

The North Branch Democrat.

HARVEY SICKLER, Proprietor.

"TO SPEAK HIS THOUGHTS IS EVERY FREEMAN'S RIGHT."—Thomas Jefferson.

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THIS establishment has recently been refitted and furnished in the latest style. Every attention will be given to the comfort and convenience of those who patronize the House. T. B. WALL, Owner and Proprietor. Tunkhannock, September 11, 1861.

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HAVING resumed the proprietorship of the above Hotel, the undersigned will spare no effort to render the house an agreeable place of sojourn for all who may favor it with their custom. RILEY WARNER. September 11, 1861.

MAYNARD'S HOTEL, TUNKHANNOCK, WYOMING COUNTY, PENNA. JOHN MAYNARD, Proprietor.

HAVING taken the Hotel, in the Borough of Tunkhannock, recently occupied by Riley Warner, the proprietor respectfully solicits a share of public patronage. The House has been thoroughly repaired, and the comforts and accommodations of a first class Hotel, will be found by all who may favor it with their custom. September 11, 1861.

M. GILMAN, DENTIST.

M. GILMAN, has permanently located in Tunkhannock Borough, and respectfully tenders his professional services to the citizens of this place and surrounding country. ALL WORK WARRANTED, TO GIVE SATISFACTION. Office over Tutton's Law Office, near the Post Office. Dec. 11, 1861.

Blanks!!! Blanks!!!

BLANK DEEDS

SUMMONSES SUBPENAES

EXECUTIONS CONSTABLE'S SALES

Justice's, Constable's, and legal Bonds of all kinds. Neatly and Correctly printed on good Paper, and for sale at the Office of the "North Branch Democrat."

LIME AND BRICK, CHEAPER THAN AT where else in the county, for sale at the Office. VERNON'S Meshoppen, Sept. 18, 1861.

Poet's Corner.

[From the Carbonate Advance.]
The Prose of a Woman's Life.

First, she is born, and the whole world knows,
That is the commonest kind of prose,—
Commonest kind, as the census shows:—

Born, and swaddled, and benighted tight,
In the middle of some cloud blackened night,
By the ghostly, glimmering, dim lamp's light,—

When mortals are heavy, as pigs of lead,
Huddled and cuddled, snug in bed,
Heedless of all that is sung or said.

And the little "woman in white" gets mis'd
Colic'd, and catnip-tea'd, and kissed,
And bounced about like a corn-meal grist:

Practicing babyhood's grandest airs,—
Simpere, pouting, in equal shares,
Till properly taught to lisp her prayers.

That night she sings—songs, on battered knees,
Adding petitions, by sage degrees,
Till included all that she hears and sees.

Time lifts the child up his ladder of years,
Now in dimples, and now in tears,—
Woman's aspirations and baby fears.

Far in the distance, dimly gleams,
Among the foldings of curst-told seams,
Turbids of gossamer, woven in dreams:—

Woo'd of rapture, glancing bright,
In and out of the dusky night,
As fire-flies dance in the black mid night;

And a dream of beauty, that all have had,
Sometimes torturing—sometimes glad,
Veineth her life-mesh sweetly sad.

But beautiful visions, and all bliss things,
Vanish on swift and invisible wings,
And only their echo sits and sings,—

Sits and sings, in the shady slopes,
Down where glided our golden hopes,
As orioles wing through the greenwood copse.

The maiden's heart hath a new-taught prayer,—
Her blue-veined hand—oh, "tis passing fair,
And she giveth it to a stranger's care;

I say it softly in his own,
Trusting the pressure and the tone,
Will last, when the bridal lays be down.

But spring flowers fade in the blossoming year;—
From the early frost there is more to fear,
Than the blighting autumn's, chill and drear.

And a touch of coldness creeps apace,
Over the love-warmth in his face,
And the roses droop in the household vase.

And tears rain down from her saddened eyes,
As she thinks of an orange-wreath that lies
Off in the dawn of her year of sighs:—

Off in the dawn! how strange it seems,
That the heart lives on, though its broken dreams
Scattered lie in the morning's beams!

Drifting now from the happy shore,—
Leaving the robes that her girlhood wore—
Leaving the paths she will tread no more.

Might she but gather an armful of things—
Paired pictures and broken rings,
And a lock of hair, where the curl still clings.

Then would she turn with her precious freight,
Back to the tread of her burdened fate—
Back, where the calls of duty wait.

What must the bride of a sad year do?
Solace her lord with a savory stew,
Made by hands with the veins so blue!

And with the pain in her womanly heart,
Mere for dinner some delicate art
Blending the wife's with the house-maid's art

Solace herself with a needle and thread,
Stitching, and stitching, till weary head
Drop on a breast, with the hope-star fed

Over the house, with an eye of care,
Watching for cob-webs everywhere,
Till wrinkles groove in her forehead fair.

Soothing the white dove on her breast,
Mourning so in a babe unrest,
Murmuring songs that they both love best.

By and by, as the years steal on,
The red from the lovely lip is gone,
And the rose-check fades, thin and wan,

And the blue-veined hands grow white each day,
And the heavy life-sands drop away,
As though they would mingle with church-yard clay.

And then a tale that is told of all—
She falls, some day, as the pale leaves fall,
And the plaintive night-winds sigh o'er all.

STELLA of Lackawanna.

TRUE EDUCATION.—Educate your children to activity, to enterprise, to fearlessness in what is right, to cowardice in what is wrong. Educate them to make for themselves the noblest purposes of life, and then to follow them out. Educate them to despise suffering that stands in the way of the accomplishment of many aims, and count it as a little thing. Make them free by lifting them up into the storms of life, and not by covering them down with soft and downy plush.

Society, like shaded silk, must be viewed in all situations, or its color will deceive us.

The Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was is democratic creed.

Punch says that poverty must be a woman—it is so fond of pinching a persons.

LETTER FROM EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN, IN REPLY TO GENERAL SCOTT.

On Wednesday last I received the *National Intelligencer*, containing Gen. Scott's address to the public. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the administration, in regard to the seven Cotton States now in rebellion. From our past relations I was greatly surprised at the appearance of such a paper. In one aspect, however, it was highly gratifying. It has justified me, nay, it has rendered it absolutely necessary, that I should no longer remain silent in respect to charges which have been long vaguely circulating, but are now endorsed by the responsible name of Gen. Scott.

I. The first and most prominent among these charges is my refusal immediately to garrison nine enumerated fortifications, scattered over six of the Southern States, according to the recommendation of Gen. Scott, in his "views," addressed to the War Department on the 29th and 30th of October, 1860. And it has been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented the civil war.

The refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd. All my Cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all acts of the administration; and certain it is that during the last six months previous to the 28th December, 1860, the day on which he resigned his office, after my request, he exercised less influence on the administration than any other member of the Cabinet. Mr. Holt was immediately thereafter transferred from the Post Office Department to that of War; so that, from this time until the 4th of March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the administration, he performed the duties of Secretary of War to my entire satisfaction.

But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications, in such manner, to use the language of Gen. Scott, "as to attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup-de-main ridiculous?" There is one answer both easy and conclusive, even if other valid reasons did not exist. There were no available troops within reach which could be sent to those fortifications. To have attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive by any means within the President's power would have been simply absurd. Of this Gen. Scott himself seems to have been convinced, for on the day after the date of his first "views" he addressed (on the 30th of October) supplemental views to the War Department, in which he states: "There is one (regular) company in Boston, one here, (at the Narrows,) one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta, (Ga.) one at Baton Rouge"—in all five companies only within reach of garrison or reinforce the forts mentioned in the "views!"

Five companies—four hundred men—to occupy and reinforce nine fortifications in six highly excited Southern States! The force "within reach" was so entirely inadequate that nothing more need be said on the subject. To have attempted such a military operation with so feeble a force, and the Presidential election impending, would have been an invitation to collision and secession. Indeed, if the whole American army consisting then of only sixteen thousand men, had been "within reach" they would have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want of troops that although Gen. Scott, believing, in opposition to the opinion of the committee raised in the House of Representatives, that the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military force, was only able to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th March, six hundred and fifty three men, rank and file of the army. And, to make up this number, even the sappers and miners were brought from West Point.

But why was there no greater force within reach? This question could be better answered by Gen. Scott himself than by any other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a few hundred men, were out of reach on our remote frontiers, where it had been continuously stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants on their way thither against the attacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient and both Gen. Scott and myself had endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regiments for this purpose. In recommending this augmentation of the army, the General states in his report to the War Department of November, 1857, that "it would not more than furnish the reinforcements now greatly needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington (T.) Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah." And again, in his report of November, 1858, he says:

"This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add, that as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion."

These "views" of General Scott exhibit the crude notions then prevailing even among intelligent and patriotic men on this subject of

secession. In the first sentence the General whilst stating that "to save time the right of secession may be conceded," yet immediately says "this is instantly balanced by the correlative right on the part of the Federal Government against an interior State or States to re-establish by force if necessary, its former continuity of territory." (For this he cites "Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy," last chapter.) It may be there, but I have been unable to find it.) Whilst it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he renders what he did not mean quite clear in his supplementary "views." In these he says: "It will be seen that the 'views' only apply to a case of secession that makes a gap in the present Union." The falling off of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the Potomac south, (the very case which has occurred,) was not within the scope of General Scott's "provisional remedies;" that is to say, to establish by force, if necessary, the continuity of our territory. In his "views" he also states as follows: "But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of recruiting the fragments, except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison, with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the General's opinion "a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragments of the great Republic to form themselves into new Confederacies, probably four." He then points out what ought to be the boundaries between the new Unions, and at the end of each goes so far as even to indicate the cities which ought to be the capitals of the three first on this side of the Rocky mountains, to wit, "Columbia, South Carolina," "Alton or Quincy, Illinois," and "Albany New York," excluding Washington city altogether. This indication of capitals contained in the original now in my possession is curiously omitted in the version published in the *National Intelligencer*. He designates no capital for the fourth Union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what encouragement these views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have afforded to the secessionists of the cotton States.

I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every mind who I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile; Forts Pickens and M'Cre, in Pensacola harbor; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah; Forts Moultrie and Sumpter, Charleston harbor; and Fort Monroe, in Virginia.

These "views," both original and supplementary, were published by General Scott in the *National Intelligencer* of January, 18, 1861, at the most important and critical period of the administration. Their publication, at that time, could do no possible good, and might do much harm. To have published them, without the President's knowledge and consent, was as much in violation of the sacred confidence which ought to prevail between the commanding general of the army and the commander-in-chief as it would have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his authority.—What is of more importance, their publication was calculated injuriously to affect the compromise measures then pending before Congress and the country, and to encourage the secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into fragments. From the great respect which I then entertained for the General I passed it over in silence.

It is worthy of remark that soon after the Presidential election, representations of what these "views" contained, of more or less correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially throughout the South. The editors of the *National Intelligencer*, in assigning a reason for their publication, states that both in public prints and in public speeches allusions had been made to them, and some misapprehensions of their character had got abroad.

It and III General Scott states that he arrived in Washington on the 12th, and accompanied by the Secretary of War, held a conversation with the President on the 15th December. Whilst I have no recollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtless states correctly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to reinforce Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed to Fort Sumpter. The reason for this refusal is manifested to all who recollect the history of the time. But twelve days before, in the annual message of the 3d December, I had urged upon Congress the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the "Crittenden Compromise." At that time high hopes were entertained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Besides, I believed, and this correctly, as the event proved, that Major Anderson was then in no danger of attack. Indeed he and his command were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities and people of Charleston.—Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would have been only to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke collision and disappoint the country.

There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the General's memory must be defective. At present I shall specify only one. I could not have stated that

graph "Major Anderson of Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumpter) against attack," because, with prudent precaution, this had already been done several days before through a special messenger sent to Major Anderson for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buell, of the army.

The General's supplementary note of the same day, presenting to me General Jackson's conduct in 1833, during the period of nullification, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the cases were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This was, every hazard, to collect the customs at Charleston, and outside of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the existing collector, as I had anticipated, resigned his office about the end of December, and immediately thereafter I nominated to the Senate as his successor a suitable person, prepared at any personal risk to do his duty. That body, however, throughout its entire session declined to act on this nomination. Thus without a collector, it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue.

IV. General Scott's statement alleges that "the Brooklyn, with Capt. Vodge's company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 2d, and on the 29th President Buchanan, having entered into a quasi armistice with certain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct in a joint note the commander of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieut. Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Capt. Vodge's company unless the fort should be attacked." He afterwards states, within brackets, "That joint note I never saw, but suppose the armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was understood to terminate with it."

These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part of General Scott. It is scarcely credible that this very joint note presented in such odious colors was submitted to General Scott on the day it was prepared, (29th January), and met his entire approbation. I would not venture to make this assertion if I did not possess conclusive evidence to prove it. On that day Secretary Holt addressed me a note, from which the following is an extract: "I have the satisfaction of saying, that on submitting the paper to General Scott, he expressed himself satisfied with it, saying that there could be no objection to the arrangement in a military point of view or otherwise." This requires no comment. That the General had every reason to be satisfied with the arrangement will appear from the following statement:

A revolutionary outbreak had occurred in Florida; the troops of the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and the adjacent navy yard; and Lieut. Slemmer, of the artillery, with his brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens; where he was in imminent danger every moment of being captured by a vastly superior force. Owing to the interruption of regular communications Secretary Holt did not receive information of these events until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter addressed to a third person. He instantly informed the President of the fact, and reinforcements, provisions, and military stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a moment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January.

Well-founded apprehension were, however, entertained at the time of her departure that the reinforcement, with the vessels of war at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive in time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of suspense, and whilst Lieut. Slemmer was in extreme peril, Senators Sidel, Hunter, and Bilger received a telegraphic dispatch from Senator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola, on the 28th January, with the urgent request that they should lay it before the President. This dispatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made on Fort Pickens if the present status should be preserved.

This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort and to the unhappy effect which an actual collision either at that or any other point might produce on the Peace Convention then about to assemble at Washington. The result was that a joint dispatch was carefully prepared by the Secretaries of War and Navy accepting the proposal, with important modification, which was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th January to Lieutenant Slemmer and to the naval commanders near the station. It is too long for transcription; suffice it to say it was carefully guarded at every point for the security of the fort and its free communication with Washington.

The result was highly fortunate. The Brooklyn had a long passage. Although she left Fortress Monroe on the 24th January, she did not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th February. In the meantime, Fort Pickens, with Lieutenant Slemmer, (whose conduct deserves high commendation,) and his brave little band were placed, by virtue of this arrangement, in perfect security until an adequate force had arrived.

Well might General Scott express his satisfaction with this arrangement. The General was correct in the supposition that this arrangement was to expire on the termination of the Peace Convention.

V. But we now come to an important period, when dates will be essentially necessary to disentangle the statement of Gen. Scott. The South Carolina Commissioners were appointed on the 22nd, and arrived in Washington on the 27th December. The day after their arrival it was announced that Major Anderson had removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumpter. This rendered them furious. On the same day they addressed an angry letter to the President demanding the surrender of Fort Sumpter. The President answered this letter on 30th December by a peremptory refusal. This brought forth a reply from the Commissioners on the 2nd January 1861 of such an insulting character that the President instantly returned it to them with the following endorsement: "This paper just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, politic and personal intercourse finally ceased between the revolutionary Senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coldest character ever since the President's anti-secession message at the commencement of the Session of Congress.

Under these changed circumstances, General Scott, by note on Sunday, the 30th December, addressed the following inquiry to the President: "Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits, from New York harbor, to reinforce Fort Sumpter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition and subsistence? It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose to-morrow."

The General seems not to have then known that Mr. Floyd was out of office. Never did a request meet a more prompt compliance. It was received on Sunday evening December 30th. On Monday evening General Scott came to congratulate me that the Secretaries had issued the necessary orders to the army and navy officers, and that they were in his possession. The Brooklyn with troops, military stores and provisions was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe for Fort Sumpter. I am, therefore, utterly at loss to imagine why the General, in his statement, should have asserted that "the South Carolina Commissioners had already been many days in Washington and no movement of defence (on part of the United States) was permitted." These Commissioners arrived in Washington on 27th December; Gen. Scott's request was made to the President on the 30th. It was complied with on the 31st, and a single day is all that represents the "many days" of the General.

Again, General Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, the President refused to allow any attempt to be made—to reinforce Fort Sumpter—because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina Commissioners. And still again he asserts, in the face of the fact, and reinforcements, provisions, and military stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a moment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January.

At the interview already referred to between the General and myself, on the evening of Monday the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina Commissioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be considered an improper act to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumpter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day; that the delay could not continue more than forty-eight hours.—He promptly concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not transmitted to the Brooklyn that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2nd of January I received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the meantime, however, the General had become convinced, by the representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success and reach the fort, would be to send a fast side-wheel mercantile steamer from New York with the reinforcement. Accordingly the "Star of the West" was selected for this duty. The substitution of this mercantile steamer for the Brooklyn which would have been able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgment of Gen. Scott.

The change of programme required a brief space of time; but the Star of the West left New York for Charleston on the evening of the 5th January. On the 6th day, however,

adequate force had arrived.