THE PITTSBURGH DAILY MORNING POST.

JOHN BIGLER, Editor.

PITTSBURGH, FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 1846.

FOR CANAL COMMISSIONER,
WILLIAM B. FOSTER, Jr.,
OF BRADFORD COUNTY.

☞For Latest News, see Postscript, on second page.

☞Mr. Hampton's Masonry.—When will the editor of the Gazette give the public some evidence, that Mr. Hampton, *is not now an adhering Mason.*"

Death of Judge Randall.—Hon. Archibald Randall, Judge of the U. S. Court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, died in Philadelphia, on Monday morning of gastric, apoplexy. He had been subject to sudden and serious attacks of this disease for some years past, and on Thursday last compelled to adjourn the court in consequence of its recurrence.

Military Movements in Ohio.—There were no less than six sword presentations, to the officers of the different volunteer companies in Columbus, Ohio, two of which were presented by the Masonic Lodge. The scene is said to have been very interesting and exciting. Two companies passed through Columbus for camp Washington on Monday.

☞The Boston *Courier* states that Edward Webster, youngest son of the Senator from Massachusetts, is raising a volunteer company in that city to form part of the regiment called for by the proclamation of Gov. Briggs.

We have observed that no whig paper in this country is more frequently quoted against his own party than that one [the Wheeling Times.]—*Pitts. Gaz.*

But, thank God, we are never quoted against our country.—*Wheeling Times.*

Highly Important Correspondence.

THE PRESIDENT AND GEN. SCOTT.

We publish to-day, to the exclusion of almost every thing else, the very important correspondence communicated by the President to the Senate on the 8th inst. The Washington Union, in referring to the facts of the case, says: "The President was determined from the commencement of the war to give the command to Gen. Scott. The Secretary of War cheerfully agreed to the selection. Gen. Scott was called into consultation with them to devise the best plan for conducting the campaign. It was desired that he should repair as soon as possible to the camp. We regret, deeply regret, that instead of promtly complying, he should not only delay his movements, but ascribe this impatience of the Executive to motives of hostility, which would only have subjected them to the severest censure. The letters speak for themselves—but no man who weighs the general's first letter can be astonished at the change of decision on the part of the President. No one can censure the President or the Secretary for the course which they have pursued. They owed it to themselves, if not to the general, to permit him to remain at Washington."

The following message was received from the President of the United States, which was read:

To the Senate of the United States:

I communicate herewith a report from the Secretary of war, transmitting the correspondence called for by the resolution of the Senate of the 5th inst., with *General Edmund P. Gaines* and *General Scott*, of the army of the United States.

The report of the Secretary of War, and the accompanying correspondence with *General Gaines*, contain all the information in my poession in relation calls for volunteers or militia into the service of the United States' "by any officer of the army," without legal "authority therefor," "and of the "measures which have been adopted" "in relation to such officer or troops so called into service."

In addition to the information contained in the report of the Secretary of War, and the accompanying correspondence with "major General Scott of the United States army, upon the subject of his taking the command of the army of occupation on the frontier of Texas"—I state, that on the same day on which I approved and signed the act of the 14th of May, 1846, entitled "An act providing for the prosecution of the existing war between the United States and the republic of Mexico," I communicated to *General Scott*, through the Secretary of War, and also in a personal interview with that officer, my desire that he should take command of the army on the Rio Grande, and of the volunteer forces, which I informed him, it was my intention forthwith to call out to march to that frontier, to be employed in the prosecution of the war against Mexico. The tender of the command to General Scott was voluntarily on my part, and was made without any request or intimation on the subject from him. It was made in consideration of his rank as commander-in-chief of the army.—My communications with General Scott assigning him the command were verbal, first through the Secretary of War, and afterwards in person. No written order was deemed to be necessary. General Scott assented to assume the command, and on the following day I had another interview with him and the Secretary of War, in relation to the number and apportionment among the several States of the volunteer forces to be called out for immediate service; the forces which were to be organized and held in readiness subject to a future call should it become necessary; and other military preparations and movements to be made with a view to the vigorous prosecution of the war. It was distinctly settled and was well understood by General Scott, that he he was to command the army in the army in the war against Mexico, and so continued to be settled and understood, without any other intention on my part, until the Secretary of War submitted to me the letter of Gen. Scott adressed to him under date of the 21st of May, 1846, a copy of which is herewith communicated. The character of that letter, made it proper in my judgement to change my determination in regard to the command of the army; and the Secretary of War by my direction, inhis letter of the 25th of May, 1846, a copy of which is also herewith communicated, for the reasons therein assigned, informed General Scott that he was relieved from the command of the army, destined to prosecute the war against Mexico, and that he would remain in the discharge of his duties at Washington. The command of the army on the frontier of Mexico has since been assigned to General Taylor with his brevet rank of major-general, recently conferred upon him.

JAMES K. POLK.

Washington, June 8, 1846.

[We insert that portion of the correspondence relating to General Winfield Scott, which is as follows:]

War Department, June 8, 1846.

Sir: In compliance with your direction, I have the honor to transmit herewith such letters and documents as are in this department, to enable you to answer the resolution of the Senate of the 5th instant, requesting information. First, in relation to unauthorized calls of volunteers and militia into the service of the United States by any officers of the army, &c. Second, the correspondence between the Secretary of War and Major General Scott, on the subject of his taking the command of the army of occupation on the frontiers of Texas, &c. And third, the correspondence between General Gaines and the government, from the 1st of June, 1845, to the present time, upon the subject of volunteers or militia ordered to the frontiers of Texas.

The information requested in the first and last branches of the resolution, is mainly furnished by the correspondence herewith submitted between this department and General Gaines, who is the only officer of the army known to have called for volunteers or militia without legal authority within the periods specified. The first authorized call by that officer was made on the governor of Louisiana on the 15th of August, 1845, for two companies of volunteer artillery, (about 200 men,) which were mustered into service on the 21st of that month, and immediately sent to Texas, to report to General Taylor at Corpus Christi. As soon as information of this call was made knowu to the department, General Gaines was reminded, in a communication addressed to him, that authority to make such calls was vested only in the President, and that "the emergency which would tolerate or excuse the assumption of this authority by a military officer in command at a distance from the seat of government, in anticipation of the President's action must be one indicating great and imminent peril to the country—a peril so great and so imminent as to leave no reasonable doubt that the President, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case, would have felt it to be his duty to resort to such aid." As the call had been promptly responded to, and the troops sent to their destination before the action of Gen. Gaines could be stayed, Gen. Taylor was directed to receive and retain them in service, as long as, in his judgment, the public emergency might require, although, by your direction, Gen. Gaines was informed that his proceeding was not approved by you. These volunteers were discharged and sent hame on the expiration of their three months term of service.

No further calls appear to have been made by Gen. Gaines for volunteers or militia, until early in May of the present year, when unauthorized request, or requisitions in various forms and of different import, were made by him for a volunteer force, some to be in readiness, and others for immediate entrance into service, the amount of which is not yet known at this department, but, as far as ascertained, is embraced in a statement which is among the documents herewith furnished.

It is also understood that he has taken measures to organize troops independent of his call upon States through the respective governors; and the accompanying documents show that he had appointed various staff officers, without instructions or legal authority. As soon as information was received of those proceedings, prompt measures were taken to counteract them, and to arrest this course of independent action. A portion of those thus called into service by requisitions upon the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Missouri, having promptly responded to the same, the governors of those States were informed that these calls upon them had been recognized "*to the extent of the numbers furnished and sent to Texas.*" To this extent, and no further, has the conduct of General Gaines, in making requisitions calling into service and organizing troops, been recognized, and all beyond has been distinctly disapproved.

By your directions orders have been issued relieving him from the command of the western division and requiring him to repair to this city.

The correspondence called for by the second branch of the resolution accompanies this communication. In relation to that part of it which asks for information "whether any order was at any time given by the President or Secretary of War to Gen. Scott to proceed to the Rio Grand, or to take command of the army," &c., I have to state that, about the time the first recognizing the existence of a war between the United States and Mexico, and authorizing the raising of a volunteer force of 50 000 men was passed, I had a conversation with Major General Scott, and by your direction, informed him that you intended to put the army, designed to operate against Mexico, under his immediate command, and informed him, as you requested to do, to call on you for the purpose of receiving your views and instructions. An interview between yourself and him, at which I was present, shortly after took place, when you announced to him your determination to assign him to the command of the army in the war against Mexico. The order and instructions to him were verbal, and I am not aware that they have been reiterated in writing. He immediately entered upon the necessary arrangements to carry into effect your views and instructions, and down to the present time, has been assiduously engaged in the duties of his office. Interviews and consultations between him and myself, often at my particular instance, have very frequently taken place in regard to arrangements and preparations for carrying on the war. When I first communicated to him your intention to place him in the command of the army, he replied that he should neither decline nor solicit that service, but at once on receiving your verbal order, entered readily into the preparatory measures to carry them into effect. I am not aware that he claimed "that command as due to him from his rank in the army" or expressed any wish to be assigned to it, until his preference was intimated in his letter of the 25th ult. in reply to mine of the same date, and his claim set forth in that of the 27th, both of which are among the papers herewith submitted. His wishes in this respect have not been made known to me further than they are expressed in these two letters. I had no intimation whatever that you intended to change, or thought of reconsidering the orders to General Scott, assigning to him the command of the army to operate against Mexico, until I had submitted to you his letter to me of the 21st ult. After your examination of that letter I received your direction, changing your previous orders, and communicated it to him in my letter of the 25th of May.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY.

To the President.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, May 21, 1846.

Sir:—I have received no orders, as yet, assigning me to the immediate command of the army about to be raised to conquer a peace within Mexico; but I have been told to hold myself in readiness for that service. From that moment I have occupied myself, incessantly, with the vast preliminary arrangements which can only be made advantageously at this place, through the respective chiefs of the general staff—the adjutant general, quartermaster general, commissary general of subsistence, chief of ordnance and surgeon general—I have been much occupied also in the distribution of the quotas of volunteers needed among the several States; in apportioning the horse to the foot, in the study of the routes of march and water conveyances for the several bodies of troops to the best points in the frontiers of Mexico; in the study of the northern interior, and the southern routes of that republic; in looking to the means of transportation *on* the Rio Grande, *to* and *beyond* that river; in determining the depots of supplies of all sorts on this side, &c., &c.

As these matters are respectively settled, orders and instructions have been, or will be given, to the chiefs of the general staff at this place, and the routes of march and water conveyances, together with the depots for supplies of every description, are finally to be communicated to the unknown commanders of volunteers whose services are to be accepted.

In the midst of these multitudinous and indispensable occupations I have learned from you that much impatience is already felt, in high quarters, that I have not already put myself en route for the Rio Grande; and now, with fourteen hours a day of preliminary work remaining on my hands for many days, I find myself compelled to stop that necessary work to guard myself against, perhaps, utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against danger (ill will or precondemnation) in my rear before advancing upon the public enemy.

Not an advantageous step can be taken in a forward march without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed, nay, crippled in my energies, by the knowledge of the impatience in question, and I beg to say I fear no other danger.

My intentions have been, after making all preliminary arrangements here, to pass down the Ohio and Mississippi, to see, or to assure myself by correspondence, that the volunteers, on whom we are mostly to rely in the prosecution of the existing war, are rapidly assembling for the service; to learn the probable time of their readiness to advance upon Mexico; to ascertain if their supplies of every kind are in place, or are likely to be in place in sufficient time; to hasten one and the other; to harmonize the movements of volunteers, and to modify their routes (if necessary) so that all, or at least a sufficient number, shall arrive at the indicated points in the Mexican frontier at the best periods, and, as far as practicable, about the same time. All that I have but *sketched* I deem to be not only useful to success, but indispensible. As a soldier I make this assertion without the fear of contradiction from any *honest* and *candid* soldier.

Against the *ad captandum* condemnation of all other persons, whoever may be designated for the high command in question, there can be no reliance (in his absence) other than the active, candid and steady support of his government. If I cannot have that sure basis to set upon, it will be infinitely better for the country (not to speak of my personal security) that some other commander of the new army against Mexico should be selected.—No matter who he may be, he shall, at least, be judged and supported by me, in this office and everywhere else, as I would desire, if personally in that command, to be myself judged and supported.

My explicit meaning is, that I do not desire to place myself in the most perilous of all positions—*a fire in my rear from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans.*

It was distinctly admitted, and laid down as a basis, in the interviews I had the honor to hold with the President and yourself on the subject, that a special army of some thirty thousand troops, regulars, and twelve months' volunteers, would be necessary for the march against, and the conquest of a peace in, Mexico. I adhere to that opinion. It is foreseen, with tolerable certainty, that we shall not have, in many months, more than seven thousand (if quite so many) regulars, applicable to that service. The remaining numbers are to be made up in volunteer horse and foot. I suppose of these, taken together, about 17,000 have been actually called for. There is yet good time I think to make the additions suggested in one of the tables I had the honor to submit last night.

The question follows: By what time can an army of about 30,000, as above, be brought to act from the different points agreed upon in the interviews alluded to upon Mexico?

More than half of the 7,000 regulars remain to be recruited. I hope they may be obtained and taken to the Rio Grande, though raw or uninstructed, by the first of September next. Can two-thirds, or even a half, of the volunteer horse be got to that river much before that time? I greatly doubt the possibility—without the shadow of a doubt about the patriotism or zeal of the citizens who have been specially called upon. The foot volunteers, aided by water transportation, (believed to be impossible with the horse,) may, probably, reach all the points for commencing operations a week or two earlier. But if horse be a necessary element to success (and two-thirds, if not three-fourths, of the Mexican army are understood to be in the saddle,) what utility would there be in forcing the foot much ahead of the horse? This ought to be a matter of arrangement, left to the commander of the special army, as information may open upon him in his progress to the Mexican frontier, near the heads of columns, or within easy corresponding distance with most of them. The particular question here then recurs (can the horse regiment from Kentucky, (the most distant from Mexico) or that from Tennessee (say 19 days nearer) reach the Rio Grande (*by land* be it remembered) much before the day (1st of September) before mentioned? I have learned personally from the zealous and intelligent Adjutant General (Dudley) of Kentucky, that that most distant horse regiment cannot be assembled (say) at Frankfort on the Bowling-green, earlier than the latter part of June.

Thence it will probably be obliged to march *via* Memphis, Fulton, on the Red river, San Antonio de Bexar, &c., a line of some 1,200 miles. The routes made in the manner it was, should not have been kindly received, is surprising to me, but vastly more so is the fact, that it should be made the basis of the most offensive imputations against the executive government, which had voluntarily selected you to conduct our army, and determined to put at your disposal the amplest means it could command to insure victory, and to bring the war to a successful and speedy termination.

It was also a matter of unfeigned surprise to me that you should have attributed to the President the intention of opening a fire upon your rear, while a fire in front was opened upon you by the enemy. On what foundation could such an assumption rest! Had not the President, in a frank and friendly spirit, just intrusted you with a command on which the glory and interest of the country depended, to say nothing of the success of his own administration! How could you, under these circumstances, arrest your labors of preparation, and suffer your energies to be crippled, for the purpose of indulging in illiberal imputations against the man who had just bestowed upon you the highest mark of his confidence!

Entertaining, as it is most evident you do, the opinion that such are the motives and designs of the Executive towards you, and declaring it to be your explicit meaning that "you do not desire to place yourself in the most perilous of all positions—*a fire upon your rear from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans,*" and so entertaining them entirely without cause, or even the shadow of justification, the President would be wanting in his duty to the country, if he were to persist in the determination of imposing upon you the command of the army in the war against Mexico.—He would probably misunderstand the object you had in view in writing your letter, and disappoint your expectations, if he did not believe that it was intended to effect a change of his purpose in this respect. I am, therefore, directed by him to say, that he will be continued in your present position here, and will devote your efforts in making arrangements and preparations for the early and vigorous prosecution of hostilities against Mexico.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY.

Major General Winfield Scott,
Commanding General, &c.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, May 25 1846.

Sir: Your letter of this date, received at about 6, p. m., as I sat down to take a hasty plate of soup, demands a prompt reply.

You have taken four days to reflect, and to convict me, upon my letter to you of the 21st instant, of official, perhaps, personal disrespect to the constitutional commander-in chief of the army and navy of the United States.

If you have succeeded in imparting that impression to the President, then, by the conclusion of your letter, written in his behalf, I am placed under very high obligations to his magnanimity—may I not add, to *his kindness!*—in not placing me instantly in arrest, and before a general court-martial. I may then hope that the President saw no such intended disrespect; and I can assure you both that I feel too great a deference to the constitution and the laws of my country to offer or to design an indignity to our chief magistrate.

The strongest passages in my condemned letter are, I think, hypothetical. In it, I spoke of "impatience"—"perhaps in high quarters;" of "perhaps, utter condemnation, in the quarters alluded to;" of the "infinite importance of securing myself against danger (*ill-will* or *precondemnation*) in my rear," and of that "most perilous of all positions" to any commander—"a fire upon [his] rear from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans." And I also spoke of the necessity of "the active, candid, and steady support of (such commander's) government" in the hope of conciliating it

Now, if there be any offence to the President in these passages—the intention of committing which I utterly disclaim—it must, in candor, be found in the meaning of the passages "high quarters" and the "quarters alluded to," which qualify all the others quoted by you.

It will be perceived that I spoke not of the *highest quarter*, but, in the plural, "high quarters," and beg as an act of justice, no less to myself than the President, to say I meant "impatience," and even "pre-condemnation," on your part, and the known, open and violent condemnation of me on the part of several leading and supposed confidants of the President in the two houses of Congress, (high quarters;) because, on an intimation—not an order—I did not fly to the Rio Grande without waiting for the invading army, yet to be raised—nay abandoning it to get to that river, as it could, and without the least regard to the honorable pride and distinction of the gallant general already in command on that river, who, we knew, had done well, was doing well, and who, I was quite sure, and his little army, would, if the occasion offered, rover themselves with glory. My prediction, in this respect, has been fully accomplished.

But that I did mean to express, the fear in my hasty letter of the 21st, that those persons here enumerated would, sooner or later, impart their precondemnation of me to the President. I will not deny. My letter was written, in part, to guard both the President and myself against such utter condemnation in the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much *special* experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself against danger—(ill will, or precondemnation) in my rear, before advancing upon the public enemy. Not an advantageous step can be taken in a forward march, without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am, therefore, not a little alarmed—nay, *crippled* in my energies—by the knowledge of the impatience in question; and I beg to say I fear no other danger."

This language scarcely requires a comment. That it conveys the strongest suspicion—not to say a direct imputation of most unworthy motives in the Executive government—of bad faith towards yourself—of a reckless disregard of the interests of the country—of a design to carry on a war against you while you are sent forth to carry on a war against the public enemy, there can be, I think, no question. You must allow me to advert to the only fact to which you allude as the foundation for such grave imputations. *You have learned*, you say, *from me that much impatience is felt, perhaps in high quarters, that you are not already put in route for the Rio Grande, &c.* What was said upon this point at our interview, when this subject was alluded to, is not so fully stated as it ought to be, considering the purposes to which you have converted it. You presented to me fully and clearly the difficulties and delays which, in your opinion, would attend the assembling of the volunteers on the Rio Grande, and, in conclusion, expressed your belief that it could not be done before the 1st day of September next. I then alluded to the troops which were now hastening to Gen. Taylor's standard, under his requisition—to the excited feelings of the country—to the patriotic ardor of the troops—to the disappointment which both they and the country would feel, if an army of eight or ten thousand men were on the Rio Grande comparatively inactive during their entire tour of service, which, being limited to three months, would terminate before the period named by you for the assembling of the volunteers on the Rio Grande. It was with special reference to the employment of the troops that would be on that frontier by the 1st day of June, that I spoke of what would be the sentiments of the country, and of the spirited and gallant men who had entered into the service, and of the expectations of the Executive upon this subject. I was well aware that the President was most anxious that the war should be prosecuted with promptness and vigor, and that the brave and patriotic men who had been called out should have an opportunity to render their country active and effective service. I knew, too, that the President confidently hoped and expected that a large portion of the volunteers, authorized by the act of May 13th, would arrive on the frontier in sufficient force for active operations before the time which you indicated. With the view of securing this important object, the most energetic measures had been adopted. Every consideration of economy and duty forbade that the troops should, if thus collected, be permitted to remain inactive, by reason of the absence of the general officer, who, fully possessed of the views of the Executive, was to direct their movements.

I did not deem it improper, indeed I considered it a matter of duty, to communicate to the general, to whom the President had freely confided the management of the war, his views and expectations upon this point. That this communication, made in the manner it was, should not have been kindly received, is surprising to me, but vastly more so is the fact, that it should be made the basis of the most offensive imputations against the executive government, which had voluntarily selected you to conduct our army, and determined to put at your disposal the amplest means it could command to insure victory, and to bring the war to a successful and speedy termination.

It was also a matter of unfeigned surprise to me that you should have attributed to the President the intention of opening a fire upon your rear, while a fire in front was opened upon you by the enemy. On what foundation could such an assumption rest! Had not the President, in a frank and friendly spirit, just intrusted you with a command on which the glory and interest of the country depended, to say nothing of the success of his own administration! How could you, under these circumstances, arrest your labors of preparation, and suffer your energies to be crippled, for the purpose of indulging in illiberal imputations against the man who had just bestowed upon you the highest mark of his confidence!

Entertaining, as it is most evident you do, the opinion that such are the motives and designs of the Executive towards you, and declaring it to be your explicit meaning that "you do not desire to place yourself in the most perilous of all positions—*a fire upon your rear from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans,*" and so entertaining them entirely without cause, or even the shadow of justification, the President would be wanting in his duty to the country, if he were to persist in the determination of imposing upon you the command of the army in the war against Mexico.—He would probably misunderstand the object you had in view in writing your letter, and disappoint your expectations, if he did not believe that it was intended to effect a change of his purpose in this respect. I am, therefore, directed by him to say, that he will be continued in your present position here, and will devote your efforts in making arrangements and preparations for the early and vigorous prosecution of hostilities against Mexico.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY.

Major General Winfield Scott,
Commanding General, &c. &c.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, May 27, 1846.

Sir—I had the honor to receive your letter of yesterday, at my office, about 9 o'clock at night.

As you do not say that you had shown my explanatory note to you of the previous night, May 25, to the President, may I beg you to lay the fair copy (herewith) before him! In this copy I have inserted in brackets a material word—"friends"—accidently omitted in the hurry of writing, and also a development of my meaning in another place, in red ink and in brackets.

Allow me to recapitulate some of the principal facts in my present (to me) unfortunate misunderstanding with the War Department.

About the 13th instant, both you and the President expressed the desire, very explicitly, that I should conduct, on an extensive scale, with the new forces about to be raised, the conquest of a peace within Mexico. I considered myself honored by the intended appointment, and I beg that my expressions on the occasion, which I need not here repeat, may be remembered.

I have said in my letter to you of the 21st instant, "I have received no orders as yet, assigning me to the immediate command of the army about to be raised," &c. No officer of the army or navy was ever despatched by any executive, on distant important service, without *written* instructions or orders from his government. I have received no such paper, and have never even heard that such paper had been drawn up, or was even in preparation for me. It is evident, then, that, without instructons, or orders, I could not have left my habitual duties here, independent of the preliminary arrangements for the formidable movements contemplated against Mexico.

On the 18th instant, hearing that Mexican troops had passed the Rio Grande, and of the capture of Capt. Thornton's detachment, I addressed a letter to Gen. Taylor, a copy of which I annex, and beg it, also, (with this letter,) may be laid before the President. The letter to Gen. Taylor was twice sent up to you before it was despatched, and, at your instance, was changed (by the omission of a paragraph) to the exact shape of this copy.

Its last paragraph is in these words: "I do not now expect to reach the Rio Grande much ahead of the heavy re-inforcements alluded to above, or to assume the immediate command in that quarter before my arrival."

I quote this paragraph to show that I did not expect to be sent to the Rio Grande, and did not even suspect it was the intention of the President, or yourself, to send me thither, "much ahead of the heavy re-inforcements alluded to"—viz: some twenty odd thousand volunteers, besides a few additional regulars.

Though I had occasion to see you twice or thrice in the mean time, I heard no complaint from you, and received no correction of that misapprehension—if, in fact I had fallen into any—before the evening of the 20th instant, when you spoke of the impatience manifested at my occupations (or delay) here—which complaint caused my letter to you of the next morning—May 21st.

It seemed, therefore, evident to me, at that time, that your complaint had been caused by the out-of-door clamors to which I have since alluded.

Three hours before I received your letter of the 25th instant, conveying the displeasure of the Executive, and without the least expectation of receiving such a letter, I had sent in to you my report or note of the same day, (the 25th,) which concluded with this declaration.

"I think my preliminary and necessary occupation may be ended here in (say) three days more, when—promising that after the great and brilliant victories of the gallant Taylor, (of which we have recently heard,) I should be ashamed to supercede him before the arrival of competent reinforcements to penetrate the interior of Mexico, and to conquer a peace—I shall be ready for any instructions or orders with which the President may honor me."

And again, on that day, (the night of the 25th,) after receiving the censure of the President, through your letter, I concluded my prompt explanatory reply, thus:

"Whether it shall be pleasure of the President to send me to the Rio Grande, (which I would prefer,) or to retain me here, I can only say I am equally ready to do my duty in either position with all my zeal and all my ability."

I still hope when the President shall have read that explanatory letter and the foregoing exposition of facts attentively, he may be willing to recur to his original purpose, and accord to my senior rank the preference which I have never ceased to entertain, and which I should have pressed with incessant zeal, but for the apprehensions heretofore expressed, and which your letter have nearly, if not quite, removed. I therefore beg leave to claim that command, whenever the President may deem it proper to give me assignment—whether to-day, or at any other better time, he may be pleased to designate.

In your rejoinder to me of yesterday (May 26th,) which I have acknowledged above, you quote from my letter of explanation the words: "You are also aware of other causes of uneasiness I have against the department," &c., &c.

Your notice of this complaint, on my part, is so liberal—not to say kind—that I am bound to be frank and explicit, as to one of those causes: I had, upon my mind, in hastily penning those words, these facts: Brigadier General Wool was called to this place, by a letter of your own writing, to command, under me, one of the detached columns against Mexico, according to an understanding between the President, you, and me, to that effect. I saw Gen. Wool first, the day of his arrival, (May 17,) and communicated to him the purpose of his being called to this place. In a day or two, I learned from Gen. Wool that, notwithstanding my intimation, he had been told by you, he might not be ultimately assigned to that command, because, perhaps, other generals might be authorized and appointed, for the army, and called into service from the States.

That information gave me no serious apprehensions for Gen. Wool or myself, until I saw, in the morning of the 20th, a bill reported in the Senate (at your immediate instance *I knew,*) the day before, providing for two major generals, and four brigadier generals, to be added to the regular military establishment, besides giving to the President the power of State generals for the command of the 50,000 volunteers. I then thought I saw a strong probability that both General Wool and myself would be superceded, at least *in the war against Mexico*, by two of the new regular generals of our respective grades, to be appointed, as was generally understood, from civil or political life.—It was then that my apprehensions became serious, as may be seen in my letter to you of the following day, (May 21st,) and in many of my subsequent acts. From that moment, (before my letter of the 21st) I have had but little doubt down to last night, that if that bill became a law—connecting it with the clamors against me to which I have alluded—I should not be sent against Mexico.

I will now, however, hope for the better fortune, and appealing to the justice of the President and the rights of senior rank, I have the honor to remain, sir, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

P. S. I add to the papers, herewith, a copy of Col. Butler's *explanatory notes* of a rough sketch made by him of northern Mexico, which may be valuable. The colonel, in the notes, is not so full on the *rainy season* as he and General J. T. Mason were in conversation with me. I beg again to refer to them personally.

W. S.

Hon. Wm. Marcy,
Secretary of War.

War Department,
June 2, 1846.

Sir: When I received your letter of the 27th ult., it was my intention to answer it at some length, and to note the misapprehensions under which you are still laboring; but on account of my official engagements at this particular juncture, and not wishing to protract this correspondence, which can end in no practical good, I have changed my purpose, preferring to point out those misapprehensions in a personal interview, if you should desire it.

Your communications have all been laid before the President, but I have received no instructions to change or modify the directions contained in the closing paragraph of my letter of the 25th ultimo.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. L. MARCY.

Major Gen. W. Scott.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, May 28, 1846.

Sir: Your letter of yesterday, although left at my house last evening, was not received by me until this morning. Though not much of the time between the date of yours of the 21st; and of my reply of yesterday was devoted to the subject, yet it was, as justice to you required it should be, well considered, and the construction reluctantly given to your letter, was such, and only such, as your language seemed to me to render unavoidable. As you now explain that letter, the suspicions or imputations of "ill will," "precondemnation," &c., were not intended by you to be applied to the President, but in some measure to myself. There is nothing in that letter which warrants this particular application,—there was nothing in our intercourse, and certainly nothing in the state of my feelings which could lead even to a conjecture that such an application was designed.

You cannot recur with more pleasure than I do to the "many personal courtesies" between us for "long years," and I was unconscious that the kindly feelings in which they had their origin, had undergone any change—on my part they certainly had not. I had hoped that your knowledge of my character was such as to place me in your opinion beyond the suspicion or apprehension which you seem to have indulged, that I was capable of being influenced and controlled in my official conduct towards you by unfounded clamor, even should it come from leading and supposed confidants of the President in the two houses of Congress." As you "have not accused," and as you declare "do not mean to accuse me of a *set purpose* to discredit you, as the commander, &c., but only fear the effects of sinister influences, I submit to your judgement whether it was not due to our personal and official relations, that you should have been more explicit—that you should have stated the circumstances which had excited your apprehensions, and thereby opened the way to correct the rash conclusion you have adopted, "that (I) had allowed (myself) to be influenced by the clamor of some of the friends to whom you have alluded."

You state that I am "aware of other causes of uneasiness" (you) "have against the department—of the want of that confidence and support necessary to (your) official position, whether here or on the Rio Grande." I must say that I am wholly ignorant of any just cause for uneasiness on your part, and I am very sure you have no ground whatever to sustain the allegation of a want of that confidence and support necessary to your official position. The matters, or rather matter to which you probably allude, (for I can recollect but one,) and which has been made the subject of a frank—and I hoped—satisfactory explanation, was of minor importance of too slight a character to disturb our friendly intercourse, or influence in the smallest degree our official relations.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. L. MARCY.

Major General Winfield Scott,
Commanding General, &c. &c.

Headquarters of the Army,
Washington, May 26, 1846.

Sir: Your letter of yesterday, although left at my house last evening, was not received by me until this morning. Though not much of the time between the date of yours of the 21st; and of my reply of yesterday was devoted to the subject, yet it was, as justice to you required it should be, well considered, and the construction reluctantly given to your letter, was such, and only such, as your language seemed to me to render unavoidable. As you now explain that letter, the suspicions or imputations of "ill will," "precondemnation," &c., were not intended by you to be applied to the President, but in some measure to myself. There is nothing in that letter which warrants this particular application,—there was nothing in our intercourse, and certainly nothing in the state of my feelings which could lead even to a conjecture that such an application was designed.

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I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. L. MARCY.

Major General Winfield Scott,
Commanding General, &c. &c.

COMMERCIAL RECORD.

Prepared and corrected every Afternoon.

PITTSBURGH BOARD OF TRADE.
COMMITTEE FOR JUNE.
W. H. Denny, R. E. Sellers, W. Martin.

PORT OF PITTSBURGH.

4 FEET WATER IN THE CHANNEL.

ARRIVED.

Michigan, Boies, Beaver;
Louis M'Lane, Bennet, Brownsville;
Consul, Mason, Brownsville.
Lake Erie, Hoops, Beaver.
Clipper No. 2, Crooks, Cincinnati.
Dominion, Tyler, Wellsville.

DEPARTED.

Lake Erie, Hoops, Beaver;
Consul, Mason, Brownsville.
Louis McLane, Bennet, Brownsville.
Michigan, Boies, Beaver.
Wisconsin, Grace, Cincinnati.
Tom Corwin. Bugher; St. Louis.

IMPORTS BY RIVER.

Cincinnati—Per str Clipper No. 2, 900 pigs lead, 87 bales hemp, 20 bbls lard oil, 105 sacks dried apples, 26 sacks rags, 10 bbls sausages, 2 hhds bacon.

St. Louis—Per str Cambria; 1006 pigs lead, 66 hhds bacon, 769 kegs lard, 500 deer skins, 21 bales hemp, 13 packs mdz, 14 bales leather, 31 sacks wool, 6 stoves; 3 bales furs, 32 bags wheat, 8 bear skins.

Monongahela Improvement—per stmr Louis M'Lane—215 kegs nails, 118 bdls iron, 127 bxs glass, 50 bbls flour.

Per str Consul: 5 tons pig metal, 139 bxs glass, 29 bbls flour, 3 sacks rags.

☞The splendid passenger steamer Declaration, Capt. Voorhies, will positively leave for St. Louis, this afternoon, at 4 o'clock.

☞The U. S. Mail steamer Clipper No. 2, Capt. Crooks, departs for Cincinnati, at his usual hour this morning.

Office of the Pittsburgh Morning Post.

REVIEW OF THE MARKET FOR THE WEEK ENDING *Thursday, June 11, 1846.*

Business during the week has been very quiet, and there has been a general depression in the produce market, with a still downward tendency of nearly every article. Trade has been confined principally to the city, with but few orders from the country. The rivers keep in excellent navigable order,—something unusual for this season,—there was last evening four feet and a half water in the channel.

The weather has been cool and pleasant—some few showers.

Ashes—But little enquiry and prices nominal; sales have been made during the week of Pots, good, at 3 cts.; Pearls, 3½@3¾. Scorchings, 2¼@2½ per lb.

Beans—In fair demand at former quotation:

Beeswax—Good yellow 28 cts.

Brooms—Market full, and very dull at from 75 cts to $2 as to quality.

Butter—No demand, we quote kegs nominal at 6½@7 cts.

Cheese—Declined, sales new W. R. at 5¾@5¾.

Cotton Yarns—Nominals, at 15@16 cts.

Feathers—Good clear, dull at 25 cts.

Fruit—H. R. Raisins, $2,70, dried apples dull at 87½@90 cts. per bush.

Flour—The market continues in a very depressed state, and since our last there has been a still further decline; the prices range from $2,50 to $2,70 for good to prime.

Fish—Herrings, $6,25; Shad $8,25@8,50; No. 3 Mackerel, S. 8 $8;75, do, N. $6,50, do. No. 2, S. $9,50.

Groceries—Sugar is very dull, fair can be bought for 6@6½ cts. Coffee is firm at former quotations. Molasses—the business season being over, there has been no inquiry beyond regular trade sales, and a disposition on the parts of some to sell a shade below former rates—we quote 33@34c as the market price.

Grain—Wheat—60@56—Rye in demand at 52 cents ℔ bushel—Corn sales at 31@32 cents. Oats dull at 20@22.

Lead—pig—3¾@3¾ in lots; bar 4½.

Provisions—bacon, the market during the week his been dull, the prices are lower than noted last week, shoulders 3¾@4, sides 4¾@5, hams, assorted, 5½@6, lard is not much in demand, keg 6½ bbls 6 @6½ pork nothing doing.

Whiskey—Common 15@16. rectified a shade lower than last quotations 18@19.

PITTSBURGH THEATRE.

Charles S. Porter, Manager. | *Mr. Fredericks*, Stage Manager.

Prices of Admission:

First Tier, ... 50 cents.
Second Tier, ... 37½ "
Third Tier, ... 20 "
Pit, ... 25 "

Benefit night of the re-engagement of the celebrated Authoress and Actress Mrs. MOWATT.

This Evening, will be performed the successful Comedy, written by Mrs. Mowatt, of

FASHION.

Mrs. Mowatt as Gertrude.

To conclude with the 4th act of the play, entitled

THE MERCHANT OF VENICE.

☞Doors to open at a ¼ before 7, Curtain to rise at ½ past 7. je12

Pennsylvania Insurance Company.

THE sixteenth instalment, on the stock of this