

Should any foreign government attempt to possess it as a colony; or otherwise to incorporate it with itself, the principle avowed by President Monroe in 1823, and reaffirmed in my first annual message, that no foreign power shall, with our consent, be permitted to plant or establish any new colony or dominion on any part of the North American continent, must be maintained. In maintaining this principle, and in resisting its invasion by any foreign power, we might be involved in other wars more expensive and more difficult than that in which we are at present engaged.

The provinces of New Mexico and the Californias are contiguous to the territories of the United States, and if brought under the government of our laws, their resources—mineral, agricultural, manufacturing and commercial—would soon be developed.

Upper California is bounded on the north by our Oregon possessions, and if held by the United States, would soon be settled by a hardy, enterprising and intelligent portion of our population. The bay of San Francisco, and other harbors along the Californian coast, would afford shelter for our navy, for our numerous whale ships, and other merchant vessels employed in the Pacific ocean, and would, in a short period, become the marts of an extensive and profitable commerce with China, and other countries of the East.

These advantages, in which the whole commercial world would participate, would at once be secured to the United States by the cession of this territory; while it is certain that, as long as it remains a part of the Mexican dominions, they can be enjoyed neither by Mexico herself, nor by any other nation.

New Mexico is a frontier province, and has never been of any considerable value to Mexico. From its locality, it is naturally connected with our western settlements. The territorial limits of the State of Texas, too, as defined by her laws before her admission into our Union, embrace all that portion of New Mexico lying east of the Rio Grande, while Mexico still claims to hold this territory as a part of her dominions. The adjustment of this question of boundary is important.

There is another consideration which induced the belief that the Mexican government might even desire to place this province under the protection of the Government of the United States. Numerous bands of fierce and warlike savages wander over it, and upon its borders; Mexico has been, and must continue to be, too feeble to restrain them from committing depredations, robberies and murders, not only upon the inhabitants of New Mexico itself, but upon those of the other northern States of Mexico. It would be a blessing to all these Northern States to have their citizens protected against them by the power of the United States. At this moment many Mexicans, principally females and children, are in captivity among them. New Mexico were held and governed by the United States, we could effectually prevent these tribes from committing such outrages, and compel them to release these captives, and restore them to their families and friends.

In proposing to acquire New Mexico and the Californias, it was known that but an inconsiderable portion of the Mexican people would be transferred with them, the country embraced within these provinces being chiefly an uninhabited region.

These were the leading considerations which induced me to authorize the terms of peace which were proposed to Mexico. They were rejected; and negotiations being at an end, hostilities were renewed. An assault was made by our gallant army upon the strongly fortified places near the gates of the city of Mexico, and upon the city itself; and after several days of severe conflict, the Mexican forces, vastly superior in number to our own, were driven from the city and it was occupied by our troops.

Immediately after information was received of the unfavorable result of the negotiations, believing that his continued presence with the army could be productive of no good, I determined to recall our commissioner. A despatch to this effect was transmitted to him on the sixth of October last. The Mexican government will be informed of his recall; and that in the existing state of things, I shall not deem it proper to make any further overtures of peace, but shall be at all times ready to receive and consider any proposals which may be made by Mexico.

Since the liberal proposition of the United States was authorized to be made in April last, large expenditures have been incurred, and the precious blood of many of our patriotic fellow-citizens has been shed in the prosecution of the war. This consideration, and the obstinate perseverance of Mexico in protracting the war, must influence the terms of peace which it may be deemed proper hereafter to accept.

Our arms having been everywhere victorious, having subjected to our military occupation a large portion of the enemy's country, including his capital, and negotiations for peace having failed, the important questions arise—In what manner the war ought to be prosecuted? And what should be our future policy? I cannot doubt that we should secure and render available the conquest which we have already made; and that, with this view, we should hold and occupy, by our naval and military forces, all the ports, towns, cities, and provinces now in our occupation, or which may hereafter fall into our possession; and we should press forward our military operations and levy such military contributions on the enemy as may, as far as practicable, defray the future expenses of the war.

Had the government of Mexico acceded

to the equitable and liberal terms proposed, that mode of adjustment would have been preferred. Mexico having declined to do this, and failed to offer any other terms which could be accepted by the United States, the national honor, no less than the public interests, requires that the war should be prosecuted with increased energy and power until a just and satisfactory peace can be obtained. In the meantime, as Mexico refuses all indemnity, we should adopt measures to indemnify ourselves, by appropriating, permanently, a portion of her territory. Early after the commencement of the war, New Mexico and the Californias were taken possession of by our forces. Our military and naval commanders were ordered to conquer and hold them, subject to be disposed of by a treaty of peace.

These provinces are now in our undisputed occupation, and have been so for many months; all resistance on the part of Mexico having ceased within their limits. I am satisfied that they should never be surrendered to Mexico. Should Congress concur with me in this opinion, and that they should be retained by the United States as indemnity, I can perceive no good reason why the civil jurisdiction and laws of the United States should not at once be extended over them. To wait for a treaty of peace, such as we are willing to make, by which our relations towards them would not be changed, cannot be good policy; whilst our own interest, and that of the people inhabiting them, require that a stable, responsible, and free government under our authority should, as soon as possible, be established over them.

Should Congress, therefore, determine to hold these provinces permanently, and that they shall hereafter be considered constituent parts of our country, the early establishment of territorial governments over them will be important for the more perfect protection of persons and property; and I recommend that such territorial governments be established. It will promote peace and tranquility among the inhabitants, by allaying all apprehension that they may still entertain of being again subjected to the jurisdiction of Mexico. I invite the early and favorable consideration of Congress to this important subject.

Besides New Mexico and the Californias, there are other Mexican provinces which have been reduced to our possession by conquest. These other Mexican provinces are now governed by our military and naval commanders, under the general authority which is conferred upon a conqueror by the laws of war. They should continue to be held as a means of coercing Mexico to accede to just terms of peace. Civil as well as military officers are required to conduct such a government. Adequate compensation to be drawn from contributions levied on the enemy should be fixed by law for such officers as may be thus employed. What further provision may become necessary, and what final disposition it may be proper to make of them, must depend on the future progress of the war, and the course which Mexico may think proper hereafter to pursue.

With the views I entertain, I cannot favor the policy which has been suggested, either to withdraw our army altogether, or to retire to a designated line, and simply hold and defend it. To withdraw our army altogether from the conquests they have made by deeds of unparalleled bravery, and at the expense of so much blood and treasure, in a just war on our part, and one which, by the act of the enemy, we could not honorably have avoided, would be to degrade the nation in its own estimation and in that of the world.

To retire to a line, and simply hold and defend it, would not terminate the war. On the contrary, it would encourage Mexico to persevere, and tend to protract it indefinitely.

It is not to be expected that Mexico, after refusing to establish such a line as a permanent boundary, when our victorious army are in possession of her capital, and in the heart of her country, would permit us to hold it without resistance. That she would continue the war, and in the most harassing and annoying forms, there can be no doubt. A border warfare of the most savage character, extending over a long line, would be unceasingly waged.—It would require a large army to be kept constantly in the field, stationed at posts and garrisons along such a line, to protect and defend it.

The enemy, relieved from the pressure of our arms on his coasts and in the populous towns of the interior, would direct his attention to this line, and, selecting an isolated post for attack, would concentrate his forces upon it. This would be a condition of affairs which the Mexicans, pursuing their favorite system of guerilla warfare, would probably prefer to any other. Were we to assume a defensive attitude on such a line, all the advantages of such a state of war would be on the side of the enemy. We could levy no contributions upon him, or in any other way make him feel the pressure of the war, but must remain inactive and await his approach, being in constant uncertainty at what point on the line, or at what time, he might make the assault.

He might assemble and organize an overwhelming force in the interior, on his own side of the line, and, concealing his purpose, make a sudden assault upon some one of our posts so distant from any other as to prevent the possibility of timely succor, or reinforcements; and in this way our gallant army would be exposed to the danger of being cut off in detail; or, if, by their unequalled bravery and prowess, every where exhibited during this war, they should repulse the enemy, their numbers stationed at any one post may be too small to pursue him.

If the enemy be repulsed, in one attack, he would have nothing to do but to retreat to his own side of the line, and, being in no fear of a pursuing enemy, may reinforce himself at leisure, for another attack on the same or some other post. He may, too, cross the line between our posts, make rapid incursions into the country which we hold, murder the inhabitants, commit depredations on them, and then retreat to the interior before sufficient force can be concentrated to pursue him. Such would probably be the harassing character of a mere defensive war on our part.

If our forces, when attacked, or threatened with attack, be permitted to cross the line, drive back the enemy and conquer him, this would be again to invade the enemy's country, after having lost all the advantages of the conquests already made, by having voluntarily abandoned them. To hold such a line successfully and in security, it is far from being certain that it would not require as large an army as would be necessary to hold all the conquests we have already made, and to continue the prosecution of the war in the heart of the enemy's country. It is also far from being certain that the expenses of the war would be diminished by such a policy.

I am persuaded that the best means of vindicating the national honor and interest, and of bringing the war to an honorable close, will be to prosecute it with increased energy and power in the vital parts of the enemy's country.

In my annual message to Congress of December last, I declared that "the war has not been waged with a view to conquest; but having been commenced by Mexico, it has been carried into the enemy's country, and will be vigorously prosecuted there, with a view to obtain an honorable peace, and thereby secure ample indemnity for the expenses of the war, as well as to our much injured citizens, who hold pecuniary demands against Mexico." Such, in my judgment, continues to be our true policy—indeed the only policy which will probably secure a permanent peace.

It has never been contemplated by me, as an object of the war, to make a permanent conquest of the republic of Mexico, or to annihilate her separate existence as an independent nation. On the contrary, it has ever been my desire that she should maintain her nationality, and, under a good government adapted to her conditions, be a free, independent and prosperous republic. The United States were the first among the nations to recognize her independence, and have always desired to be on terms of amity and good neighborhood with her. This she would not suffer.

By her own conduct we have been compelled to engage in the present war. In its prosecution we seek not her overthrow as a nation; but, in vindicating our national honor, we seek to obtain redress for the wrongs she has done us, and indemnity for our just demands against her. We demand an honorable peace; and that peace must bring with it indemnity for the past, and security for the future. Hitherto Mexico has refused all accommodation by which such a peace could be obtained.

Whilst our armies have advanced from victory to victory, from the commencement of the war, it has always been with the olive branch of peace in their hands; and it has been in the power of Mexico, at every step, to arrest hostilities by accepting it.

One great obstacle to the attainment of peace has, undoubtedly, arisen from the fact that Mexico has been so long held in subjection by one faction or military usurper after another, and such has been the condition of insecurity in which their successive governments have been placed, that each has been deterred from making peace, lest for this very cause, a rival faction might expel it from power.

Such was the fate of President Herrera's administration in 1845, for being disposed even to listen to the overtures of the United States to prevent the war, as is fully confirmed by the official correspondence which took place in the month of August last, between him and his government, a copy of which is herewith communicated. "For this cause alone," the revolution which displaced him from power was set on foot," by General Paredes.—Such may be the condition of insecurity of the present government.

There can be no doubt that the peaceable and will disposed inhabitants of Mexico are convinced that it is the true interest of their country to conclude an honorable peace with the United States; but the apprehension of becoming the victims of some military faction or usurper may have prevented them from manifesting their feelings by any public act. The removal of any such apprehension would probably cause them to speak their sentiments freely, and to adopt the necessary measures necessary for the restoration of peace.

With a people distracted and divided by contending factions, and a government subject to constant changes, by successive revolutions, the continued successes of our arms may fail to secure a satisfactory peace. In such event, it may become proper for our commanding generals in the field to give such encouragement and assurances of protection to the friends of peace in Mexico in the establishment and maintenance of a free republican government of their own choice, able and willing to conclude a peace which would be just to them, and secure to us the indemnity we demand.

This may become the only mode of obtaining such a peace. Should such be the result, the war which Mexico has forced upon us would thus be converted into an enduring blessing to herself. After finding her torn and distracted by factions, & ruled by military usurpers, we should then

leave her with a republican government in the enjoyment of real independence, and domestic peace and prosperity, performing all her relative duties in the great family of nations, and promoting her own happiness by wise laws and their faithful execution.

If, after affording this encouragement and protection, and after all the persevering & sincere efforts we have made, from the moment Mexico commenced the war, and prior to that time, to adjust our differences with her, we shall ultimately fail, then we shall have exhausted all honorable means in pursuit of peace, and must continue to occupy her country with our troops, taking the full measure of indemnity into our hands, and must enforce the terms which our honor demands.

To act otherwise, in the existing state of things in Mexico, and to withdraw our army without a peace, would not only leave all the wrongs of which we complain unredressed, but would be the signal for new and fierce civil dissensions and new revolutions—all alike hostile to peaceful relations with the United States.

Besides, there is danger, if our troops were withdrawn before a peace was concluded, that the Mexican people, wearied with successive revolutions, and deprived of protection for their persons and property, might at length be inclined to yield to foreign influences, and to cast themselves into the arms of some European monarch for protection from the anarchy and suffering which would ensue. This, for our own safety, and in pursuance of our established policy, we should be compelled to resist. We could never consent that Mexico should be thus converted into a monarchy governed by a foreign prince.

Mexico is our near neighbor, and her boundaries are co-terminous with our own, through the whole extent across the North American continent, from ocean to ocean. Both politically and commercially we have the deepest interest in her regeneration and prosperity. Indeed, it is impossible that, with any just regard to our own safety, we can ever become indifferent to her fate.

It may be that the Mexican government and people have misconstrued or misunderstood our forbearance, and our objects, in desiring to conclude an amicable adjustment of the existing differences between the two countries. They may have supposed that we would submit to terms degrading to the nation; or they may have drawn false inferences from the supposed division of opinion in the United States on the subject of the war, and may have calculated to gain much by protracting it; and, indeed, that we might ultimately abandon it altogether, without insisting on any indemnity, territorial or otherwise. Whatever may be the false impressions under which they have acted, the adoption and prosecution of the energetic policy proposed must undeceive them.

In the future prosecution of the war, the enemy must be made to feel its pressure more than they have heretofore done. At its commencement, it was deemed proper to conduct it in a spirit of forbearance and liberality. With this end in view, early measures were adopted to conciliate, as far as a state of war would permit, the mass of the Mexican population; to convince them that the war was waged not against the peaceful inhabitants of Mexico, but against their faithless government, which had commenced hostilities; to remove from their minds the false impressions which their designing and interested rulers had artfully attempted to make, that the war on our part was one of conquest; that it was a war against their religion and their churches, which were to be desecrated and overthrown; and that their rights of person and private property would be violated.

To remove these false impressions, our commanders in the field were directed scrupulously to respect their religion, their churches and their church property, which were in no manner to be violated; they were directed also to respect the rights of persons and property of all who should not take up arms against us.

Assurances to this effect were given to the Mexican people by Major General Taylor, in a proclamation issued in pursuance of instructions from the Secretary of War, in the month of June, 1846, and again by Major General Scott, who acted upon his own convictions of the propriety of issuing it in a proclamation of the eleventh of May, 1847.

In this spirit of liberality and conciliation, and with a view to prevent the body of the Mexican population from taking up arms against us, was the war conducted on our part. Provisions and other supplies furnished to our army by Mexican citizens were paid for at fair and liberal prices, agreed upon by the parties. After the lapse of a few months, it became apparent that these assurances and this mild treatment had failed to produce the desired effect upon the Mexican population.

While the war had been conducted on our part according to the most humane and liberal principles observed by civilized nations, it was waged in a far different spirit on the part of Mexico. Not appreciating our forbearance, the Mexican people generally became hostile to the United States, and availed themselves of every opportunity to commit the most savage excesses upon our troops. Large numbers of the population took up arms, and, engaging in the most cruel manner individual soldiers, or small parties, whom accident or other causes had separated from the main body of our army; bands of guerrillas and robbers infested the roads, harassed our trains, and, whenever it was in their power, cut off our supplies.

The Mexicans having thus shown them-

selves to be wholly incapable of appreciating our forbearance and liberality, it was deemed proper to change the manner of conducting the war, by making them feel its pressure according to the usages observed under similar circumstances by all other civilized nations.

Accordingly as early as the twenty-second of September, 1846, instructions were given by the Secretary of War to Major General Taylor to "draw supplies" for our army "from the enemy, without paying for them, and to require contributions for its support," if in that way he was satisfied he could "get abundant supplies for his forces." In directing the execution of these instructions, much was necessarily left to the discretion of the commanding officer, who was best acquainted with the circumstances by which he was surrounded, the wants of the army, and the practicability of enforcing the measure.

Gen. Taylor, on the 26th of October, 1846, replied, from Monterey, that "it would have been impossible hitherto, and is so now, to sustain the army to any extent by forced contributions of money or supplies." For the reasons assigned by him, he did not adopt the policy of his instructions, but declared his readiness to do so, "should the army, in its future operations, reach a portion of the country which may be made to supply the troops with advantage." He continued to pay for the articles of supply which were drawn from the enemy's country.

Similar instructions were issued to Major Gen. Scott on the third of April, 1847, who replied from Jalapa, on the twentieth of May, 1847, that, if it be expected that "the army is to support itself by forced contributions levied upon the country, we may ruin and exasperate the inhabitants, and starve ourselves." The same discretion was given to him that had been to Gen. Taylor in this respect. Gen. Scott, for the reasons assigned by him, also continued to pay for the articles of supply for the army which were drawn from the enemy.

After the army had reached the heart of the most wealthy portion of Mexico, it was supposed that the obstacles which had before a time prevented it would not be such as to render impracticable the levy of forced contributions for its support; and on the first of September, and again on the sixth of October, 1847, the order was repeated in despatches addressed by the Secretary of War to Gen. Scott, and his attention was again called to the importance of making the enemy bear the burdens of the war by requiring them to furnish the means of supporting our army; and he was directed to adopt this policy, unless, by doing so, there was danger of depriving the army of the necessary supplies. Copies of these despatches were forwarded to Gen. Taylor for his government.

On the thirty-first of March last, I caused an order to be issued to our military and naval commanders to levy and collect a military contribution upon all vessels & merchandise which might enter any of the ports of Mexico in our military occupation, and to apply such contributions towards defraying the expenses of the war.—By virtue of the right of conquest and the laws of war, the conqueror, consulting his own safety or convenience may either exclude foreign commerce altogether from all such ports, or permit it upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe.

Before the principal ports of Mexico were blockaded by our navy, the revenue derived from impost duties, under the laws of Mexico, was paid into the Mexican treasury. After these ports had fallen into our military possession, the blockade was raised, and commerce with them permitted upon prescribed terms and conditions. They were opened to the trade of all nations upon the payment of duties more moderate in their amount than those which had been previously levied by Mexico; and the revenue, which was formerly paid into the Mexican treasury, was directed to be collected by our military and naval officers, and applied to the use of our army and navy.

Care was taken that the officers, soldiers, and sailors of our army and navy should be exempted from the operations of the order; and as the merchandise imported, upon which the order operated, must be consumed by Mexican citizens, the contributions exacted were, in effect, the seizure of the public revenues of Mexico, and the application of them to our own use.—In directing this measure, the object was to compel the enemy to contribute, as far as practicable, towards the expenses of the war.

For the amount of contributions which have been levied in this form, I refer you to the accompanying reports of the Secretary of War and of the Secretary of the Navy, by which it appears that a sum exceeding half a million of dollars had been collected.

This amount would undoubtedly have been much larger, but for the difficulty of keeping open communications between the coast and the interior, so as to enable the owners of the merchandise imported, to transport and vend it to the inhabitants of the country. It is confidently expected that this difficulty will to a great extent, be soon removed by our increased forces which have been sent to the field.

Measures have recently been adopted by which the internal revenues of Mexico, in all places in our military occupation, will be seized and appropriated to the use of our army and navy.

The policy of levying upon the enemy contributions in every form, consistently with the laws of nations, which it may be practicable for our military commanders to adopt, should in my judgment, be rigidly enforced, and orders to this effect have accordingly been given. By such a policy,