimps, and Fringes.
Tassels and Loops.
Hooks, Rings, and Brackets.
Furniture Coverings.
EMBROIDERED LACE CURTAINS
Lace Curtains; $5.00 a pair.
Lace Curtains, $7.50 a pair.
Lace Curtains, $B.OO a pair.
Lace Curtains, $8.50 a pair.
Lace Curtains, $lO.OO a pair.
Lace Curtains, $12.00 a pair.
Lace Clirtains, $14.00 a pair.
Lace Curtains, $15.00 a pair.
Lace Curtains, $lO.OO a pair.
Lace Curtains, $20.00 a pair.
Lace Curtains, $25.00 a pair.
Lace Curtains, $30.00 a pair.
Lace L
a c ecpCurtai ns, Curtains,ow $$
w 4.
00 00 aa
SHADES,p
pair.a r
Painted and Gold Borders, in store and for sale at
IoW prices, with good Fixtures complete for earl
Shade.
Gold-Bordered Shades made to order, any style at
size. WM. K CARRYL,
Curtain Store,
de24-2t Masonic Hall, 719 Chestnut street
Cratraers ErrrArm—An epitaph, Which
graces the church-yard of Moreton, England, rus t
thus :
" Here lie the bones of Richard Sawton,
Whose death, slant was strangely brought On:
Trying one day his corns to mow or,
The razor slipped and cut Ms toe off:
His toe—or rather what it grew to—
An inflammation quickly flew to,
Which took, alas to mortifying,
And was the cause of RiAanFredyktg.o
A curious case of =or/Wane* front a est hap.
pined to a gentleman in Germantown last week.
On examining a new dress coat he learned that it
was not cut by Mons. Seynaye, at Charles Stokest
"one price," under the Conthiental t when he was se
mortified that he immediately laid it aside and par.
chased' another, of the desired cut. at the above ea.
tablishment.
SIGNOR BLITZ, With his LCETIIed Canary
Birds, Ventriloquism, and Metamorphoses, like a
magnet, draws everybody to witness hie wonders od
the Assembly Buildings, Tenth and Chestnut.
morrow, C7trialnies Day, there will be three grant
performances, to enable all to attend. Blitz is
host in himself.
FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL,
TEE MONEY MARKET.
PHILADELPHI A, December trt.,
Money matters were more settled to day., The Cabinet
diMullica being at an end, parties worked more securely
and satisfactorily. Specie was (mite active, and the
market was weaker at the close, with 111 bid. Old de
mands were steady at 1263.. All Government securities , :
firmer. Money active at 6 per cent. the supply overba
lancing the demand.
The Stock market was quiet but firm. Governments,
recovered very nearly to former figures, the sires selling
as high as BMX, the seven-thirties at 102. Pennsylvania
fives rose 14: at the second board, closing at 96 4. off
city sixes sold at par ,t the new were steady at 103. Pitt,
burg, Fort Wayne, and Chicago, second mortgage, at
9231. Philadelphia and Erie sixes at 102. North Penn
sylvania. Railroad sixes were steady at 86. Ridgeave
nue sevens brought W. Northern Liberty sixes sold at
par. Lehigh Valley sixes at 10734. Elmira sevens ad
vanced 1. Camden and Amboy sixes, 1832, sold at lee
Schuylkill Navigation sixes, 3572, at 91. Reading and
Pennsylvania Railroad bonds. were steady. Schuylkill
Navigation, common, sold at a. Morris Canal was
steady.
, Beading shares Were steady at yesterday's figure, 37?;
Pennsylvania rose X, selling np to 66. MinehW sold at
60X ; North - Pennsylvania at 9.X, a decline; Camden and
Amboy at 159 X .; Long Island at 22. Little Schuylkill rose
X Carewlava was a shade lower. Elmira and Norristown
steady. Passenger Railways were more active. Rare
and Vine sold at 7X, Arch-street at 2.5 X, and Chestnut
and Walnut at 49. Seventeenth and Nineteenth improved
1; Thirteenth and Fifteenth, X.". Second and Third feu
off 1. Philadelphia Bank sold at 113 hi ; Commonwealth
at 36. The market closed steady, 4V67,000 in bonds and 4011
shares chaniing hands.
The New York Bank statement, of yesterday, cow-
Pares as follows with that of last Monday:
heck ending. Loans. Specie. Circularn. De..-its.
Dec. 13 $172,9:r3,946 35,715,754 9029.544 154... ~ 655
Dec. 20 1.73530)5 35,554416 9,830,620 15014501
Increase A 919,650
Decrease
••• • —1,154,41 S
The Louisville Journal of Saturday hasthc following
relearns and list of money values in that city:
'A general dullness pervaded the money market yes
terday, and. there was no change in the current rates.
The buying rate for gold - was 59@31 cent prem, and the
selling priceMo3s. Silver was in demand at 2.*?.3 is
cent prem buying, and 230:33 cent .sealing. Demand
notes were bought at 2.4Ce15 'll cent prem. The bankers
pay 93 cents on the dollar for the notes of the old banks
of Tennessee, and discount the notes of other Southern
banks at. 25 to SO S cent. Eastern exchange dull-the
brokers buying at .34 . 14 cent discount, and selling at par
to i 4 premium."
Phi Leda.. Stock Esc
[Reported by S. B. SLAIMAK
FIRST
wage Sales, Dee. 23.
a, Philadelphia Eaelataite.)
; ARD.
2010 Lehigh Val 65ea514•107M26001.7g 7-30 Tr Nblank.lo2
20 Penns It. . .57X L 4500 US 6s 1431....,....unv
25 Cheit & Ifitrutitli: 49 500 do
Piffled& Bank 115% 3)00 do 1004:
17 Arch-at It UK ZOO co 103% .
IR) Schnyl Nay. • •• 4% 6 Commonwealth Bk 36
1000 Elmira E is 99 8 Pettus It • • 5Pi
1000 Cam Sc Amb 6s 1443•152 250 &hey!. Nay 644 - 64. •91
1 30 00 0 410 City fis CAP 1R) 00 1
1-_lO AMOUR It 50N
' 1
BB:TWEEN BOARDS.
2000 Penns coupon do.
SECOND
RIO N Liberty Ss: 100
4 Little Schuyl Zi%
1600 Ridge Avenue 75... 96
200 Long Island R. 22
100 Readiugit .. 37:
2 C:l9 & Amb R 151 X
500 N orth Pcnna 6e•-• S 6
S(M do S 6
6 Perms R 59
CLOSING) PE
Rid. Asked.'
17 8166 cpaus 81....103% 1110%!
11 S 7-30 D Ilk —.101% 102
American Gold. •]32% 132%
Pbila 6s —old.— 99% 100
Do new los znyi
Anneo6e B
. 47g
60%
Heading R. 37.56 sim
Do bds 'R)...106% 109
Do bde '70...1113.34 •
Do bds
Perms E'69 99%
Do Ist in 65..111 112
Do . 2d m 65...106 106.11
Morris Canal.... 62 63
98X
BOARD.
2 PCIIDEL R ~ 56
110 'Race & Vine R.—, 7:4
2.1.X0 Philada & Erie& —lO2
?AIM do 102
90 North Penna R.... oR
1000 U S 6s Rt Ka%
40WP Ps W & C2dnx 14. ..oth
ROD Penner as 2 cents---. 96.4
936.90 do 954
IRES---STRADY.
, Bid. Med
Catawissa R..... 4% 4
Do p_rfd..—.. 14% 15
Beaver Mead R.. 65 67
Wfinehin E 60% 60 7 i
RarrisinuT R—• • 6 0 ••
Wilmington R., ..
Lehigh Nay tia.• L ... • •
Do shares... Its'4: 64
Do scrip ..... —30 u;
Cam &Amb 8...162 154
Phila k Brie Ss—
Sun &Erie 15.... .
. _
22 Mi
Do bonds.... . • DO
Delaware Dir..—
Do b0nd5..... .
__ • .
Spruce-street R.. 19
Cmwtnat-st R— - • 49 90
Arch-street R..• 29.14 29
Race-street B.
Do pre' 10e.-119130
Do es 76.. • ..11.0
Do 2d mtg... 209
Soma CanaL
Do es
Schnyl Nay 436
Do prla 1224
Do 6s 'ID:— ON 66
Sbnire. B Mi. Ye
Do prid...... 31 Si
Do 7s Ist m.. 99 99X
N Penns 11. 93‘
Do 6e 85X 86
Do ....
Phila Ger & Nor. 63
Lehigh Tal 8... 55
Lehigh Tat bd6-1073f 106
Tenth-street B. 34 344'
:Thirteenth-st It— MS
IW Plana R 58 67
Do
Green-street R... 35,ver 37 '
Do bonds.._
Second-street R... 75 710;
Do bonds ,
Fifth-street 513'; 824
Do b0nd5.... ..
Girard College t ..
Seventeenth-a It /0 10
Sexal-weekly Review of the Philodelphia
Markets.
IiRCEXIMII 21—Evening,.
The produce markets continue shall, the approaching
'holidays limiting operations in most branches of trade,
Flour and Grain are without change in price or demand.
The stock of Co ,flee bi very light, and there is little sr
nothing doing in the way of sates.. Cotton is steady, with
limited sales. Provisions are firm,aud prices well main
tained. Wool is unchanged.
FLOUR.—The Flour market continues dun, there being
very little deMand for shipment or home use. Sales
comprise about 4.,000 bills at viCafill for :superfine ;
for,Wes. tent extra; for extra including
5011 bbls Western extra at 1iA.40. The sales to the re
tailers and bakers range at the above quotations fur en-
Perfine and extras, and $858.50 bid for fancy brands,
according to quality. Eve Flour is selling slowly at
£5.5.5C(10.6•24 bbl. Corn Itend is quiet at $3.50 for Penn
sylvania, and 44.2.3 :# bbl for Brandywine.
GRAlN.—Wheat is in steady demand at previeus rates,
with sales of 20,000 bus, mostly prime Penna. red, at
$l.4S,' in store; and white at BILfii@LEO, the latter for
choice. Rye is selling at 9:[a15% ha for Penna. Corn
is dull, and there Is very little doing; sales cortlathu
about 13,000 bus at FirOSie for old yellow. and 75@ ;Tr
stew. Onts are in demand, with sales of 1S.:100 bit , at 41
04-1 c "els, the latter for heavy. A small sale of Penna.
Barley- was made at $1.55 Mt.
PROVISIONS.—There has been mess activity in the
market. ...B.tesso Boas are hetriunia ff wine hi, and sell
- fruitiThe cars at 65.5rCa6 VI lea lint. Mess Pork is mire irt
'.qnired after; sales of old at *13.50@h1; new at 814@ll:70,
cash. City-packed Mess Beef is selling Mr ship stem; at
tWelit, and country at -Tat The packers are still en
gageilma furnishing Government supplies. There is very
little movement hi Bacon, and prices arc :lruier; sale of
Hams at Rigkqe for plain , and 100:10l./c for canvassed;
Sides at sN®6l4e, and Shoulders at ritg:Wc, it, in quality,
including several lots for New Orleans, Green Meat , are
in fair deniand,bat the sales are limited, owiag to its ab
sence of supplies. There is rather more demand for Lend.
and not ninth stock here; prices at the elate nhiTe firm:
sales of liou bbls and Ms at it.'44'l(k., cosh and on tier, uoW
held attite latter figure, and kegs at loi,fiEllc: country
Lard sells at ,9@ . 9?:4e, Butter continues in fair request.
and prices are' steady; sales of solid-packed at vim:Mc.
and roll at lfigiVes. some Pennsylvania glade sold at :Br
Cheese is steady at IfigOlc # lb. Eggs sell at 2- El ;
dot.
' , -hritTAL:3.—There is a firm feeling in the Iron market ,
and prices are well maintained, with a steady
for future delivery; sides of 400 tons Anthracite at ssfitg ,
'% cash mid 4 months, for 1, and dtYO cash for No.:.
In Scotch Pig no sales. Prices of Bar Iron and Boiler
Plates contiune without change. Lead is held 6rm
-Iy, and there is very little =steak here; the ht 4 sale of
Galena was at Shan cash, to arrive from a neighboring
market. .
BARE—The receipts and stock of Quercitron are limit
ed, but the demand has tidien off; sates of 100 Idols ist.
No. lat ti 6 'NOD, which is the general asking rate. In
Tanners' Barkno sales have been reported to alter (Po
tations. „
C.ANDLES are held firmlr, and the stock bfAdamantiae
is light ; sales of city at IXll,sk„ and Westernat 19NO:lic.
cask. . Tallow Candies are without change.
COAL:he demand for shipment has fallen off, nad
there is less inquiry Or home consumption, but price
are - without quotable change, •
COFFEE.—The demand is limited, and only about 2,*
bags sold at 26?-40320 for Rio, and 31®f 1 for Lag-naynt,
cash and time.
COTTON.—There is a firm feeling lathe market, hnt tha
rnanufiwatrers purchase lightly; sales of 100 bales,
eldelly Middling Uplands,
.at 67c, en,h, closing yen
quiet, including a lot of ordinary at iig@gle, cash.
FISH —The -demand for Mackerel is extremely light.
the , -easen, for canal navigation being over, 'Plea ,ter-•
qttotationsare4l2l3 for 'iNo. .g...6®ft for No. 24'1J5-41:-(4'551
for median ; *6.50 for'•-
large No. 54. Pickled Herring "'L
at %Lat.:lso Ltd. Codfish are scarce, and held at -Pi
Cat.:
FRUIT'—The absence of all kinds of foreign confirm - ,
to limitoperations. A few Rosana Oranges sold at ea.c!.•
bbl, as in quality. Domestic fruit of all kinds is in calla
request. (liven Apples range from $1.50 to $11.50, the Ist
ter rate;for good NeW York; dried Apples come foresel
slowly, and are in good request at 5®60 f. lb. Drie ,
Teaches .range from diraWc, for quarters and lady , :
pared Teaches are scarce, and wanted. Cranberries ard
worth it gria Pb!, as in quality.
310L.Aiii,iRS.--The market is very quiet, bet Price
steady,. titles of Cnba Muscovado in a small waY at "'
on usual tettns.
NAVAL STODES.-There is little doing in tiny
miles of Rosin at ff.. 16,50 for coutmon„ and SiSfiiiAl for low
grade and good No. I. A lot of renusylvaniii Tar soot
of - Turpentine are quiet, with small '3l'"
Ott
t. OITA continue very firm, with a fair demand; sa
wintersperm at If . l,Wi cash. Linseed. oil sclls $1.2 - .3C:i.1.1!
ireirelecunla unactried; s..te , or relined at dirCkg ,
' - le4sofive and
SEEDS.—T an
The demd. for Clover:wit
'prices are barely' maintained ;sales or LtX^'
0*."11:Ca , 6.50 t bushel. Timothy ranges front ,D.ratri.-.•
bushel Flaxseed Is taken on arrival at q l 3 . int:` t " .l I
SPIRITS.—There is no change in. IlrandY or Oi l ,'
but little selling: Runt is steady at O 05 7"
lon. Whisky is firm, and prices rather better :
Penn's and Ohio bbls at 41Ett3c, hit& Pk, and dr , r' t-
€4oc Wien. ..,....intit-
SUGAIt continues VPN, dull, and the transacto.
edstEntleArof Cuba at UhAll.V: - .c, anti New Ortega"
? lb.
TAT:LOW is tin/thanked t sales of eity-rendered ;.t 111si4
and country at 10.4 e, cash
. TOBACCO.-,The tuarket is nearly bare oral'. gm , le,'
manufactured, anti ituonumunis full rates. The swot
o.
.Leaf is also very light_
WOOL.—Medliam and tine qualitietrein better reqlp: i ii
Low grades are neglected, with sales of 70,000 IDs.
tine and medium, at Wil@adef lb. cash
-The followingare the receipts of Flour and Orals st
this_nort tozpAliy; ,
. ..
OWN,
.
b
11. Y) hic-b
1,1•,*