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MONTROSE, PA. DEC. 16, 1847.

WHOLE NO. 79.

EVERY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION IS NOT A DIFFERENCE OF PRINCIPLE.

Miscellany.

THE WIFE OF AUDUBON.

Mr. Audubon married early, a daughter of the Bakers of England.

So far from this being the case, she appears to have been so entirely identified with his successes, that it would be impossible to separate her from our pleasing recognition of them.

How many a dark hour amidst the deep shadows of savage woods has such a trust made forests luminous with joy to him.

THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.

The United Service Journal gives the following anecdote of the Emperor of Russia, illustrative of his character and habits.

It happened once, as he was thus walking alone, that he came up with a Frenchman newly arrived at St. Petersburg, who, ignorant of the reciprocal considerations due from man to man, was smoking his cigar.

"I respect authority and obey," said the Frenchman. He threw away his cigar and continued walking by the side of the supposed officer, and with French facility entered into conversation, which he turned chiefly upon the country, and the government.

"You appear, Monsieur, to possess a large acquaintance."

"That is a fact," said the Emperor. They walked on, the Frenchman talking and the Emperor replying.

"I have been happy to afford information to a stranger, but you are mistaken in supposing me to be the Governor-General."

"Why then do all persons whom we meet salute you?"

"Because I am the Emperor."

The astonished Frenchman, much gratified with his adventure, paid his willing homage also.

REVELLING IN THE HALLS OF THE MONTROSE.

An officer of the South Carolina volunteers writes from the National Palace of Mexico, under date of Oct. 16th, as follows:—

"Much has been said about reveling in the halls of the Montrose, but we have seen but little of it."

A SHORT LOVE STORY.

A young attorney who was desirous of entering the holy state of matrimony, and had turned his attention to the "gilded" beauties of the day; selected, at length, for particular address, a young lady who was reported rich, as well in the matter of "lure" as in mental and personal attractions.

Yankee Doodle in Mexico.

"Mustangs" favors his renders with the following graphic picture of "Yankee Doodle" in the theatre.

ROMANCES.

It is probable that of all the causes which have injured the health of women, the principal has been the prodigious multiplication of romances during the last century.

ANECDOTE.

A celebrated lawyer in this State, riding through a country town, stopped at a cottage to inquire his way.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE WAR.

The arrival of the war having been declared by Congress, it became my duty, under the Constitution, and the laws of Congress, to raise an army.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

Fellow-citizens of the Senate, and House of Representatives:

The annual meeting of Congress is always an interesting event. The Representatives of the States and of the People come fresh from their constituents to take counsel together for the common good.

No country has been so much favored, or should acknowledge with deeper reverence the manifestations of Divine protection. An all-wise Creator directed and guided us in our infant struggle for freedom, and has constantly watched over our surprising progress, until we have become one of the great nations of the earth.

It is in a country thus favored, and under a government in which the executive and legislative branches hold their authority for limited periods, alike from the people, and where all are responsible to their respective constituents, that it is again my duty to communicate with Congress upon the state of the Union, and the present condition of public affairs.

During the past year the most gratifying proofs are presented that our country has been blessed with a wide spread and universal prosperity. There has been no period since the government was founded, when all its industrial pursuits of our people have been more successful, or when labor in all its branches of business has received a firmer or better reward.

In the enjoyment of the bounties of Providence at home, such as have rarely fallen to the lot of any people, it is cause of congratulation, that our intercourse with all the powers of the earth, except Mexico, continues to be of an amicable character.

It has ever been our cherished policy to cultivate peace and good will with all nations; and this policy has been steadily pursued by me.

No change has taken place in our relations with Mexico since the adjournment of the last Congress. The war in which the United States were forced to engage with the government of that country, still continues.

I deem it unnecessary, after the full exposition of them contained in my message of the 11th May, 1846, and in my annual message at the commencement of the session of Congress in December last, to reiterate the serious causes of complaint we had against Mexico before she commenced hostilities.

It is sufficient on the present occasion to say, that the wanton violation of the rights of person and property of our citizens committed by Mexico, her repeated acts of bad faith through a long series of years, and her disregard of solemn treaties, stipulating for indemnifying to our injured citizens, not only constituted ample cause of war on our part, but were of such an aggravated character as would have justified us before the world in resorting to this extreme remedy.

With an anxious desire to avoid a rupture between the two countries, we forbore for years to exercise our clear rights by force, and continued to seek redress from the wrongs we had suffered by amicable negotiation, in the hope that Mexico might yield to the pacific councils and the demands of justice. In this hope we were disappointed.

Our Minister of peace sent to Mexico was insultingly rejected. The Mexican government even refused to hear the terms of adjustment which he was authorized to propose; and finally, under wholly unjustifiable pretex, involved the two countries in war, by invading the territory of the State of Texas, striking the first blow, and shedding the blood of our citizens on our own soil.

Though the United States were the aggrieved nation, Mexico commenced the war, and we were compelled, in self-defence, to repel the invader, and to vindicate the national honor and interests by prosecuting it with vigor, until we could obtain a just and honorable peace.

On learning that hostilities had been commenced by Mexico, I promptly communicated that fact, accompanied with a succinct statement of our other causes of complaint against Mexico, to Congress; and that body, by the act of the 13th of May, 1846, declared that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that government and the United States"—this act declaring "the war to exist by the act of the Republic of Mexico," and making provision for its prosecution "in a speedy and successful termination," was passed with great unanimity by Congress, there being but two negative votes in the Senate, and fourteen in the House of Representatives.

The success of the war having been declared by Congress, it became my duty, under the Constitution, and the laws of Congress, to raise an army. This duty has been performed, and though at every stage of the progress I have manifested willingness to terminate it by a just peace, Mexico has refused to conclude it, and has even manifested her disposition to treat her peace and even her own interests as a mere pretext for her aggression, and that in agreement to go through the terms of negotiation.

THE RAPID AND BRILLIANT SUCCESS OF OUR ARMS.

The rapid and brilliant successes of our arms, and the vast extent of the enemy's territory which had been overrun and conquered, before the close of the last session of Congress, were fully known to that body. Since that time, the war has been prosecuted with increased energy, and I am gratified to state with a success that commands universal admiration. History presents no parallel of so many glorious victories achieved in so short a period. Our army, regular and volunteer, have covered themselves with imperishable honors. Whenever, and wherever our forces have encountered the enemy, though he was in vastly superior numbers, and often entrenched in fortified positions of his own selecting, and of great strength, he has been defeated. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon our officers and men, regulars and volunteers, for their gallantry, discipline, indomitable courage and perseverance, all seeking the post of danger, and vying with each other in deeds of noble daring.

While every patriot's heart must exult, and a just national pride animate every bosom, in beholding the high proofs of courage, consummate military skill, steady discipline, and humanity to the vanquished foe, exhibited by our army, the nation is called to mourn over many brave officers and soldiers who have fallen in defence of their country's honor and interests. The brave dead meet their melancholy fate in a foreign land, nobly discharging their duty, and with their country's flag waving triumphantly in the face of the foe. Their patriotic deeds are justly appreciated, and will long be remembered by their grateful countrymen. The parental care of the government they loved and served should be extended to their surviving families.

Shortly after the adjournment of the last session of Congress, the gratifying intelligence was received of the signal victory of Buena Vista and of the fall of Vera Cruz, and with it the strong castle of San Juan de Ulloa, by which it was defended. Believing that after these and other successes, so honorable to our arms and so disastrous to Mexico, the period was propitious to afford her another opportunity, if she thought proper to embrace it, to enter into negotiations for peace, a commissioner was appointed to proceed to the headquarters of the army, with full powers to enter upon negotiations, and to conclude a just and honorable treaty of peace.

He was not directed to make any new overtures of peace, but was the bearer of a despatch from the Secretary of State of the United States to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, in reply to one received from the latter of the 22nd of February, 1847, in which the Mexican government, in violation of his appointment, and of his presence at the headquarters of our army, and that he was clothed with full powers to conclude a definite treaty of peace, whenever the Mexican government might signify a desire to do so. While I was unwilling to subject the United States to another indignity refusal, I was yet resolved that the evils of the war should not be protracted a day longer than might be rendered absolutely necessary by the Mexican government.

Care was taken to give no instructions to the Commissioner which could in any way interfere with our military operations, or relax our energies in the prosecution of the war. He possessed no authority in any manner to control these operations. He was authorized to exhibit his instructions to the general in command of the army; and in the event of a treaty being concluded and ratified on the part of Mexico, he was directed to give him notice of that fact. On the happening of such contingency, and on receiving notice thereof, the General in command was instructed by the Secretary of War to suspend further operations until further orders. These instructions were given with a view to intermit hostilities, until the treaty thus ratified by Mexico could be transmitted to Washington, and receive the action of the government of the United States.

The commissioner was also directed, on reaching the army, to deliver to the General in command of the army, the despatch which he bore from the Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, on receiving it, the general was instructed by the Secretary of War to cause it to be transmitted to the commander of the Mexican forces, with a request that it might be communicated to his government.

The commissioner did not reach the headquarters of the army until after another brilliant victory had crowned our arms at Cerro Gordo. The despatch which he bore from the Secretary of War to the General in command of the army, was received by that officer, then at Jalapa, on the seventh day of May, 1847, together with the despatch from the Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, having been transmitted to him from Vera Cruz. The commissioner arrived at the headquarters of the army a few days afterward. His presence with the army and his diplomatic character were made known to the Mexican government from Puebla, on the twelfth of June, 1847, by the transmission of the despatch from the Secretary of State to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico.

Many weeks elapsed after its receipt, and no overtures were made, nor was any desire by the Mexican government to enter into negotiations for peace.

Our army pursued its march upon the capital, and as it approached it, was met by considerable resistance. Our forces first encountered the enemy, and achieved great victories in the severely contested battles of Contreras and Chetumal. It was not until after these actions had resulted in decisive victories, and the capital of the enemy was within our power, that the Mexican government manifested her disposition to treat her peace and even her own interests as a mere pretext for her aggression, and that in agreement to go through the terms of negotiation.

The object was to gain time to strengthen the defence of their capital, and to prepare for fresh resistance.

The General in command of the army deemed it expedient to suspend hostilities temporarily, by entering into negotiations, with a view to the opening of negotiations. Commissioners were appointed on the part of Mexico, to meet the Commissioner on the part of the United States. The result of the conference which took place between the commissioners of the two governments was a failure to conclude a treaty of peace.

The Commissioner of the United States took with him the project of a treaty already prepared, by the terms of which the indemnity required by the United States was a cessation of territory.

It is well known that the only indemnity which it is in the power of Mexico to make in satisfaction of the just and long deferred claims of our citizens against her, and the only means by which she can reimburse the United States for the expenses of the war, is a cessation to the United States of a portion of her territory. Mexico has no money to pay, and no means of making the required indemnity. If we refuse this, we can obtain nothing else. To reject indemnity by refusing to accept a cessation of territory, would be to abandon all our just demands, and to wage the war, bearing all its expenses, without a purpose or definite object.

A state of war abrogates treaties previously existing between the belligerents, and a treaty of peace puts an end to all claims for indemnity—for tortious acts committed, under the authority of one government against the citizens or subjects of another, unless they are provided for in its stipulations. A treaty of peace which would terminate the existence of war, without providing for indemnity, would enable Mexico—the acknowledged debtor, and herself the aggressor in the war—to relieve herself from her just liabilities. By such a treaty, our citizens, who hold just demands against Mexico or her own government. Our duty to these citizens must forever prevent such a peace, and no treaty which does not provide ample means for discharging these demands can receive my sanction.

A treaty of peace should settle all existing difficulties between the two countries. If an adequate cessation of territory should be made, by such a treaty, the United States should release Mexico from all her liabilities, and assume their payment to our own citizens. If, instead of this, the United States should consent to a treaty by which Mexico should again engage to pay the heavy indebtedness which a just indemnity to our government and our citizens would impose on her, it is notorious that she does not possess the means of such an undertaking. From such a treaty no relief could be anticipated, but the same irritating disappointments which have hitherto attended the violation of similar treaty stipulations on the part of Mexico. Such a treaty would be but a temporary cessation of hostilities, without the restoration of the friendship and good understanding which should characterize the future intercourse between the two countries.

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That Congress contemplated the acquisition of territorial indemnity when it made provision for the prosecution of the war, is obvious. Congress could not have meant, when, in May, 1846, they appropriated ten millions of dollars, and authorized the President to employ the militia and naval and military forces of the United States, and to accept the services of fifty thousand Volunteers, to enable him to prosecute the war; and when, at their last session, and after an army had invaded Mexico, they made additional appropriations and authorized the raising of additional troops for the same purpose—that no indemnity was to be obtained from Mexico at the conclusion of the war; and yet it was certain that, if no Mexican territory was acquired, no indemnity could be obtained.

It is further manifest, that Congress contemplated territorial indemnity, from the fact that, at their last session, an act was passed, upon the Executive recommendation, appropriating three millions of dollars, for that express object. This appropriation was made "to enable the President to conclude a treaty of peace, limits and boundaries with the Republic of Mexico, to be used by him in the event that said treaty, when signed by the authorized agents of the two governments, and duly ratified by Mexico, shall call for the expenditure of the same, or any part thereof." The object of asking this appropriation was distinctly stated in the several messages on the subject which I communicated to Congress. Similar appropriations made in 1803 and 1806, which were referred to, were intended to be applied in part consideration for the cession of Louisiana and the Florida.

In like manner, it was anticipated that, in settling with Mexico, a cessation of territory estimated at greater value than the amount of our demands might be obtained; and that the prompt payment of this sum—in part consideration for the territory ceded—on the conclusion of a treaty, and its ratification on her part, might be an inducement with her to make such a cessation of territory as would be satisfactory to the United States. And although the failure to conclude such a treaty has rendered it unnecessary to use any of the three millions appropriated by that act, and the entire sum remains in the treasury, it is still applicable to that object, should the contingency occur making such application proper.

The doctrine of no territory is the doctrine of no indemnity; and, if sanctioned, would be a public acknowledgment that our country was wrong, and that the war declared by Congress, and should be abandoned, an admission unfounded in fact, and derogatory to the national character.

The terms of the treaty proposed by the United States was not only just, but in accordance with the principles of justice, and the interests of both nations, than any other cessation of territory which it was probable Mexico could be induced to make.

It is manifest to all who have observed the condition of the Mexican government, for some years past, and at present, that if these provinces should be retained by her, she could not long continue to hold and govern them. Mexico is too feeble a power to govern these provinces, lying as they do, at a distance of more than a thousand miles from her capital, and if attempted to be retained by her, they would constitute but for a short time, even nominally, a part of her dominions.

This should especially be the case with Upper California. The sagacity of powerful European nations has long since directed their attention to the commercial importance of that province, and there can be little doubt that the moment the United States shall relinquish their present occupation of it, and their claim to it as an indemnity, an effort would be made by some foreign Power to possess it, either by conquest or purchase. If no foreign government should acquire it in either of these modes, an independent revolutionary government would probably be established by the inhabitants, and such foreigners as may remain in or remove to the country, as soon as it shall be known that the United States have abandoned it. Such a government would be too feeble long to maintain its separate independent existence, and would finally become annexed to, or a dependent colony of some more powerful State.

Should any foreign power attempt to possess it as a colony, or otherwise to incorporate it with itself, the principle avowed by President Monroe in 1823, and reaffirmed in my first annual message, that no foreign power shall, with our consent, be permitted to plant or establish any new colony or dominion on any part of the North American continent, must be insisted. In maintaining this principle, and in resisting its violation by any foreign power, we might be involved in other wars more expensive and more difficult than that in which we are now engaged.

The provinces of New Mexico and the California are contiguous to the territories of the United States, and if brought under our laws, their resources—mineral, agricultural, manufacturing and commercial—would be developed.

Upper California is bounded on the north by our Oregon possessions; and if held by the United States, would not be settled by a hardy, enterprising and intelligent portion of our population. The Bay of San Francisco, and other harbors along the California coast, would afford shelter for our navy, for our numerous whaling ships, and other merchant vessels employed in the Pacific ocean, and would, in a short time, become the theatre of extensive and profitable commerce with China and the East Indies.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES BY THE EXPENSES OF THE WAR TO WHICH WE HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED.

The commencement of hostilities by the expenses of the war to which we have been subjected, and the success which has attended our arms, were deemed to be of a most liberal character.

The Commissioner of the United States was authorized to the establishment of the Rio Grande as the boundary, from its entrance into the Gulf to its intersection with the northern boundary of New Mexico, in north latitude about thirty-two degrees, and to obtain a cession to the United States of the provinces of New Mexico and the California, and the privilege of the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The boundary of the Rio Grande, and the cession to the United States of Upper California, constituted an ultimatum, which our commissioner was, under no circumstances, to yield.

That it might be manifest not only to Mexico, but to all other nations, that the United States were not disposed to take advantage of a feeble power, by insisting upon wresting from her all the other provinces, including many of her principal towns and cities, which we had conquered, and held in our military occupation, but were willing to conclude a treaty in a spirit of liberality, our commissioner was authorized to stipulate for the restoration of all our other conquests.

As the territory to be acquired by the boundary proposed might be estimated to be of greater value than a fair equivalent to our just demands, our commissioner was authorized to stipulate for the payment of such additional pecuniary consideration as might be deemed reasonable.

The terms of a treaty proposed by the Mexican commissioners were wholly inadmissible. They negotiated as if Mexico were the victorious instead of the vanquished party. They must have known that their ultimatum could never be accepted. It required the United States to dismember Texas, by surrendering to Mexico that part of the territory of that State lying between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, included within her limits by her laws when she was an independent republic, and when she was annexed to the United States, and admitted by Congress as one of the States of our Union.

It contains no provision for the payment by Mexico of the just claims of our citizens, for injuries they may have sustained by our troops in the prosecution of the war. It demanded the right for Mexico to levy and collect the Mexican tariff of duties on goods imported into her ports while in our military occupation during the war, and the owners of which had paid to officers of the United States the military contributions which had been levied upon them; and it offered to cede to the United States, for a pecuniary consideration, that part of Upper California lying north of latitude thirty-seven degrees. Such were the unreasonable terms proposed by the Mexican commissioners.

The cession to the United States by Mexico of the provinces of New Mexico and the California, as proposed by the Commissioner of the United States, it was believed, would be more in accordance with the convenience and interests of both nations, than any other cessation of territory which it was probable Mexico could be induced to make.

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