for as his unhappy situation, and the safety of the community in which it is thus ascertained to be unsafe to let him go at large, may require; and such, should the defense set up in this case prevail, will be your duty.

The law, gentlemen, which must govern your inquiries, and to which you must apply, and by which you must judge of and pass upon the facts relied upon to establish the defense of insanity,—as declared by all the judges, in England, in Mr. Naghten's case, and by the English courts ever since, and by almost every American court, including the supreme court of Pennsylvania, and by the most able and eminent judges, among them Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, and the late distinguished Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania, and in the words which we have felt it to be our duty heretofore to state it to a jury in a capital case,—is this:

"Every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to the satisfaction of the jury; and, to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved, that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, did not know that he was doing what was wrong." However others may speculate, it is the duty of a jury to bring the evidence to this test.

Upon this general subject, we state to you the law as applied to a case before the judges of our own Supreme Court (three of them present) in the language of Chief Justice Gibson:

"Insanity is mental or moral; the latter being sometimes called homicidal mania, and properly so. It is my purpose to deliver to you the law on this ground of defence, and not to press upon your consideration, at least to an unusual degree, the circumstances of the present case on which the law acts.

"A man may be mad upon all subjects; and then, though he may have glimmerings of reason, he is not a responsible agent. This is general insanity; but, if it is not so great in its extent or degree, as to blind him to the nature and extent of his moral duty, it is no defence to an accusation. It must be so great as entirely to destroy his perception of right and wrong; and it is not until that perception is thus destroyed that he ceases to be responsible. It must amount to delusion or hallucination, controlling his will, and making the commission of the act, in his apprehension, a duty of overruling necessity. The most apt illustration of the latter is the perverted state of religious obligation which has caused men sometimes to sacrifice their wives and children.

"Partial insanity is confined to a particular subject, the man being sane on every other. In that species of insanity, it is plain that he is a responsible agent if he were not instigated by his madness to perpetrate the act. He continues to be a legitimate subject of punishment, although he may have been laboring under a moral obliquity of perception, as much as if he were laboring under an obliquity of vision. A man whose mind squints, unless impelled to crime by this very mental obliquity, is as much amenable to punishment as one whose eye squints. On this point there has been a mistake as melancholy as it is popular. It has been announced by learned doctors that if a man has the least taint of insanity entering into his mental structure, it discharges him of all responsibility to the laws. To this monstrous error may be traced both the fecundity in homicides which has dishonored this country, and the immunity which has attended them. The law is, that whether insanity be general or partial, the degree of it must be so great as to have controlled the will of its subject, and to have taken from him the freedom of moral action.

"But there is a moral or homicidal insanity, consisting of an irresistible inclination to kill, or to commit some other particular offence. There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind, drawing it to consequences which it sees but cannot avoid, and placing it under a coercion which, while its results are clearly perceived, is incapable of resistance. The doctrine which acknowledges this mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognized only in the clearest cases. It ought to be shown to have been habitual, or at least to have shewn itself in more than a single instance. It is seldom directed against a particular individual; but that it may be so, is proved by the case of the young woman who was deluded by an irresistable impulse to kill her child, though aware of the heinous nature of the act. The frequency of this constitutional malady is fortunately small, and it is better to confine it within the strictest limits. If juries were to allow it as a general motive operating in cases of this character, its recognition would destroy social order as well as personal safety. To establish it as a justification in any particular case, it is necessary either to show by clear proof its contemporaneous existence evidenced by present circumstances, or the existence of a particular tendency developed in previous cases, becoming in itself a second nature."

We introduce here, and answer, the written points submitted by the prisoner's counsel:

1. "The court are requested to instruct the jury that if they believe that at the time of the killing the defendant was in such a state of mind as to be unable to apply the test of right and wrong to the particular case, he is not a responsible agent, and the verdict should be not guilty."

This is the test or criterion, in passing upon evidence of the existence of insanity, in its common and usual forms, to a degree that will relieve from responsibility; and we answer the point in the affirmative.

2. "The court are requested to instruct the jury that if they believe the prisoner to have been 'governed by an uncontrollable impulse, his will no longer in subjection to his reason, owing to the excited and continued impetuosity of his thoughts, the tumultuous and confused condition of his mind, goaded by a sense of grievous wrong, he was wrought to a phrensy bordering upon madness, which, for the time being rendered him unable to control his actions or to direct his movements,' their verdict should be not guilty."

We are at some loss to understand what is here meant. If the point is predicated of *moral* insanity, which is recognized in Mosler's case, and which we recognize, we affirm it. We recognize moral insanity, however, as they did, as of uncommon occurrence, and evidence of the existence and operation of which, since it cannot be tested by the general rule applicable to the common and usual forms of insanity, is to be received and passed upon in view of the cautions suggested in the case referred to. If the point means more or less than we have supposed, we refuse our assent.

You will inquire, then, gentlemen, whether the prisoner was laboring under moral insanity; and in doing so, you will remember the cautions suggested in the case read. The general test here fails; for, in this mania, it seems, one may be drawn on to consequences which "he sees but cannot avoid," and "be aware of the heinous nature of the act."—There is little, in such case, to distinguish it from an ordinary criminal act. "To the eye of reason, every murderer is a madman." In the commission of every crime, the judgment and conscience are overborne for the time by temptation to evil, acting upon the wickedness of the heart, and exciting the evil passions to overmastering strength; but to allow that to excuse would be to make crime its own justification, and evidence of its own innocence, and to strike at the foundation of all accountability. It is well said, therefore, that "the doctrine which acknowledges this mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognized only in the clearest cases."—The evidence adduced to establish it should be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. "It ought to be shown to have been habitual, or at least to have shewn itself in more than one instance." "To establish it as a justification in any particular case, it is necessary either to show by clear proofs its contemporaneous existence evidenced by present circumstances, or the existence of a particular tendency developed in previous cases." Is there such proof here? Were the shots fired at the deceased without discrimination, or without a motive? Had a tendency to such acts been developed in a single instance in the whole life of the prisoner before this act of homicide, or has it been since?

If the prisoner was not laboring under *moral* insanity, you will inquire whether, upon the evidence here, he was laboring under mental malady of any kind, so as not to know and understand the nature of the act he was doing, and that it was wrong and would subject him to punishment. And we propose to detain you but a short time longer, with a few observations upon the evidence in this part of the case.

It is claimed, on the part of the prisoner, that his appearance and conduct, on that occasion, explained and accounted for by other evidence heard in his behalf, evidenced insanity. The witnesses state that he was wild and excited in his appearance, violent in his gestures, his voice raised to a high and unnatural pitch and heard in a crying tone, and his expressions, some of the witnesses say, were incoherent. The witnesses themselves were of course more or less excited, and they use their own words to describe his conduct and to express their own impressions. Some express his manner and appearance as "excited" and "wild;" some of them say he was in "a phrensy." They testify that he swore profaneiy, and used also low and vulgar expressions. The question here is, was this the incoherent raving and phrensied conduct of a maniac, or one at the time insane?—or, was it the violence of one excited by passion, and seeking revenge? Was it insanity?—or was it anger? You will judge. Violent gestures, loud tones, and excited looks are the natural expressions of anger, varying in degree with the temperament of the person and the intensity of his passion. Profanity seems, also, to be the natural language of angry passion. The witnesses say that his appearance was different from what they had ever noticed it; but none of them had ever seen him angry. Was his conduct natural, or otherwise, supposing him to have been sane, and to have sought out Marbourg and shot him down, in revenge for an injury? If, calm and unexcited, and as the witnesses had always before seen him, or with a smile on his face, instead of the fire of anger in his eye, he had met Marbourg and shot him down, without any assigned or known motive, and then turned around and walked calmly away, without manifesting any excitement or concern,—what would have been the conclusion?—that he was *sane*, or INSANE?

It is claimed, also, that his appearance and conduct on that occasion were in such striking contrast with his habits and character thro' his whole life, as to exhibit a complete transformation, which is only reasonably explained on the supposition that the sad calamity that had befallen him, the evidence of which he had confirmed that morning by the confession of his wife, acting upon an excitable temperament for a week, during which he had ate and slept but little, had dethroned his reason. And it is true that he has shown, by all the witnesses, not merely a good, but *every* good, an excellent character. It has been shown, too, that he has long been a regular, punctual and an exemplary member of a church—an elder, occasionally officiating for the preacher in his absence; that no one had ever heard him use a profane or vulgar word, or any expression which might not have been used in any company. All this is certainly entitled to your consideration, and to such weight as you think it deserves, in determining the question of his sanity. Is it probable, the inquiry naturally arises, that, if his reason had not for the time been overthrown, he would have acted and talked in a manner so inconsistent with his whole previous life, and so contrary, apparently, to his very nature as exhibited in the proof of his excellent character as a man and a Christian? And yet it is not to be forgotten that men of the most exalted personal and religious character have fallen into crime. David, who was a man after God's own heart, was guilty of adultery, and, to hide it, of murder. And we read that when the mob had taken his Divine Master before the high priest, "Peter sat without in the palace, and a damsel came unto him saying, thou also wast with Jesus; but, *he denied before them all*, saying, I know not what thou sayest." He was accused by another; "and again he denied with *an oath*, saying, I know not the man." And "after a while they that stood by" accosted him with the same accusation;—"then began he TO CURSE AND TO SWEAR, saying, I know not the man!" He soon afterwards "went out and wept bitterly."—Peter was guilty of lying and profanity. It was conduct grossly inconsistent with his religious character; but it is not intimated that he was insane. The Savior, "who knew what was in the heart of man," said to his followers, "watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation." And an apostle said, "let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall!" Such is human nature, that a good character is no certain guaranty that its possessor may not fall into sin, and but feeble evidence against clear proof of guilt Still, we commend this evidence to your consideration upon this question of insanity; and you will allow it all the weight you think it merits, in the prisoner's behalf.

It has also been shown that one of the prisoner's brothers is insane, and has been a raving maniac for twenty-eight or thirty years, and that he has a sister who, as some of the witnesses expressed it, is a weak-minded woman. She is married, and has children; but, in the opinion of some of the witnesses, is not capable of giving proper attention to her children and her domestic affairs. This evidence was offered, and received, to shew a hereditary taint. Insanity is, no doubt, a hereditary disease, which may appear, and reappear, overleaping, sometimes, a generation. And proof of its existence in a family is pertinent evidence on a question like this. The evidence here, however, going no further than we have stated, is very slight. It does not appear that his parents, or any of his ancestors, have been insane, or any of the family, except one brother. But, if such proof were made, the force of it would only be to show a liability, or a *predisposition*, at most, to the disease. That is not the disease. If a hereditary taint were established, it might aid in solving the question, whether his unusual conduct is most reasonably ascribable to insanity or anger. You will judge whether this evidence sheds any light on the question.

We all remember, too, that the prisoner became suddenly ill here in this room on last Friday, and it has been shown that, after he was taken to the jail, he was laboring under delirium, and was, for a short time, phrensied and raving. He imagined there were persons there trying to injure him, and he wanted the sheriff sent for to protect him, when the sheriff *was* there, trying to calm him. He wanted to see his son, when his son was present. He fancied they wanted to shoot him, and that he saw blood on his breast. He continued in that state near half an hour, when he fell asleep and awoke rational. This was *delirium*, "resulting," as Dr. Bunn testifies, "from depression following high nervous excitement, and resembling *mania a potu*." During its continuance, there can be no doubt he would not have been responsible for any act done by him. But, the question is not what was his condition on Friday, but on the 12th of February, when he shot Marbourg. The evidence has no other bearing on this question than as it may tend to show the existence of some predisposition to delirium or mania, under like circumstances, and from a similar cause, and of the same character. He had been under excitement a week before the homicide. This fact, with the evidence now under consideration, it is argued, explains and accounts for his conduct at that time. It is not made appear, however, that he labored under any *delusion* then. He was dealing with a real character, and for a reason then given. To the excitement up to that time was added that of the terrible tragedy, of every thing that has followed to him, and of this trial; and yet we do not learn that he had any mania or delirium during the intervening month. That mania, too, results from and *follows* excitement; while he was under high excitement at the time of the homicide. It is to be remarked, also, that in *mania a potu*, with which Dr. Bunn classes it, the patient is not fierce, but fearful, his delusion being apprehended danger to himself, which he is trying to escape; and so it was with him on Friday.

On the other hand, it is urged that the prisoner, during the whole of the week before the homicide, was ferreting out and trying to ascertain the truth of the reports concerning his wife and the deceased; going from one person to another, and from place to place, as he discovered some new source of information; comparing statements and noticing discrepancies, in his efforts to get at the truth, as counsel would prepare a cause; that, after having satisfied himself of the truth of the reports, he provided the loaded pistol and went to the vicinity of the post office, where, as it is alleged, he expected to find the deceased; waited and watched, lying in wait for him in Wehn's store, as it is also alleged, till he passed; followed him to the post office, and shot him down—what he declared a week before he would do, if he found the report to be true, and giving that reason for it at the time and afterwards. In all this, it is argued against the prisoner, he was following out and executing a deliberately formed and repeatedly declared purpose, reasoning at every step, and knowing and understanding what he was about. It is urged, also, that he afterwards went to the office of Irvin Rutledge, Esq., knowing where it was, and that he was a magistrate; stating to him that he had shot Marbourg, and had come to surrender himself into the hands of the law, expressing at the same time his belief that God would forgive him, and his willingness to be tried by a jury of his country. This, it is argued, all clearly shows that he knew at the time the nature and consequences of the deed, and knew and understood before what tribunal he was answerable for it.

You, gentlemen of the jury, will take into careful consideration the whole evidence, and determine the prisoner's responsibility. This is all we have to say to you.

If you find the prisoner guilty, you will state in your verdict the degree of his crime, or of what you find him guilty. If you find him not guilty on the ground of insanity,—the only ground on which you can acquit him,—it will be your duty to state that you find he was insane at the time of the commission of the act, and that you acquit him on that ground.

And now, gentlemen, we have discharged our duty. We have dealt faithfully with this case. We sit here, as you sit in that box, to discharge our duty, as you must discharge yours, under the solemn obligations of an oath. Having done so, according to our best judgment, no conscious self-reproach, which we should of all consequences most dread, will ever rise up within us to disturb us in the future. For other consequences, we are not responsible. It is not our province, nor yours, to make the law, but to administer it. It is not for us or for you to remit its penalties; the pardoning power is lodged in other hands. Whatever the result may be, to the prisoner or to the public,—whether it be a result which will convict the prisoner, or acquit him,—that will vindicate the law, or strike it down,—whatever the result may be, we are acquitted at the bar of our own conscience.

The case, and the responsibility of its decision, are now with you.

☞ On Wednesday, 16th inst., the two houses of our State Legislature met in joint convention, for the purpose of electing a State Treasurer. On the first ballot, Hon. Henry D. Moore, (Republican) of Philadelphia, who formerly held the office for two terms, was elected, receiving 66 votes against 56 for Wm. D. M'Grath, the present Democratic incumbent. Mr. Moore has heretofore proven himself a skillful and safe financier, and with the experience he has already had in the office, it is safe to say that the financial affairs of the State will be carefully guarded in his hands.

☞ Since the appointment of Grant as Lieutenant General, the position held for a year and a half by General Halleck has been declared a superfluity. Accordingly, the latter has been removed therefrom and made Chief of Staff at Washington. Sherman succeeds Grant in the command of the Army of the Southwest. Grant's headquarters as Commander-in-chief, will be "in the field."

☞ It is rumored that Lieut. Gen. Grant will soon take command of the Army of the Potomac, as General-in-chief, and move upon the enemy's works. If so, there will be something done soon.

☞ The President has appointed Charles Gilpin U. S. District Attorney for Philadelphia, vice George A. Coffey, deceased.

☞ The Richmond *Dispatch* says Lent in the South lasts 365 days.

The Alleghanian.

RIGHT OR WRONG.

WHEN RIGHT, TO BE KEPT RIGHT, WHEN WRONG, TO BE PUT RIGHT.

EBENSBURG:

THURSDAY.....MARCH 24.

FOR PRESIDENT:

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, of Illinois.

The "Answer," and What of It.

The *Dem. & Sent.* has given us what it is pleased to style "an answer" to some queries we propounded it a few weeks ago. Let us look at it:

It says it is "not ashamed to proclaim its sentiments in favor of peace." We are not surprised at this—it is lost to all sense of shame. This is known and read of all men who have the patience to wade through its filthy columns from week to week. What kind of *peace* does it want? Since it is eternally harping on this one string, it certainly ought to be able to define its position, and give us the terms of the peace it so devotedly wishes.—Just here, talking of peace, let us say there has never been a time since the beginning of the rebellion when the rebels proposed any other terms of adjustment of our difficulties than is contained in the desire to be "let alone." In the last "Manifesto of the Confederate Congress to the Southern People," we have the desire of these villainous outlaws set forth as follows:

"In every form in which expression could be given to the sentiments—in public meetings, through the press—by legislative resolves—the desire of the people for the uninterrupted enjoyment of their rights and property, have been made known. The President, more authoritatively in several of his messages, protesting the utter absence of all desire to *interfere with the United States*, or acquire any of them, has avowed that the advent of peace will be hailed with joy."

Again.

"Commencing our new National life under such circumstances, we had a right to expect that we would be permitted, *without molestation*, to cultivate the arts of peace and *vindicate on our chosen arena*, and with the selected type of social characteristics, our claim to civilization."

This is the kind of "peace" which Davis & Co. want, and this is the kind of peace which the D. & S. wants. After those arch-traitors and infernal scoundrels have succeeded in inveigling their willing dupes to resist the "powers that be;" after they have initiated one of the wickedest rebellions on record, stolen the nations' property, and deluged the land in blood; after they have pulled down on their guilty heads the execration of the whole civilized world—there are whimpering curs in the North mean enough to yelp them on by saying, "wayward sisters, go in peace!"

The cases of Mexico and Great Britain are not parallel cases to our own at all.—"England, proud England," never made a treaty with us until force of circumstances *compelled* her to so do, and Mexico the same. Has it come to this, that we, like a whipped spaniel, must cower before the "lords of the lash" and make peace because we can do no better? Never! The D. & S. knows better.

Then, again, we have a rehash of the old, threadbare assumption, "Why did our Government abandon the policy upon which it started out at the commencement of the war!" This is departing from the usual phraseology of the D. & S., and virtually acknowledging the "Administration" is the "Government!" The design of the Government is to put down the rebellion at all hazards. It started out with the policy to save the Union with or without Slavery, as the case might be.—After the war had progressed a considerable length of time, it became evident that Slavery was the hand by which the mouth of the rebellion was fed, and it was determined to sever this hand by one decisive blow.

But, it has "turned the war into a crusade against the peculiar and local institutions of the South." This is what disturbs the night visions and day dreams of Southern sympathizers. Slavery has been the master of the Shamocracy for the past thirty years, and now because it is in danger, the war ought to stop! This same party has always been for war or against war, for peace or against peace, just as its master might decree. But it will have to give it up at last, for its leaders begin to acknowledge, unwillingly, that "Othello's occupation is gone."

The D. & S. shows poor proficiency in its catechism, and if it does not answer better it will never be admitted into full communion. In answer to "Who are the Abolitionists?" it says "they are shoddy contractors, unprincipled office holders, sycophants of base tyrants." More than that, sir; if you mean *all* who are opposed to Slavery, then their name is legion.—Peter Beauregard includes all the North under the ban, and to-day a *vast majority* of the honorable freemen of the North have passed the righteous decision that Slavery shall die.

"Who are those who first responded to their country's call? Who are those who are enlisting by thousands?" "Democrats," the D. & S. stupidly drawls out. We do not deny that there are brave Democrats in the army, but there are but few *Copperheads*, excepting those who were taken against their will, or who crept into places of profit under disguise. It is very strange if our soldiers are all Democrats, that when they came home last fall, according to the Copperhead press, they all voted for Curtin. Please solve us that riddle, neighbor, and we will be able not only to "point to one Abolitionist," but to thousands "who have enlisted honorably in the army," notwithstanding the broad assertion that you have put forth, that not one single "Abolitionist" has honorably enlisted in the army, within a thousand miles of this place. From the fact that we can't give the exact proportions, suppose we just wait for the election returns next fall, when our noble braves will be allowed to vote, in defiance of the opposition of those sixteen Copperhead State Senators.

"We never speak disrespectfully of our soldiers in the field, or slander them, so long as they behave themselves." This is a deliberate lie. You have slandered our brave soldiers who went from this place on every available opportunity. This is a matter so patent to all that we need not waste words upon it. Never slander our soldiers!—why, what did you say only last week concerning the "emergency" men of last summer, who went forth to defend the State when her institutions were in deadly peril? Why, that they were common thieves and pickpockets!

We care nothing about the garbled extract from the Boston *Commonwealth*, as to the ignorance prevailing in Massachusetts. She needs no defence by us, as she needed none in the day of Webster, when he replied to Hayne. There she is,—read her history. All the world knows of the reputation, of the schools and the general intelligence of New England, if the D. & S. does not. That there is ignorance there, we do not deny; but the statistics conclusively show that the greater amount of it is confined to the foreign population of this "self-righteous people." By the way, it is touching a very sensitive point when you broach a man's religion. The editor of the D. & S. has no more business with the religion of the people of New England than we have with his. But we are willing to compare notes with him any day. And if we had a mind, we might tell such a bloody tale of stakes and martyrs as would throw the "burning of old women for witches" far into the shade.

As to the "Greenbacks," so long as the public are satisfied with their "value," it makes very little difference about the insane ravings of this mongrel sheet. See the fable of the fly on the horn of the ox. By the way, we seem to have a faint recollection of hearing of a certain editor who was proffered a five hundred dollar Greenback for dues on subscription, and that he fumbled over his "pile" and found his change wanting. We have just been wondering whether the issues of the same "paper mills" of Lincoln & Co. are still at par at the office of the D. & S.

We cannot close without advising the editor of the D. & S. to *repent*, because we are convinced his "end is nigh," politically, if he persists in his wicked ways. A day of reckoning is coming, when an incensed people will visit with fearful reckoning those who have hoodwinked and deceived them too long. These little one-horse teams, like the D. & S., who have more brass in their faces than brains in their heads, and who are continually crying "unconstitutional!" "unconstitutional!" will be brought to a severe account, when the war closes—which will soon take place—and the traitors of the South have received their just doom.—These sneaking tories will *then* be looked upon with contempt, and they richly deserve the scorn and indignation of all good men. The thunder of a nation regenerated from the curse of treason and slavery will mutter "traitor!" in their ears, And as they skulk away down to their graves of shame, the lightnings of insulted justice will search their guilty souls to the very gates of hell.

"Mark How Plain a Tale Shall Put Him Down."

The *Dem. & Sent.*, unable to successfully controvert our statement with regard to the political complexion of the "emergency" company which went from Ebensburg in June last, upon the occasion of the rebel invasion of Pennsylvania,—said statement being to the effect that, of the ninety men composing it, only some half dozen acknowledged themselves to be Copperheads,—has recourse to a very dirty but very characteristic expedient in order to dodge the true issue. Unable to deny our assertion, it does the "next best thing" in its power, and makes an attempt to throw unlimited odium upon these good men and true, who instituted a wall of bristling steel between their homes and firesides and the war's desolation, by classing them in the same category with thieves and outlaws. It introduces the following extract from the Bedford *Gazette* of the 26th June last in support of its position:

"The citizens of Bedford did all that was in their power to feed them (the "emergency" men) and make them comfortable. But what was the surprise of our people, when they found that instead of friends, they were really harboring foes! For no sooner had they arrived, than they began to scatter abroad through the country, stealing horses, shooting cattle, and destroying property generally. They seemed to be under no restraint from their officers; some of the latter, as we are informed, encouraged the men in their lawless conduct."

Now, to show up the *Dem. & Sent.* in its true light, let us continue the article from which it makes the above extract;—and here let us remark that the *entire article* as published in the Bedford *Gazette* was reproduced in the *Dem. & Sent.* of date July 1, 1863, we quoting from the *Dem. & Sent's.* own republication of it.—After mentioning that some officers "encouraged the men in their lawless conduct," the next two sentences goon to say that—

"True, there were many well-behaved and quiet men among these militia, and we, of course, except such in our animadversions upon the conduct of their rowdy companions. A COMPANY FROM EBENSBURG WAS AN HONORABLE EXCEPTION, *and we make this mention so that injustice may not be done them.*"

Fair, honest-minded reader! What can be said, think you, too strongly denunciatory of a sheet which thus unblushingly distorts the truth to suit its own selfish purposes! What would you say of the man who quoted, as a justification for murder, the sixth commandment to read, "Thou *shalt* kill?" Yet the one perversion is no worse than the other, nor more effectually obscures the true signification of what is intended to be said. We think we never, in our somewhat limited experience, saw or heard of a more deliberate attempt at dishonest dealing than is evinced in this same experiment at falsifying the record. Did *you*? It even overtops the *Dem. & Sent.'s* assertion in July last, only two or three days before the battle of Gettysburg, that the report of the rebel invasion of the State was a lie,—an invention of the administration to get men into the army,—that it was all a "big scare!"

Oh! time, death, and the hereafter!—What is the world coming to when beings created in the image of God allow themselves to thus degrade their manhood! Is the theory of "total depravity" then the true one!

But why complain! Falsehood and slander constitute the natural element of the *Dem. & Sent.*—lying and reiterating a lie its daily meat and drink. Conceived in sin and reared in iniquity, to expect anything other than wickedness from its teachings were to reverse the general order of things. The age of miracles is past. When a profane man opes his mouth, it is to let fall an oath; when the *Dem. & Sent.* brays, it is to give utterance to falsehood and deceit.

The *Dem. & Sent.* is the accredited organ of the Copperhead party of this county. If "like father like son" be a maxim which will hold good in this instance, to what an unfathomable depth of moral blackness and darkness then must not that party be sunk!

EXECUTOR'S NOTICE.—Letters testamentary on the estate of George Leslie, dec'd. late of Carroll tp., Cambria county, having been granted the subscriber by the Register of said county, all persons indebted to said estate are requested to call and settle the same immediately, and those having claims against said estate will present them, properly authenticated, for settlement. HIRAM FRITS.

Carroll tp., March 24, 1864-6t.

INSURANCE AGENCY.—James Purse, agent for the Blair county and Lycoming Mutual Fire Insurance Companies, Johnstown, Pa.

☞ Will attend promptly to making insurance in any part of Cambria county upon application by letter or in person.

JAMES GRAHAM. R. J. THOMAS.

GRAHAM & THOMAS, WHOLESALE GROCERS, *And Dealers in Flour*, 157 Liberty street PITTSBURG, Penn'a. Dec26, 1861-tf