

# PRESIDENT MCKINLEY'S ANNUAL MESSAGE.

## The National Spirit Has Been Strengthened by the War.

### A BRIEF RECITAL OF THE STRIFE.

Military Law Will Continue In Our New Possessions Until Congress Has Legislated Otherwise

### FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND.

Cubans Encouraged to Form a Government for Themselves—Australia Still Demanding Satisfaction for the Lattimer Riot—Congress Urged to Act in Regard to the Nicaragua Canal—Government in Sympathy With the Carr's Peace Movement—Condition of the Treasury.

President McKinley's message was submitted to Congress last Monday. The war is carefully reviewed from beginning to end and the president feels grateful over the result. Our new possessions and their future governments, as well as the history of the war are considered in the following message:

Washington, December 5.—The President's message was sent to Congress to the Senate and House of Representatives:

Notwithstanding the added burdens rendered necessary by the war our people are as happy as they have ever been. Our steady increasing degree of prosperity, evidenced by the largest volume of business ever recorded. Manufacture has been productive. Agricultural pursuits have yielded abundant returns, labor in all fields of industry is better rewarded, revenue legislation passed by the present Congress has increased the treasury's receipts to the amount estimated by its authors; the finances of the government have been successfully administered and its credit advanced to the first rank; while its currency has been maintained at the world's highest standard. Military service under a common flag and for a righteous cause has strengthened the national spirit and served to cement more closely than ever the fraternal bonds between every section of the country.

A review of the relation of the United States to other powers, always appropriate, is this year of primary importance in view of the momentous issues which have arisen, demanding in one instance the ultimate determination by arms and involving far-reaching consequences which will inspire the earnest attention of the Congress. In my last message very full consideration was given to the question of the government of the United States toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection as being by far the most important problem with which we were then called upon to deal. The considerations then advanced, and the exposition of the views therein expressed, disclosed my sense of the extreme gravity of the situation. Setting aside, as logically unfounded or practically inadmissible, the recognition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents, the recognition of the right of intervention to end the war by imposing a military government between the contestants in preference in favor of one or the other party, and forcible annexation of the island—I concluded it was honestly due to our friendly relations with Spain to allow her to retain her independence and to give a reasonable chance to realize her long-cherished reform to which she had become irrevocably committed. Within a few weeks previously she had announced comprehensive plans which it was confidently asserted would be effectual to remedy the evils which had afflicted our country, so injurious to the true interests of the mother country as well as to those of Cuba, and so repugnant to the universal sentiment of humanity.

The ensuing month brought little sign of real progress toward the pacification of Cuba. The autonomous administration set up in the capital and some of the principal cities appeared not to gain the favor of the inhabitants nor to be able to extend their influence to the large extent of territory held by the insurgents, while the military army obviously unable to cope with the still active rebellion, continued many of the most objectionable and offensive policies of the government that had preceded it. No reasonable relief was afforded. No reconcentration was effected, reconcentration, despite the reiterated professions made in that regard, and the amount appropriated by Spain to that end. The proffered expedient of such cultivation proved illusory; indeed, no less practical or effective promises of succor could well have been tendered to the exhausted and destitute people, stripped of all that made life and home dear, and herded in a strange region among unsympathetic strangers hardly less necessitous than themselves.

By the end of December the mortality among them had frightfully increased. Conservative estimates from Spanish sources placed the deaths among these distressed people at over 40 per cent, from the time Gen. Weyler's decrees of reconcentration were enforced. With the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities a scheme was adopted for relief by charitable contributions, raised in this country and distributed, under the direction of the consul general and the several consuls, by noble and earnest individuals, and through the organized agencies of the American Red Cross. Thousands of lives were thus saved, but many thousands more were inaccessible to such forms of aid.

The war continued on the old footing without comprehensive plan, developing only the same spasmodic encounters, barren of strategic result, that had marked the course of the earlier ten years' rebellion as well as the present insurrection from its start. No alternative save physical exhaustion of either combatant, and therewithal the practical ruin of the island, lay in sight, but how far distant no one could venture to conjecture.

At this juncture, on the 15th of February, a single shot, which exceeded \$5,000. This was a most encouraging and significant result, showing the vast resources of the nation and the determination of the people to uphold their country's honor. It is not without the province of the extraordinary war that followed, the Spanish declaration of April 21, but a brief recital of its more salient features is appropriate. The first encounter of

an instant, desperate resolve to tolerate no longer the existence of a condition of anarchy and disorder, at our doors that made possible such a day by whomsoever wrought. Yet the instinct of justice prevailed and the nation anxiously awaited the result of the searching investigation at once set on foot. The finding of the naval board of inquiry established that the origin of the explosion was externally by a submarine mine, and only halted, through lack of positive testimony, to fix the responsibility of its author.

All these things carried conviction to the most thoughtful, even before the finding of the naval board, that a crisis in our relations with Spain and toward Cuba was at hand. So strong was this belief that it needed but a brief executive suggestion to the Congress to receive immediate answer to the duty of making instant provision for the possible and perhaps speedily probable emergency of war, and the remarkable, almost unique, spectacle was presented of a unanimous vote of both houses on the 9th of March approving \$50,000,000 for the national defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith, to be expended at the discretion of the President. That this act of provision came none too soon was disclosed when the application of the fund was undertaken. Our coasts were practically undefended. Our navy needed large provision for increased ammunition and supplies, and even numbers to cope with any sudden attack from the navy of Spain, which comprised modern vessels of the highest type of continental perfection. Our army also required enlargement of men and munitions. The details of the hurried preparations for the possible and perhaps speedily probable emergency of war, and the reports of the secretary of war and of the navy, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that the outbreak of war, when it did come, found our nation not unprepared to meet the conflict.

### PREPARING FOR HOSTILITIES.

The maximum effective fighting force of the navy during the war, separated into classes, was as follows: Four battleships of the first class; 1 battleship of the second class; 2 armored cruisers; 6 coast defense monitors; 1 armored ram; 12 protected cruisers; 3 unprotected cruisers; 18 gunboats; 1 destroyers; 11 torpedo boats; 11 vessels of the navy, including monitors, auxiliary navy; 11 auxiliary cruisers; 28 converted yachts; 27 converted tugs; 19 converted colliers; 15 revenue cutters; 4 lighthouse tenders and 19 miscellaneous vessels. Much activity was felt along our entire Atlantic seaboard last summer, and might be made by the enemy. Every precaution was taken to prevent possible injury to our great cities lying along the coast. Temporary garrisons were provided, drawn from the State militia, Infantry and light batteries were drawn from the volunteer forces. About 12,000 troops were thus employed. The coast signal service was established for observing the approach of an enemy's ships to the coast of the United States, and the life-saving and lighthouse services of the Navy which enabled the Navy department to have all portions of the Atlantic coast, from Maine to Texas, under observation.

The auxiliary navy was created under the authority of Congress and was officered and manned by the militia of the several States. This organization patrolled the coast and performed the duty of a second line of defense. Under the direction of the chief engineers, submarine mines were placed at the most exposed points. Before the outbreak of the war, permanent mining casemates and cable galleries had been constructed at nearly all the principal harbors. Most of the torpedo material was imported from the market, and had to be specially manufactured. Under date of April 19, district officers were directed to take all preliminary measures, short of actual attacking of the loaded mine, to be ready to issue the orders to the loaded mines in position. The aggregate number of mines placed were 1,535, at the principal harbors from Maine to California. Preparations were also made for the planting of mines at certain other harbors, but owing to the early destruction of the Spanish fleet, these were not placed.

The Signal Corps was promptly organized and performed service of the most important and important character. Its operations during the war covered the electrical connection of all coast fortifications, the establishment of telephonic and telegraphic facilities for the camps at Manila, Santiago and in Porto Rico. There were constructed 300 miles of telegraphic lines, the chief of these facilitating military movements from those points in a manner heretofore unknown in military administration. Field telegraph lines were established and maintained under the supervision of Manila, and later the Manila-Honolulu cable was reopened. MONEY PROVIDED BY CONGRESS.

In Porto Rico cable communications were opened over a distance of 100 miles and on land the headquarters of the commanding officer was kept in telegraphic communication with the division commanders on four different lines of operations.

There was placed in Cuban waters a completely outfitted cable ship, with war cables and cable gear, suitable both for the destruction of communications belonging to the enemy and the establishment of our own. Two ocean cables were destroyed, the enemy's batteries at Santiago. The day previous to the landing of Gen. Shafter's corps at Calmanera, within 20 miles of the landing place, cable communications were established and a cable station opened, giving direct communication with the government at Washington. This service was invaluable to the executive in directing the operations of the army and navy. With a total force of over 1,300, the loss was by disease in camp and ill, officers and men included, only five.

The national defense fund of \$50,000,000 was expended in large part by the army and navy, and the objects for which it was used are fully shown in all reports of the several agencies. It was a most timely appropriation, enabling the government to strengthen its defenses and make preparations greatly needed in case of war. This fund being inadequate to the requirements of equipment and for the conduct of the war, the patriotisms of the Congress provided the means in the war revenue act of July 13, by authorizing a 3 per cent popular loan not to exceed \$400,000,000 and by levying additional imposts and taxes. Of the authorized loan \$200,000,000 were offered and promptly taken, the subscriptions so far exceeding the call as to cover it many times over, while preference being given to the smaller loans, no single allotment exceeded \$5,000. This was a most encouraging and significant result, showing the vast resources of the nation and the determination of the people to uphold their country's honor. It is not without the province of the extraordinary war that followed, the Spanish declaration of April 21, but a brief recital of its more salient features is appropriate. The first encounter of

the war in point of date took place April 21, when a detachment of the boarding squadron made a reconnoissance of the harbor, shelled the harbor forts and demolished several new works in construction.

**DEWEY'S MAGNIFICENT VICTORY.**  
The next engagement was destined to mark a memorable epoch in maritime warfare. The Pacific fleet, under Commodore George Dewey, had lain quietly at Hongkong. Upon receipt of the colonial proclamation, being issued and the customary 24 hours' notice being given, it repaired to Mirs Bay, near Hongkong, whence it proceeded to the Philippine Islands under telegraphic orders to capture or destroy the formidable Spanish fleet then assembled at Manila. At daybreak on the 1st of May the American force entered Manila Bay, and after a few hours' engagement effected the total destruction of the Spanish fleet, consisting of ten warships of a transport, besides capturing the naval station and forts at Cavite, thus annihilating the Spanish naval power in the Pacific ocean and completely controlling the city of Manila, with the ability to take the city at any time as was lost on our ships, the wounded numbered only seven, while not a vessel was materially injured. For this gallant achievement the Congress, upon its recommendation, fitting bestowed upon the actors preference and substantial reward.

The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A great destruction of the Spanish fleet, attached to our arms, which continued throughout the struggle. Reinforcements were hurried to Manila under the command of Maj. Gen. Merritt, and firmly established within sight of the capital, which lay helpless before our ships. On the 7th day of May the government was advised officially of the victory of Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet what troops would be required. The information was that on the 13th day of May, and the first army expedition sailed May 25, and arrived at Manila June 30. Other expeditions soon followed, the total force consisting of 641 officers and 15,988 men.

Our military cause needless to say, the early landing and property prevented the early storming and capture of the city, and therewith the absolute military occupancy of the whole group. The insurgents meanwhile had resumed their operations, but were hindered by the uncompleted troops of Dewey's army. Their forces invested Manila from the northern and eastern side, but were constrained by Admiral Dewey and Gen. Merritt from attempting an assault. It being fitting that whatever was done in the way of decisive operations in that quarter should be accomplished by the strong arm of the United States alone. Obeying the stern precept of war which enjoins the extinction of his power, which is available as the speedy and sure means to win a peace, divided victory was not permissible, for no partition of the rights and responsibilities attending the attainment of a just and advantageous settlement of the momentous political thought of...

### THE BLOCKADE OF CUBA.

Following the comprehensive scheme of general attack, powerful forces were assembled at various points on our coast to invade Cuba and Porto Rico. Meanwhile, naval demonstrations were made at several exposed points. On May 11 in the bay of Wilmington and the schooner boat Winslow was captured in an attempt to silence the batteries at Cardenas, a gallant ensign, Worth Bagley, and four seamen falling. These grievous fatalities were, unaccounted for, among the very few which occurred during the war operations in this extraordinary conflict.

Meanwhile the Spanish naval preparations had been pushed with great vigor. Gen. Miles left Guantanamo on July 21, having nine transports, conveyed by the fleet under Cap. Higginson, with the Massachusetts (flagship), Dixie, Gloucester, Columbia and Yale, the two latter carrying troops. The expedition landed at Guanica, July 25, and the actual operations with little opposition. Here the fleet was joined by the Annapolis and the Wasp, while the Puritan and Amphitrite went to San Juan and joined the New Orleans, which was engaged in blockading that of the Philippines. The commander in chief, Admiral Cervera, was subsequently reinforced by the Schwann's brigade of the Third army corps, by Gen. Wilson, with a part of his division, and also by Gen. Brooks, with a part of his corps, numbering in all 27,000 officers and men.

On July 27, Gen. Ponce, one of the most important ports in the island, from which he thereafter directed operations for the capture of the island. With the exception of encounters at Manly in Guayama, Hornigales, Coma and Yaguajay, an attack on a force landed at Cape San Juan, there was no serious resistance. The campaign was prosecuted with great vigor, and by the last of August, when the island was in our possession, and the acquisition of the remainder was only a matter of a short time. At most of the points in the island our troops were enthusiastically welcomed. Protestations of loyalty to the flag and gratitude for delivery from Spanish rule met our commanders at every stage. As a potent influence toward peace, the outcome of the Porto Rico operations was of great consequence and generous commendation is due to those who participated in it.

The last scene of the war was enacted at Manly starting place. On August 15, after a brief October, the works by the land forces, in which the squadron assisted, the capital surrendered unconditionally. The casualties were comparatively few. By this virtually complete annihilation of the Spanish capacity for resistance was destroyed by Admiral Dewey's victory of the 1st of May, was formally sealed. To Gen. Merritt, his officers and men for their uncompensated and devoted service, and for their gallantry in action, the nation is sincerely grateful. Their long voyage was made with singular success, and the soldierly conduct of the men, most of whom were without previous experience in the military service, deserves unmeasured praise.

The total casualties in killed and wounded in the army during the war with Spain were: Officers killed, 23; enlisted men killed, 257; total, 280; officers wounded, 113; enlisted men wounded, 1,464; total, 1,577. Of the navy, killed, 12; wounded, 67; died as result of wounds, 1; invalid from service, 6; total, 91. It will be observed that while our navy was engaged in two great battles and in numerous perils, undertaken in blockade and bombardment, and more than 50,000 of our troops were transported to distant lands and were engaged in assault and sieges and battles, the very small number of our naval forces, in a few days of the month, won the victory. The crew of the Merrimack not a soldier or sailor was taken prisoner.

On August 7, 46 days after the date of the landing of Gen. Shafter's army in Cuba and 21 days from the surrender of Santiago, the United States troops commenced embarkation for home, and our entire force was returned to the United States as early as August 24. There were on the American squadron, under command of Commodore Sampson. In less than three hours all the Spanish ships were destroyed, two torpedo boats being sunk, two Maria Teresa, Abnantes, Oquendo, Vizcaya and the Colos, driven ashore. The Spanish admiral and over 1,300 men were taken prisoners, while the enemy's loss of life was deplorably large, some 600 perishing. On our side not one man was killed, on the Brooklyn, and our men were seriously wounded. Although our ships were repeatedly struck, not one was seriously injured. Where all so conspicuously distinguished themselves, from the commander to the privates, and the unnamed heroes in the boiler rooms, each and all contributing toward the achievement of this astounding victory for which neither ancient nor modern history affords a parallel in the annals of the world. The achievement of this event and the marvelous disproportion of casualties, it would be invidious to single out any for special honor. Deserved promotion has rewarded the more conspicuous actors—the nation's profoundest gratitude is due to all of these brave men who, by their skill and devotion, in a few short hours crushed the sea power of Spain and wrought a triumph whose decisiveness and far-reaching consequences can scarcely be measured. One may be unthankful of the achievement of our builders, mechanics and artisans for their skill in the construction of our warships. With the catastrophe of Santiago Spain's efforts upon the ocean virtually ceased, and from that time the end of June to sent the Mediterranean fleet, under Admiral Camarota to relieve Manila was abandoned, the expedition being recalled after it had passed through the Suez canal.

**THE FALL OF SANTIAGO.**  
The city was closely besieged by the entry of our ships into the harbor, which aided them to that side and caused a truce to follow for the removal of non-combatants. Protracted negotiations continued from July 3 to July 15, when, under protest of immediate assault, the preliminaries of a truce were agreed upon. On the 17th Gen. Shafter occupied the city. The capitulation embraced the entire eastern end of Cuba. The number of Spanish soldiers surrendered was 22,909, all of whom were completely unarmed, and the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish minister of state, inviting the United States to state the terms upon which it would be willing to make peace. On July 30, by a communication addressed to the Duke of Almodovar, the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish minister of state, the terms of this government were announced, substantially as in the protocol afterward signed. On August 16 the Spanish reply, dated August 7, was handed by M. Cambon to the secretary of state, conveying the unconditional terms imposed as to Cuba, Porto Rico and an island of the Ladrone group, but appeared to seek to introduce inadmissible reservations in regard to our demand as to the Philippine islands. Conceiving discussion on this point could neither be practical nor profitable, I directed that in order to avoid misunderstanding, the matter should be forthwith closed by proposing the embodiment in a formal protocol of the terms upon which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken. The vague and implicit suggestions of the Spanish note could not be accepted, the only reply being to present as a virtual ultimatum a draft or protocol embodying the precise terms tendered to Spain in our note of July 30, with added stipulations of detail as to the appointment of commissioners to arrange for the evacuation of the Spanish Antilles.

**A PROTOCOL SIGNED.**  
On August 12, M. Cambon announced his receipt of full powers to sign the protocol so submitted. Accordingly, on the afternoon of August 12, M. Cambon, as the plenipotentiary of Spain, and Secretary of State, signed a protocol providing: "Article 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and the title to Cuba." "Article 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrone group, to be selected in the United States." "Article 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines."

The fourth article provided for the appointment of joint commissions of the part of the United States and Spain, to meet in Havana and San Juan, respectively, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of stipulated evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and other Spanish islands in the West Indies. The fifth article provided for the appointment of not more than five commissioners on each side to meet at Paris not later than October 1, and to proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries. The sixth and last article provided that upon the signature of the protocol hostilities between the two countries should be suspended, and that notice to that effect should be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

Immediately upon the conclusion of the protocol I issued a proclamation of August 12 suspending hostilities on the part of the United States. The necessary orders to that end were at once given by telegraph. The troops of the ports of Cuba and San Juan de Porto Rico was in like manner raised. On August 18 the muster out of 100,000 volunteers, or as near that number as was found to be practicable, was ordered.

### MILITARY COMMISSIONERS NAMED.

On December 1, 101,145 officers and men had been mustered out and discharged from the service, and 9,000 more will be mustered out by the 15th of the month. Also a corresponding number of general and general staff officers have been honorably discharged from the service. The military commissioners to supervise the evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and adjacent islands were forthwith appointed:

For Cuba—Maj. Gen. James F. Wade, Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, Maj. Gen. Matthew C. Butler, for Porto Rico, Maj. Gen. John D. Brooke, Rear Admiral Winslow, Schley, Brig. Gen. Wm. G. Gordon, who soon afterward met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and San

Juan respectively. The Porto Rican joint commission speedily accomplished its task, and by October 18 the evacuation of the island was completed. The United States flag was raised over the island at noon on that day. The administration of its affairs has been provisionally entrusted to a military governor until the Congress shall otherwise provide. The Cuban joint high commission has not yet terminated its labors. Owing to the difficulties in the way of removing the large numbers of Spanish troops still in Cuba, the evacuation cannot be completed before the 1st of January next. Pursuant to the fifth article of the protocol, I appointed William H. Day, lately secretary of state, and Senators Davis, William P. Fry and George Gray, senators of the United States, and Whitelaw Reid, to be the peace commissioners on the part of the United States. Preceding in due season to Paris, they met the peace commissioners appointed on the part of Spain. Their negotiations have made hopeful progress, so that I trust soon to be able to sign a definitive treaty of peace before the Senate, with its review of the steps leading to its signature.

I do not discuss at this time the government or the nature of the new possessions which will come to us as the result of the war with Spain. Such discussion will be more appropriate after a treaty of peace shall be ratified. In the meantime and until the Congress has legislated otherwise, it will be my duty to continue the military governments which have existed since our occupation and give to the people security in life and property and encouragement under a just and beneficent rule.

**OUR RELATIONS WITH CUBA.**  
As soon as we are in possession of Cuba we shall have pacified the island it will be necessary to give aid and direction to its people to form a government for themselves. This should be undertaken at the earliest moment consistent with safety and assured success. It is important that our relations with the people should be of the most friendly character and commercial relations close and reciprocal. It should be our duty to assist in every proper way to build up the waste places of the island, encourage the industry of the people, and assist them to form a government which shall be free and independent, thus realizing the best aspirations of the Cuban people. Spanish rule must be replaced by a just, beneficent and humane government, created by the people, capable of performing all international obligations and which shall encourage thrift, industry and prosperity and promote peace and good will among all the inhabitants, whatever may have been their former opinions. Neither revenge nor passion should have a place in the new government. Until there is complete tranquility in the land and a stable government inaugurated, military occupation will continue.

With the exception of the rupture with Spain, the history of the United States with the great family of nations has been marked with cordiality and the close of the eventful year finds most of the issues that necessarily arise in the complex relations of sovereign States adjusted, and no serious obstacle to a just and honorable solution by amicable agreement.

**THE LATTIMER RIOT INCIDENT.**  
On the 10th of September, 1897, a conflict took place at Lattimer, Pa., between a body of Irish immigrants and the sheriff of Luzerne county and his deputies, in which 22 miners were killed and 44 wounded, of whom 10 of the killed and 12 of the wounded were Austrian and Hungarian subjects. This deplorable and entirely unnecessary solitude of the Austro-Hungarian government, which, on the assumption that the killing and wounding involved the unjustifiable misuse of authority, claimed reparation for the deaths. After some searching investigation and a preliminary action of the authorities of Pennsylvania, the federal executive took appropriate steps to learn the merits of the case, in order to be in a position to meet the urgent complaint of a friendly power. The sheriff and his deputies having been indicted for murder, were tried and acquitted after protracted proceedings and the hearing of hundreds of witnesses on the ground that the killing was in the line of their official duty to suppress a riot. A public order in the State, a recess of the department of justice attended the trial for indemnity for its injured. The government expects to reach a harmonious understanding on this subject with that of Austria, notwithstanding the renewed claim of the latter after learning the result of the trial for indemnity for its injured subjects.

**THE NICARAGUA CANAL.**  
The Nicaragua canal commission, under the chairmanship of Gen. Admiral John G. Walker, appointed July 24, 1897, under the authority of a provision in the sundry civil act of June 4 of that year, has nearly completed its report on the results of its exhaustive inquiry into the proper route, the feasibility and the cost of construction of an inter-oceanic canal by a Nicaraguan route. In view of overtures made to the governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, by other parties for a new canal to be constructed on the assumed approaching lapse of the contracts of the Maritime Canal company, with those states, I have not hesitated to express my conviction that considerations of expediency and international policy as between the several governments interested in the construction and control of an inter-oceanic canal by this route require the maintenance of the status quo, until the canal commission has reported, and the United States Congress shall have the whole matter during the present session, without prejudice by reason of any change in the existing conditions.

Nevertheless, it appears that the government of Nicaragua, as one of its last sovereign acts before resigning its powers in those of the newly formed United States of Central America, has granted an optional concession to another association, to become effective on the expiration of the present grant. It does not appear whether surveys have been made or what route is proposed under this contingent grant, so that an examination of the feasibility of its plans is necessarily not embraced in the report of the canal commission. Although circumstances suggest the urgency of some definite action by the Congress at this session if the labors of the past are to be utilized and the linking of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans by a practical waterway is to be realized. That the construction of such a maritime highway is now more than ever indispensable to that intimate and ready inter-communication between our eastern and western seaboard demanded by the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific, and that our national policy now must have the whole matter during the present session, without prejudice by reason of any change in the existing conditions.

Our relations with China. The United States has not been an indifferent spectator of the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese