6 THE DAILY EVENING TELEGRAPH PHILADELPHIA SATURDAY , JUNE 18, 1870. THE JULY MAGAZINES. "TIIK U AI.AW." The July number of The (Jelary has the following list of articles: "A Leap in the Dark," by Edward II. House; "American Women and English "Women," by Jnstin McCarthy; "Summer Kain," by E. R. Sill; "Lo-Land Adventure," by Albert 8. Evans; "A Problem," by Louise Chandler Monitor; "Gleanings lrom the Sea," by John C. Draper; "Condemned," by M. L. 11. i "Museums of Art, Artists, and Ama teurs in America," by J. Jackson Jarves; "So Dearly Bought," by Frank Lee Benedict; "Foppies," by Rose Terry; Tut Yourself in his riace," by Charles Reade, chapter XLV to end (with an illustration); "A Sigh," by J. W. De Forest; "The New Lamps of His tory," a lecture delivered before the Univer sity of California, by William Swinton; "Mr. Welles in Answer to Mr. Weed The Facts of the Abandonment of Gosport Navy Yard," by Gideon Welles; "Drift-Wood," by Thilip Qui libet; "Literature and Art;" "Memoranda," by Mark Twain; "Nebulrc," by the Editor. As the reply of that eminent mariner, ex Secretary of the Navy Welles, to Thurlow Weed, is of considerable interest, and spicy withal, we give it entire: MR. WELLES IN A NS WEB TO MRm WEED. THE FACTS OF THE ABANDONMENT OF GOSPORT NAVY YARD. In the Galaxy tot June there was published a chapter from the autobiography of Mr. Thurlow Weed, which contains, with a vast amount of egotism, some facts perverted, and no little fiction. The author has a very fertile recollection, a prodigiously prolific memory, and in his conceits and details he remembers, and relates with a minuteness that is wonder ful, events that never took place, or which occurred under circumstances widely different from his narration of them. This chapter of the autobiograpy com mences with an account of two visits which were made to Washington in March and April, 1861 an interesting period of our his tory. Mr. Weed describes not only his ob servations, but the vigilant supervision which he exercised over the Govern ment, and the admonitions, promptings, and instructions which he kindly administered to the President and various Departments. It is pleasant to read the incidents he relates. It is still more pleasant to witness the self-satisfied complacency and the modest and unaf fected self-conceit which crop out in almost every sentence. That the autobiographer was as officious and intrusive as he states, perhaps without any intention of being im pertinent, is altogether probable. Unfortu nately for the accuracy of his memory and the truthfulness of his statements, many of his reminiscences are inconsistent with facts. The two opening paragraphs will bear repub lication. Mr. Weed says: The first ami only Inauguration of a President I ever attended was mat, or Sir. Lincoln in 1801. It was known that designs upon his life while on his way from Springfield to Washington were providentially averted. It was also known that the question of seizing upon the Government and its archives had been contemplated. The few troops In Washington were therefore stationed around the Capitol. During the ceremoDy of inanguratlon I walked about the grounds, encountering Major-General Wool, with a detachment of United States troops ready for action, and two pieces of cannon poBted so as to rake an important avenue. 1 soon after found Lieutenant General Scott, with the same number of cannon (on one of which the veteran was resting his elbow), posted In an equally advantageous position. This, in a country bo long exempted from serious internal collisions, occasioned painful reflections. General Scott assured me that these precautions were not un necessary, and that they had not been taken a moment too early. All, however, passed without either an attack or an alarm. But it was not long belore un equivocal symptoms of rebellion were manifested. When in Washington a few days afterwards I was awakened early one morning by llorace H. Hidden, formerly a resident of and representative from Alleg hany county, N. V., but then living at Harper s Ferry, who Informed me that unless immediately reinforced the arsenal and armory at that place would be attacked and taken by enemies of the Gov ernment, who were banding together for that pur pose ; adding that there was not an hour to lose. I went Immediately to the Secretary of War with this information. He thought the danger could not be so imminent, but said that the subject should have immediate attention. I went from the Secretary of War to General Scott, who promptly said that my information was confirmatory of that which he had received the evening previous. "But," ho added, "whatcan 1 do? My effective force, all told, for the defense of the capital. Is twenty-one hundred. Washington is as much in danger as Harper's Ferry. I shall repel any attack upon this city, but I cannot hazard the capital of the Union, as I should by dividing my force, even to save Harper's Ferry." My friend Kiddle's Information was out too reliable. The next day brought us Intelligence of the loss of Harper's Ferry. Soon after this, our first taste of rebellion, I re ceived Information from an equally reliable source that Gosport, with Its vast supply of munitions of war, was In danger. Of this I informed the Secre tary of the Navy at the breakfast-table of Willard's Hotel. Believing from his manner that be attached but little Importance to my information, I reiterated it with emphasis, assuring hlra that it would be occa sion for deep regret if Gosport were not immediately strengthened. Meeting the Secretary at dinner the same day, 1 renewed the conversation, and was io . formed the matter iroufd be attended to. This did not quiet my solicitude, and leaving the Secretary to the placid enjoyment of his dinner, I repaired to the White HoiiBe. Air. Lincoln, however, had driven out to visit some fortifications. I made another attempt In the evening to see him, but he was again out. Early the next morning, however, I found him and informed him what 1 had heard of the danger that threatened Gosport, and how, as I feared, 1 had failed to Impress the Secretary of the Navy with the accuracy of my information or the necessity of Im mediate action. "Well," said Mr. Lincoln, "we can t afford to lose all those cannon: I'll sro and see Father Welles myself," as he did Immediately. The result was that Admiral Paulding, who was then de spatched to Norfolk, arrived just in time to enjoy au illumination occasioned by the burnlug of Govern ment property, and witness the capture of Gos port." I do not affect to misunderstand the scope and purpose of the allusions to myself, nor the impressions which the autobiographer seeks to convey. They are in character and keeping with years of misrepresentation in relation to the abandonment of the navy yard at Norfolk, and other events by which the administration of the Navy Department was for years maligned and wronged. This de traction and these slanders, covertly made, I wasted no time to correct, when employed in duties which demanded all my attention. Nor should I now notice them but for cer tain associations of the autobiographer, nor have given them a thought if they had been repeated by an anonymous defamer. Time and truth will dissipate the errors which have been industriously and insidiously sown some of which pervade the pages of what pur port to be histories of the civil war and the two last administrations. Dates are important in developing history, and are sometimes essential to verify state ments and facts. The arsenal and armory at Harper's Ferry were destroyed and the place was abandoned on the evening of the 18th of April, 18C1. The navy yard at Norfolk, as it is familiarly called, but, correctly speaking, Gosport, was abandoned on the night of the JOth. Commodore Paulding testified before the Congressional Committee, who inquired into and reported-upon the subject of "the de struction of the property of the United States at the navy yard in Norfolk, and the armory at Harper'B Ferry," as follows: was sett to Norfolk on the jctb day of April, iw.1. Vndrr verbal orders of the Secretary of the Navy 1 l?!t the Navy Department that evening ami arrived at Norfolk the following afternoon, convey ing despatches to commodore McCauley, and with directions from the Secretary of the Navy to confer w ith him and commodore Frndergrast with refe rpnee to the safety of the public property at the Norfo'k Navy Yard. 1 performed that duty, and left Norfolk in the Baltimore boat on the afternoon of the 17th of April. He further testifies that he returned and reported to me, and that immediately after, On the afternoon of April 18, 1 received from the Secretary of the Navy instructions to proceed to Norfolk with the Pawnee. I left Washington on the evening of the lDth of April in the Pawnee, and arrived at Fortress Monroe on the following day at about 4 o'clock. Mr. Weed says, after his friend Riddell awakened him early one morning: The next day brought us intelligence of the los Of Harper's Ferry. Soon after this, our first taste of rebellion, 1 received Information from an equally re liable source that Gosport, with Its vast supply of munitions of war, wan in danger. Of this 1 Informed the Secretary of the Navy at the breakfast table at Willard's Hotel. Believing from his manner that he attached but little importance to my Information, I reiterated it with emphasis, etc. This interview, if it ever took place, of which, however, I have no recollection, must have been on the morning of the litth, suc ceeding the abandonment of Harper's Ferry, which was on the 18th of April. When, therefore, Mr. Weed came to me with "relia ble information," which was no news to me, whatever it may have been to him, my "man ner" did not indicate excitement or sensa tional alarm. I heard his story, and its reite ration with emphasis, calmly and, I trust, respectfully; for I knew, what he did not know, that Commodore Paulding had at that moment my orders in his pocket, directing him to proceed to Norfolk, investing him with full power to protect the public pro- erty, and that he had been and was then col ecting his forces to proceed as soon as his vessel and men could be got ready for the service. These facts I did not communicate to Mr. Weed, although he had given me what information he pos sessed. The rresident,"on whom Mr. Weed represents he called with his information, was cognizant of these facts, and appears to have been equally uncommunicative, and, in in order to rid himself of an inquisitive and perhaps troublesome gentleman who had no information to impart, dismissed, him with the remark that he would seevm In point of fact, the President and myself had been two or three times in consultation the pre ceding day one a very lengthened interview with General Scott on the subject of the danger and defenses of Norfolk Navy Yard. Thse frequent interviews were necessary in consequence of the avalanche of duties and difficulties that were precipitated upon us in that eventful week, which commenced with the fall of Sumter and the issuing of the pro clamation calling for troops; but was espe cially necessary on the 18th, from the fact that Chief Engineer Isherwood had arrived on the morning of that day, and reported the strange and unaccountable conduct of Commodore McCauley, and the unfortunate condition of affairs at the yard under his command. Immediately on receiving this report, I went with the President to General Scott with a view of getting a military force and a competent military officer to defend the station. I had some time previously had in terviews with General Scott on this subject, who uniformly Baid, as he now repeated, that he would send troops for the shore defense, as was his duty, if he had them. But Con gress had provided neither men nor means for this great and terrible crisis. On this occasion he bewailed the necessity which compelled him to leave Harper's Berry and its armory and arms to destruction a mili tary station in which his duty and his honor as the head of the army were concerned; but he had no men to send for their protection, and the Massachusetts volunteers, who were directed to report there and at Fortress Monroe, had none of them arrived. The property there and at the navy yard must, he said, be sacrificed. Mr. Weed says he "repaired to the White House" after seeing me. Mr. Lincoln, how ever, had driven out to visit some fortifica tions. There were, unfortunately for the autobiography, no fortifications about Wash ington at that time for the President to drive out and ' visit. Mr. Weed remembers too much, an unhappy infirmity with which he is Badly afflicted. As the President was "out," he called, "early the next morning," the 20th, "stated the danger that threatened Gosport, and how, as I feared, I had failed to impress the Secretary of the Navy with the accuracy of my information or the necessity of immediate action." Commodore Paulding quietly left Washington in the Pawnee on the evening of the 19th, and was well on his way to Norfolk when this interview with the Pre sident purports to have taken place. I know not that the President was at that time aware of this fact, but he was fully conversant with all of the attending circumstances, at the same time knowing that special injunctions were imposed to give no- publicity to the move ment. He must have been amused when Mr. Weed related his interview with me, my manner, and his fears that he had failed to impress me. The President on his part was as reticent as myself; but allowed the author of the autobiography to cheer himself with the belief that he had impressed the President, if he had failed with the Secretary of the Navy, by an assurance that we could not afferd to lose all those cannon, and he would "see Father Welles." The appellation "Father Welles" was at a later period often applied to me by naval officers, sailors, and others, but not at that early period of the administration, and never, that I am aware of, by President Lincoln. Nor would he then, or at any time, be likely to use the expression as regards myself, when three of the members of the Cabinet Messrs. Bates, Cameron, and Seward were my seniors. The term was sometimes kindly and affectionately applied by him to Attorney-General Bates, the eldest of his political family, for whom he had a tender regard. The remark which is quoted in the autobiography may have been made by the President; but it is more likely to be the off spring of that prolific and fertile memory to which I have adverted, which could recollect details that never took place, and manufac ture facts with facility for any emergenoy. Mr. Riddell may have awakened Mr. Weed "early one morning," and he may have gone immediately to Secretary Cameron with tidings that Harper's Ferry was in danger; but in so doing so he communicated no more information than when he told the Sec retary of the Navy that Gosport was in danger. Mr. Cameron, like the .Secretary of the Navy, was not as much excited as Mr. Weed expected he would be. He therefore went to General Scott, who "promptly Baid that my information was confirmatory of that which he tad received the previous evening." Each of the Secretaries might with truth have given him the same answer as General Soott, for he told them nothing new. The truth is, the Government lad other, earlier, and more authentie sources of information than Mr. Weed. The information which the depart ments received did not always come through him, strange as it may seem to him, and to those who read and credit the pages of his autobiography. Despatches sometimes reached the Secretaries direct, without passing under his inspection, or through his hands, and there were, as he well knows, departments of the Government which never made him their confidant. I do not question that he was as active, as busy, as officious, and as in trusive as he describes; but he was of vastly less consequence than his imagination led him to suppose. In the matter of the autobiogra phy, due allowance must be made for one who is the hero of his own story, and a mind never endowed with a very scrupulous regard for facts in a partisan practice of half a century of fierce and reckless party warfare. I had not, as already stated, during the eventful years of the was, the leisure to cor rect the errors and misrepresentations which were made by unscrupulous partisans, some of which have been, in ignorance of the facts, incorporated into what purport to be the his tories of those times. This occasion is not inappropriate to bring out the facts in relation to the condition and capture of the navy yard at Norfolk, the po licy of the Government, the course which the administration pursued, and the attend ing circumstances, all of which have been much misrepresented and only imperfectly understood. At the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, and for several weeks thereafter, he and others indulged the hope of a peaceful solu tion of the pending questions, and a desire, amounting almost to a belief, that Virginia and the other border States might, by for bearance and a calm and conciliatory policy, continue faithful to the Union. Two-thirds of tho Convention then in session in Richmond were elected as opponents of secession, and the people of that State were in about that pro portion opposed to it. But the Union ele ment, in the Convention and out of it, was passive and acquiescent, while the secession ists were positive, aggressive, and violent; and, as is almost always the case in revolu tionary times, the aggressive force continu ally increased in strength and exactions at the expense of those who were peacefully inclined. It was charged that the new administration was inimical to the South, was hostile to South ern institutions, and would use its power to deprive the people and States of their rights by coercive measures. In order to counter act these unfounded prejudices, and to do away with these misrepresentations, which were embarrassing to the administra tion just launched upon a turbulent sea, and to conciliate and satisfy the people of Virginia and the convention then in ses sion, the President desired that there should be no step taken which would give offense; and, to prevent any cause of irritation, he desired that not even the ordinary local politi cal changes, which are usual on a change of administration, should be made. In regard to the navy yard at Norfolk, he was particu larly solicitous that there should be no action taken which would indicate a want of confi dence in the authorities and people, or which would be likely to beget distrust. No ships were to be withdrawn, bo fortifications erected. We had reports from that station and from others that there were ardent seces sionists among the civil and naval officers, end assurances, on the other hand, that most of them were patriotic and supporters of the Union. It was difficult, there and elsewhere, to distinguish between the true and the disaf fected officers of the service. Some had already sent in their resignations; others, it was understood, prpposed to do so if any conflict took place between the State and Federal Governments; and there were many who occupied an equivocal and doubt ful position. Among those who hesitated to avow themselves on either side, and were un determined "how to act, were officers who subsequently took a firm stand and rendered gallant service in the war which followed. Commodore McCauley, who was in com mand of the Norfolk yard, I had personally known in former years, and esteemed as a worthy and estimable officer. His reputation as a Union man in 18C1 was good, and all my inquiries in relation to him were satisfacto rily answered. His patriotism and fidelity were beyond doubt; but events proved that he was unequal to the position he oocupied in that emergency. Commodore Alden, whom I sent to Nor folk in special trust on the 11th of April, with orders to take command of and bring out the Merrimac, but who was prevented by Com modore McCauley, wrote me the succeeding November, six months after (he abandon ment of the navy-yard, in regard to Commo dore McCauley: "I believe, Indeed I know, that the old hero who has fought so well for his country could have none but the best and purest motives in all he did ; but he was surrounded by masked traitors whom he did not suspect, and in whose advice he thought there was safety. The cry, too, was raised, and in everybody's D'outli, otllcers and all, 'If they move that ship, the Merrimac, it will bring on a collision with the people outside, who are all ready, if anything of the kind is done, to take the yard.' Besides, Commodore Paulding, whom I accompanied to Norfolk, ex- Eressed the idea that if we could not do anything etter, she (the Merrimac), with her guns on board, would make a good battery for the defense of the yard. This opinion influenced Commodore McCauley not a little." If Commodore McCauley had not the ac tivity and energy which were essential to a revolutionary period, he was an old and trusted officer, who had not served oat one third of his term as commandant of the sta tion. To remove him would have necessi tated extensive changes, involving an entire reorganization of the government of the yard, and consequently a departure from the President's policy of permitting things to continue undisturbed in Virginia. Whatever negotiations, complications, or correspon dence were going forward at that period to insure harmony and peace, though connected more or less with the occurrences here re lated, need not be now detailed. It is suffi cient to say that- no military foroe was or dered to Norfolk; no fortifications were erected for the defense of the navy yard; a passive course was enjoined upon the Navy Department, and the military also, in relation to that station! A large amount of property had been accumulated at the navy yard, and a number of vessels were then in a disman tled condition, without armament or crews. To attempt to refit them or put them in con dition to be removed, or to remove the stores, would, it was thought, indicate distrust, and give the secessionists an argument to be nsed against the administration, accused of a design to Bubjugate and coerce Virginia. Not until the last of March did the Presi dent fully and finally decide to' attempt to relieve Fort Sumter. He never proposed or intended to order it to be evacuated; but cer tain assurances and committals which had been made embarrassed him, and a hope that in some way there would be an adjustment of difficulties without a resort to arms caused him to hesitate, and delayed his final deci sion. The condition of that fort and the garrison had received immediate attention after the inauguration, and the Cabinet was earnest and aluiost unanimous for its prompt reinforcement. Numerous consultations were held on the subject, to some of which Generals Scott and Totten were invited. The delibe rate and united opinion of these officers was unqualified against any attempt to reinforce or supply the garrison, which they pro nounced ntterly impracticable, and which, if attempted, would result in a failure, with a waste of blood and treasure. These arguments, and an elaborate written report which they submitted by order of the President, had an influence on him and seve ral of the members of the Cabinet, wh felt that the opinions of military men should have weight on a military question. It is generally known, however, that one of the members of the Cabinet had from the first opposed any attempt to relieve the garrison, and one had been and continued throughout persistent and emphatic in its favor. For some days the President was undetermined what course to take. Delay was moreover important until the Administration could get in working order; but the supplies at Sumter were getting short, and he finally decided, on the oOth of March, that an effort should be made to send supplies to the gar rison. The attempt to relieve Major Anderson, though a military question, was a political necessity. It became a duty of the Govern ment after all conciliatory efforts were ex hausted. The expedition to supply the garri son was under tho direction of the War De- Eartment, in which the navy co-operated, lut the whole combined military and naval force of the Government was feeble. Con gress had adjourned on the 4th of March without making any provision for increasing the naval strength, although the danger of a civil war was imminent; no increased appro priations were made. The navy was restricted to a strictly peace establishment, with a force limited by law to eight thousand five hundred men. But five vessels were in commission in all our Atlantic ports. The Navy Department had quietly commenced recruiting, and on the 2!th of March Commodore Breese, then in command of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, was ordpd to send two hundred and fifty Bea men to Norfolk, a vulnerable point if Virginia should attempt to secede.. ,, On the next day, however, the 30th of March, the President informed me that he had come to the con clusion that supplies should be sent to Major Anderson, and, if resistance was made, that the garrison should be reinforced. To exe cute, and, if it became necessary, to enforce his orders, a naval force would be required. As we then had but three naval steamers that were available two having a few days pre vious been sent to the Gulf by special re quest of General Scott the Harriet Lane, a revenue cutter, was transferred by the Secre tary of the Treasury to the navy to form a part of the expedition. The two hundred and fifty seamen on the receiving ship at Brook lyn, whom I had directed on the 29th to be sent to Norfolk, were transferred to the Powhatan, which was to be the flagship of the squadron. The Pocahontas, one of the vessels of the Home Squadron, which I had detained and ordered to Norfolk by way of precaution early in March, was one of the three vessels temporarily detached and detailed for the expedition. To supply her place I, on tho 30th of March, the day I received the President's decision, ordered the sloop-of-war Cumberland, then at Hampton Roads, destined for the West Indies, to proceed to Norfolk. The Cumberland was a sailing vessel which could not be made available for the Sumter expedition. She was the flag-ship of Commodore Pendergrast, who was in com mand of the Home Squadron, and if it was a satisfaction that so experienced an officer could be associated with Commodore McCau ley, with a full crew, in case of an emer gency. The President and Secretary of State proposed that Commodore Pendergrast should go to Vera Cruz, in consequenoe of certain complications in that quarter; but the condi tion of affairs at home made it advisable that he and his flag-ship should be detained in the waters of Virginia. With the exception of the Cumberland, the Sumter expedition took from the Navy Department on the G'th of April every available naval vessel. It was at this culminating period that ves sels were most wanted in the Chesapeake and on the Potomac; for, in case of a conflict at Charleston, it was uncertain what would be the attitude of Virginia. I felt hopeful, how ever, that the Cumberland would be adequate for the protection of the yard from any attack by water. The defense by land was a military measure, in which she could also participate, and render efficient assistance, if necessary. There were many circumstances attending the Sumter expedition which are interwoven with this subject, that are net generally known; but, as I have said, they belong . to the history of those times. Allusion to some of them cannot be wholly omitted in stating the proceedings of the navy and the Navy Department, and the acts of the administra tion attending the destruction of the navy yard at Norfolk. The men on the receiving ship at Brooklyn, whom Commodore Breese had been directed on the 29th of March to send to Norfolk, were diverted to that expedition and placed on the Powhatan. This important vessel was, by an irregular and most extraordinary proceeding, and against the final and express orders of the President, detached from the expedition she was to lead after she left the Brooklyn Navy Yard, and' withdrawn for several weeks, until after Sumter fell and Norfolk was abandoned, from the control of the Navy Department, and sent to the Gulf, where she was not needed, instead of going to Charleston and then returning North, where she was most wanted. On the Cth of April every available naval steamer at the disposal of the department, and all the men excepting those on the Cum berland, sailed for Sumter. What was to be their reception, what would be the determina tion of the secession organization at Charles ton, and what the result of the attempt to relieve the garrison, were matters uncertain, but of deep anxiety. In a few days all doubts were removed. The secessionists, on being apprised of the determination of the administration, and of the departure of the expedition, commenced immediate hostilities. They opened fire on Sumter on the 12th of April, before the vessels reached Charleston. The fort was evacuated on the 11th. Three days after the evacuation of Sumter, the Vir ginia Convention joined the Confederates. In that period of uncertainty, while hoping for the best, but in anticipation of the worst, I wrote Commodore McCauley, in command of the Norfolk Navy Yard, on the 19th of April, the squadron being then on its way to Charleston, that, "in view of the peculiar condition of the country and of events that have already transpired, it becomes necessary that great vigilance should be exercised in guarding and protecting the public interests and property committed to your charge. If other precautions are required, you will im mediately apprise the department." In the same communication he was informed, in view of the President's policy and the attitude of Virginia, "it is - de sirable that there should be no steps taken to give needless alarm; but it may be betst to order most of the shipping to sea or to other stations;" and he was further di rected to "keep the department advised of the condition of affairs; of any cause of ap prehension, should any exist." On the 11th of April I directed Commodore Breese to send two hundred men to Norfolk, if that number Lad been enlisted. Com mander now Commodore Alden, the pre sent Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, was ordered on the same day, the 11th, to report to Commodore McCauley, to take charge of the steamer Merrimack, and deliver her over to the commanding officer at Philadelphia. Orders were sent to Commodore McCauley at the same time to have the Merri mack and Plymouth prepared immediately for removal, and that there should be no de lay, Mr. Isherwood, Chief of the Bureaa of Steam Engineering, was directed on the fol lowing day, the 12th, to proceed to Norfolk . and give his personal attention to putting the engines of the Merrimack in working condition. On the 14 th of April Fort Sumter was eva cuated, and on the 15th President Lincoln issued his proclamation calling for seventy five thousand troops. On the succeeding day the following letters were sent, respec tively, to Commodore McCauley, command ing the navy yard, and to Commodore Pendergrast, commanding the above squad ron, by the hands of Commodore Pauld ing: Navy Department, April 16, 1861. Sir: The events which have transpired since my confidential communication to you of the Kith instant Impose additional vigilance and care in protecting the public property under your charge, and placing the vessels and stores, if necessary, beyond Jeopardy. Preferring to my letter of the loth, you will continue to carry out the instructions therein contained. The Engineer-in-Chief, B. F. Isherwood, who was des- f tatched to Nor: oik to aid in putting the Merrimack n condition to be moved, reports that she will be ready to take her departure on Thursday. It may not be necessary, however, that she should leave at that time unless there Is immediate danger pend ing. But no time should be lost In getting her armament on board ; and you will also place the more valuable public property, ordnance stores, etc., on shipboard, so that they can at any moment be moved beyond the reach of seizure. With diligence on yoWr part, It Is not anticipated that any sudden demonstration can be made which will endanger either the vessels or stores. The Plymouth and Dol phin should be placed beyond danger of immediate assault at once, if possible. The Gerraantown can receive on board stores and ordnance from the yard, and be towed out by the Merrimack if an assault is threatened. Men have been ordered from New York to man and assist in moving the vessels; but recent demands have left an Insufficient number to meet the requisition. Under these circumstances, Bhould it become necessary, Commodore Pender grast will assist you with men from theCumberlaud. You will please to submit this letter and my confi dential communication of the 10th to Commodore Pendergrast.who will assist and co-operate with you in carrying the views of the department into eireet. As it is difficult at this distance to give instructions In detail, the department has thought proper to des patch Commodore Paulding to Norfolk, who will be the bearer of this communication, and explain to yourself and Commodore Pendergrast the views and purposes or the department. You will be pleased to advise with him freely and fuily 'as to your duties and the Interest of the Government In the present threatening emergency. The vessels and stores under your charge you will defend at any hazard, repelling by force, If necessary, any and all attempts to seize them, whether by mob violence, organized effort, or any assumed authority. i nave tne nonor to oe, very respectruuy, yours, etc., Giueon Weli.es, Secretary of the Navy. Commodore C. S. McCauley, Norfolk, Virginia. Navy Department, April 16, lS6t-Sir: A state of things has arisen which renders the immediate departure of the Cumberland, as originally intended, inexpedient. Events of recent occurrence, and the threatening attitude of affairs in some parts of our country, call for the exercise of great vigilance and energy at Norfolk. Confidential communications have been heretofore made to Commodore McCauley on these subjects, which he will submit to yon ; and Commodore Paulding, who brings this letter to you, will verbally and more In detail explain the views of the department. Please to advise freely and fully with both these gentlemen, and co-operate with them In defending the vessels and public property at the navy yard. As there is an insufficiency, of men in the service at that station for moving the vessels, it may become necessary to render assist ance from the force under your command. i Until further ordeers the departure of the Cum berland to Vera Cruz will be deferred. In the meantime you will lend your assistance and that or your command towards putting the ves sels now in the yard in condition to be moved, placing the ordnance and ordnance stores ou board for moving, and in case of invasion, in surrection, or violence of any kind, to suppress it, repelling assault by force U necessary. The Cum berland can render effective service, and It is deemed fortunate that the Government Is enabled to avail itsclt or your service and that of your command, at this juncture, at Norrolk. I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, Gidkok Welles, Secretary or the Navy. Commodore G. J. Pendergrast, commanding U. S. sloop Cumberland, Norfolk, Virginia. Commodore Paulding was at that time at tached to the Navy Department as its detail ing officer; and lest there should be some misapprehension, neglect, or wrong, I gave him verbal orders to go to Norfolk, personally inspect the condition of the navy yard, satisfy himself of the fidelity and vigilance of the officers and men, and to consult and advise at his discretion with Commodores McCauley and Pendergrast. Many of the most import ant orders given at that early day were verbal, unwritten instructions, for great infidelity pervaded the departments. Confidence was impaired, distrust prevailed, and", when treachery was so extended and deep, pene trating every branch of the Government, extreme caution beoame necessary in regard to every movement. Commodore McCauley wrote to me on tho lGth that the Merrimack would probably be ready for temporary service on the evening of the next day. Commodore Paulding re turned on the 17th, and made a favorable re port of affairs, of the fidelity and Union feel ing of the officers in command; said that the engines of the Merrimack were in order, and she would leave on the following day. But Chief Engineer Isherwood returned to Wash ington the next morning, the 18th, and re ported that Commodore McCauley had refused to permit the Merrimack to depart after her engines were in order and men to move her were on board, and had directed the fires that were kindled to be drawn. Immediately on receiving this report I went with the President to General Soott to pro cure a competent military officer, and, if pos sible, a military force, for the shore defenses of the navy yard. Information had reached us that the convention at Richmond had yielded to secession. We also heard of the rapid rising of the insurgents, and of their intention to seize at once Harpers ferry, the navy yard at Norfolk, and Fortress Monroe, not one of which had a proper military sup port. There were no fortifications whatever to defend the navy yard from the insurgents, no military force was there, and the expecta tion that the Cumberland and the small num ber of sailors would be able to temporarily hold the yard until military assistance could arrive was shaken by the intelligence that morning received, and the further fact that vessels were being sunk to obstruct the chan nel. General Scott, on our application for military aid, said we were asking an impossi bility. He assured us he had no troops to 6end for the defense of the navy yard, and that it was not susceptible of defense if he bad them; that any men he might order there would almost certainly be op tured; that it was enemy's country, without fortifications or batteries for them to occupy; that seamen and marines who might be ou shipboard for water defense could perhaps do something towards protecting the public pro perty, and escape if overwhelmed, provided the obstructions which we heard were being sunk in the channel did not prevent, but there could be no escape for soldiers. Tho General stated, with a heavy heart, that he had no troops to spare for the defense of Harper's Ferry, and that the arms and stores at that place must inevitably be lost. The garrison at Fortress Monroe was, he feared, insufficient to repel the force which it wan understood was organizing to attack it. ne had not, he said, men sufficient to protect Washington if a formidable demonstration, was made. At length he promised to send Colonel Dela field of the Engineer Corps, and I think consented, before the Tawnee left, that a battalion of the Massachusetts volunteers, raised under the proclamation of the 15th, might accompany Commodore Paulding, pro vided they had reached Hampton Roads. They were, he said, undisciplined would be good for nothing as yet for serious fighting, but would be serviceable ia throwing up bat teries under the direction of the engineer. For the present, his first great duty, with his feeble force, was to defend Washington, and next to Washington, Fortress Monroe, which was the key to Washington, Norfolk, Balti more, Chesapeake Bay, and the rivers which entered it. He therefore could not, and would not, consent to part with a single regu lar for either Harper's Ferry or the Nerfolk Navy Yard; and his opinion frankly expressed to us was that the publio property in each of those places must, in case of an attack, be sacrificed. The most that could be done waa -to prevent the vessels and stores from passing into the hands of the insurgents. Harper's Ferry was abandoned that evening. As but little assistance could be derived from the military, I lost not a moment, after parting from the President and General Scott, in giving the following order to Commodore Paulding: Navv Department, April 18, 1861 Sir: You are directed to proceed forthwith to Norfolk and take command of all the naval forces there afloat. With the means placed at your command, you will do all in your power to protect and place beyond danger the vessels and property belonging to the United .States. On no account should the arms and muni tions be permitted to fall Into the hands of the in surrectionists, or those who would wrest them from the custody of the Government; and, should it finally become necessary, you will, In order to pre vent that result, destroy the property. In carrying into eflect these orders, you are Invested with full power to command the services of the entire naval force, and yon will, if necessary, repel rorce by rorce In carrying out these instructions, it is understood that theWar Department will detail Colonel Richard Deln field, or some other competent "Officer, with a command to aid and assist in protecting and guard ing the yard and property at Gosport and vicinity, and you will co-operate with that officer in this object. 1 am sir, respectfully, etc Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy. Commodore Hiram Paulding, Washington, D. U. This order was to repel, not to assail; the administration continued to be forbearing, and to the last was not aggressive. Extreme men were dissatisfied and censorious because the administration did not attack, though not prepared. On to Sumter was the word, as at a later period the cry, equally inconsiderate, was "On to Richmond !" Commander Alden, who, as already re marked, had been sent on special duty to Norfolk on the 11th of April, returned on the morning of the l'.)th, and confirmed the state ments of Chief Engineer Isherwood. The Cabinet was in session when he arrived. The loss of Harper's Ferry the preceding evening, and the movements at Norfolk, with the threatened attack upon the navy yard and upon Fortress Monroe, were among the matters under consideration. When Com mander Alden arrived he went to the Navy Department, and finding me absent, followed to the Executive Mansion, and calling me from the council, related the strange condi tion of things at Norfolk, and the bewildered and incapacitated state of mind of Commo dore McCauley. After hearing his statement I introduced him to the President and Cabinet, to whom he recapitulated the statement which he had made to me. He was immedi ately attached to the expedition under Com modore Paulding, and returned to Norfolk that evening. The Pawnee reached Wash ington from the Sumter expedition just ia time to be despatched to Norfolk. She was placed at the disposal of Commodore Paulding, with all the naval officers, men, and means that were at command, and left Washington on the evening of the 19th. Captain Wright, of the army engineers, now Brevet Major-General Wright, was substituted for Colonel Delafield, and aocompanied the expedition. The Pawnee reached Fortress Monroe on the afternoon of the 20th. Com modore Paulding procured from Colonel Dim mick, in command, three hundred and fifty Massachusetts volunteers, who had been en listed, embarked at Boston, and reached Hampton Roads within four days after the proclamation of the President of the 15th. ' When Commodore Paulding arrived at Nor folk, on the evening of the 20th, he found that the vessels had been scuttled and were sinking. Nothing, in his opinion, remained but to burn them and destroy such property as could not be carried away by the Cumber land and Pawnee, as General Scott bad said would be inevitable, to prevent it from pass ing into the possession of the insurgents. Of the manner in which the orders of the Navy Department were executed, or of the expediency and necessity of the measures taken in the first instance by Commodore McCauley, after consulting with and being advised by Commodore Pendergrast to sout tle the vessels and destroy the guns, and of the completion of the work of destruction thus commenced by Commodore Paulding when he arrived, it is unnecessary to speak at this time. The whole was an exercise of judgment and of authority by three experi enced, brave, tried, and faithful officers in a great emergency, for which Congress had not provided and the country was not prepared. Great censure has been bestowed upon them by persons who know little of the circum stances, and who had none of the responsi bilities. Whether the conclusions of these officers were right or wrong, they were such as in their judgment were best, and were pre cisely such as,General Scott had said would be inevitable. These proceedings, it "will be borne ia mind, were all of them before a blockade had been ordered. The first proclamation of the President directing a blockade or closing of the Southern ports was issued on the 19th of April, the day on which Commodore Paulding went a second time to Norfolk, in vested with plenary powers. Bat this procla mation did not include Virginia; that State and North Carolina were exempted from its operation. The administration was deter, mined to occupy no hostile attitude towards Virginia so long as a single hope remained that her Government and people would con tinue faithful to the Union. It was not until the 27th of April that her ports were ordered to be put under blockade, just one week after the abandonment of Norfolk. Gideon Welles. MEDICAL. "VT O ir K 13. NO I A V! J.' IOX'8 CRAM P AND DfAKRHCKA MIXTUKKl baa proved itself to be the eureat ud apeediest remedy lurCrampe, Diarrhea, Dyaenterr, Cholera Alurbue, ao& brut kiat-evof Ablatio Cholera. No family at tor barm once tried it will be without it. A.k for rui'i (Jraap ai3 Inerrhu Mixture, and take no other, hoid at VAU NAIXA CO'K. rlrTEKNfii and MARKUP Ktreete. kud W tVi AKC11 (street. t AJ ir
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