kWTi wi'tri. 41A krkV- ' ,W'f fc?li, ! J ..t HJv m - I RMANY (By CARL W.ACKERMAN Coprrlcht, 1U17, George II. Doran Company. ' ' . &f NEXT &EPU3UC "Von Jagow knew that every square mile of territory gained was being paid for' 1 only by the cost of German blood, but by the more terrible cost of public opinion 2 Uerman influence abroad, nut Germany was unaer maruai law ana the Fore imui'u iiuu nuining 10 say uuuui iiumui.j' piano. K.'A w ) m &t "Zimmermann Began to Plan With the General Staff and the Navy to League Mexico Against he United States When He Awakened to the Realization That Germany's Threatening Propaganda in America and Her Plots Against This Country's Property Were Not Frightening Uncle Sam Away From War Colonel House Tried Hard, When He Arrived in Merlin in 1916, to Impress the German Offi cials With the Fact That President Wilson Was Not Only Not Bluffing, but That the American People Would Support Him in Whatever He Did in Dealing With the Ger man Government -si t& i V i' v tltfHEN Zimmermann began to realize that Germany's threatening . '"propaganda in the United States and Germany's plots against miiviiiuu ihujiuiij nvic nut RiiuLxuuill in irigiiiemiig uiu unueii Statcfe away from war, lie began to look forward to the event of war. Ho saw, as most Germans did, that it would be a long time before the United States could get forces to Europe in a tufiicient number to have a decisive effect upon the war. He began to plan with the General Staff and the navy to league Mexico against America tr two purposes. One, Germany figured .at n war with Mexico would keep the United Stntes army and navy busy over here. Further, Zimmermann often said to callers that if the United States Went- tor war with Mexico it would not bo possible for American factories to send so much ammunition and so many supplies to ike Allies. ' German eyes turned to Mexico. As soon as President Wilson recognized Carranza as President Germany followed with a formal recognition. Zubaran Capmany, who had been Mexican representa tive in Washington, was sent to Berlin as Carranza's Minister. .Immediately upon his arrival Zimmermann began negotiations with him. Reports of the negotiations were sent to Washington. The State Department was warned that unless the United States solved the "Mexican problem'' immediately Germany would prepaie to attack us through Mexico. German reservists were tipped off to be ready to go to Mexico upon a moment's notice. Count von Bcrn atorff. and the German consuls in the United States were instructed, and Bernstorff, who was acting as the general director of German interests in North and South America, was told to inform the Ger man officials in the Latin-American countries. At the snmc time, German financial interests began to purchase banks, farms and mines in Mexico. i Von Jayow at It earl a Pacifist After the sinking of the Arabic the German Foreign (Mice intimated to the United States Government and to the Amer ican correspondents that methods of submarine warfare would be altered and that ships would be warned before they were tor pedoed. But wjien the navy heard that the Foreign Ofiice was inclined to listen to Mr. Wilson's protests it made no attempt to conceal its opposition. Gottlieb on Jagow, the Secretary of State, although he was an intimate friend of the Kaiser and an officer in the German army, was at heart a pjcinV. Every time an opportunity presented itself he tried to mobilize the peace forces of the world to make peace. From time to time the German financiers and propaganda leaders in the United Stntes, as well as influential Germans in the neutral European countries, sent out peace, "feelers," Von Jagow realized that. the sooner peaco was made the better it would bo for Germany and the easier it would be for the Foreign Office to defeat the military party at homo He saw that the more victories the army had and the more victories it could announce to the people the more lustful the General Staff would be for a war of exhaustion. Army leaders have always had more confidence in their ability to defeat the world than the Foreign Ofiice. The army looked, at the map of Europe and saw so many hundred thou- ISP cmiKB0 tAtrrr ZfUt. jLsjf eVS-3. This is the picture of Von Hindcnburg which is found in nearly every German home. sand Miiarc miles of territory under occupation. The Foreign Ofiice saw Germany in its relation to the world. Von Jagow knew that every new square mile of territory gained was being paid for, not only by the cost of German blood, but by the more terrible cost of public opinion and German influence abroad. Hut Germany was under martial law, and the Foreign Office had nothing to ay about military plans. The Foreign Office alto had little to say about naval warfare. The nay was building submarines as fast as it could, and the number of ships lost encouraged tho people to believe that the more intensified the submarine war became tho quicker the war would end in Germany's favor. So the navy kept sinking ships and relying upon the Foreign Office to make excuses and keep America out of the war. The repeated violations of the pledges made by the Foreign Ofiice to the United States aroused American public opinion to white heat, and justly so, because the people here did not under stand that the real Mibmarine crisis was not between President Wilson and Berlin, but between Admiral o Tirpltz and Secretary on Jagow and their followers. President Wilson was at the limit of his patience with Ger many, and the German people, who were becoming impatient over the long-drawn-out proceedings, began to accept the inspired think ing of the navy and to believe that Wilson was working for tho defeat of Germany by interfering with submarine activities. On February 22, 191G, in one of my dispatches I said: "The patient attitude toward America displayed during the Lusitania negotiations, it is plain today, no longer exists, because of the popular feeling that America has already hindered so maany of Germany's plans." At that time it appeared to observers in Berlin that unless President Wilson could show more patience than the German Government the next submarine -accident would bring about a break in. relations. Commenting on this dispatch, the Indianapolis News tho next day said: "In this country tho peoplo feel that nil tho patience has been shown by their Government. Wo believe that history1 will sustain that viow. Almost ten months ago moro than ono hundred Amer ican citizens were deliberately done to denth by the German Govern ment, for it is understood that tho submarine commander nctcd under instructions and that Germaany refuses to disavow on tho ground that tho murderous act was tho act of tho German Govern ment. Yet, after nil this time, tho Lusitania caso is still unsettled. The Administration has with marvelous self-restraint recognized that public opinion in Germany was not normal, and that for that reason it has done everything in its power to smooth the way to a settlement by making it as easy as possible for tho Imperial Govern ment to meet our just demands. . Indeed, the President has gone so far as to expose himself to severe criticism at home. Wo believe that ho would have been sustained if ho had immediately after the sinking of tho Lusitania broken off diplomatic relations,. "But he has stood out against public opinion in his own country, waited ten months for nn answer and done everything that lie could in honor do to soften the feeling here. Yet just on the cvo of a settlement thnt would have been unsatisfactory tomany of our people Germany announced tho policy that wo had con demned as illegal, and that plninly is illegal. Tho troublo in Berlin is an utter inability to seo anything wrong in tho attack on tho Lusitania or to appreciate tho sense of horror that was stirred in this country by it. The idea seems to bo that tho policy of frightfulness could bo extended to tho high seas without in any way shocking the American people. Nothing has come from Berlin that indicates any feeling of guilt on tho part of tho German peoplo or their Government. "In tho United States, on tho contrary, tho act is regarded as one of the blackest crimes of history. And yet, in spite of that feeling, we have waited patiently for ten months in the hope that the German Government would do justice and clear its name of reproach. Yet now we arc told that it is Germany that has shown a 'patient attitude,' tho implication or insinuation being that our long-suffering Administration has been unreasonable and impatient. That will not be the vordict of history, as it is not tho verdict of our own people. Wo have made every nllowanco for the conditions existing in Germany and have absolutely refused to take advantage of her distress. Wo doubt whether there is any other Government in the wi,rld that would havo. shown the patienco and moderation under like provocation that havo been shown by tho American Government in these Lusitania negotiations." I sent tho editorial to Von Jngow, who returned it tho next day with the brief comment on one of his calling cards, "With many thanks." Colonel House at Work in Berlin About this time Count Reventlow and the other naval writers began to refer to everything President Wilson did as a "bluff." When Goloncl E. M. House came to Berlin early in 101G, he tried to impress tho officials with die fact that Mr. Wilson was not only not bluffing, but that the American people; would support him in wlialruT he did in dealing with the German (ioM-rnmcnt. Mr. Gerard tried, too, to impress the Foreign Office, but because ho could only deal with that branch of tho Government ho could not change the navy's impression, which was that Wilson would never take a definite stand against Germany. On tho eighth of February the London Times printed tho following dispatch, which I had sent to tin United States: Mr. Gerard has been accused of not being forceful enough in dealing with the Berlin Foreign Ofiice. In Berlin ho has been criticized for just the opposite. It has been stated fre quently that he was too aggressive. Tho Ambassador's posi tion was that he must carry out Mr. Wilson's ideas. So he tried for days and weeks to impress officials with the serious ness of tho situation. At the critical point in tho negotiations various unofficial diplomnts began to arrive, and they seriously interfered with negotiations. One of these was a politician who, through his credentials from Mr. Bryan, met many high officials and informed them that President Wilson was writing his notes for "home consumption." Mr. Gerard, however, appealed to Washington to know what was meant by the moves of this American with authority from Mr. Bryan. This was tho begin ning of the reason for Secretary Bryan's resigning. Secretary Bryan had informed also former Ambassador Dumba that the United States would never take any position - against Germany even though it was hinted so in tho Lusi- r..v ?,.i i.iVi. f$i .SM 'J' v '-" f- rv;--; Ur,i:. yr. "JiJWi ftw W - IV.' W1 4 .v "v " l -) M'J r i K (w S'S n&m -i-vJTvii IV M S '.v- riz fX,!vrvi s . r . ,"J r,-.vj SECRETARY OF STATE VON JAGOW Whose opinions" were so favorable to the United States tWj mcy couia not do pnnteu in uermany. 1 wuta tania note. Dumba telegraphed this to Vienna, and Berlin informed immediately. TJrtjtn 1 rrt ftf Tf r,auH..lt .. ..1 J 1 1 m 1 j.k.ua ul n. uciiiius iiursumu iiienasnip and nersoiul association wjth Secretary of State von Jagow and Under s-. rotary of State Zimmermann, he was acquainted with Seer.-. Bryan's move. Ho telegraphed to President Wilson, and theP 'uii, mio inu iiajfjiiuuun ui iur. liryan. In December the Ancouu was torpedoed, and it was offici explained that the act was that of an Austrian submarinn ,. mamler. Wilson's note to Vienna brought about a near ruptuj between Austria-Hungary and Germany, because Austria uH Hungary at that timo were much opposed to Germany's submirisi meinous. Aunougn tnc submarines operating in the Mcditerraneii were iiying mo Ausinan Hag, tliey were German submarines, n members of the crews were German. Throughout the life of lit' wmperor rranz Joscl tlie Dual Monarchy was ruled, not froi Vinnun lint frnm lltirJnmiot K. fi... cirn.. rm .1 . . . ...., .,.. ...... uuuusi u; vuum oii-iuii iiszu, me iiungarua Premier. I was in Budapest at the time, and one evenine ti1 rV..... T!. i !.! 1 ...i.;.i. . 1 .. . " r?ri vvuuui. .i.o..a ..1, uia imiucu, which sianus on tne rocKy cliff opposil mu uiaui pan. ui uuuiipraii unu wnicn ovenooKs tne valley of uanuDe ior many miles. Tisza, as well as all Hungarians, ii American before he is pro-German. "To think of trouble between Austria-Hungary and the' United States is sheer nonsense," he said in his nuiet but forced ful manner. "I must confess, however, that we were greatly surprised to get the American note. It is far from our intentioa to get into any quarrel with America. Pcrhans I should nor say quarrel, because I know it would nofbe that; but, of courted matters do not depend upon us entirely. Thero is no reason? "fnv anv ttwuKla aha. Ik. A ... ....aJ t 1 1 ... tl .., ..,uu.v ; wic .mituiui question, it must De seuiMii satisfactorily," he said emphatically, "not only from the standi nnfnt nf tlin TInlforl Rtntno l,.,t ... .. t 1 :i i $ (CONTINUED TOMORROW) BANQUET TO JAPANESE MISSION GIVEN BY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AT THE BELLEVUE-STRATFORl)
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