\ DALLAS POST, DALLAS, PA. FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1931 Gen. John J. Pershing. From painting by Joseph Cummings Chase fn Paris. 1910. NE My Experiences in the World War By General John J. Pershing Copyright, 1931, in all countries by the North American N Alliance, World rights reserved, including the WN. u. wvian, Reproduction ta whole or part prohibited. “ Petain “Most Agreeable.” A visit to French general headquar- ters at Compiegne was made, primarily to meet General Petain and the offi- cers of his staff. Petain is above medium height and weight. He wore a full mustache, slightly gray, and was then about sixty. He has a kind- ly expresison and is most agreeable, “but not especially talkative. His keen sense of humor became : apparent from .the jokes he told at | the expense of some of his staff. Our conversation after ‘luncheon was al- most entirely on military affairs, in- . cluding America's probable part in the war, which, as: matters stood, gave lit- tle promise of becoming effective “un- til the following spring. able and it remained | unchanged - throughout the war, Our friendship, which 1 highly treasure, had its be- ginning at this meeting. At the luncheon there were several general officers, among whom was Maj. Gen. Franchet d’Esperey, then -in command of a group of armies under Petain. He was considered one of the ablest and most aggressive officers in the French army and was very popu- lar with his men. As we wished to get a glimpse of the actual front he took us by motor as near as possible without drawing the fire of the enemy's artillery, al- ‘though at that time there was little . activity on that part of the front. The Point of observation that we reached was opposite St. Quentin, which was then within the enemy’s lines, and which was later near the center of the great German drive of 1918 against the British. after being cautioned several times, continued to drive at a somewhat dan- gerous speed, which so exasperated the general that he finally threatened the chauffeur with violence, whereup- on the speed was greatly reduced. CHAPTER VI As soon as the formalities incident to our arrival in Paris were over—and 1 made them brief as possible—we got down to work, as it was urgent that we should begin at once to lay the foundation for: the development and employment of the American army. | To expedite handling the many ques- tions that must arise, especially in our relations with the French war office, which controlled practically all indus- | trial facilities and transportation, it “was War Minister Paul Painleve’s videa that there should be a group of French officers placed at our disposal. Marshal Joffre was designated as head of this liasion group. The in- structions received by Marshal Joffre My impression of Petain was favor-: On the return trip the chauffeur,’ Iron tne minister of war were trans- mitted to me in a polite note. Natur. ally, it was pleasing to think of being associated with Marshal Joffre, but I thought the adoption of the plan at this time would only add an extra channel through which requests must pass and that this would complicate rather than simplify matters. . The scheme indicated that a sort of tutelage was comtemplated, which also made it objectionable. In my opinion, it would be more expeditious to utilize the French offi- cers on duty at my headquarters and develop a workable system through experience: I explained my views to: M. Painleve and readily arranged for the officers of our supply department to confer directly with the chiefs of the coresponding bureaus of the French organization. But this was only the beginning and we soon found that we had much to learn of the diffi- culties of dealing with French bu- reaus, either directly or indirectly. There was no question that under the great enthusiasm the afternoon of our arrival there existed serious de- spondency among all classes. The ter- rible strain of the previous years of continuous fighting, with heavy losses, was telling against both the French and the British. Temporary success in different theaters of war had brought small comforts, followed as they had been all too frequently by disastrous reverses. With actual conditions in mind, one could fully understand why the allies had been So insistent that a contingent of American troops be immediately sent to France to bolster their morale. While not yet prepared to do any fighting, we could and did furnish men for seryice behind the lines, We also provided raw material and certain manufactured supplies as rapidly as possible and financial aid without stint. U. 8. Inaction Shows Effect. The more serious the situation In France, the more deplorable the loss of time by our inaction at home ap- peared. It is true that a committee at the war college in February had presented a brief outline report on the organization of a limited force, yet no comprehenSive general plan had been considered for the formation or em- ployment of such a force, much less for a larger one, It was finally decided we should use the ports of Bordeaux and St. Nazaire, It was likewise estimated that the rail lines leading to the Lorraine sector, with collateral routes available, could be improved to meet our needs. Then it became necessary to deter- mine the sector where our forces, fight- ing as a unit, would be most effective. After lengthy study and consultation with _allied leaders if was logical to Music Dancing FERNBROOK INN ALL KINDS OF SEA FOOD DINNERS SERVED HOME STYLE DANCING AND CARD PARTY RESERVATIONS conclude that Irom the purely Inilitary standpoint the employment of the American armies on the Lorraine front would prove the most beneficial. In conference with. General Petain, who had reached the same conclusion, the decison was made accordingly. It was necessary to have a particu- uar sector in mind to plan definitely and construct requisite! rail and dis- tributing facilities. It was tentatively understood between General Petain and myself that the American,sector should include the St. Mihiel salient. I suggested that the first American of- fensive would naturally be its reduc, tion. He fully agreed. Place of Red Cross Decided. ? Maj. Grayson M. P. Murphy, head of the Red Cross in France, and his assistant, James H. Perkins, called at my headquarters June 17 to discuss co-operation with the army. It was decided the Red Cross could best han- dle its work if given a semiofficial status, so Major Murphy was attached to my headquarters. It was the French situation that gave me the gravest concern. Pacifist sentiment was prevalent in France and in many quarters there was talk of a peace parley, This pessimistic and despondent mood of the people further depressed the morale of their armies as men at the front contemplated an- other winter of suffering and distress for their families. To help meet these conditions 1 sug- gested to Major Murphy that the first task of the Red Cross should be to aid needy French people. As a result he and Perkins proposed that funds be distributed to soldiers’ families wher- ever necessary. When the idea was presented to General Petain he expressed the keen- est appreciation and at once under- took through his military organization to obtain the necessary data. The Red Cross arranged to make 5,000,000 francs (nearly $1,000,000) available to be distributed by local charitable agen- cies as rapidly as the information could be furnished as to where funds should be sent. Sees First Troops Arrive. I went to St. Nazaire June 28 to meet the advance elements of the first division and inspect the port. ; The first section of the first division convoy had brought to St. Nazaire the headquarters, the Sixteenth infantry, two battalions of the Twenty-eighth infantry, one battalion of the Fifth marines and some motor transport troops and stevedores. To see the naval vessels and.transports flying the American flag in the hagbor gave us all a thrill of pride. It was a pleas- ure to meet the naval commander, Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, who was to have general charge of the convoy system, The regiments of the division had all served under my command at one time or another. They were now, however, composed of a large percent- age of recruits and would have to go through a long period of training. After a few days spent in the canton- ment at St. Nazaire the infantry of the division was sent to the training area of Gondrecourt, north of Neuf- chateau, and the artillery to Valdshon, near Belfort. Arrival “Tipped Off.” Maj. Gen. William L. Sibert, who had won distinction as an engineer in the construction of the Panama canal, was in command of the first division. The two infantry brigades’ were commanded by Brig. Gens. R. L. Bul- lard and Omar Bundy, both of whom had many years of line service behind them. I had known all three of the general officers, as we were cadets to- gether at the academy, although all belonged to classes ahead of mine. It had been arranged that the regu- lations restricting reference to the al- lied armies by the press should apply to the American forces. But to my utter surprise the French and British papers, in their eagerness to let their people know that the elements of the American army had really reached France, carried full accounts of the arrival of this convoy, giving the port of debarkation, the designation of units and the number of men. Tighten on Censorship. The publication of this piece of news was in open contravention'of the cen- sorship rules and called for immedi- ate steps to prevent further infrac- tions. My vigorous protest resulted in our placing in the French press bu- reau an American representative, to whom all matter regarding our army was to be submitted for approval. There is no doubt, however, that the suppression of news prevented our people from obtaining a clear and con- temporaneous conception of the great and often brilliant achievements of our armies and left such knowledge to “be gleaned from meager siccounts by participants or from the later writ- ing of historians. It was unfortunate that such rules had to be enforced, as otherwise much that might have been published at the time may never be known, but there was nothing else to be done without serious risk. CHAPTER VII As the French authorities wished to honor our national holiday they re- quested that some of our troops pa- rade in Paris July 4, 1917. We were not prepared to make much of a mili- tary impression, as our men were largely recruits. But to stimulate morale the French wanted to demon- strate that the Americans were actu- ally coming, so a battalion of the Six- teenth infantry was brought up from Saint Nazaire. The untrained, awkward appearance of this unit, which was accepted as the cream of our regular army by the French officials, no doubt tended to confirm their belief that it would be some time before we should be able to Organize an effective army, = thay could have foreseen the tri- nmph af this sams Seitelion at the ! | Parade of the First American Troops in Paris. peak of the great COumcer-omrens=%e On the field of Soissons just one year lat- er we might have been spared many delays and difficulties in carrying out our plans. Troops Bring Joy to French. Nevertheless, the first appearance of American combat troops in Paris brought joyful acclaim from the peo- ple. On the march the battalion was accompanied by a great crowd, many women forcing their way into the ranks and swinging along arm in arm with the men. With wreaths about their necks and flowers in their hats and on their rifles, the column had the appearance of a moving flower garden. With only a semblance of military formation the animated throng pushed its way through avenues of people to the martial strains of the French band and the still more thrilling music of cheering voices. Many dropped on their knees in reverence as the col- umn went by. The battalion marched to the ceme- tery where the tomb of Lafayette is located. The ceremony there consist- ed of a few speeches, the principal speaker being Brand Whitlock, our ambassador to Belgium. I had been asked to deliver an address but had designated Col. C. E. Stanton of my staff, an old army friend and some- ' thing of an orator, to speak in my place. However, I was prevailed upon to speak extemporaneously. * “Lafayette, We Are Here!” It was on this occasion that utter- ance was given to an expression that ‘could be born only of inspiration, one that will live long in history: “Lafay- ette, we are here!” Many have attributed this striking utterance to me, and I have often wished it could have been mine. But I have no recollection of saying any- thing so splendid. I am sure those words were spoken by Colonel Stan- ton, and to him must go the credit for so happy and felicitous a phrase. The parade of our troops through Paris doubtless fortified the morale of the people to a certain extent, but we all knew that ‘eventually something very much more effective would have to be done. The real question was whether the allies could hold out until we were ready. It was clear that no halfway measures on our part would answer and that allied hopes lay in Ameri- can military assistance on a vast scale at the earliest moment, Cables for 1,000,000 Men. The allies thought an American force of 500,000 men the maximum that we could have in France in 1918, but in my opinion that would not be enough to meet the situation. If we could have had half a million fighting men in France in the early spring it would have been a different matter. But looking ahead it was necessary to allow from 35 to 40 per cent ‘for the services of supply, which would leave out of this number only approxi- mately 300,000 fighting troops. Although this would aid, we could not be con- tent merely to lend a helping hand but must prepare to strike a decisive blow. While the appearance on the front of any American force was still months away, yet there was little doubt that if we could induce allied co-operation we should be able to give much great- er assistance than they believed pos- sible. Our study having confirmed the correctness of my tentative estimate made on the Baltic, I therefore called Washington, July 6, as follows: > “Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men by next May, . This estimate would give practically half million men for trenches. Inasmuch as question af- fects all allies whose common inter- ests demand that we exert maximum military power consistent with trans. port problem, suggest early agreement be reached among allies which would provide requisite transportation . . . and limit sea transportation to. food and military supplies and the exclusion of every kind of luxury as well as other supplies in excess of immediate needs of ‘countries dependent upon oversea supplies.” Question of Transportation. The question was, therefore, one of Sea transportation, but so far all ef- forts to get the allies, especially the British, to consider giving help to bring over men and supplies had been futile, They did not seem to realize that America would be practically negli- gible from a military standpoint unless hiey could provide some shipping. Nor dig they seem to appreciate that time was a vital factor: But the spirit of full co-operation among the allies did not then exist. They seemed to regard the transporta- tion of an American army overseas as no concern of theirs, This apparent indifference also gave further color to the suspicion that perhaps after all an American army as such was not want- ed. The situation from our standpoint was grave and embarrassing, for it looked as though it might not be nec- essary for us to save either the allies or ourselves. An entry in my diary notes: “Two of the Roosevelt boys, Theodore, .Jr., and Archie, reported. Unable to par- ticipate himself, their father’s fine spirit is represented by his sons.” CHAPTER VII As the details of our mission abroad developed it soon became evident that in all that pertained to the mainte- nance and supply of our armies as dis- tinguished from the purely military task, men with expert knowledge and broad experience in business, industry and transportation would be needed. In the technical branches of the army there were many officers with theoretical training in special lines, but with some notable exceptions they generally lacked broad constructive or administrative experience. From the very start I determined to obtain the best talent available, and was fortu- nate in practically every field to find able men who were anxious to do their part. The earliest application of the prin- ciple was in connection with timber and lumber procurement. The call for lumber would be enormous, and since it would be impossible with our limit- ed tonnage to bring a great quantity across the Atlantic, most of it would have to be obtained in Europe. A cable to the War department early in July, 1917, recommended the imme- diate organization of a forestry serv- ice, consisting of sawmill units, to be composed . of experienced lumbermen and 8,000 to 10,000 unskilled ‘iaborers to build roads and transport lumber. Special request was made for the ap- pointment of Prof. Henry Graves, chief of the United States forestry service, who