! i ii it, BI S. J. ROW. CLEARFIELD, PA.. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 1863. VOL. 31- , t '. . . . . .. . . . .. ; ' ...... ' 1 ,T' 1 7 ' " .. ' - - TH CONDUCT OF THE WAR. Report of the Joint Committee. ' THE PESIH80LA CAMPAIGN. Oeo. Heinttelmsn, who commanded the first troops ot tbe army of tbe Potomac that land Id od tbe peninsula, arriTed at Fortress Mon roe on tbe 23d of March, two weeka after the evscuAtion ol Manassas. He bad orders to en camp aa near Fortreaa Monroe as possible, in 'orcrr that the enemy shoo Id have no Idea ot ibe direction in which tbe army was to move whether toward York town or Norfolk. Gen. Hsintzelman atates that atiortly after land ins; be obtained information that the enemy bad not more than 1C,000 troops at Yorktown and n the Peninsula, and is satisSed tbst he could Lave advai.ced and isolated Yorktown, in which case there would have been no serious obstacle in the way of proceed ins; directly to Richmond. On tbe 27th of March he sent out tt-connoitering part lea as far aa Biz Bethel and Watt's Creek, and went near the Half way House, where about 400 of the enemy, and a little artillery were seen. Lie telegraphed to (Jen. McClellan what he was doing, and re ceived a dispatch, in reply, that he (Gen. Mc Clellan) hopedthat nothing had been done to gT9 tbe enemy information of the line of op erations of The army. Tbe rrconnoUssoce was then withdrawn. . Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Mon roe, and on the 2d of April Gen. MoClellaa Mmaelf arrived. On the 4th of April the ar my commenced ita movement in tbe direction o'f Yorktown, and on the 6th appeared before the enemy's lines. Gen. McClellan states that he moved from Fortress Monroe sooner than hs otherwise would have done, upon bearing that the enemy were sending down re-enforcements. ; DELAY BEFORE TOtnoVK. Alt the testimony goes to prove that when our troops first landed on the PeninsuU tbe force of tbe enemy there constated of Magrn der's command, variously estimated at from 7,000 to 12.000 men, except by Gen. McClel lan, who estimates it from 15,000 to 20.000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, United States Senator from Virginia then living within the Rebel lines, near Williamsburg testifies that the Rtbels did not determine to re-enforce Ma gruder until it was apparent that our forces in tendtd to stop befort Yorktown and commence a regular Miege of the place. It is now evident, whatever may have been tbe opinion of onr officers at' the time, that our forcts, when they first appeared before Yorktown, could have pier ced the line of works across the Peninsula there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown, and cutting off re-enforcements, when the place must hare fallen in a very short time. Some of our Generals exprcted and desired that that should b done. Gen. Ileintzelman forwarded to Gen. McClellan tbe application to Gen Ham ilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy's linea. So answer was received to tbe application. HOW MANX TROOfS. U'CLELLAX HAD. Instead of that, however, a siege was de termined upon, contrary to the desire of tbe President, who, aa early as the 9th of April, wiote to Gen. ycClellan asrpllows t "There ia a curious mystery ahont tbe num. fcr ot troops now with you.. I telegraphed you on the 6ih, urging that yon had over 100, 000 with yen. I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 103,000 tUen with you and en route to you. You now 'say that you will bave not 85,000. when all en route to you shall bave reached you. How can this discrepancy of 25,000 beaceounted f-r J Aa to Gen. Wool's command, I under stand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own' would have to do it that command away. I suppose tbe whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time, and if so, I think It is tbe precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will stead ily gs'.a on you that js, be will gain faster by fortifications and ie-enforcements than you can by re enforcements alone. "And, once more, let me tell yon It Is Indis pensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do jne the Justice to remember I always wished not go in down the bay in seircb of a field, instead I fighting at or near Manassas, as only shift ing and not surmounting a difficulty ; that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal Intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note is noting now that the present hesitation to move upon an in trtuchtd poution is but the story of Manassas re ptaitd." And the repetition, was made complete near !.T a month later, when the enemy, in the face a superior force, evacuated their works :thut loss and without the knowledge of the sreral commanding our army. m'clellan wants mors, troops. Oeo. McClellan, however, did not deem his forces sufficient, and objected very strongly o the order of the President detaching Mc Dowell's corps for the defense of Washington, "imperilling the auccess or our cause." " called again and again for re-enforcements, asking for Franklin's and McCall'a Divisions McDowell's corps, to be under command of franklins insisting that Franklin's Division, t least, should be sent to him. On the Illh ) April Franklin's Division was ordered to Alexandria to embark for Fort Monroe. On hs 14th, Gen. Fianklin reported to Gen. Mc Uellan near Yorktown, but bis troops remain aon board the transports until af er the ene "y evacnafed tbe place, when they were or ated to West Point. HE WANTS TRANSPORTATION. On the 6th of April Gen. McClellan tele rphed to tbe President, -I have by no ens the ttansportation I must have to move y army even a few miles ; and asks that all "isonjera for wagon trains, &c, may at once complied with. All was sent to him aa de rI, until even Gen. McDowell found him se.t so stripped otthe transportation designed Jf hia corps, that when be moved to Freder- e ii rg St WM with ,be r,'t difficulty he uid mOT0 BuppUe, hj, force trom eqaja to Falmouth until the railroad was 'ompleted. month w,s BPnt fon Yorktown, our "J.in tbe opinion ofsomo of our ablest of fers, becoming mora demoralized by the la ws of a, long siege than it would have been en by M nnsucceaaful assault. toe retnrna in th Adjutant-General's of- ' signed bv Gen. McCtellsn and bis Adju tant-General, ahow that on the 30th of April, 1862, the forces oh tbe Peninsula under Gen. McClellan amounted to 182,392 present for duty i , . .. . , as wants gins., L. On the 1st of May tbe President telegraphs to Gen. McClellan : "lour call for Parrott guna from Washington alarms me, chiefly be cause it arguea indefinite procrastination.' Is anything to be done ?" ' - ' YORKTOWN EVACUATED "CLELLAN CHAGRINED. On the nigbt of the 3d and the morning of the 4tb of May, the enemy evacuated York town without loss. One ol the witnesses tes tifies that Gen. McClellan waa very much cha grined and mortified at the evacuation, as he bad made his preparations to open from his batteries oo Monday, tbe 6th of May. . ; , , FCRSCIT OF THE REBELS. The evacuation was discovered by dsytight on the morniog of tbe 4th. Between 10 and 11 o'clock, Gen. Stonrman, with the cavalry and toaiH light hoi so artillery, started in pur suit. About 1 o'cltck. Gen. Hooker, with his division, left Yorktown. with orders to support Gen. Sroneman. Gens. Sumner, Heint Zeltnan and Keyes also moved out inrin; the day, with the whole or portions of their corps. About five mile.t from Yorktown the division of Gen . Hooker was delayed tor some time in consequence of other troops, coming from an other direction, gettiDg into tbe road before him. i - - - ; . " In the meantime Gen. Stoneman had over taken the rear of the enemy with bis cavalry, and followed them up closely, keeping np a running fire nil tbe time, until ; the enemy reached their works in the neighborhood of Williamsburg, wbeu the pursuit was checked. Gov. Sprague was sent back to hurry up the .infantry support under Gen. Hooker. After considerable delay, , finding it impossible to pass . tbe troops ahead of him. Gen. Hooker turned off and proceeded by another road, of which be had obtained intoimation from some of the inhabitants; marched till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at day light, and came up to the advanced works ot the enemy a little after 7 o'clock, about half a mile from Fort Mgruder,and at once engagfd tbe enemy. , . ' ' , BATTLS OF WILLI AM9BCRG. ' There seems fa have been great misappre-. bension and confusion in relation to the man agement of the troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first commenced on Sunday, Gen. Hemtzelman was instructed by Gen. McClel lan to take charge of operations in front. On the morning of Monday orders were sent to Gen. Sumner to take the command ; Gen. McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to su perintend the sending of two divisions up the York River to West Point: A havy fain set in on Sunday; rendering tbe roads almost im practicable for the passage of troops. Tbe troops of the different commands became roin gled divisions and brigades, to some extent, were separated from each other and it seems to have beep difficult to get tbe troops up in time. ' ' ' ,; ; During Monday forenoon Gen. Hooker.flnd ing himself - hard pressed by the enemy, and understanding that Gen Sumner bad 80,000 troops Sriib htm, sent tepeatediy forreenforce ments.. So did Gen. Stoneman and Gen. Hrintzelman, but no'reenforcments srrived. Gn.t(imnr states that, having sent Gen.' Hancock to the right, he had at the center only about 3,000 infantry the cavalry thre not being fitted tor operations against the en emy, on account of the country being so wood ed. .Upon receiving the call for re-enforcements to be sent to the leff to Gen. Hooker, he sent staff" officers to hurry np troops from the rear, bis own corps being some ten miles off, and ordered Kearney to re-enforce Hook-' er. , Re-enforcements not coming up to Gen.' Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expect ed, the Prince de Joinville and Gov. Sprsgne went to Yorktowu to urge Gen. McClellan to come up to the front, and take charge of mat ters there. Glv. Sprague arrived at York town about 1 o'clock, ' having been about an hour in going down. He testifies that when Gen. McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he. remarked that he had supposed "those xn front could attend to that little matter." After some time Gen. McClellan started from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Wil liamsburg about 5 o'clock in tho afternoon. BOOKER DOES THE TIGHTtSO. , By that time Gen. Kearney had reached the field and re enforced Gen. . Hooker, taking command, being the senior in rank to Gener al Hooker. Gen. Hancock bad been engaged on the right, bi.t, upon being re-enforced, had succeeded in repulsing the enemy, losing a bout forty men. The principal fighting was done by the troops under Gen. Hooker, his di vision sustaining a loss of about 1,700 men. Before he was te-eniorced, bis troops were obliged toehold their po-ltion with, the bayo. net and such ammunition as the men could obtain from the bodies of those who had fal len, the roads being so muddy that it was im possible to bting up fresh ammunition. . EETRRAT ASD rTBSCIT. .. That night the enemy evacuated their posi tion at Williamsburg. Gen. McClellan states that after he arrived on the field he was so satisfied that tbe enemy bad been beaten and would be compelled to evacuate their position that night or be taken at a gteat disadvantage, that be countermanded orders to the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick aud sent them back to Yorktown. Tbe next day tbe pursuit was continued for a short distance by Gen. Stoneman and tbe cavalry, with a small body of infantry. Sever al of the Generals testify that, had the enemy been promptly followed tip after the battle of Williamsburg, they could have been followed right into Richmond one ot them says without firing a gun. Gen. McClellan saya that tbe roads were so bad, in consequence of tbe rains, that it waa impracticable to make a vigorous pursuit. - Tbe battle of Williamsburg appears to have been fought under many and serious disadvan tages. Nothing waa known of the nature of the country or the defensive works of the en emy nntil our troops arrived before - ibera ; there was no controlling mind in charge of tbe movements ; there was uncertainty in re gard to who waa in command ; each General fought as he considered best ; and, by the time the General Commanding appeared on the field, the principal part of the fighting was over. FCBTBER DELAY. Some three or four days were spent at Wil liamsburg for the purpoM of bringing up sup plies, &c, and then the line of march was ta ker, up for I be Cblckabomioy,; K wss.abpat.tho time that the army left Williamsburg hat Nor folk' was taken and the M err i mac destroyed. But preparations had been made before those events occurred to have supplies sent up York River instead of the Jamea. and the line after warda followed was adopted.' The consequence was that the gunboats were of little or no ser vice in the operations against Richmond, and remalued entirely inactive, except in some op erations against Fort Darling, nnitl they wxe called upon to protect the army when, in July, it fell back to tbe James river. The distance between Williamsburg and the line of operations on the Chickahominy waa from forty to fifty miles, and the army was most two weeks in moving (bat distance. Tbe first troops that .crossed the Cfiickahominy was the corps of Gen. Keyes, which crossed on the 24tb of May,-followed by the corps of Gen. Ueintzelman on the 25th. The rest ot our army remained on the left bank of the Chick ahominy until lh battle of Fair Oaks, when the corps of Gen. Sumner crossed to the as sistance of Gens. Heiotzelman and Keyes.' X'CLELLA!? STILL CALLING FOR X0RE TBOOPS. Gen. MCIellan continued c tiling for re in forcements, representing that the force id tbe enemy in hia tront waa superior to bis own. and that tbe force under Geo. M'Dwe!l would do more for the protection of Wasbinxton, if sent to his army, than In any other pom Iron in which it could be Dlaced. In a letter written Win the 21st of May he asks that Gen. McDow ell s corps be sent htm by water, rather than by land, as the more expeditious mode, and that he and his forces be explicitly pUce-i un der his orders, in the ordinary way." He closes his letter by saying : 1 believe there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor dis couraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can ; bnt, in sny event, I shall fight It with all the skill, and caution, and determi nation that " I possess. And I trust that the result may either obtain for me the perma nent confidence of my Government, or that it may close my career." - ' ' - In reply to tbe request of Gen. M'Clellan that Gen. M'Dowell should join his forces by water, the President states, on the 21st of May: Gen-M'Dowell cae reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats if the boats were . ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shaH be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he will reach you in five daya after starting ; whereas, by water, he Iwonld not reach yon in two weeks, judging by past experience, frank no 'a single aivistonaid not reacb you in ten days after 1 ordered it." t JACKS0X IX THC SHENANDOAH. , Preparations were accordingly made for Gen eral M'Dowell to leave Fredericksburg on the 2-5th of May to join Gen. M'Clellan. - Just at that time, however, Jackson commenced bta expedition down' the Shenandoah Valley, and Gen. M'Dowell, tsptrier with Gen.FreTnont, Irora Western Virginia, was sent to the assist ance of Gen. Banks, and to. intercept Jackson in bis retreat. Upon being informed of this, Gen. M'Clellan replied Ifcat the movement of Jackson was probably intended to prevent re inforcements being sent to him. The Presi dent replied, giving him full information as to the condition of affairs in the Valley, and Closed by saying : : -. . 'If M'Dowe'Ws force was now beyond our rrach we should be utterly helpless . Apprehen sions ot something like this, and no. unwilling ness to sustain yon, has always beerswny rea son for withholding-M'Dowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with trie forces you now have." . . BATTLE Or THE SKVEM PI.1KS. . On the 81st of May and the 1st of June the battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks were fought. As there has been so much -controversy in regsrd to the conduct of some of the troops engaged in that battle, your Committee will refer more particularly to the? testimony of Gen. Casey, who commanded the advanced division, upon which the attack was first made. Gen. Casey states that, when the campaign of the Peninsula commenced, bis division con sisted principally of raw and-inexperienced troops. They had suffered greatly from the labors and exposures incident upon the siege of Yorktown and the advauce of the troops tip the Peninsula. Some of them bad been tor weeks without shelter, being compelled to leave their camp equipage behind when order ed on the pursuit ol the enemy after the evac uation of Yorktown. That division took the lead across tbe Chickahominy, taking np a high position at Seven Pines, where it stab lished itself ly throwing: np intrenchments and. cutting abatis. A few days before the battle of Seven Pines, contrary to the advice and opinion of Gen. Keyea apd Gen. Casey, the division was ordered tbre-qnarters ot a mile to the front, within six miles of Rich mond, his pickets extending within five miles. They bad no support upon tbeir.rigbt or their left, tbe remainder of. the corps to which they belonged (Keyes') being in their, rear. Tbey at once commenced digging rifle-pits and cut ting abatis, the pickets at nigbt being. attack ed by tbe enemy who were repulied. - About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 31t tbe pickets reported the .enemy approaching-, and an aid of General Johnson waa captured and brought in with, important papers upon him. Gen. Casey, with this aid and his general offi cer of the day, went to General Keyes and re ported tbe circumstances to bim. Gen. Keyes testifies, that for some days before the attack he sent to Gen. M'Clellan report of bis con dition, the threatening attitude of the enemy in bis immediate vicinity ,and urged that Gen. Sumner be sent across to his support. . This was not done, however, until after the attack commenced. Reports .continued to come in of the approach of the enemy.. The division was called out and formed, the working men called in, and preparations made to meet the coming attack. Two lines of battle were? form edone in tbe rifle-pits, and another about oneahird of a mile in advance composed of five or six regiments and tour pieces of artil lery. A regiment had previously been , sent out to support the pickets. About 20 minutes to 1 o'clock the enemy commencad the attack in force, supposed to amount to about 35,000 men, attacking in front and . on both flanks. After fighting for some time, the enemy con tinning to come in force, the forces in front fell back to the rifle-pits, and fought there un til nearly surrounded. . Re-enforcements had been promised , and Geo. Casey had selected the position to which they were to be assign ed ; but no re-enforcements came up to bis position until just before he was forced to fall beck from bis second line,, when a single reg-. iment arrfvjtd.' After .about three boars' 8jM- fng tbe division fell back from ita second line with a loss of 1.433 in killed, wounded and n f . l. . . . . j . j". T lulling, iu mc course ui an oour suer jw sey's division bad been driven back, the re mainder of our forces were swept back from a rail and a bait to two miles from Casey's first line, when tbe enemy were checked, and the fighting ceased for tbe day. ; During tbe battle Gen. Snmner,whose corps was on tbe left bank of the Chickahominy, was ordered by Gen. M'Clellan to bold hia forces in readiness to cross. Gen. Sumner not only did that, but at once called out hia forces and moved them until the headaof the columns were at the bridges ready to cross, thereby saving between one and two hours. When the order came to cross he immediately mov ed hia forces in the direction of the field of butle,ctme up with and engaged the ene my, and relieved the pressure upon tbe troops engaged upon his l?ft. ' - ., ROCT OF FAIR OAKS. , . . The next day, the 1st of June. the enemr attacked Gen. Sumner at Fair Oaks. General Hookor, who had been ordered forward the day before by Gen. Ileintzelman with one half of his division, bearing the firing of the ene my upon Gen. Sumner's forces, .proceeded at once in mat direction ana engaged the ene my. In a short time the enemy were repula d, and fell back iu confusion. There waa no communication between the forces under Gen. Sumner and those under General Hetmzelman (Hooker's), but each fought as he deemed bet under the circumstances. - Gen. M'Clellan was with the main part of the -army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. Jfler the fighting was over ni came across to the right bank oj the niter, '. ' . HOOKER'S RECOJIBOISSASCE. , . . , On the morning of Monday Gen. ileintzel man ordered Gen. Hooker to make a recon noissance in force, which he did, advancing to within tour miles of Richmond, meeting with no resistance except a littlo from the enemy 'a pickets. Upon being informed by Gen. Ileint zelman of what he had done, Gen. M"Clel!an ordered the troops to be rf called and ocenpy the position that had been held by Casey's division Tho officers engaged in that battle, who have been examined, testify that tbe army could hare pitshed right on to the City of Richmond with little resistance ; that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing. &c, that might impede their flight.:. Gen. M'Clellan seems to have contem plated an immediate movement upon Rich mond, for, the day after the battle, June 2d, lie writes to the Secretary of War : , The enemy attacked in force, and ' with great apirit yesterday morning, but are every where moat signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both daya, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our , left is within tour miles of Rich mond. I only wsit for the river to fall to cross with the rest ot the force,-and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very - strong- pesition; 1 may wait for' what troops 1 can bring up from Fort Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much.. 1 do not fear tbe odds against me. Tbe victory is complete, and all credit is due to tbe gallantry ot our officers and men." . The movement was not made, however, aa General M'Clellan states, because of tbe high stage of tbe water and tbe bad roads. MORE B ENFORCEMENTS. ' ' r' ;,, On tbe 6tbofJune, M'Call'a division of Geii. M'Dowell'a corps was ordered to join the arm .n the peninsula. On the 8th of June Gen. M 'Cleilao telegrapha t "1 shall be in per. feet readiness to move forward and take Rich-mond-the moment that M 'Call reaches here and tbe ground will permit the passage ol ar tillery." On the 10th and lltb of June Gen. eral M Call's Iroops commenced arriving at the White House. Preparations continued to be made at Wash ington to send dawn by land from Fredericks burg tiie remainder of Gen. M'Dowell's corps, he being directed to co-operate, fully with Gen. M'Clellan, bnt retaining an independant com mand. This does not appear to have been in accordance with General . M'Clellan's wish es; for., on the 16th of June, he telegraphs to the Secretary of War: 'It ought Ip he distinctly understood that M'Dowell anor his .troops are completely udder my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that M'Call'a division might be placed so as to join him Immediately upon his arrival. That request does not breathe tbe proper spirit; whatever troops come tome mast be disposed of so as to do tbe most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as thoso in which I am now placed Gen. M'Dow ell should wish tbe general interest to be sac rificed for tbe purpose of increasing hia com mand. If I cannot fdlly control all bis troops I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what 1 have, aud let others be responsible for tbe results. " .. On the 18th of June, Gen. M'Clellan tele graphs to the Secretary ot War that he has received information from deserters to the ef feet that troops have left Richmond to re en force Jackson ; that tbe movement commenc ed on the 8th ; and .bat, it ; re-enforcements bave gone to Jackson, they, are probably not less than 10,000 men ; that he cannot voucb for the truth of the statement, but that it seems pretty certain that it is believed in Richmond and among, the Rebel troops... To this the President replies, on the same day. tbat the information is corroborated by a dis patch from Gen. King at Fredericksburg, and remat ks : "If this is true, it is as good as a re- enforcement to you of an equal force On the aame day General M'Clellao tele- graphs to the President : "A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by ua involves a bat tie more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet ns. Tbey cJrtainly bave great numbers and extensive works. If ten or. fifteen thousand, men have left Richmond to' re-enforce Jackson, it illus trates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we; shall fight the Rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and tbe completion of some neces sary preliminaries." . ' STRENGTH OB THK ABUT. . The return t of Gen. M'Clellao to the Ad- jntant-Gencral'a ' office give tbe following a on the 20tb of Jane, Present for duty; 115, 102; special duty, sick and In arrest, 11,225 -h im en . ',. cos ... ... .., abeeirt, 29,511 total, 156,838., , 'V ' ' 8T0akt itp. - I Abopt tbls tUne' ibe Rebel. Genera), Stuart, with bis cavalry, iade his celebrated raid, making. the entire circuit of tbe army unharm ed, and. discovering the nature of our com munications with the York River. . . , - .... i. ; . .' . JACKSON THREATENS AN ATTACK- On the 24th and 25th ot June, Gen. McClel lan telegraphs the Secretary of the War that he is informed by deserters and contrabands tbat Jackson is contemplating an attack upon his right and rear. . As this dispatch of Gen. McClellan, and the oue of the President in re ply, are dafod immediately previous to the "seven days' battle," they are given here tn f nil. ; . w .-,:. i-;-v -i t.t !...:; , Received 8.50 p. m. 4 , 7 1 McClellan's, June 25 6.15 p.m. "I have just returned from the field, and find your dispatch tn regard to Jaekson. Sev eral contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jacksou'a adt vance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard : arrived,' with strong re en forcements, in Richmond yeaterdsy. I incline to tbink that Jackson will attack my right and rear. Tbe Rebel force is stated at 200, 000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shll have to contend against vastly superior odda if these reports be true ; but this army will do all in the power of man to bold their position and repulse an attack. J regret my great Inferiority ot numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcetuenia j that thia waa . tbe decisive point; and tbat all the available, means of the Government should be concentrated here." will do all that a general can' do with ' the splendid army I have tbe honor 10 command ; and if it is destroyed by overwhelming num bers, can at least die . with it, and share ita fate. But if the result of the action which will occur to morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility , cannot , be thrown, on my shoulders ; it. must rest where it belongs. .. . ;. ; . : ,. . Since I commeuced this, I have -received additional intelligence confirming the snppo, sition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to, the. other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side 1 feel th it there is no ue in my again asking for re-enforcements. - , Geo. B. McClellan, Major General. ' "Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec'y or War." ' The answer of the President la as follows : "Washington, Jnne 26, 1862. ' . ."Your three dispatches of . yesterday iu re lation to too afiair, euding with the statement that you completely succeeded, is making yonr point, are very gratifying. . The later one of 6 p. iu., noggesting the probability , of your being -,ovrw he lined by 200,000 men, and talking of whom tbe respon sibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all 1 can, and act on tbe presumption that you will do the best ' you can with what you have; while you continue, aiagenerously. I think, to assume that I could give you more Jf I would. I have omitted, I shall omit, no ppportunity to send you re-enforcements when ever I possibly can. . ' "A. Lincoln. , Major-General McClelland" .... ;i. . ; - ; battle of mechanicsvillc. ' On the afternoon of the, 26th ol Jnne, be tween 2 and 3 o'clock, tbe enemy, in consid erable force, made a vigorous attack upon the troops of Gen. McCaM's Division, stationed at Mechauicsvihe, consisting of tbe two brigades of Seymour and liejuolds. The action lasted until nightfall, when the enemy were repuls ed. "Troops were sent up by Gen. Porter to the assistance of those engaged ; bnt they were not in the battle, though some of them were in positi n to support the right of the line. About 12 o clock that night the troops were ordered to fall back to Gaines s Mill, which was accomplislred withont loss. i r - BATTLE OF GAIXB'S JIILl.' On the 27ib the battle of Gaine's Mill was fought, principally by the troops under Gen. Porter. Our forces there engaged were from 27,000 to 30,000; the force ot the enemy being from two to three times that number. L The enemy were to such superior foree that, al though our. troops fought, with, exceeding bravery, they were driven back with . a loss ol about 9,000 men) in killed, wounded and missing. ' Gen. McClellan was questioned as to the policy of leaving the right , wing, consisting of only about 30.000 men, to meet the attack of the superior force of the enemy, instead of withdrawing it to the right bank of tbe Chick ahominy before the battle of Gaine's Mill. His testimony on tbat point is as follows: Question. Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, as the attack was to bave been made by bim, would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on tbe same side of the 'Chickahominy prior to the battle of Gaine's Mill 7 '"Answer. I do not think they ought to have been brought to the' same side of the rlver-before they actually were. - - a : "Question. What advantage, was gained by leaving the right wing of onr army to be attacked by a greatly superior force " . "Answer.; It prevented- the enemy from getting on our flank and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the army and its material. ' "Question. Will you explain what was done by the right wing of our ' army - at or about tbe time the left was engaged which saved onr flank from attack and enabled; the army and its material to be withdrawn 1 '"Answer.' By desperate figUljng they in- Ajete.1 o great loss on tbeenemy " to uec u" i"" river, and gave us time , to get our . material out of tbe way." RETREAT Or THE WHOLF ARNT DECIDED ON.' ' During the nigbt after the battle of Gaine's Mill, all our forces were concentrated on tbe Fight bank of tbe Chickat.ominy, and the next day the movement to the James River waa determined upon. Gen Ueintzelman testi fied that the night after' that battle be waa sent for" by Gen McClellan r that'- be found everything packed, ready to leave ; tbat Gen. McClellan said there were two; things to be done to concentrate his forces and risk all on a battle, or to withdraw to the James River) tbat if be risked a battle there, and waa "beat en the army waa destroyed. Gen. Heintzelman advis.-d bim not to risk, a . battle under such lZ""'iVZL 7' .. V". tVi.L "V lost tbe. ; f ,7,,. : ,T ... , , V V ' goto the James Klver and await remforce- ow, McClllao ..Hti,.. of tbat opinion himself, and that was . doter- mined opon Thai sight, at 2,20ca, tn., Gen-.; McClellan telegraphs to the Secretsrr rf war thst he (Gen. McClellan) is not responsible for. the result , bnt he feeTs tbat tfier Government -baa not sustained bis army'" : v-:-l To this the Presideut. replies, on the 28tb I ;. "if you bave had a drawn battle. ora re pnlse, it is the price we pay : for. the enemy nt being in Washington. : We protected .Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. : Had we stripped Washington h wonld have been npon us- before tbe troops sent could have gut toyonv--- '' ' , "Save your army at all events, ..Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of. course they cannot reach you to day, to-morrow t. 6f next day.";,.-- - : " . . .,'.;-- f .The 2t$tli ot June passed without Any serf, ous lighting.' Col b. S." Alrtandoi testifies that on the afternoon ot that day he was , sent for by Gen. McClellstt, ant went to bis head quarters, at Savage's Station, ' arriving then about dark.k He roceived instructions to pro ceed with an escort to the Jamoa Kive,r,. send, backs sufficient numb r of; men to act as guides for the diflureut cplumos. .of . the army, communicate with. 1 the gun boats, and . order, supplies to be brought up the. river,; to exam ine both shores of, tbe James to the mouth of, the Chickahominy. and ascertain, the Undi&j: places; proceed up the Cbickahomuiy to .the, bead of navigation and ascertain ,tli places, . where the army could cross, jucase. yf nvCeiU ty, and then return to ieadqnarletf$ and report He left Savage's station, that njght aud reach--ed the James river the next afteruoon.. By tbe time be had completed his examination thaar.-, my had reached Him James River at Malvern.;. m'clsllan rRorosEs to destroy his BAOOAaR.i l : While at head quarters receiving bis -instructions, be waa shown, as he testified, u- printed order, not then issued, directing the dttstrne' tion ot the baggage of officers and men, and' the tents, camps, equipage, aud things oC that kind ; appealing to the army to submit to this privation, as it would be only temporary- only for a few days." He remonstrated ,witb' Gen. McClellan against issuing such an orders that it would bava a bad effect, would demoraf. ize the army, as 'it would be telling them more plainly than they contd be' tojd ;in. any other way that tby were defeated- and run ning for their lives. Tbe order was not is sued, and Gen. McClellan testifies that he baa no recollection of any such order. THE RETREAT TO JAMES RITES. . The retreat to James River having be a de cided upon, the army took up Its march, being attacked by tbe enemy in the day time, and however successful is repelling those attacks, evacuating their positions daring tbe night. : Tbe actions of Savage's Station, Giecdale and : Malvern were fought during the movement of ; the arwiy to tbe James, th nmr being re pulsed in each day's fighting, and onr army falling back, under orders, daring the night. it would appear, irom all the Information your Committee can obtain, that the battles were foughlt the troops handled, -new disposi tions made and old ones changed entirely by Ike torps comtnandersicithout directions, from the Commanding General.. , He., would place tin troops in the morning, then letr.e the field and seek the petition for the next day, giving no di rections until the rlose of the ' day's- fighting, when the troops would be or dered to fall badtdu. ring the night to the ntw position selected by Aim In that manner the army reached thi James river. ...... BATTLE or MALVERN HILL The battle of Malvern H III, of the first of Jn ly, was the most fiercely contested of any ap-" on the Peninsula. - The troop were placed in the morning, und-r tbe direction .of Geo.; McClellan iro then hft the field,, returning . fe, it again in the aflernovi the first actiou uu the day commenced about 10 e.clocV 1n 'the' forenoon, bnt did not' continue long'.' ; The! principal action, wbtn the eomj attacked: most vigorously and persistently, commencvd late in the afternoon and continued till after dark, the enemy being repulsed and beaten at every pnint. Many of the officers examraed by your commiitee are of . the opinion that) the enemy were so severely punished on that day that tbey could of been' followed 'Into Richmond had our army followed tben up! vigorously, : - : .' , h . ' ad It is true that our army had , been, severely tried during the preceding week, . fighting' as they did, nearly every day, and retreating' every night. The corps commanders and' tbe' troops tinder them fought most bravely no troops better. However, disheartened -they, may have become by what all must bave re garded as a precipitate retreat durihg"the" night, they still fongbt with the' most ohsCi-o nate bravery wbn attacked in the day time; by an exultant and successful enemy . m'clbllan still krtbeats,,, ... The commanding general, however,. defer- mined to fall back trom Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwithstanding the victory won' there' by oar army- He seems to bave regarded bf army as entirely . unfitted to meet tbe enemy , lor on. the aay or the battle at Malvern, evi dently before that battle took place, be writes to the Adjutant General of the artny front Uaxall s plantation. . v : . . ; .;. - AND STILL WANTS TROOPS. i-,-' . : "My men are completely exhausted, ajno l. dread the result if we are attacked, te-day by fresh troops. If possible I shall' retire to- night to Harrison's Bar; where tbe ' runboats' can render more aid in covering our position.! Permit me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More iun- boatf are mucb needed." ' r " On tbe 2d ot July the President te!eTarbs 1 to Gen. McClellan t - , t ; sA ,..r ,-;, Your dispatch of yesterday mornin in-. daces me to hope your army, ie having some , rest. e In this hope, allow me to ' reason wit b yon for a moment. When you ask -for 50 ,000-' men to be promptly seat yon, -yon must ; sursV j iv jaoor uouer soma cross mistake, of fact.. Recently you sent papers showjng, yopr . dis posal 01 forces msde last spring lor the de. tense or Washington, and advising a return to ' that plan. I Bud inclnded inaactatwBt Wasb. j ington 75,000 men. 1 Aow . please . ba assured that I have- not .men enough to fill that, verv plan by 15,000. : All of General ' FreTn6ntsYrf, the valley t all ef General Banks' f air of Gea J McDowell's oot wit you ; and all La. Wah outside of yUtr anriy, 75,000 etc 6&'ct tbp.: mountains,. Tbos the IdeaofawndBg yoo5, 000. men, or any other considerable force, promptly, IS simply absurd. ' if, in yorir fre-" qnent meatfoa of ; responsibility 'yen' had tbV impression 1 that I Name yoa or ootdeiatt"' wtore bsa job cao, plf asa be, relieved of anch tngton, lasen togettier ao not eleeejn. if Ihjjv t reach, 60,000," with, General "Wovl'apd Gen. Dlx added to' tbose mentioned.'' ' t have WoV -A nr ir
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