

Democrat

THE BLESSINGS OF GOVERNMENT, LIKE THE DEWS OF HEAVEN, SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED ALIKE UPON THE HIGH AND THE LOW, THE RICH AND THE POOR.

NEW SERIES.

EBENSBURG, JANUARY 25, 1855.

VOL. 2, NO. 17.

Select Poetry.

From the Illustrated London News.
BY THE ALMA RIVER.
Willie, fold your little hands;
Let it drop—that "soldier" toy,
Look where father's picture stands,
Father, that here kissed his boy
Not a month since—father kind,
Who this night may—never mind
Mother's sob, my Willie dear—
Cry out loud that he will hear
Who is God of Battles—say
"God keep my father safe this day
By the Alma River!"
Ask no more, child. Never heed
Either Russ, or Frank, or Turk
Right of nations—trampled crew—
Chance-poised victory's bloody work;
Any flag 't the wind may roll,
On thy heights, Sevastopol!
Willie, all to you or me
Is that spot where'er it be,
Where he stands—no other word—
Stands—God save the child's prayer heard!
Near the Alma river,
Willie, listen to the bells,
Ringing in the town to-day;
That's for victory. No knell swells,
For the many swept away;
Hundreds, thousands! Let us weep,
We who need not—just to keep
Reason clear in thought and brain
Till the morning come again;
Till the third dread morning tell
Who they were that fought and—fell
By the Alma river,
Come—we'll lay us down, my child;
Poor the bed is—poor and hard;
But thy father, far exiled,
Sleeps upon the open sward,
Dreaming of us two at home;
Or beneath the stary dome,
Digs out trenches in the dark,
Where he buries—Willie, mark!
Where he buries those who died
Fighting, fighting at his side,
At the Alma river.
Willie, Willie, go to sleep
God will help us, O my boy!
He will make the dull hours creep
Faster, and send news of joy;
When I need not shrink to meet
Those great placards in the street,
That for weeks will glastly stare
In some eyes—child, say that prayer
Once again a different one—
Say—"O God: Thy will be done,
By the Alma river."

A Humorous Sketch.

The difference between courtship and marriage was never more forcibly explained than in the following "Charcoal Sketch."
"What made you get married if you don't like it?"
"Why, I was deluded into it—fairly deluded. I had nothing to do of evenings, so I went a courting. Now, courting's fun enough—I haven't got a word to say agin courting. It is about as good way of killing an evening as I know of. Wash your face, put on a clean dicky, and go and talk as sweet as molasses—easily for an hour or two, to say nothing of the kisses behind the door as your sweetheart goes to the step with you."
"When I was a single man, the world wagged on well enough. It was just like an omnibus; I was a passenger, paid my levy, and hadn't nothing more to do with it but sit down and not care a button for anything—'S'poken the omnibus got upset, well, I walks off, and leaves the man to pick up the pieces. But then I must take a wife and be hanged to me. It is very nice for a while; but afterwards it plaguy like owning an upset omnibus."
"Now?" queried Montezuma, "what's all that about omnibuses?"
"What did I get by it?" continued Game-lier, regardless of the interruption. "How much fun, why a yawning old woman and three squallers. Mighty different from courting that is. Where's the fun of buying things to eat and things to wear for them, and wasting all good spending money on such nonsense for other people? And then, as for doing as you like, there is no such thing. You can't clear out when the people's owing you so much money you can't stay conveniently. No, the nabbers must have you. You can't go on a spree, for when the missus kicks up the devil's delight, you can't teach her better manners for the constables are as thick as blackberries. In short, you can do nothing. Instead of 'yes my duck,' and 'no my dear,' 'as you please honey,' and 'when you like,' as it was in courting times, it's a darning and mending, and nobody ever darned and mended. If it wasn't that I am particularly sober, I'd be inclined to drink, it's all owing to that I've such a pain in my gizzard of mornings. I'm so miserable I must stop and sit on those steps."
"What's the matter now?"
"I am getting aggravated. My wife is a saving critter—a sword of sharpness; she cuts the throat of my felicity, stabs my happiness, chaps up my comforts, and snips up all my Sunday-go-to-meetin's to make jackets for the boys; she gives all the wittles to the children, to make me spy and jump like a lamplighter. I can't stand it, my troubles are overpowering when I come to add them up."
"Oh, nonsense, behave nice, don't make a noise in the street, be a man."
"How can I be a man when I belong to somebody else. My hours ain't my own, my money ain't my own, I belong to four people besides myself—the old woman and four children. I'm a partnership concern; and so many has got their fingers in the till that I must bust up. 'I'll break, and sign over the stock in trade to you."

THE TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE.

SPEECH OF THE HON. JOSEPH R. CHANDLER, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 11, 1855.

In the National House of Representatives on Thursday, the House being in Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, (Mr. Orr in the chair) on the bill "to provide for the establishment of Railroad and Telegraphic communication from the Atlantic States to the Pacific ocean, and for other purposes." Mr. Chandler, of Pa., took the floor, and replied at length to the recent charges preferred by Mr. Banks, of Massachusetts, against the fealty of the Catholic citizens of the United States.

Mr. Chandler. I rise to express my opinions on a subject which ought never to have been introduced into the Congress of the United States; but having been brought before me, and discussed, the suggestions of many friends lead me to believe that it is my duty to present, not merely my opinions, but certain facts, in relation thereto. I purpose making some reply to the remarks of the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Banks], who recently addressed this House, in committee, on some of the prevailing topics of the day, and made a special and incidental allusion to the creed of the Roman Catholic Church; involving a charge of latent treason against its members, or at least imputing to them an article of religious faith that overrides all fealty to the Government of the country, and would render them unworthy of public trust—suspected citizens, and dangerous officers.

But, sir, I commence my direct reference to the subject of my remarks, let me say that whatever may be my religious belief and connections, I trust that all who know me in this House will accord me of the charge of any attempt to obtrude those opinions upon others, or to press upon my associates, publicly or privately, any defence of the creed of my church, or the peculiarity of its forms and ceremonies. Believing, sir, that religion is a personal matter, I have avoided public exhibition of my pretensions; and, knowing the unpopularity of my creed, I have been careful not to jeopard my usefulness, in their legitimate channel, by any untimely presentation of irrelevant and unacceptable dogmas.

But now, sir, I think I cannot be deceived in supposing that a well-tempered reply would not only be patiently received in this House, but that an attempt at such a reply as the charge of the gentleman from Massachusetts would suggest to a Catholic, is expected from me, as the oldest of the few, the very few, (I know but one besides myself in this House,) who are obedient to its forms and ceremonies. Believing, sir, that religion is a personal matter, I have avoided public exhibition of my pretensions; and, knowing the unpopularity of my creed, I have been careful not to jeopard my usefulness, in their legitimate channel, by any untimely presentation of irrelevant and unacceptable dogmas.

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of this country is, that their views of the supremacy of the Pope renders them unsafe citizens, because it renders them liable to be withdrawn from their allegiance to their own civil government by the decrees or ordinances of their spiritual superior. Of the cruelty of disturbing the public mind with such questions, and disfranchising well-disposed citizens, I shall not now speak. I shall leave to other times, and other persons, and in other places, too, the task of impeaching and developing the motives upon which such invidious and unrighteous proceedings rest. I shall leave to those who have more bitterness of temper than I possess, to show that, though newly revived, the charge is as old as the hostility of Paganism to Christianity; and that those who are vitiating public sentiment in this ministering to the appetite which they have made morbid, have their prototype in the man who, under the name of the Savior of the world, came and took our city from us," or in the Titus Oates of later times, who disturbed the public mind of England by discoveries of plots that existed only in his infamous invention, and who, by his perjuries, sent men to the scaffold whose innocence is now generally admitted as a corollary to the fact of their being the victims of the tricks which he could destroy the peace of an excellent portion of the community, and send to the scaffold and block men of immaculate purity, merely to give himself a temporary notoriety, and a sort of political aggrandizement. That branch of the discussion I reserve to those who are more at ease with the offensive details, and with horror at its intimate association with the men, the motives, and the means of modern times. I leave such considerations to others, and proceed to take notice of that part of the subject which concerns the political relations of American Catholics with the head of the Roman Catholic Church—the character of the fealty which I, and all the Roman Catholics in this country, owe to the Bishop of Rome.

The question raised by the gentleman from Massachusetts is one of political power, and that I imagine, is the leading objection to Catholics, and to Catholicity with gentlemen who venture on the dangerous movement of dragging religion into the political arena. Mr. Chandler, I deny that the Bishop of Rome has, or that he claims for himself, the right to interfere with the political relations of any other country than that of which he is himself the sovereign; I mean—and I have no desire to conceal any point—I mean that I deny to the Bishop of Rome the right resulting from his divine office, to interfere in the relations between subjects and their sovereigns, between citizens and their Governments. And while I make this denial, I acknowledge all my obligation to the church of which I am an humble member, and I recognize all the rights of the venerable head of that church to the spiritual defence of its children; and I desire that no part of what I may say, or what I may concede, in my remarks, may be considered as yielding a single dogma of the Catholic Church, or manifesting, on my part, a desire to explain away, to suit the spirit of the times, or the prejudices of my hearers, any doctrine of the Catholic Church. I believe all that that church believes and teaches as religious dogmas, but I am not bound by the imputations of its opponents. I am not bound by the assertions of those who would make the political capital out of denunciations of her errors, or misrepresentations of her creed. Nay, more, sir, I ask the attention of gentlemen to my disclaimer. I am not bound by any action which the Pope takes as a temporal sovereign, or which he performs as Bishop of Rome, or Pope, when he is only carrying out a contract with Kings and Emperors to secure to them the integrity of their possessions, and the perpetuity of their power.

As I cannot accept the honorable gentleman's discrimination between me, as a Catholic, and other members of the Church as Roman Catholics, I must regard myself as involved in the general censure, and feel that I stand charged, a national Representative, with holding opinions and owing fealty that may demand from me a sacrifice of patriotism to a higher obligation; pointed at, by a man who while he swears to maintain the Constitution of the country, and professes to make the fulfillment of his obligation to that country his paramount political duty, yet cherishes in his heart the principles of latent treason. I may be allowed, without the imputation of vanity, to make one more direct allusion to myself and my creed. And, sir, clearly and distinctly do I deny that the power of the Pope extends one grain beyond his spiritual relations with the members of his church, or impresses, in the least degree, upon the political allegiance which any Roman Catholic of this country may owe to the Government and Constitution of the United States.

And, sir, that this disavowal of a divided fealty may not be regarded as a mere generality, I give it explicitness by declaring that if, by any providence, the Bishop of Rome should become possessed of armies and a fleet, and in a spirit of conquest, or any other spirit, should invade the territory of the United States, or assault the rights of our country, he would find no more consistent antagonists than the Roman Catholics. And for myself, if not here in this Hall to vote supplies for a defending army, or if too old to take part in the active defence, I should, if alive, be at least in my chamber, or at the foot of the altar, imploring God for the safety of my country and the defeat of the invaders. [Applause.]

Mr. Orr reminded gentlemen that applause was not becoming in a deliberative body.

Mr. Chairman, Or, if the spirit of conquest and cruelty should seize upon the wearer of the tiara, and he should seek to subjugate Italy by improper assumptions, and, by immense, provoke the arms of other nations against his own city, I could look on the chances of the defeat of his army as coolly and as complacently as on the misfortunes and punishment of any other ambitious monarch, and safe in my love of right, and in the enjoyment of my religious creed, and the comforts of my home, I could say, "Let the Volscians plow Italy and harrow Rome."

Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to attract attention by declamation; I wish to state simply and distinctly, but very emphatically, what are the opinions of a Roman Catholic as to the influence of the dogma of the Papal supremacy on political allegiance, and my own opinion I have given. But since some exception was made in my behalf—an exception which I cannot admit, though I thank the honorable gentleman for the courtesy with which it was expressed—and since it may be asserted that, as a Republican and layman, I could not be supposed to understand all the relations and influences of the dogma of the supremacy of the Pope, let me add, that what I assert as my belief of the entire political independence of every Roman Catholic of the Papal States—political independence, I mean, of the Chief Magistrate of that State—is fully held, and openly asserted and approved by every Catholic bishop and archbishop in the United States.

I have not time here to quote from the writings of all those who have published their opinions upon the subject, nor shall I have space to copy them in my published remarks, but I may say that such are the views which I have learned from them in conversation, and such is the view of the

late Dr. England, a Roman Catholic Bishop of Charleston, a divine whose erudition and whose well-established fame gave consequence to all he asserted, and whose zeal for the church of which he was a distinguished prelate, and whose lofty position in the estimation of the sovereign Pontiff, rendered it unlikely that he would underrate the Papal power.

Extract from a letter from Bishop England to an Episcopal clergyman, vol. 2, pages 250-51:— "I wish to charge which you make upon the Papists is exactly the same charge which the Jews were in the habit of making against the Apostles. From that day to the present we have met it as we meet it now. We have a kingdom, it is true, in which we pay no obedience to Caesar; but our kingdom is not of this world—and whilst we render unto God the things that are God's, we render unto men the things that are man's." To the successors of the Apostles we render that obedience which is due to the authority left by Jesus Christ, who alone could bestow it. We do not give it to the President; we do not give it to the Governor; we do not give it to the Congress; we do not give it to the Legislature of the States—neither do you; nor do they claim it—nor would we give it, if they did, for the claim would be unfounded. We give to them everything which the Constitution requires; you give no more—you ought not to give more. Let the Pope and cardinals, and all the powers of the Catholic world united, make the least encroachment on that Constitution, we will make them feel that we are not to be trifled with—let that council interfere in the mode of our electing but an assistant to a turnkey of a prison—we deny its right; we reject its usurpation. Let that council lay a tax of one cent only upon any of our churches; we will not pay it. Yet we are most obedient Papists—we believe the Pope is Christ's Vicar on earth, supreme visible head of the church throughout the world, and lawful successor to St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles. We believe all this power is in Pope Leo XII, and we believe that a general council is infallible in doctrinal decisions. Yet we deny to Pope and council united any power to interfere with one title of our political rights, as firmly as we deny the power of interfering with one title of our spiritual rights to the President and Congress. We will obey each in its proper place; we will resist any encroachment by one upon the rights of the other. Will you permit Congress to do the duties of your convention?"

Here is another extract from the writings of the same Roman Catholic prelate:

"Kingdoms, Emperors, and the Roman Catholic Church have frequently been at war with the Pope. Yet they did not cease to be members of the church, and subject to his spiritual jurisdiction, although they resisted his warlike attacks. Any person in the least degree acquainted with the history of Europe, can easily refer to several instances. The distinction drawn by our blessed Savior, when he stood in the presence of Pilate, was the principle of those rulers. They were faithful to the head of the church, whose kingdom is not of this world, but they repelled the attack of an enemy to their rights. You, sir, acknowledge the authority of bishops. Suppose a bishop under whom you were placed, proceeded to take away your property; could you not defend your rights? And you reduced to the dilemma of being plundered, or of denying an article of your religion? Can you not keep your property, and deny the right of the bishop to take it away, and resist his aggression, at the same time that you are canonically obedient? Can you not be faithful to him as bishop, and to yourself as a man? The King of Maryland claimed some right which he neither had by your church law nor by the law of the States. You may, and ought to, resist the aggression. Yet you would not be unfaithful to him. Let the Pope be placed in the same predicament; I can be faithful to the Pope and to the government under which I live, and yet resist the influence of the Pope administered by a Papist, by a Protestant, by a Jew, by a Mohammedan, or by a Pagan. It is, then, untrue to assert, as you have done, that a consistent Papist, and a dutiful subject of a Protestant administration, must be incompatible."

Kenrick, Archbishop of Baltimore, one of the most learned of the Roman Catholic Church, asserts, positively, that the temporal power of the Pope is not a right claimed by the Church, and he challenges the production of a single decree of definition in which this power was pronounced as an article of faith. "Such," says the learned Bishop, "does not exist."

Dr. Troy, Archbishop of Dublin, in his Supplementing power of Popes never was an article of faith, or doctrine of the Catholic Church, nor was it ever proposed as such by any council, or by any Popes themselves who exercised it."

Archbishop Hughes, of New York, is equally explicit on this point. And I might fill volumes with citations to prove my position.

A council of the Catholic Church in Baltimore expressed the same idea in the most emphatic terms.

Mr. Chairman, since I began to speak here, I have received a treatise by Bishop Spaulding, of Kentucky, on this very subject, sustaining my view. It is a timely and acceptable offering, by a lady in the gallery, to the spirit of truth, and her influence will assist to purify and reform the government of the House, as the woman's offering of ointment from the alabaster box was scattered over the head of the Author of truth, while its fragrance was diffused throughout the chamber in which the offering was made.

But I shall, of course, be asked, whence the boldness of the assertion against Catholics, and whence the readiness to believe the charges, if they are altogether unfounded? Has not the Pope exercised the power of deposing monarchs, and thus releasing subjects from their allegiance? Has he not interfered with the temporalities of a sovereign, and thus exercised a power sufficient to justify the apprehensions of the timid, and to give some appearance of probability to the assertions of the bold, reckless, and unprincipled party politician of the present and recent times? Mr. Chairman, as a Christian man and an American legislator, I have nothing but truth to utter; and I scorn to utter less than the whole truth.

Undoubtedly, the Pope has proceeded to de-throne Kings, and thus to release subjects. He has been declared to be more than one monarch, and has been deposed from his throne by the elect and influences of the dogma of the supremacy of the Pope, let me add, that what I assert as my belief of the entire political independence of every Roman Catholic of the Papal States—political independence, I mean, of the Chief Magistrate of that State—is fully held, and openly asserted and approved by every Catholic bishop and archbishop in the United States.

I have not time here to quote from the writings of all those who have published their opinions upon the subject, nor shall I have space to copy them in my published remarks, but I may say that such are the views which I have learned from them in conversation, and such is the view of the

right has been claimed; but on what grounds this right was asserted. If it was a divine right, a right inherent in the spiritual office of the Bishop of Rome as the successor of St. Peter, then, sir, I confess it may never, it can never lapse; and its exercise may be renewed with the reception of additional power. But, sir, if it was a right conferred for special occasions, by those interested in its exercise, conferred by monarchs for their own safety, and approved by the people for their own benefit, who were ready, able, and willing to contribute means for giving its exhibition power, then it would, of course, cease with the change of circumstances in which it was conferred; and those who invested the Pope with the right, because they could assist him with power, and because general safety required the exercise of that power, retained in their own hands the right to withdraw or invalidate their former bestowal, and leave in the hands of the Roman Pontiff only his spiritual rights over Kings or people, *dehors* the limits of his own temporal dominion.

To understand how the Pope ever possessed any power over Emperors and Kings, and by such power, inducing them to depose a monarch, is that by Gregory VII., (Gangabari) who deposed and deposed the Emperor Henry IV. The peculiar character of these times I have already noted. The peculiar character of Henry may be learned from history. He was corrupt, venal, turbulent, cruel, blasphemous, hypocritical. He had violated his coronation oath and made submission, saved himself from the hands of the Pope for the exercise of those powers which the Pontiff held from the Emperor; and when the Pope was exercising his admitted legal powers against the Emperor, Henry called a council, and caused to be passed and promulgated a sentence of deposition against Gregory, the Pope. Of course, this drew from Rome a sentence of excommunication, and excommunication, unless removed within a year, was to assist in working out depositions. The Princes of Germany, even, assembled to elect a successor to Henry; but the excommunicated Emperor, in full acknowledgment of the power of the Pope, hastened to Italy, made submission, saved himself from the hands of the Pope for the exercise of those powers which the Pontiff held from the Emperor; and when the Pope was exercising his admitted legal powers against the Emperor, Henry called a council, and caused to be passed and promulgated a sentence of deposition against Gregory, the Pope.

In a letter from Gregory VII. to the German Lords, he, the Pope, expressly declares that he did not pretend to ground himself merely on the divine power of binding and loosing, but on the laws of men—that is, the constitution or laws of the Empire, as well as the laws of God, and, according to the last named code, as well as the requirement of the former, he intended that he should be excommunicated, but also to be deposed of his Imperial dignity.

The most distinguished writer of the time of Gregory VII., Peter Damier, shows that Gregory did not depend alone upon his spiritual power, but acted upon the authority of the constitution of the Empire. If Gregory had acted alone, and others had admitted a divine right alone to depose an Emperor, his apostolic would scarcely, at such a time, have presented the smaller right of human authority.

The following, from a work on the temporal power of the Pope, by Mr. Gosselin, is directly to the point, and will illustrate this part of my remarks:

"From these observations it follows, in fact, first, that Gregory VII., the first that ever pronounced a sentence of deposition against a sovereign, did not pretend to ground his proceedings solely on the divine right, but on laws both human and divine. Secondly, that in the opinion of all their contemporaries, the deposition of an excommunicated Prince was not a necessary consequence of excommunication, and did not follow from the divine power of binding and loosing, alone, but from a special provision of a human law, and principally from the laws of the Empire, which declared deposed of its throne any Prince remaining obstinately under excommunication a whole year."

"These important facts once proved, there is no difficulty in understanding how the Popes could naturally cite, in support of their sentences of excommunication and deposition against Princes, the divine power of binding and loosing, although not considering it as the sole title of that deposing power which they claimed. It is, in fact, evident that, at a time when constitutional law attached the penalty of deposition to excommunication or heresy, the Pope's sentence against an excommunicated or heretical Prince was grounded both on the divine right and on human law.—It was founded on the divine right, not as much in so far as it declared the Prince heretical and excommunicated, but still more in so far as it enlightened the conscience of his subjects on the extent and limits of the obligation arising from the oath of allegiance which they had taken to him. It was founded on human law, also, in so far as it declared the prince deprived of his rights, in punishment of his remaining obstinately in heresy or excommunication. It is obvious, also, why the Popes' sentences mentioned only the divine power of binding and loosing; for it was on that divine power that the sentence was really grounded, considered in its principal, direct and immediate object; for the deposition was effected by excommunication—the natural result, according to the constitutional law then in force."

While I have asserted, and with the little time allowed me, referred you to the authorities upon which my assertions rest, that the Popes of the middle age did not declare that their interference with the temporal powers of Kings and Emperors was authorized by their spiritual commissions, as Bishops of Rome; and that their antagonistic and summary proceedings towards offending sovereigns, with regard to their temporal powers of the latter, were authorized by a constitution formed by these sovereigns or their predecessors, I do not pretend to assert that the power was always rightly used. I do not deny ambitious or vengeful motives to the Popes. Nothing in my creed or in their presents such a conclusion, and nothing in their conduct renders such a conclusion necessary. I only say that the spiritual power here is not in question, and there, and at that time, the power to depose—power humbly conferred—was never called in question by the deposed monarchs.

They admitted the constitutional right and power, though they may have called in question the justice of the act. With the justice of the proceeding, I have nothing to do here, though I may be allowed to say that, however the Pope may have transgressed the rules of justice between him and the deposed monarch, it is probable that, as Christ, and sustained by the Scriptures. But nowhere is the right to such power claimed, as of divine right, by the Catholic Church.

In the Catholic Church, as in all other churches, there have been found a few individuals of less discretion than zeal, who, from a mistaken view of the Christian duties, thought it a merit on themselves to impute to religion a direct secular power which it was never intended by God, nor understood by good, prudent men to exercise. We see it in the careless writings of certain Catholic scholars, as we find it in the preaching and discipline of many other denunciations. Bitter in the Catholic Church those individual opinions have been disapproved by the bishops, and in other churches they have grown much out of practice; by all they are considered as rendering unto God the things which are Caesar's. The assertion by individuals, or the practice by a few Popes, of any power, does not make that power right. That only is of faith which is so declared, and which is for all times and all circumstances.

The most distinguished instance of the exercise of the Papal power of deposing a monarch, is that by Gregory VII., (Gangabari) who deposed and deposed the Emperor Henry IV. The peculiar character of these times I have already noted. The peculiar character of Henry may be learned from history. He was corrupt, venal, turbulent, cruel, blasphemous, hypocritical. He had violated his coronation oath and made submission, saved himself from the hands of the Pope for the exercise of those powers which the Pontiff held from the Emperor; and when the Pope was exercising his admitted legal powers against the Emperor, Henry called a council, and caused to be passed and promulgated a sentence of deposition against Gregory, the Pope. Of course, this drew from Rome a sentence of excommunication, and excommunication, unless removed within a year, was to assist in working out depositions. The Princes of Germany, even, assembled to elect a successor to Henry; but the excommunicated Emperor, in full acknowledgment of the power of the Pope, hastened to Italy, made submission, saved himself from the hands of the Pope for the exercise of those powers which the Pontiff held from the Emperor; and when the Pope was exercising his admitted legal powers against the Emperor, Henry called a council, and caused to be passed and promulgated a sentence of deposition against Gregory, the Pope.

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"These important facts once proved, there is no difficulty in understanding how the Popes could naturally cite, in support of their sentences of excommunication and deposition against Princes, the divine power of binding and loosing, although not considering it as the sole title of that deposing power which they claimed. It is, in fact, evident that, at a time when constitutional law attached the penalty of deposition to excommunication or heresy, the Pope's sentence against an excommunicated or heretical Prince was grounded both on the divine right and on human law.—It was founded on the divine right, not as much in so far as it declared the Prince heretical and excommunicated, but still more in so far as it enlightened the conscience of his subjects on the extent and limits of the obligation arising from the oath of allegiance which they had taken to him. It was founded on human law, also, in so far as it declared the prince deprived of his rights, in punishment of his remaining obstinately in heresy or excommunication. It is obvious, also, why the Popes' sentences mentioned only the divine power of binding and loosing; for it was on that divine power that the sentence was really grounded, considered in its principal, direct and immediate object; for the deposition was effected by excommunication—the natural result, according to the constitutional law then in force."

While I have asserted, and with the little time allowed me, referred you to the authorities upon which my assertions rest, that the Popes of the middle age did not declare that their interference with the temporal powers of Kings and Emperors was authorized by their spiritual commissions, as Bishops of Rome; and that their antagonistic and summary proceedings towards offending sovereigns, with regard to their temporal powers of the latter, were authorized by a constitution formed by these sovereigns or their predecessors, I do not pretend to assert that the power was always rightly used. I do not deny ambitious or vengeful motives to the Popes. Nothing in my creed or in their presents such a conclusion, and nothing in their conduct renders such a conclusion necessary. I only say that the spiritual power here is not in question, and there, and at that time, the power to depose—power humbly conferred—was never called in question by the deposed monarchs.

They admitted the constitutional right and power, though they may have called in question the justice of the act. With the justice of the proceeding, I have nothing to do here, though I may be allowed to say that, however the Pope may have transgressed the rules of justice between him and the deposed monarch, it is probable that, as

Christ, and sustained by the Scriptures. But nowhere is the right to such power claimed, as of divine right, by the Catholic Church.

In the Catholic Church, as in all other churches, there have been found a few individuals of less discretion than zeal, who, from a mistaken view of the Christian duties, thought it a merit on themselves to impute to religion a direct secular power which it was never intended by God, nor understood by good, prudent men to exercise. We see it in the careless writings of certain Catholic scholars, as we find it in the preaching and discipline of many other denunciations. Bitter in the Catholic Church those individual opinions have been disapproved by the bishops, and in other churches they have grown much out of practice; by all they are considered as rendering unto God the things which are Caesar's. The assertion by individuals, or the practice by a few Popes, of any power, does not make that power right. That only is of faith which is so declared, and which is for all times and all circumstances.

The most distinguished instance of the exercise of the Papal power of deposing a monarch, is that by Gregory VII., (Gangabari) who deposed and deposed the Emperor Henry IV. The peculiar character of these times I have already noted. The peculiar character of Henry may be learned from history. He was corrupt, venal, turbulent, cruel, blasphemous, hypocritical. He had violated his coronation oath and made submission, saved himself from the hands of the Pope for the exercise of those powers which the Pontiff held from the Emperor; and when the Pope was exercising his admitted legal powers against the Emperor, Henry called a council, and caused to be passed and promulgated a sentence of deposition against Gregory, the Pope. Of course, this drew from Rome a sentence of excommunication, and excommunication, unless removed within a year, was to assist in working out depositions. The Princes of Germany, even, assembled to elect a successor to Henry; but the excommunicated Emperor, in full acknowledgment of the power of the Pope, hastened to Italy, made submission, saved himself from the hands of the Pope for the exercise of those powers which the Pontiff held from the Emperor; and when the Pope was exercising his admitted legal powers against the Emperor, Henry called a council, and caused to be passed and promulgated a sentence of deposition against Gregory, the Pope.

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The most distinguished writer of the time of Gregory VII., Peter Damier, shows that Gregory did not depend alone upon his spiritual power, but acted upon the authority of the constitution of the Empire. If Gregory had acted alone, and others had admitted a divine right alone to depose an Emperor, his apostolic would scarcely, at such a time, have presented the smaller right of human authority.

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