BctJforiJ 3nqmm auti Cltriraiflt
BY DAYID OVER.
MAJORITY REPORT
OF THE
SEIJfT COMMITTEE,
Of the Striate of Pennsylvania, upon the
decision in the esse of Dred Scott vs.
John F. A. San fori.
Th? seleat committee of the Senate, to
which was referred the resolutions relative
to the decision of the Supreme Court of
the Uuited States in tbe case of Dred Scott
vs. Joh a F. A. Sanford, submit the fol
lowing
REPORT:
Your committee, for want of time, snd
by reason of numerous other engagements
at this late stage of the session, have been
unable to give the decision referred to that
careful examination wbich its importance
demands, or to prepare such a report as
would do justice to tbe subject, or to them
selves. They wtre embarassed also by an
-inability to procure au authentic copy of
ihe entire opinion of the Court, as deliv
ered by Chief Justice Taney; but from
what is conceded to be a correct abstract
of the opiuion, and from the opinions of
the dissenting judg.-a, we can gather with
reasonable certainty correct ideas of the
whole case.
The fact* are substantially as follows:
la the year 1834, Pred Scott, the plaintiff,
was a negro slave, belonging to Pr. Emer
ou, of the State of Mis-oari; and ia that
year his master took the plaintiff from Mis
souri to Koek Island, in tbe State of Illi
nois, and there held turn as a slave until
183*5. From Ilock 1.-land the plaintiff was
taken tu Fort Snelling, then in the territo
ry of the United States, north of the State
of Missouri, and iu which alavery was pro
hibited by the act of OoDgrss knottu as
the Missouri Compromise, aod there held as
a slave until 1838. Iu 1835 My r L.
Taliaferro took Harriet to Fort Snellicg,
aud there held her as a slave until 1836,
wheD he sold her to said Pr. Emerson, who
thereafter elaiiued her as his slave. In
1836 the plaintiff and Harriet were mar
ried at Fort Snelling, and two daughters,
Kltzt zui Lizzie were the children of this
marriage. Elian was born north of the
•orlh line of the State of Missouri, and at
the coaiu:ncetr:ent of the suit was about
fourteen years of age. Lizzie was about
seven years younger, and was born iu the
State of Missouri. In 1533 Dr. Euietwon
removed the plaintiff ami his wife Hatriet,
and their daughter Eliza to the State of
Missouri, where they have ever since resi
ded. Before the commencement of tbe
action, Pi. Emer-on had sold Pred ScOtt*
Harriet hU wife, Elizv and Lizzie, to the
defendant, John F. A. San ford, as slaves,
and be has ever since claimed to hold theui
as such. The suit was brought by the
plaintiff in the circuit Court of the United
States, for the district- of Missouri, to re
cover the freedom of himself, of his wife,
and of his children. That Court decided
agaicst the plaintiff, and an appeal was ta
ker. to the Supreme Court of the United
Stales. That Court dismissed tbe case for
want cf jurisdiction, on the ground that tbe
plaintiff was not a citizen of tbe State of
M saouri, r.cr of the Uuited States, and
that he was, therefore, iucoinpetent to
maintain any actum in the Courts of the
United Slates.
The opinion of the Court was delivered
by Chief Justice Taney, and concurred in •
the four other Judges from the Slave
States, whilst the four Judges of the Free ;
State* dissented from the wos* important j
points laid down by the majority of the '
Court. The Chief Justice, in his opiuion,;
tock a most extensive view of tbe whole )
subject, and among other things of less '
importance laid down in substance as tbe j
law of the land, tbe following most impor
tant propositions:
Ist. That the plaintiff Dred Scott was
. not a citizen of the State of Missouti, or of '
tbe Uni'ed States, and that therefore Le j
was not competent to maintain any suit in j
tbe Courts of tbe United States.
2d. That tbe plaintiff, having been a
slave in the State of Missouri, his subse
quent residence in the State of Illinois,
and in the Territory north of the State of
Miasouru did not affeet the condition of
himself or bis family, bat tbmt all remain
ed slaves.
3rd. That slaves are property, by tbe
express provisions of tbe Constitution of
tbe United States, in no wise differing front
other property, and that therefore neither
the Congress of the United States, cor say
territorial government created by it, has
any power to exclude slavery from the Na
tional Territories.
These novel and startling propositions j
year committee propose to examine briefly
in tbeir order.
X- Tbe first proposition is not of to
uch practical importance to the people of
l'cunsylvania ss are the second and third,
A Weekly Paper, Devoted to Literature, Politics, the Arts, Sciences, Agriculture, &c., &c —Terms: Two Dollars per annum.
yet its bold and positive announcement by
such high authority, has occasioned no lit
tle surprise, and caused much iuquiry to be
made into the reasons on which the doc
trine is based. In the argument of this
point, Chief Justice Taney says:
"It is difficult at this day to realize the
state of public opiuion respecting that un
fortunate class (negroo) with the civilized
and enlightened portion of the world, at
the time of the Declaration of Indepen
dence and the adoption of the Constitution;
but history shows they have for more than
a century been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and unfit associates for the
white race, either socially or politically,
and had no rights which white tuen were
bound to respect; and the black man might
be reduced to slavery—bought aud sold,
and treated as au ordinary article of mer
chandise. The doctrine of which we have
spoken, was strikingly enforced by the De
claration of Independence. It begins thus:
'When in the cuurse of human events it
becomes necessary for on people to dis
solve the political bonds which have con
nected theui with another, and to assume
among the pawers of the catth the sepa
rate and equal station to which the laws of
nature and of nature's God entitle them, a
decent respect to the opinions of mankind
requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the separation;' and
proceeds: 'We hold these truths to be self
evident, that all men are created equal , that
they are endowed by their cieutor with
certain inalienable rights; that auioog these
are life, liberty , and the pursuit of happi
ness; that to secure these rights, govern
ments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the
governed.' "
In the opiniou of your committee, this
first position taken by the Court was at
best a most questionable one. and the evi
dence by which the Chief Justice thus en
deavors to support it, is much more ques
tionable. Our veneration for old age, and
our respect for the Court from which the
opiuioo emanated, preclude the supposition
that the above quotations thus made by the
Chief Justice were intended iu a Pickwick
ian sense; and there being no such logic in
the books, wo are therefore reluctantly
driven to the humiliating acknowledgement
that we cannot comprehend how it is that
said quotations prove, or can in any way
be tortured into the support of tbe doc
trine, that a coloreJ person cannot be a
jitizeu of any State, or of the United
States, or that still ronro monstrous dootiiue
that this "unfortunate class" "has no rights
which white men arc bound to respect,"
Tbomaa Jefferson is the admitted author
of the Declaration cf Independence, and
be has left oo record abundant evidence
that be entertained views entirely differeut
fronu Judge Tanoy in relation to this "uc
fortuoate class," lie considered colored
persons citizens, and so bis writings, both
historical and official, abundantly show.—
Iu his celebrated work called Notes on the
State of Virginia, (chapter IS,) in speak
ing of tbe demoralizing influences of slave
ry in his native State, be says: "And with
what execration should the statesman be
loaded, who, permitting one half the citi
zens t/uu to trample on the rights of the
other, transforms those into despots, and
these into enemies, destroys tbe motals of
tbe one part, and tbe amor patria of the
other." The same idea also was even wore
clearly proclaimed in his proclamation as
President of the United States, in refer
ence to the famous outrage perpetrated by
the British man of war, Leopard, upon the
frigate Chesapeake. To understand tbe
full force of the expressions use 1, it must
be recollected that of tbe four seamen ta
ken from the Chesapeake on tbe claim of
desertion from tbe British service, tbe only
two bora in the United States were two
colored men, natives of Maryland. The
passage referred to in Jefferson's proclama
tion, is as follows:
"This enormity *M not only without pro
vocation or justifiable cause, but was com
mitted with the avowed purpose of taking
by foree from a ship of war of the United
States a part of her crew: and that no cir
cumstance might be wanting to mark its
character, it had been previously ascertain
ed that the seamen demanded were native
born eitiaens of the United States."
Negroes are also recognized as citizens
by numerous acts of Congress; and among
other* by the act of 28th February, 1803,
(Danlop' i Dig. Laws of N. d., p. 32-1,)
which lays —
"That from and after the first day of
April next, no tnseter or captain of any
ship or Teasel, or any other person, shall
import or bring, or cause to be imported
or brought, any negro, mulatto, or other
person of color, not being a native, a citi
zen, or registered citizen of the United
States, or seamen natives of countries be*
yond the Cape of Qood Hope, into any port
or place of the United States, wbich port or
place shall be situated in a State which by
law has prohibited, or shall prohibit, the ad
mission or importation of any such negro,
mulatto, or other person of color,"
To the same effect also are the decisions
of the Courts, both State and National.—
The Supreme Court of N'orth Carolina, in
an elaborate opiuion delivered in 1838,
State vs. Manuel—(4 Dev. & Bat., p. 24)
by Judge Gaston, one of the rnosr learned
and able jurisis in the Union, on the pic
cise point now under considerrtion, fully
sustained the Jeffersonian sud Congression
al views of ciiizenship, just cited. In the
opinion of the Court in that case, i? is said—
"British subjects in North Carolina—by
virtue of the Revolution—became North
Carolina freemeu, foreigners, until made
members of the State, continued aliens;
slaves manumitted here became freemen,
and therefore, if born within Notth Caro
liuu, are citizens of North Carolina; and al!
free persous born within the State arc born
citizens of the State."
To tbe same effect aiso are the decisions
of the Supreme Courts of other States, and
of the Supreme Courts of the United States.
In the case of Lee vs. Lee, [3, Peters 48,]
this latter court ia au actiou for freedom
said—"Freedom is not to be valued." In
the case of Wallingsford vs. Allen—(10
Peters, 583,) Judge Wayne, one of the
Judges concurring in the Dred Scott opin
ion, declared that "thh question of freedom
is superior to any question of property."
In Williams vs. Ash, (1 Howards, Rep
1,) in wbich R. B. Taney, then as now
Chief Justice, delivered tbe opioion of the
Court, a colored man was not only permit
ted to sue for his freedom in a court of die
United States, but was permitted to tecov
er it. And 10 the same effect also is Rhode*
vs. Bell, (2 How., 397,) in which the opio
ion of the Court was delivered by Justice
Jl'Lean.
Can it be then in Ibis free country and
in this enlightened ago, that "one half the
citizens," as Jefferson expressed it, in soite
of the States, and a greater or les* oortion
of them in all the States suddenly become
uo citizens at all! That solely by reason of
their color, they are presumed to be with
out the pale of citizenship, that they eaouot
even sue in any court of the United States
to try the question whether they are bond
or ftoe.
This doctrine is so contrary to al! past
history and judicial precedent, so repugnant
to all ideas of law an Iju slice, and so ab
horrent to teason and humanity, that your
committee eau uot do otherwise than con
demn and repudiate it as Miterly unsotndi
and unworthy the C<uirt which proclaimed ii.
2. The plaintiff having bee n a tlavo in
the Siute of Missouri, his subs.qient resi
dence in the State of Illinois, and iu bo
National territory North of Missouri, did
uot affect the condition of himself or his
family, but all remained slaves.
Tbe question here raised isp irely a legal
one; and one which bis been decided agnin
and again, from the organiz ition of our Gov
ermueut down to the case of Dred Scott,
aud by the Courts of almost every State in
tbe Union. Slavery being contrary to nat.
Ural rights,is created only by municipal law
This is not only plain in itself, and agreed
to by all writers on the subject, but is also
the doctrine laid down by our Federal Con
stitution, and has been most explici'ly de
clared by tbe same Courc which now denies
it in the case of Died Scott. Tbe second
section of article of the Constitu
tion of the United States, is as follows:
" No person held to labor or service in
one State, undtr the lows thereof, shall, in
consequence of law or regulaton therein, be
discharged from such service or labor, but
shall be delivered up, on claim of the party
to whom such service or labor may be due.
No words could more clearly describe a
status created by municipal law than these
words in tbe Constitution. Iu the celebra
ted and leading case of Prigg vs. the Com
monwealth of Pennsylvania, (16, Peters'
Reports, 539.) decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States iu 184?, tbe
same principle is solemnly recognized and
affirmed. Tbe late eminent Judge Story
delivered the opinion of the Court,and among
other things said, "The state of slavery is
deemed to be a mere municipal regulation,
founded upon and limited to tbe territorial
laws." "It is manifest from this considera
tion that if tbe Constitution had not contain
ed this clause (reqniring tbe delivery np of
fugitives) every non-slfvebolding State in
the Union would have been at liberty to
have declared free all runaway slaves coming
within its limits, and to have given them
eatire immunity and protection against all
claims of their masters." Judge Taney
was then as now Cbicf Justice of tbe Court
and be and all tbe other Judges concurred
in that part of the opinion here cited.
Tbe above quoted clause of tbe eoastitn-
BEDFORD, PA.. FRIDAY. MAY 15.1857.
r 'ion providing only for the arrest and giving
' up of fugitive slaves, does not apply, and has
never been construed to apply, to eases
where tbe master voluntarily takes his slave
' into a ffee territory or a froj State. Such
has ever been tbe law of England, and of
these United States, until new. In the first
and second sections of the sixth article of
the Constitution of Illinois, H is declared
that neither Slavery nor involuntary servi
tude shall hereafter be introduced into this
Slate, otherwise than for crimes, of which
the party shall lie duly convicted; and in
the eeond section it is declared, that any
violation of this article *balf effect the eman
cipation of such person frotn his obligation
to service. The Supreme C-iurt of Illiuoi*,
in the case of Jarrot vs. Ja&ot, (2 tiihuore's
Ilep. 7) declared. "After the conquest of
this territory by Virginia she ceded it to the
United State*, and stipulated that tbe titles
and possession*, rights and liberties of the
French settlers should be guaranteed to
them. This, it has been contended, seeursd
thrttu in the possession of those negroes as
Slaves which thoy had before that time, and
that neither Congress nor the Convention
had power to deprive them of it; or, in
other words, that the Ordinance aud Con
stitution should uot be so interpreted aud
understood as applying to such Slaves, when
it is there shall be neitlier Slavery nor
involuntary servitude in tbe North West Ter
ri ory, nor iu tbe State of Illinois, otherwi-ie
than in the puuisbuieut of crimes; but, it
was held that those rights could not b.-. thus
protected, but must yield to the Ordinance
and Constitution."
Awoog numerous other eases establishing
the same principle decided by the supreme
Court of Missouri, is*; he leading case of
Rachel vs. Martin, (4 Missouri Rep. 850,
Jane Ter.u 1336,) substantially the same iu
every prticular as the Dred Scott ease.—
Rachel sued for her freedom, and it appeared
Mat she bad been bought as a slave ia the
State of Missouri by Stockton, an officer of
the army, taken to Fort Suejling where he
was *inl she wor-wetaioed as a
slave there r.no year. Stockton then re
moved to Prarie du Chien, taking Rachel
with him as bis slave, where he continued
to boid her for three years, and then took
her back to the State of Missouri, and sold
her as a slave. In the opinion of the Court
on these facts it was said:
"i he officer iived in M-ssoori Territory at
the time he bought the slave; he ent to a
slavcholding eoutury and purchased her.—
This was his voluntary act, done without
ty other rouse , than thqr of hi* convenience
and he aud those claiming under him must ;
he hoiden to abide tho cons-q icnt'cs of in- :
traducing slavery botb ia Missouri Territory 1
and Michigan co-diary io I 'aw, and on ibis
j.round Rachel is -tciared entitled to her
freedom.
In 1851 the Cau.t of apyeals r.f Sou'b
Caroiiua recognised the principle ifiat a slave
being taken to a free state became free
(Commoairtaltk vs, lcnsants,P Leigh K,-p
697). lu Betty ws. Horton the CV.rt of
Appeals helti that tho freedom of the slave
was acquired by the action of tho laws of
Massachusetts, by the slave being taken
there (Leigh Ilep. 615). It has been so
held by Ike Supreme Courts of Mississippi,
Virginia, Louisiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
and ptber slave State."; and in the free States
the doctrine is believad to be universal. It
was firmly established iu tbe State of Penn
sylvania at an early day, and among otber
cases is that of The Commonwealth rr Hol
lowly (2 Sergt ani lluiole 305) in which
CHIEF JUSTICE TII/IHMAN, and justices
YEATES AND GIBSON, all concurred iu
opiuion.
An innumerable list of other authorities
might be cited: but with this cloud of witness
es against the accuracy of tbe second position
laid down in the Dred Scott case your com
mittee will proceed to the consideration of
the last proposition.
3. Slaves are property, by tbe express
provisions ot the Constitution of the United
States, iu no wise differing from other pro
perty, and therefore neither the Congress of
tbe United States nor any territorial gov
ernment created by it, has any power to ex
clude slavery from the National territories-
To the citizens of Pennsylvania, and t!
other free States, this is perhaps the most
startling and monstrous doctrine ever pro
claimed; and the sensation it has created,
and the excitement and condemnation with
which it has everywhere been received
* I
evince but a just appreciation of its vast im
portance. The institution of slavery is
hereby not only docUrud to be National but
Congress is denied the power to restrain it
within any limits whatever, and by clear
and inevitable implication slavery is carried
into every State in tie Union, and tbe Leg
islatures thereof prohibited from excluding
it. It is the right aud duty of every Com
monwealth to guard and project hog State
rights against all usurpation and encroach- i
nient by the National Government; and
hence the eminent propriety of the Legisla
ture of Pennsylvania taking these grave
questions into serions consideration. Let
us inquire then, as briefly as possible, whet her
there is anything iu the Constitution of the
Uuited States, or in our legislative or judicial
history, to warrant tho promulgation of such
monstrous doctrines as are set forth iu this
third proposition.
That slaves in the slave States, and for
certain purposes, are reeogniz-rd as proper
ty, wiil not be denied, but that they do
not differ from other property, or that they
are mere property by any express or fairly
implied piovisions of the Constitution of the
United States, ia a most unwarranted as
sumption. On the contrary, the word slave
or slavery is nowhere used iu that instrument
and where they are spoken of by descrip-ion
they urc called persons. Ia the third section
of the first article of the Federal Contitu
tion, fixing tho basis of representation and
taxation, slaves are described by tbe words,
"three fif'.hi of nil other Ptasoxs" So also
io the th;rd section of the fourth article be.
fore cited, on the subject of fugitive slaves
'l he lauguagc there is: "No person held to
service or labor in one State under the laws
thereof, escaping into another," Si:. Here.
tofore, as already shown by numerous au
thorities cited, they have been adjudged and
treated as {<ersons and citizens, and as such
allowed to sue aud be sued in both the State
and Federal courts, they have been deemed
under the protection of the laws for tbe se
curity of their persons, their property aud
their liberty; aud they have been held re
sponsible in all criminal courts for the perpe
tration f.f crime*. But now, for the first
time, iu the face of those piaiu provisions of
•he Constitution, in deSance of ali past ad
judications of me Courts, we ate gravely
told that slaves are only prooerty, and
differing in no respect from other property,
and that therefore, inasmuch as tio mau cau
be prevented from taking his horse into any
State or Territory, so neither eau he bepro-
f h'bitod from taking bis slaves there. And
in further development of this new idea,
we are further informed by tue opinion of
' the court in this Dred Seott case, that the
I celebrated Jeffersuaian Ordinance of 1784,
! tbe Ordiuanoe of 1787, and the no less
celebrated Missouri Compromise Law of
1820, excluding slavery from the National
I Territories, were all euacfed in violation of
tbe Constitution of the United States; aud
that they are therefore all null and void.—
It these tlmgs be so, then there can be no
; limitations put npon slavery by Congress;
; and the right to hold slaves, and to slavery
| < stensioa teiuggu iraiiteed by the Cqastitu
: tion of the United States, no State Constitu
! . _
I tion or State law can reach it, for the Con
.-ututioß of tbe United States is the supremo
\ law of the land.
Thomas Ji fferson was the author Qf tLe
Ordinance of !7.f7, which was enacted by
the Continental Congress, with only one dis
senting voice it provided a territorial
government for that immense territory north
and we?tof the river Ohio. Tbe sixth article
of that Ordinance is in the following words:
''There shai! be neither slavery nor in
voluntary servitude in said territory, other
wise thau in punishment of crime, whereof
the party shall hsve been duly convicted. '
In 1789, aud after the adoption of the
Constitution, the first Congress under it
(and iu which were foartceu members of the
Convention wnich framed the Constitution, j
includiug James Madison) a bill wos passed
re-enaeupg tho Oordinance of 1787, and
the preamble to said bill was as follows:
"WHEREAS, In order that the Ordinance
of the United States in Congress assembled
*or the governtneut of the territory north ,
and west of the Ohio river, may continue to j
have Jull rjftct, it is requisito that certain '
provisions should be made so as to adapt
the same to the present Constitution of the ;
United States; therefore, bo it enacted,&e." j
This act was approved by George Wash- '
ington as President; and ha had also been
President of the Convention which framed j
tbe Constitution. Here is a most explicit I
and official declaration, by tbe first Presi- j
dent and the first Congress, of the views
then held of tbe constitutional power of Con- [
grcss to prohibit slavery in tbe territories. [
Numerous other iustauoes can be cited, and :
without going into details, your eommittee I
will refer to two classes of congressional j
acts npon the subject, la one class, Con- j
gress has extended the Ordinance of 1787
over territories, thereby prohibiting slavery |
thereiu; and in the other, Congress has e
rected governments over territories where 1
slavery already existed, and refused by poa-i j
itive enactment to exclude slavery there-: '
from.
Of the first class arc the act of May 7,
1800, (1 Stat, at Large, 58,1 for the gov
ernment of the Indisna Territory, tbe a-et
January 11, 18Q5, (2 Stat, at Large, 309-,)
tyr the gerernmaat of Michigan Territory;
the act of May 3, 1809, (*2 Stat, at Large,
514.) for the government of Illinois Terri
tory; the act of April 20, 1836, (5 Stat at
Large, 19,} for the government of the Ter
ritory of Wisconsin, the act of June 12,
1838, for the government of the Territory
of Iowa; the act of August 14 1818, for the
gjvenueut of the Territory of Oregon. To
these should be added the act of March 6 f
1820, (3 Stat, at Large, 548,) prohibiting
slavery in tho Territory northwest of Mis
souri, and north of 35 deg. 30 miu. north
latitude.
Of the second class, m which Cvtigress
refused to interfere with slavery already ex
isting uudc, municipal law, and established
governments by which slavery was rccogni
nized and allowed, are the act of March 2G,
1804, (2 Stat, at Large, 233,) for the gov
ernment of Louisiana: the act of Mtreb 2,
1805. (2 Stat at Large, 32*2,) for the gov
ernment of the Territory of Orleans: the act
of June 4, 1812, (2 Stat, at htrgf, 743,
for the government of tbe Missouri Terri
tory ; the act of March 30, 1822, (3 Stat,
at Large, 654.) for the government of the
Territory <f Florida. Here are eight dis
tinct instances, begiouing with the first Con
gress, and couiiug down to 1848, in which
Congress has excluded sLvary from the ter
ritory of the United State*;.and six distinct
instances in which Congress organized gov
ernments of territories by which slavery was
recognized and continued, beginning also
with tbe first Congress, atid coming down
'to the year 1822. These acts were sever
i ally signed by seven presidents of the Uni
ted States, beginning with Washington, and
coming regularly down to John Qu'.ucy Ad
ams, thus including a!} wuo were iu pubhc
life when the Constitution was adopted.
If the practical construction of the Con
stitution cotemporaneonsly with its going
into effect, by tuen intimately acquainted
with its history from their personal partici
pation in framing and adopting it, and con
tinued by them through a long scries of acts
of the gravest importance, be entitled to
weight in the judicial niiai on a question of
construction, it would seem to te difficult
if not impossible to resist the force of the ,
acts here adverted to.
Such has been the settled doctrine also
j of tie legal tribunals of the country, both
i State and National, frciu the organisation
! of tac government down. In the discos
j sson of the powers of Congress to govern a
Territory in the case of the Atlantic Insu
rance Company rt. Oantei, (i Peters, Rep.
of the Supreme Court of the U. S., p. 511,)
that great juris", Chief Justice Marshall,in
delivering the opinion >f the Court, said in
irpgird to the people of Florida: "They do
not, however, par'icipate in political power:
they do not share in the government until
Florida shall become a State; in the mean
; time Florida coutitiues to be a Territory of
the United States, governed by that clause
I in the Constitution which empowers Ca
-| gress to make all needful rules and regula
: tions respecting the territory or other prnp
! erty of the United States." And he adds.
'•Perhaps the power of governing a territory
i belonging to the United States, which has
not by becqtning a State, acquired the means
i of self government may result necessarily
| front the fact that it is not within the juris
diction of any particular State, and is with
j in the jurisdiction and power of the United
States. The right to govern may be the in
evitable consequence of the right to acquire
j territory; whichever may be the source
whence the power is derived, the possession
of it is unquestioned." And in the close :
of the opinion, the Court says- "In letpsla' \
tin* jar thtm (the territories) Congress tx- \
treats'he combined powers oj the Gtmrcl and i
Stale Governments."
But why multiply authorities on a prin- '
cipie which was never before called in ques-'
two. Judge M'Lean, m his dissenting o- 1
pinion, iu this Dred Scott case, in speaking '
of the powers of Congress, says: "The jn- [
dicial mind of this country, State and Fed
eral, baa agreed on no subject within its le
gitimate action, with equal unanimity as on
the power of Congress to establish territo
rial governments. No Courts, State or Fed
eral—no judge or statesman, is known to
have had any doubts on this question for
nearly sixty years after the power was ex
ercised."
Such are the hastily prepared views of
jour committee on some of the mast prom
inent principles involved in the Dred Scott
ease. In conclusion we feel constrained to
direct the attention of the Senate to one
more feature in the case, and which is, if
possible, more alarming than any other jet
referred to. it is to the fact tb&t a major
ity of the Court has not only made the de
liberate effort to nu.lify the provis
ions of tho Constitution, to repudiate the
wise lessons of all past history and experi
ence, to declare null and void solemn acts
of Congress, the validity of which was uev
sr before questioned, and 10 overturn State
VOL. 30, NO. 20.
! laws and State eoasnimtioDs, and that the
| attempt to do ail ifust things has bun mad e
lin a cast in which the Court in fact, and
; by its own admission, had no jurridiction.
i The first que.itiu raised in the case was one
I of jurisdiction, and this the Court decided
against the plaintiff, and having so decided,
; there was legally no case, ar.u no parties bc
j fore them, and all subsequent opinions and
j declarations on other questions are, bv all
recognized rule*, extra judicial, coram a on
judice , inopetative and void,
j 'i he soundness oS this principle has never
i been heretofore questioned. Jus'ice M Lean
ia bis dissenting opinion in this very ease
| **}* "la this case a intjority of the Court
| have said that a slave may he taken by bis
master into a territory of the United States,
j the same as a horse or any other kind of
; property It is true this was said by the
j Court, a3 aUo mmj qther things, which are
[of 110 authority. ■' Nothing that has been
, said by them which has not a direct bearing
'• jon the jurisdiction of the Court, against
. which they decided, can bo considered Eg
authority. ] shall certainly uot regard it
as such. The question of jurisdiction bc
- ing b-.fjre the Court was decided by thcta,
, j authoritatively, but uotLing beyond that
. ; question."
t | Judge Curtis is equally emphatic on this
. j point. Tic says; I regret I must go furthers
: [ and dissent froui what I deem tueir assump
j tion ot authority to examine the cor.siiiu.
> (tonality of the act of C'.cgress commonly
. called the Missouri Cuoiprotuise act, and tlie
- grounds .nd conclusions annrtiucci in their
! j opinion. (Jn so grave a subject as this, I
- feel obliged to say, that, in my opinion,
: VJCfi an exercise of fadici.it power frar seqnds
t.ie limits of thf authority of the Court, as
| tic act ibtd by its repeated decisions, ar.d as
, : acknowledged in this opinion of the Court.
\ : 1 do not consider any opinion of this Cou/t,
. 'or any Court, binding when expressed cn
. a question not legitimately before it.
, j (Carroll rt. Carroll 16, Howards' Rep.,
, 275 ) The judgment of this Court is, th|
f j the case is to be dismissed for ** <- 1 nf juris
diction. Into that judgment .--cording to
the settled course of this Court, nothing
appearing after a plea to the merits ean enter.
A. groat question of constitutional law,
| deeply affecting tbe peace and welfare of
the country, is net, ic my opinion, a fit suh-
I ject to be thus reached. **
It takes two parties to make a suit, o C J
| to give jurisdiction, and the j ldges admit
. this; aud if they have the right :n a preter.ded
case which has but em party to it, to proceed,
and by a quasi official mandate to oullify
j constitutions and laws, then may they also
; do the same thing without any pretence of
a pase, and trLere there is nei'ber plxia
| tiff nor defendant.
lu the opiuiou of your cwuittoe, i'a Jev
cent respect for the opinions of uiiiikiad'*
required that the inonsroas doctrines pro
j mulgated in this Dred Sentt ca-e should have
| originated in a case which had two parties
j to it, or at least iu one in which thi Judges
; did not admit they had no jurisdiction.
1 By thus traveling out of the tecord, and
attempting by obiter dicta , and judicial fiat
: to overturn the Constitution and laws, tun
Couit voluntarily assumed legislative powers
and forfeited that respect with which its
j decisions have ever heretofore been regar
ded. In tbe examination of this daogercnj
usurpation, your committee conld not but
call to tuiud and admire the prophetic wis
dom of Thomas Jefferson who long smcq
foresaw ibis tendency to consolidation, and
predicted these unwatranted encroachment
by the federal judiciary. IBs patriotic wri-
tings, and especially those aftey he bad
retired from the Presidency are full of ap
prehensions on this subject; and front the
i seventh volume of his works we quote a feiy
sentences expressiye of h< views- In *
j letter dated Moqtiaeilo, j\ugust 13, 1821,
jhe says: "It has long, however, been my
j opinion, and I have never shrunk from i;S
expression, that the germ of dissolution of
our federal government ia in the constitution
of the federal judiciary, aq irresponsible
body, (for impeachment is scarcely a scare
crow) working like gravity by night and by
day., gaining a little to-day and a little to
tuuyrow, and advancing its noiseless step
like a thief, over the field of jurisdiction,
until till shall be usurp-d from the States,
and the government of all be consolidated
into one. If the Spates look with apathy on
this silent descent of their government into
the guif which is to swallow all, we have
only to we"p over the human character
formed uncontrolable but by a rod of iron,
and tbe blasphemers of man, as incapable of
self-government, become hi* true historian*.'
In another letter dated the next year,
in speaking of the federal judiciary, bo
says:
"We alrcany see the power, installed for
life, responsible ta no authority, advancing
with a noiseless and steady ptae to the groat
object of consolidation. Tiw foundation*
are already deeply laid by their decisis*. 4