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BY JAS. CLARK.

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Speech of A. K. Cornyn, Esq., On the Bill to elect the Judges—Delivered Feb- ruary 6th and 8th, 1850.

MR. SPEAKER: I would gladly avoid entering upon the discussion of this question at the present time, if I could at all reconcile it with my convictions of duty—not merely duty to my constituents and the Commonwealth, but an imperative duty I owe to myself.

I take it for granted that the present Constitution, as far as regards the Judiciary, is a doomed instrument, and I have not the vanity to suppose that any thing I may say, on this occasion, will avert its fate. But I deem it my duty, entertaining the deliberate convictions I do, to state fairly, fully and distinctly, the ground I occupy on this subject.

I utterly deny the statement of the gentleman from Philadelphia (Mr. Burden) that those who oppose this resolution distrust the people; and I also deny that any amendment to the original resolution, at this time, is any evidence of a want of confidence in the people. Sir, I have much confidence in the people as any man can have; every act in the history of the American people from the landing of the Pilgrims down to the present time has satisfied the world that man is capable of self-government; but I will undertake to demonstrate that the issue attempted to be made by the gentleman from the city is as false, as it is unjust. I solicit the patient attention of the House first to what I have to say in regard to the resolution itself; secondly to my objections to the principle of an elective Judiciary.

I may remark here and with great truth too, that the Legislature of Pennsylvania has never been engaged in the discussion of a question of so sober, so grave and important a nature, and one too in which the people of the Commonwealth are so deeply and vitally interested. And is it not important to consider well what we are about to do? We are not tinkering and tampering with the extremities, we are about to attack life's life in the heart.

The Judicial branch of this Government is by far the most important of all its parts. The Legislative and Executive are important in themselves, but compared with the Judiciary they dwindle into insignificance. The former might fall in ruins around us; but if the latter survive the general destruction, the rights and interests of the people would still be secured.

And how, Sir, under what circumstances are we approaching or examining, passing or amending a resolution of this nature? And in an order to show how the resolution was passed and what little care and deliberation were exhibited on the occasion, I must refer to the session of 1849. You will remember Mr. Speaker—for you were here at the time—that it was brought into this House from the Senate near the close of the last session and at a time when the wildest and most ungovernable excitement prevailed it, and was rushed rapidly through without a moment's time for reflection or examination. I well remember that I stood on the floor where the gentleman from Adams now sits, desirous of having an opportunity of seeing what it was, of offering some amendment, of bringing its defects and absurdities before the House, but my mouth was closed by an imperious call for the previous question, all discussion cut off, all deliberation and all amendment; and thus this most important resolution, without being discussed or examined, passed through the House! It is now before us, and gentlemen are anxiously pressing its passage and opposing an amendment. Let it not be said that gentlemen who oppose the passage of this resolution are opposed to the people! On the other hand it is because I have confidence in the people—in their integrity and discrimination, and because I feel a deep interest in their welfare and prosperity, that I take the course I have indicated.

The people are not to be carried away by a humbug! They are not to be deceived by false issues; they are not to be readily blinded when their own interests are at stake. I know well the risk I run and the imminent peril I encounter in subjecting myself to misapprehension from the honest, and designed misinterpretation from the demagogue;—but none of these things can move me, or drive me from the discharge of my duty.

Here, then, is this resolution with all its defects and its incongruities, passed in hot and indecent haste at the last session, although days and weeks are consumed in the discussion and consideration of contemptible divorce cases; but when it came to the great question—the question affecting the organic law of the land, the question in which every individual of the Commonwealth is deeply interested; then there was no time for reflection, no time for investigation. This resolution, then, passed under those extraordinary circumstances, is again before us, and gentlemen tell us we must pass it without amendment because the people desire it. Sir, I ask where is the evidence of the people's desire on this subject? Where have they spoken? Where are the petitions asking it? It has been said that the Conventions, Whig and Democratic, passed resolutions recommending it, but I take it, passing said resolutions was no part of their duty; their duty was to nominate a candidate for Canal Commissioner, and to inquire into or recommend a reform in the Judiciary system. There has never been a petition presented to this House; the people have not come up here and demanded it; they have not exercised the only constitutional means they possess of making known their wishes to the Legislature; what then is the pressing necessity for its hasty passage? Are the rights of the people in this country not amply and broadly secured already? Are not the Courts of Justice open to all—the rich and the poor alike? Is there no allegation that the present Judiciary is either weak or corrupt; no complaints have come up here on that score; then, I submit, if the present Judiciary is what it ought to be; if it has secured and protected every interest, public and private as I believe it has; if the State is going on prosperously; why shall this House take a leap in the dark, that may lead us, God in his infinite wisdom, only knows where?

Now, Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton (Mr. Porter) is obviously proper; which is, to submit the broad and naked proposition, will the people elect judges? curtailed of its absurdities and shorn of its incongruities.

It will be remembered that if no amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the people oftener than once in five years. If then this resolution is liable to all the objections which I will undertake to show it is, and will entail upon the people all the evil results I apprehend it will, they must bear it for five long years, for they have no remedy left to improve or reform it. But if you adopt the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton to submit the simple proposition to the people—Will you

elect your judges? and leave the details to a subsequent Legislature, the difficulties I see can be readily obviated. Again, the constitution in Article Tenth says: "that if more than one Amendment be submitted, they shall be submitted in such manner and form, that the people may vote for or against each amendment separately and distinctly." Thus it will be seen that each proposition is to be submitted to the people so that they can vote thereon distinctly, and in this respect the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton is within the letter and the meaning of the Constitution, while the original resolution is directly in its face. There is not only one, but several propositions embraced in the resolution, and so embraced that you must vote for all or none of them, or in other words, that you cannot vote on each separately and distinctly.

I know it is contended on the other side that the resolution forms but one proposition, and that the amendment is a mere mistake. The first proposition in the resolution is, will the people elect their judges; the next proposition is the time when you will elect them; then the term for which you will elect them; and how shall you elect the Supreme judges, either by districts or the State at large; you will turn out all the present judges without regard to the expiration of their commissions; shall the judges so elected be re-eligible; shall all the power over the Judiciary be vested in the Legislative branch of the Government; and shall the Executive become the mere headman to do its bidding. All these propositions, it seems to me, are embraced in the resolution and are so inseparably connected, one with another, that you must vote for all or none. I might with great propriety say that the gentleman who advocates the passage of this resolution without amendment, are opposed to this reform; that they fear if the simple proposition be submitted to the people, they would vote for it, whereas their good sense would lead them to reject the present resolution on account of its objectionable features and its impracticable details. And now I will proceed to state with great brevity, what I conceive to be the prominent objections to the resolution. First, in regard to the power of the Legislature over the Judiciary. The resolution goes on to say, "the president judges of the several courts of common pleas & such other courts of records are or shall be established by law, and all judges required to be learned in the law, shall hold their offices for the term of ten years, if they shall so long behave themselves well. The associate judges of the courts of common pleas shall hold their offices for the term of five years if they shall so long behave themselves well; all of whom shall be commissioned by the Governor, but for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment, the Governor shall remove any of them on the address of two-thirds of each branch of the Legislature." It is used, leaving the Executive no discretion, no power, no authority; but vesting it all in the Legislature.—Our government cannot be said to be a pure democracy, but what is more properly called a representative democracy, where the people have agreed to part with a certain portion of their power, and to place it in three or four branches of the government. They have parted with it on condition that it should be so placed, and that neither branch should interfere with, or usurp the power of the other. Sir, it will be seen, that if the doctrine of this resolution be established, the power of the Executive, so far as regards the Judiciary is gone; he is peremptorily directed to carry out and execute the will of the Legislature, to do its bidding and become a mere axeman in its hands.

That the Judiciary becomes entirely dependent upon the Legislature, perhaps the most unsafe depository of power in this government. What! Sir, are the people of Pennsylvania prepared to vest all the power in the Legislature? Are they prepared to destroy that nicely adjusted system of balances and checks under which this country has prospered, and under which all their rights have been secured? What would be thought of a proposition to commission the Executive to sign every bill the Legislature might see fit to pass without regard to its justice or constitutionality? and supposing such to be the case, what would become of the rights of the people, in what would consist their security? how often have measures been carried through this House, in moments of the highest excitement, under the spur and whip of party measures that struck at the constitution, and which if not arrested by the conservative arm of the Executive might have subverted the rights of the people. And yet the proposition contained in this resolution is nothing less than this, but to all intents and purposes, so far as regards the Judiciary, the Legislature have the whole and sole control. This then, it seems to me, is an insuperable objection to the resolution and would constrain me to vote against it, even were I strongly in favor of the elective principle.

The next objection to the resolution, is the re-eligibility of the judges. If the judges are re-eligible, let them be placed in circumstances under which they would have no temptation to err—no temptation to do what is wrong. Let the gentleman from Adams, (Mr. Smyser), has told us that if a man is honest and upright he will discharge his duty regardless of consequences. This is a fine theory; a beautiful morality, but unfortunately it is seldom illustrated. I have as high an opinion of mankind as the gentleman from Adams; but when statute books—all the laws, all the jails and Penitentiaries that cover this State begin to think that man is weak—that he needs safeguards—and I begin to see the great propriety of that inimitable prayer "lead us not into temptation." See to what temptations you subject a judge. Suppose him to be a fair and honest man, in the ordinary sense of the term, and anxious to do what is right. He is presiding as a judge with two parties before him; one of the parties perhaps a man of powerful influence from his wealth, his intelligence, his connections, or no matter what—the other poor and obscure, without influence and without notoriety. The judge is looking forward to a re-election, with a family at home, perhaps, whose comfort depends on that re-election; think you, sir, he will be able to look beyond himself, beyond his family, to forget everything but the justice of the cause? Think you under such circumstances, that poor and obscure man, without wealth and without influence at his command, would receive that fair and impartial justice which would be meted out to him under other circumstances? It is asking too much of poor humanity. A judge desirous of re-election instead of being the calm and impartial expositor of the law he ought to be, neither looking to

the right or the left, like Caesar's wife, not only unsuspected, but above all suspicion, will be found trimming his judicial sails to fall in with that current which will secure him possession of his office. That government, therefore, which would be either just to itself or just to its citizens, should be careful to remove every temptation that might seduce or destroy.

Supposing the judge to have risen superior to the temptations which assailed him—supposing him to have laid down the law fairly and honestly as he believed it to be, would that satisfy the disappointed suitor that the decision was just? How readily would he attribute it to a desire on the part of the judge to take the popular side! The personal security of every citizen in this country, as well as the rights of property, all depend upon the respect and veneration we have for our courts of Justice. If it is that respect which leads us to acquiesce quietly and submit tamely to the decrees of our courts; and if it were otherwise, the rights of no man would be secure. Mob law and brute force would assert their right to reign. It will therefore be seen that a judge ought not to be placed under circumstances that will subject his conduct to suspicion, and tend to destroy that respect and regard which should ever accompany and follow the decisions of our courts.

If the judge is not re-eligible—if there is held out to him no temptation in the way of popularity—when it is known to him and the community, in which he resides, that he can but serve to the expiration of a single term, then there is no inducement to err, no temptation to interfere with the scales of justice. This, then, is another objection to the resolution.

A third is, the time of the election. This resolution provides that the "said election shall take place at the general election of this Commonwealth." Now it seems to me that if the people are to elect the judges, they ought not to elect them at the time of the general election. But some other time should be fixed, when there would be less political feeling to interfere with the calm and impartial selection of a judge. Need I ask you to turn your attention to some of our past elections to see what political strife and personal bitterness have characterized many, if not all of them,—to bring, for instance, to your mind, that campaign of 1838, when Pennsylvania was convulsed from end to end of the campaign which had well nigh closed in the overthrow of the Government? Is such an occasion a fit time to elect judges of our courts of justice? Can they in the nature of things prevent themselves from being mixed up with, and becoming a part and portion of that bitterness and that strife which are inseparable from political contests? Can they be expected to remain calm, quiet and self-poised, when all around is tumult and excitement? We should never forget that they are but men, and to ask of them more than can be expected of us, is unfair and unjust. A judge elected under such circumstances is placed in a most painfully embarrassing situation. All the infractions of law and violations of right that have necessarily occurred during the wild excitement of a contest in his own district, are to be tried and adjudicated before him, and we all know how propitious such a season is for the grossest of all injustices and all rights; for how seldom does the indiscriminate barbarity of party spirit spare anything, or stop at anything which may hinder the accomplishment of its fondest schemes! It requires no farther argument to show clearly the great impropriety of electing them at such a time and under such circumstances.

A fourth objection is in relation to the injustice done the present judges, by taking from them their commissions without regard to the time of their expiration. When those judges received their appointments, they took them under an implied contract on the part of the State that they were commissioned for the term of ten years, with that understanding, and reposing in the faith of that implied contract, many of them left a lucrative practice, some of them their homes, to enter upon the discharge of their duties. They have been discharging those duties fairly, honestly and impartially; there has not been the slightest ground for any complaint, or allegation of wrong on the part of any one. Now I submit whether to turn them out suddenly, without notice and without cause, be in accordance with that great injunction—"Do unto others as you would that others should do unto you?" Nor is it in accordance with the plain rules which govern a contract between man and man. Take the case of a hiring for a year or a term; the person so hired has contracted to perform his labor under the terms of his contract; he is discharging every duty and obligation imposed upon him by its terms; he is meeting fully the very letter of the contract, when he is suddenly informed that his services can be dispensed with although the period for which he has hired has not yet terminated.—Between man and man, I say, this would be a clear and unmitigated violation of a contract, and would be held by every court of justice in the land; how, then, can the Commonwealth escape from this rule of law? Is the same rigid rule to be observed with regard to her contracts? Is less faith and confidence to be reposed in her than in the humblest citizen within her borders? It may be said, and it has been said, that if those judges are what they ought to be they would be re-elected. This does not follow by any means, and instead of being an answer to the argument, is a mere evasion. Indeed, it cannot be answered; it is too plain to admit of doubt.

The fifth objection is, the term for which they shall hold their offices. If the people are capable of electing judges once in ten years, and God knows I do not doubt their capability, they are capable of electing them oftener, they are capable of electing them once in three years or once in five years. Let the term be three or five, as it ought to be, instead of ten years, and the people will have an opportunity to bring their public servants to a short and speedy account. Ten years is entirely too long to bear with either a weak or an unjust judge, for of all curses which can be inflicted upon a community is a corrupt judge with no means of removing him. But it may be said that if he is either unjust or incapable, a mode is pointed out by which the Legislature may remove him. You can readily imagine, sir, what a slow and difficult process this might be and how uncertain would be its result. It will not only depend upon

the man and his political standing but on the nature and character of the Legislature, and the various and unforeseen influences that might operate. We have had lamentable evidences of this in Pennsylvania before to-day. Instead therefore of giving the power to the Legislature and vesting them with supreme command, give it to the people, where it rightly and legitimately belongs, for in shortening the terms you do but increase the power of the people. And I am amazed that the friends of this resolution, who seem to be so purely democratic in their notions, and who seem to entertain such a horror and disgust of anything conservative, should involve themselves in such a glaring inconsistency as to the advocate a term of ten years.

These are some of the objections, together with many others which I have not time now to enumerate or dwell upon. I have made these in no captious spirit, with no mere view of throwing anything in the way of the passage of this resolution; they have been made honestly and in good faith, and I now ask whether this reform is so imperatively demanded by the people as to require the immediate passage of this resolution with all its manifest defects and insuperable objections—taken in connection with the fact that if we do pass it we must labor under its evils without remedy for a period of five years?

So careful were the framers of the Constitution, so apprehensive were they of hasty legislation on this subject, that in the Tenth Article they provided with great wisdom, that "any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in the Senate or House of Representatives, and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each House, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be entered on their journals with the yeas and nays taken thereon and the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same to be published three months before the next election in at least one newspaper in every county in which a newspaper shall be published, and if in the Legislature next afterwards chosen, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each House, the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same to be again published in manner aforesaid and such proposed amendment or amendments shall be submitted to the people in such manner and time," &c. Now it will be seen that the assent of two Legislatures is required, and why? That care and deliberation, time and reflection should be bestowed.—Those distinguished men seem to have foreseen what has occurred in a period of twelve years, for never was the foresight or sagacity of that convention more strikingly manifest than when it incorporated this provision into the Constitution. They seemed to foresee the state of things which existed here at the session of '49; a proposed amendment to the Constitution brought into this House and in a moment of tumult and excitement, without either consideration or deliberation, passed upon as though it was a matter of no moment.

Well might they incorporate such a provision in view of such a state of facts. But if this resolution is to pass in its present shape, and without amendment, and if we have no right to go behind the action of the last Legislature, of what avail is such a provision; what is it but the action of one Legislature instead of two, as required by the Constitution? And such action as that was! The design of the framers of the Constitution was, that in subjecting it to the inspection of a second Legislature, the defects of the amendment, if it had any, might be perceived and the objections to it obviated by wise and proper amendment. That this resolution is defective is generally admitted; that the amendment of the gentleman from Northampton is proper and right, is as generally conceded. Why then will this House not pause—why will it not deliberate?

Thus much in regard to the resolution itself. I now, sir, come to the principle itself, the principle of an elective Judiciary, and I do think the propriety of adopting it may be well doubted. It becomes us to pause and reflect—to take a calm survey of all that is around us and about us, and to weigh well all we are about to do. It is easy to tear down, it requires neither science nor skill to prostrate the farthest temple ever reared by the hands of Freedom, but it is a difficult task to re-build, re-organize and re-construct. We are now happy and prosperous, this we know; in the history of mankind there is nothing approaching the public and private advantages that we possess, and yet we are not satisfied. What more can we ask—what more have we a right to expect than our institutions have already done for us? Who can foretell or even fore-

see the consequences that may flow from the adoption of the proposed reform, whether it will benefit the people, whether it will end sooner or later in anarchy and confusion, in the whole and entire overthrow of all we hold most dear?—No man can tell, sir. No man can penetrate the veil. We know the State is now flourishing, that its citizens are protected and secured in all their rights, that justice is now administered without "sale, denial or delay;" is it wise then is it prudent, to put all the blessings and privileges we enjoy in jeopardy, to hang the fate of this people on the hazard of a die, on a wild and untried experiment? What would be thought, sir, of that man, who was in a sound and healthy condition, with all his organs performing their appropriate functions, if under such circumstances he should call in a physician and desire to undergo severe medical treatment—a treatment that might weaken, if not bring him down to a premature grave? Why, sir, he would be called a fool, a madman, and yet we, in a sound and healthy condition, with all the functions of the government performing their appropriate duties, are about to do the same thing. The subject, sir, as I before stated, is surrounded on all sides with everything to invest it with a deep and solemn importance. The Judiciary to us is everything; to it we are mainly indebted for all we have, and on it we must depend; to it we must look for all we hope to have. Let us be careful then, I beseech you, how we tamper with it, lest in an unguarded moment we strike a fatal blow.

To a free people, and a people who desire to remain free, a written constitution with justice and equality for its basis is absolutely necessary; but, sir, that constitution, however well defined—however just and equitable in all its provisions and features, is not worth the paper on which it is written, if there be no power in the government to protect, defend and expound it. The Constitution has often been assailed and its principles attempted to be contravened by hasty and inconsiderate legislation; the Legislature has often laid upon its rude and unsparring hand, and had it not been for the timely interference of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth, it would have received many a serious wound, and in wounding it you wound the people and their dearest rights.

But it may be said what has time to do with the question. It has this to do, sir; under our wisely adjusted system of jurisprudence, our courts of justice are not political arenas, where judicial gladiators may meet to carry out some favorite party project, where instead of protecting and defending the Constitution, they make sad and lamentable havoc of it—under our present system they are in a great measure removed above and beyond the swellings and surgings of popular commotion, and of party strife and party bitterness. They are no part or portion of it, and as a consequence they are not its slaves to do its bidding, and its dirty work. Their position is rather neutral than otherwise, and they are thus fitted to judge calmly and decide impartially. This perhaps is not the time to speak of the present Supreme Court as it deserves to be spoken of. When it has been struck down by radicalism and polluted with party spirit, the people will be able to see and to feel what they have lost. I may, however, sir, speak of the head of that court without being regarded as invidious in any sense. The present chief justice of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is a man that the State and the nation may well be proud of—with an enlarged understanding, a powerful, vigorous and discriminating mind, he has shed a lustre upon the bench; and his judicial opinions will be read and admired as long as law and learning are appreciated. Let his enemies be patient, he is an old man, and it may soon be said of him as it was of Duncan; "after life's fitful fever he sleeps well." But when you come to elect the Supreme judges by a party movement and a party vote, you change the complexion of affairs; you give that court a party cast, aye, sir, and you give it a party bearing and a party leaning. You bring it into the mire and filth of party politics, and it is at once shorn of that regard and that respect which should ever be entertained for it and its decisions. Make it a party bench, as it would be, and what becomes of the rights of the minority? For remember, sir, the constitution was not made for the majority alone, it was made for all; yes, the humblest citizen that walks is entitled to its provisions. He has a right to hold it up as his shield and defence, and to claim its protection; but when the supreme court, the court of the last resort of this great State, has become the theatre for party figure in, as it would soon be under an elective system, God

help minorities; for the court would become the representative of the majority—that majority who placed them in power. But it may be said, they need not become party men, they need not be influenced by parties. Is there a man in this House who is not to some extent influenced by considerations that may favor the party that elected him; are we not particularly anxious about the fate of our party. Let any man look at the voting here, and see how far party feeling can and does carry men; and tell me that we are not to a considerable extent its slaves. Why, then, will you ask more of judges than we are willing to do ourselves? They are but flesh and blood, as we are, subject to like temptations, and is it fair, is it right that we should expect, that we should ask them to do what we cannot do? Show me the man who can rise superior to party spirit and party influence, especially when he is a constituent portion of it, as the judges would be if elected.—There lives no such man.

To elect a judge by the people, you place him to a greater or less extent under obligations to all those who have sustained and supported him. Every man who has voted for him or contributed to his election, supposes that he has some claims upon him, and when his cause is to be tried and adjudicated before him, he will be led to expect much favor at his hands. You thus place a judge in circumstances in which he never should be placed; if one of the suitors before him for trial has been his bitter opponent, he goes into that court with little expectation of receiving justice at its hands, and if defeated he goes home, not satisfied that the weakness or want of merit in his cause defeated him, but that it was his opposition to the judge that rendered the verdict against him. However the truth of the case might be, this would be the natural conclusion to which he would come; and men, under such circumstances, instead of quietly and peaceably acquiescing in the verdicts of our courts, would be led to look upon them as the mere reward of party, and the time would soon come when decisions and verdicts would be of no more value than the paper on which they are recorded. But suppose another case. Suppose there to be an election for judge in a certain district; suppose the campaign to be warmly and fiercely contested on both sides; suppose I, sir, as a voter in the district, felt it to be my incumbent duty to oppose with great energy the election of the successful candidate. I do all in my power to defeat him, and labor with great warmth and great zeal for the success of his opponent; think you, sir, when I come into that court with a client, that I am going to receive that consideration which is given to the lawyer who was his fast friend? My client then becomes the victim; if it is in a civil case, then he may appeal and take it to a higher court; but as the Speaker has well remarked, there is no remedy in a criminal case, there is no appeal; if justice has been done him, he must suffer without remedy. Take still another case. Suppose the candidates for judge in a close district, canvassing their district, meeting their fellow citizens at every point; meeting men who have causes to try, and those men talking to them fully and freely about the great merits of their cases, and the injustice that has been done them. In a word they are electioneering for the office, (for it will come to this, and it is idle to deny it,) and they must pass through all the paraphernalia incident to the successful politician. Is a man under such circumstances, just emerging from a fierce political strife with all the feelings and prejudices fresh upon him, fit to be a judge: fit to administer the law as it should be administered, without "fear, favor or affection?"

But it has been said by the gentleman from Adams, that the appointing power at present is the same thing. Not at all, sir. The Governor who appoints, and the Senate who confirm, never in all probability, come before that judge for trial; he will have nothing to do with their interests or their rights. Never perhaps embarrassed by having before him, the man from whom he received his office; while on the other hand it is absolutely certain that many, if not all the voters in his district will at one time or another be in his court as parties or witnesses. Thus the case is widely different and strikingly distinguished.

Let it not be said, however, that I lack confidence in the people—that I doubt their capability to choose good judges, for I do not; I believe the people might and would elect a good judge, but that is not the question. Sir, how long would he remain a good judge under the influences and temptations which surround him? Would he adhere to his integrity under all circumstances and at all times?