



HUNTINGDON:

Wednesday, June 17, 1846.

Whig Candidate for Canal Commissioner, JAMES M. POWER, OF MERCER COUNTY.

The Scott and Marcy correspondence has crowded out a number of advertisements. They shall appear again in our next.

Gen. Scott and the Secretary of War.

In justice to our readers at large, as well as to the parties immediately interested, it becomes not only proper, but expedient and necessary, that we should lay before the public the correspondence which has lately taken place between the Secretary of War and Major General Winfield Scott, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, next after the President, whom the Constitution declares to be the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States.

For some years past, Gen. Scott, as the commander-in-chief under the President, of the army, has been stationed at Washington, where an apartment is assigned him in the War office, and where he attends from day to day to the details of the military service, preparatory to the issuing of orders to the various generals and commanders having command of departments and posts. The President gives the source of all military authority, presiding himself through the Secretary of War, to Gen. Scott, who in his turn issues his orders to the officers of divisions or posts next below him, and so on until the orders finally reach and are executed by the common soldiers, or the captains, lieutenants, sergeants and corporals who command them.

In the case in hand, Gen. Taylor had been ordered to take command of the army on the Mexican frontier, where he has acquitted himself with great honor to himself and his country. It is also a principle of military discipline, that whenever a general is sent on a distant expedition, he shall be furnished with written orders or instructions from his superior officers; and no prudent officer will ever set out on a distant and hazardous expedition, without such written instructions or orders from his superiors, for the obvious reason, that if his enterprise should prove unsuccessful or disastrous, his employers may cast all the disgrace upon him by alleging that he acted contrary to orders. This much is necessary to a proper understanding of Gen. Scott's letters.

Gen. Scott's letter to the Secretary of War, that the command of the army destined to invade Mexico, was to be given to the former; but neither of the parties could have understood that the General-in-chief should proceed to the Rio Grande, or beyond it, there to await the coming of the army of invasion. Such a proceeding is unheard of in military history; and yet if any meaning can be given to the letters of the Secretary, it is that Scott should invade Mexico alone, or at most with the small force now under Gen. Taylor, who was to be deprived of his command to no purpose, and there await, in the enemy's country, the coming of the army of volunteers. No wise man would place himself in this position; and if Gen. Scott had placed himself in such a false attitude, without any written orders from the Secretary of War to leave his post at Washington, he would have forfeited the confidence of the country in his judgment as a man, as well as in his skill as a soldier. He has lived too long and seen too much hard service, to be entrapped at this day by the intrigues of Mr. Marcy and those who confederate with him.

The Secretary, by the advice of the President, has caused to be introduced into Congress a bill for the appointment of two new Major Generals in the army; and it is said to be the intention of the President to make Sam. Houston and some other favorite, the new generals. The object of Polk and his Cabinet is to get rid of the old generals, particularly of Scott, whose war-worn figure terrifies them whenever he passes the President's house. "Coming events cast their shadows before."

The most frightful of all phantoms, in the minds of Polk and Marcy, is Scott returning in triumph from a Mexican campaign. To prevent this they would willingly see the failure of a campaign, and the loss of an army of their fellow-citizens. Scott is fully aware of their designs. Had they succeeded in driving the old soldier into Mexico without written orders and without the necessary army to support him, or the necessary means to sustain his army, nothing could have been easier than the ruin of this brave man. It was only to withhold the necessary men, provisions, horses, arms and equipments of all sorts. All the blame of all the disasters of the campaign, would have been laid upon the unfortunate General, who would have had no means of justifying himself before the country, not even any authority to show for his conduct. It was the certain knowledge of these dangers, which led him to allude with indignation to the "fire in his rear from Washington."

All honorable minds must and will approve the high and delicate sense of a brother soldier's feelings, which speaks out in the following passage from Gen. Scott's first letter, viz: "It is always unjust to a junior General who has done well, and is supposed to be doing well, to supersede him by a General of higher rank, without sending him the latter corresponding reinforcements. I should esteem myself the unhappy instrument of wounding the honorable pride of the gallant and judicious Taylor, if ordered to supersede him under different circumstances."

And all must feel, too, the act of justice which is done by one old soldier to another, in tendering to Gen. Taylor his choice of the division of the army of invasion.

Mr. Webster Vindicated.

We learn from Washington, that the select committee appointed to investigate the charges preferred by Mr. Ingersoll against Mr. Webster, has made a report which entirely acquits the Senator from Massachusetts. The report is signed by Messrs. Jones, Davis, Vinton and King—two Locofocos and two Whigs. Mr. Brinterhoof, of Ohio, a bitter and uncompromising locofoco, made a minority report, easing off Mr. Ingersoll.

The moral effect, says a Washington correspondent, of this one to four, under the circumstances, cannot fail to make Mr. Ingersoll's case worse than before, as it is well known that there is nothing in the testimony casting even the shadow of a suspicion upon Mr. Webster.

The Whigs of Allegheny have nominated the following ticket:—Congress, Moses Hampton; Assembly, A. Diland, T. J. Bigham, Daniel McCurdy and John T. Wilson.

Religious Notice.

By Divine permission, the Rev. Mr. HESTER of Lewistown, will officiate in St. John's Prot. Epis. Ch. in this borough, on Sunday next at the hour of 11 A. M., and 3 1/2 P. M.

APPOINTMENTS.—The Governor has made the following appointments for Blair county.

Geo. R. McFarlane and Daniel McConnell to be Associate Judges. Sheriff—Benj. E. Betts. Register and Recorder—Wm. McFarlane. Prothonotary—Jeremiah Cunningham. Coroner—John Dougherty.

The above appointments are not very well received by the party in Blair. The Register and Coroner have declined the honor, and returned their commissions to the Governor.

The Tariff.

The Washington correspondent of the U. S. Gazette, writing under date of the 7th inst states that an attempt has been made to ascertain, with some degree of accuracy, what is the state of opinion in the House upon the Tariff question. Lists have been made out by members, of such members as they know the opinions of, and these lists show 112 members in favor of action upon the Tariff and 107 against it. He does not place much confidence in this statement, though perhaps it is an near approximation to what the vote is likely to be as can be obtained. He thinks it likely, however, that many votes are set down as against the tariff that will not be given to disturb it.

A WHIG GOVERNOR IN NEW HAMPSHIRE.—The Convention of the two branches of the New Hampshire Legislature has elected Gen. Anthony Colby, a Whig, Governor for the ensuing year, by a majority of 21 votes. The vote stood:—For Anthony Colby, 149; for J. W. Williams, 125.—Colby's majority, 24.

The Legislature of New Hampshire have elected John P. Hale to the United States Senate for six years from the 4th of March next. The vote was very decisive in his favor. This is a glorious victory over Locofoco Radicalism.

AMMUNITION TO THE OREGON QUESTION and the Cabinet, says, that the settlement of the Oregon Question on the 49th parallel does not suit Mr. Buchanan's views, and he will consequently retire from the State Department, and give place to Mr. Richard Rush, and that the President will embrace the occasion to allow Mr. Bancroft to retire from the Navy Department and give place to Senator Haywood, the North American Cougar that rushes through the jungle and darts upon his prey!

The following, among other resolutions, was adopted at a meeting of the Whigs of Allegheny township, Blair county, held on the 5th inst. Resolved, That when the time shall arrive for nominating a candidate for Governor, we have one every way qualified in the person of Gen. JAMES HAY, of Centre county.

Later From Mexico.

In addition to the news given upon our first page, we insert the following additional particulars: The blockade of Vera Cruz commenced on the 20th of May.

Information reached Vera Cruz that Mazatlan and Lepia had proclaimed in favor of Gen. Santa Anna. Gen. Alvarez, in the South, was carrying on a disastrous war against the Government.

It was reported that Gen. Paredes intended leaving the city of Mexico with troops to reinforce the army at the North.

Great animosity prevailed against the Americans since the defeat of the Mexicans at Matamoros was known. The enormous forced loans which the Government have imposed upon the clergy, the latter had declared itself totally unable to meet. The Metropolitan church was ordered to furnish a subsidy of \$95,000 per month; the Mochochua \$45,000; of Puebla \$30,000; Guadalupe \$25,000; of Durango \$15,000, and of Oajaca \$8,000. These great sums per month show that the President is determined to prosecute the war with energy.

In regard to Paredes putting himself at the head of the army, El Publicista says it is uncertain whether he will repair to the Rio Grande or to Vera Cruz; but he will leave the capital as soon as Congress assembles. Full accounts of the disastrous actions of the 8th and 9th had reached the capital and appeared in the official journal. They are more accurate by far than Mexican bulletins generally, and do credit to Arista.

The news was received with profound regret, but with an apparent determination to fight the war out.

LATER.

Embargo Declared by Mexico!

NEW ORLEANS, JUNE 5.

The barque Texidore, Capt. Major, has arrived from Tobasco, whence she sailed on the 28th ult. There was great excitement prevailing there among the resident Americans in consequence of the reception of an order for an embargo on all American vessels.

The order came express from Mexico, and was immediately followed by an order for the capture of Captain Major's vessel, and at the same time fifty Mexican soldiers were placed in charge of a New Orleans schooner. There were 400 Mexican soldiers in Tobasco.

Capt. Major was guarded by his vessel by twenty of his friends, and the soldiers were afraid to make him prisoner. The sch. Capt. Cox, of New Orleans, was seized and the crew imprisoned. The steamer Ventura was ordered to fire up and give chase to Capt. Major. She did not, however, venture out.

Gen. Taylor intends to take up his line of march

for Monterey and New Leon in ten days, taking en route Carmago, Mier, &c.

Capt. Thornton has been placed under an arrest by order of Gen. Taylor, on charges of disobedience of orders and neglect of duty in suffering his command to be surprised.

The Delta learns from gentlemen arrived in the steamer Alabama, that it is the least of Gen. Taylor's intentions to rest on his arms for any length of time.

The present camp of the enemy is in New Leon.

The Official Documents from General Taylor.

From the Washington Union of Wednesday. OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION, CITY OF MATAMOROS, MAY 18, 1846.

SIR: I have the honor to report that my very limited means for crossing rivers prevented a complete prosecution of the victory of the 9th instant. A ponton train, the necessity of which I exhibited to the department last year, would have enabled the army to cross on the evening of the battle, take this city, with all the artillery and stores of the enemy, and a great number of prisoners—in short, to destroy entirely the Mexican army. But I was compelled to await the arrival of heavy mortars, with which to menace the town from the left bank, and also the accumulation of small boats. In the meantime the enemy had somewhat recovered from the confusion of his fight, and ought still, with the 3,000 men left, to have made a respectable defence. I made every preparation to cross the river above the town, while Lieut. Col. Wilson made a diversion on the side of Barita, and the order of march was given out for 1 o'clock yesterday, from the Camp near Fort Brown, when I was waited upon by General Roguena, empowered by Gen. Arista, commanding in chief the Mexican forces, to treat for an armistice until the government should finally settle the question. I replied to this, that an armistice was entirely out of the question; that a month since I had proposed one to Gen. Ampudia, which was declined; that circumstances were now changed; that I was receiving large reinforcements, and could not now suspend operations which I had not initiated or provoked; that the possession of Matamoros was a sine qua non; that our troops would occupy the town; but that Gen. Arista might withdraw his forces, leaving the public property of every description.

An answer to the above was promised in the afternoon, but none came, and I repaired at sundown to join the army, already in position at a crossing some two miles above the town. Very early this morning the bank was occupied by our two 18 pounders and three batteries of field artillery—and the crossing commenced—the light companies of all the battalions were first thrown over, followed by the volunteer and regular cavalry. No resistance was made, and I was soon informed that Arista had abandoned the town with all his troops the evening before, leaving only the sick and wounded. I immediately despatched a staff officer to the prefect to demand a surrender, and in the meantime a company of the 22d, of the 1st Infantry, was sent on the same point. I gave assurances that the civil rights of the citizens would be respected, and our troops at once dropped down opposite the town, and crossed at the "Upper Ferry," the American flag being displayed at "Fort Paredes," a Mexican redoubt near the crossing. The different corps were once encamped in the outskirts of the city. Tomorrow I shall make suitable arrangements for the occupation of the town, and for taking possession of the public property. More than three hundred of the enemy's wounded have been left in the hospitals. Arista is in full retreat towards Monterey, with the fragments of his army.

I deeply regret to report that Lieut. George Stevens, a very promising young officer of the second dragoons, was accidentally drowned this morning, while attempting to swim the river with his squadron. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A. Com'dg.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, Matamoros, Mexico, May 20, 1846. SIR: On the 20th of April I had occasion to advise the department that hostilities had actually broken out, and that in consequence I had found it necessary to use the authority with which I was vested, and call upon the governors of Louisiana and Texas for a force, each of four regiments.—The eight regiments thus called for would make a force of nearly 5,000 men, which I deemed sufficient to meet the wants of the service in this quarter.

At the same time that I wrote to the Governor of Louisiana requesting this volunteer force, I addressed a letter to Gen. Gaines, desiring him to assist in organizing these regiments, and having them promptly supplied. In my communication to the Governor, the organization was very exactly prescribed—being that indicated from your office on the 25th of August, 1845. I find, however, that the organization has been exceeded, and moreover, that Gen. Gaines has called for many more volunteers than I deemed necessary, extending the call to other States besides Louisiana.

It will, of course, be for the government to decide whether the future operations in this quarter will require the amount of force (entirely unknown) which is coming hither. I only desire to say, that this reinforcement, beyond the eight regiments mentioned above, was never asked for by me, and that in making the call of the 26th of April, I well knew that if the Mexicans fought us at all, it would be before the arrival of the volunteers. It was for the purpose of clearing the river, and performing such other service as the government might direct, that I thought it proper to ask for reinforcements.

It is extremely doubtful whether the foot regiments from Texas can be raised, and I shall desire the Governor, who is expected here, to suspend the call for them. None of the mounted companies except Capt. Price's already in service, have reported to me. I fear the volunteers have exhausted the supply of tents deposited in New Orleans, for the use of this army. We are greatly in want of them; and I must request that immediate measures be taken

to send direct to Brazos Santiago, say 1,000 tents, for the use of the army in the field. The tents of the 7th Infantry were cut up to make sand-bags, during the recent bombardment of Fort Brown. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A. Com'dg.

Extracts from a despatch from General Taylor, dated Matamoros, May 21, 1846. "Our future movements must depend, in a great degree, on the extent to which the Rio Grande is navigable for steamboats, and I fear that my expectations in this particular will not be realized.—Though, at times, navigable as high as Carmago, or even Mier, it is doubtful whether a boat can now be pushed higher than Reinosas. Indeed the 'Neve' which is in the river, and accompanied the expedition under General Smith, has not yet reached this place, though hourly expected."

I shall lose no time in ascertaining the practicability of the river for steamboats, and shall occupy Reinosas, and such other points as a boat may be able to reach. "All the cavalry (regular and irregular) of the army, under command of Lieut. Col. Garland, is in pursuit of the retreating army, to harass its rear, and capture prisoners and baggage. We have no authentic intelligence from the Lieutenant Colonel since his departure. Deserters are, however, coming in from the Mexicans."

"Lieut. Col. Wilson's battalion, 1st Infantry, with some 200 volunteers, was at Barita on the 17th and has since been reinforced by Gen. Smith, with about 700 Louisiana volunteers. This column is ordered to move up the right bank of the river, and I look hourly for its arrival. "A large amount of public stores, chiefly ordnance, has been found concealed in this town. We are gradually recovering it from the places where it was hidden. Two field-pieces, several hundred muskets, and 200 shells, are among the articles recovered."

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, City of Matamoros, May 24, 1846. SIR:—I have to report the arrival this day of Gen. Smith, with the battalion of the 1st Infantry, the Washington regiment of Louisiana volunteers, and a company of volunteers from Mobile. Another regiment of Louisiana volunteers is below, and will probably arrive this evening or to-morrow.—This command was accompanied from the mouth of the river by the steamer Neve, which succeeded without difficulty in reaching this place.

Lieut. Col. Garland returned on the 23d, from his expedition in pursuit of the retreating army.—He succeeded in capturing a small party, after a trifling skirmish in the night, in which a man, and unfortunately a woman, were killed on the Mexican side, and two men slightly wounded on our side. The scarcity of water, and condition of his horses, made it useless to proceed farther.

I would respectfully solicit instructions as to the disposition to be made of certain property captured in the camp of Gen. Arista. A pavilion and several pieces of massive plate, are among the articles. His clothing, and other property purely personal, have been deposited in this city, with a view of being returned to him. I would suggest that the pavilion be sent to Washington, to be disposed of as the President may direct.

The recovery of ordnance and other public stores, still continues here. Two pieces of cannon have been taken from the river, and small arms in considerable numbers have been taken in the town. I am, Sir, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A. Com'dg.

THE OREGON QUESTION SETTLED! The Washington correspondent of the North American furnishes the following important and gratifying intelligence under date of June 12, 1846, 6 o'clock P. M.—Transmitted by Telegraph: "Huzza for the glorious Senate! The great question of the Session is settled. The Senate has saved the country from all danger of war. It has just given their advice by the Constitutional majority, and a Treaty will be immediately framed upon the terms offered by Great Britain."

The vote was 38 yeas to 12 nays. Mr. Corwin was detained from his seat by sickness, and Mr. Crittenden and Mr. Barrow are in Virginia; a fourth Whig vote might have been obtained, if necessary. Mr. Atchison did not vote and Mr. Bright was absent.

The following from the Baltimore Sun of June 10, gives the terms of the treaty: "The President's message which was under discussion, transmits the proposal of Great Britain, for a settlement of the Oregon difficulties on the 49th parallel, with the whole of Vancouver's Island, and the free navigation of the Columbia river by the Hudson's Bay Company, until the expiration of their charter; the British government apprehending that it might otherwise be compelled to pay that Company too large an indemnity.

The free navigation of the Straits of Fuca, and the free use of the Bays and Inlets of Vancouver's Island to be allowed to us for the same period, and some other privileges, not heretofore anticipated by the '49 men." The President asked the advice of the Senate.

Deplorable Masacres in Texas. A letter from San Antonio de Bexar, gives deplorable accounts of murdering and robbing committed upon the people inhabiting the western frontier of Texas by Camanches and Lipans. Most of the able bodied men of the colonies of New Braunfels, Castoville and Lake Quani having joined the army under Gen. Taylor, the savages profiting by their absence threw themselves upon the old men, women and children, burnt the houses and crops of corn, mutilated the dead bodies, violated the women, and carried off a number of children into slavery.

Important Correspondence.

GEN. SCOTT AND THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Washington, May 21, 1846.

SIR:—I have received no orders, as yet, assigning me to the immediate command of the army about to be raised to conquer a peace within Mexico; but I have been told to hold myself in readiness for that service. From that moment I have occupied myself, incessantly, with the vast preliminary arrangements which can only be made advantageously at this place, through the respective chiefs of the general staff—the adjutant general, quartermaster general, commissary general of subsistence, chief of ordnance, and surgeon general. I have been much occupied, also, in the distribution of the quotas of volunteers needed among the several States; in apportioning the horse to the foot; in the study of the routes of march, and water conveyances for the several bodies of troops to the best points in the frontiers of Mexico; in the study of the northern interior, and the southern routes of that republic; in looking to the means of transportation on the Rio Grande, to and beyond that river; in determining the depots of supplies of all sorts on this side, &c., &c.

As these matters are respectively settled, orders and instructions have been given, to the chief of the general staff at this place, and the routes of march and water conveyances, together with the depots for supplies of every description, are finally to be communicated to the unknown commanders of volunteers whose services are to be accepted.

In the midst of these multitudinous and indispensable occupations, I have learned from you that much impatience is already felt, perhaps in high quarters, that I have not already put myself in route for the Rio Grande; and now, with fourteen hours a day of preliminary work remaining on my hands for many days, I find myself compelled to stop that necessary work to guard myself against, perhaps, utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against danger (ill-will or pre-emption) in my rear before advancing upon the public enemy.

Not an advantageous step can be taken in a forward march, without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed, my crippled in my energies, by the knowledge of the impatience in question, and I beg to say I fear no other danger.

My intentions have been, after making all preliminary arrangements here, to pass down the Ohio and Mississippi, to see, or to assure myself by correspondence, that the volunteers, on whom we are most to rely in the prosecution of the existing war, are rapidly assembling for the service; to learn the probable time of their readiness to advance upon Mexico; to ascertain if their supplies of every kind are in place, or are likely to be in place in sufficient time; to hasten one and the other; to harmonize the movements of volunteers, and to modify their routes (if necessary) so that all, or at least a sufficient number, shall arrive at the indicated points on the Mexican frontier at the best periods, and as far as practicable, at the same time. All that I have but sketched, I deem to be not only useful to success, but indispensable. As a soldier, I make this assertion without the fear of contradiction from any other danger.

Against the ad captandem condemnation of all other persons, whoever may be designated for the high command in question, there can be no reliance (in his absence) other than the active, candid, and steady support of his government. If I cannot have that sure basis to rest upon, it will be infinitely better for the country (not to speak of my personal security) that some other commander of the new army against Mexico should be selected. No matter who he may be, he shall, at least, be judged and supported by me, in this office and every where else, as I would desire, if personally in that command, to be myself judged and supported.

My explicit meaning is, that I do not desire to place myself in the most perilous of all positions—a fire upon my rear from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans.

It was distinctly admitted, and laid down as a basis, in the interviews I had the honor to hold with the President and yourself on the subject, that a special army of some thirty thousand troops, regulars, and twelve months' volunteers, would be necessary for the march against, and the conquest of a peace in, Mexico. I adhere to that opinion. It is foreseen, with tolerable certainty, that we shall not have, in many months, more than seven thousand (if quite so many) regulars, applicable to that service.

The remaining numbers are to be made up in volunteer horse and foot. I suppose of these, taken together, about 17,000 have been actually called for. There is yet good time, I think, to make the additions suggested in one of the tables I had the honor to submit last night.

The question follows: By what time can an army of about 30,000, as above, be brought to act from the different points agreed upon in the interviews alluded to upon Mexico?

More than half of the 7,000 regulars remain to be recruited. I hope they may be obtained and taken to the Rio Grande, though raw or untrained, by the first of September next. Can two-thirds, or even a half, of the volunteer horses be got to that river much before that time? I greatly doubt the possibility—without the shadow of a doubt about the patriotism or zeal of the citizens who have been specially called upon. The foot volunteers, aided by water transportation, (believed to be impossible with the horse,) may, probably, reach all the points for commencing operations a week or two earlier. But if horse be a necessary element to success (and two-thirds, if not three-fourths of the Mexican army are understood to be in the saddle,) what utility would be in forcing the foot much ahead of the horse? This ought to be a matter of arrangement, left to the commander of the special army, as information may open upon him in his progress to the Mexican frontier, near the heads of columns, or within easy corresponding distance with most of them. The particular question here then recurs. Can the horse regiment from Kentucky (the most distant from Mexico) or that from Tennessee (say about a month's march before the day (1st of September), here mentioned) I have learned personally from the zealous and intelligent Adjutant General (Dulley) of Kentucky, that that most distant horse regiment cannot be assembled (say) at Frankfort, on the Bowling-green, earlier than the latter part of June.

Thence it will probably be obliged to march via Memphis, Fulton, or the Red River, San Antonio de Bexar, &c., a line of some 1,200 miles. The routes of the Tennessee, Arkansas, and Mississippi horse will be respectively, say 400, 600, and 700 miles shorter, but even the middle or Tennessee horse regiment, cannot, allowing not a day for instruction at its rendezvous, or on the route, reach the Rio Grande, before (according to all computations we can make here) the middle of August.

I think, considering that we cannot hope to have more than 800 regular cavalry on the lower Rio Grande, no commander would be willing to enter Mexico without both the Kentucky and Tennessee regiments of horse, and all that have been called from points near to the field of expected operations. I may now state a fact which

conclusive as to the period best for taking up lines of operations from and beyond the lower Rio Grande. All the information that can be obtained here represents that the rainy season, on and south of the Rio Grande, begins about June, and terminates about the 1st of September; that during that season, the hoof of the horse and the mule becomes softened (though shod) and diseased so as to disable the animal for travel and work. Again, it is at the end of the rainy season, and for some weeks later, that in the northern provinces of Mexico, and horses would have the best chance to obtain drinking water, the horses the best grazing, and the commissaries the best beef and mutton for the army.

But another reason has been mentioned by I should leave the preliminary work to be done, and abandon the twelve months' volunteers and their way as they may to the Mexican frontier, viz: the number of patriotic Louisianians who have poured, and are pouring in, upon Brevet Brigadier General Taylor, at Point Isabel or opposite to Matamoros.

Those meritorious volunteers can, under the circumstances, have legally engaged for three months only. They could have had no knowledge of the volunteer act of May 13, 1846, without which no enrolment for more than three months, would be binding upon them. After that term, without a formal enrolment, under the recent act, for the longer period, not an officer or a man could be legally held to service or tried for any offence whatever—They evidently hastened to the scene of danger to succour our army there; to save it from what they no doubt, deemed probable surrender or destruction. Many of the Louisianians may be ready to become twelve months' volunteers, &c. to be organized legally as such. As three months men they could hardly, even in the absence of hostile forces, march to Monterey, before becoming entitled to (no doubt) an honorable discharge. Before the time for that discharge, it may certainly be well—if numbers of them do not volunteer under the recent act—to send the quotas of foot, called for from the lower Mississippi, to aid Gen. Taylor in defending his positions, and, perhaps, taking new ones on the other side of the Rio Grande.

But for the conquest of a peace, by regular, incessant, and forward movements, the basis of our calculations here (as to numbers) must be altogether extravagant, if a much larger army, including that in position, and one very differently composed, (in horse and foot) be not necessary. It was to command such larger army that I understood myself as it is likely to be sent to the Mexican frontier, as it is always unjust to a junior General who has done well, and is supposed to be doing well, to supersede him by a General of higher rank, without sending him the latter corresponding reinforcements. I should esteem myself the unhappy instrument of wounding the honorable pride of the gallant and judicious Taylor, if ordered to supersede him under different circumstances.

However, the foregoing suggestions (hastily thrown together) may be viewed, I have deemed it due more to the country than my humble self, that I should present them, and await the wishes or the orders of the President.

With great respect, I have the honor to remain, sir, your most obedient servant, WINFIELD SCOTT, Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1846.

SIR:—I have received your letter of the 21st instant and considering its extraordinary character, and the grave matters set forth therein, reflecting upon the motives and objects of the President in tendering to you, as he has, in an explicit manner, the command of the forces destined for the war against Mexico. I deemed it to be my duty to lay it before him, and to take his direction in regard to its contents.

The passages in your letter which have excited his surprise and deep regret, are those in which you impute to the President, in terms not inexplicit, ill will towards yourself, or pre-emption, and a course of conduct on his part which has already, as you allege, impeded your labours of preparation and crippled your energies.

A reference to two or three paragraphs in your letter will show that he is not at liberty to give a different construction to your language. You were, through me, and also at a personal interview with the President, made acquainted with his settled determination to put you in immediate command of the force to be employed in carrying on the war with Mexico, and you had, as you state, been devoting your time and attention to preliminary and preparatory arrangements. "In the midst of these multitudinous and indispensable occupations," (you say, "I have learned from you that much impatience is already felt, perhaps in high quarters, that I have not already put myself in route for the Rio Grande; and now with fourteen hours a day of preliminary work remaining on my hands for many days, I find myself compelled to stop that necessary work to guard myself against, perhaps utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against danger (ill-will, or pre-emption) in my rear, before advancing upon the public enemy. Not an advantageous step can be taken in a forward march, without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed—nay, crippled in my energies by the knowledge of the impatience in question; and I beg to say I fear no other danger.")

This language scarcely needs a comment.—That it conveys the strongest suspicion,—not to say a direct imputation of most unworthy motive in your Executive government—of bad faith towards yourself—of a reckless disregard of the interests of the country—of a design to carry on a war against the public enemy, there can be, I think, no question. You must allow me to advert to the only fact which you allude as the foundation for such grave imputation. You have learned, you say, from me that much impatience is felt, perhaps in high quarters, that you are not already put in route for the Rio Grande, &c. What was said on this point at our interview, when this subject was alluded to, is not so fully stated as it ought to be considering the purposes to which you have converted it. You presented to me fully and clearly the different objections which