. •
-
A .1.4 • •• .
:I.:: •,' -
• ..7
..t'l it 4 ,41:';.'!' . 1 V - i. I j. ..I.f r 7 .4 '1.;•
. .
. • •
ifiILAIROIII
,444.„,,,,n, committee or .thiaD•O'ittd
7 • of Trade.
Wm.-111.80 ,VV , 021.4C-BII.NNIITT
DILW Wm. IifcOREBRIY.
, •1' ed 41343.,, \
• ,
k:; ' L 5
• ... , 1 :
:. 111 c?Y e licL9nig 0 Etitropean titsamers.
, - •
!Glasgow- ... 25
• :Bremen. .. . April 25
:Arabia' Boston_ Lpmrpool..;..,..a_prE 2
City Baltimore-NewYorlLL_ werpooL . . ....
Persia New. Yorka,prorpool Mai" 6-
43 Frela B..t_i§rbto -Nett Yorkaaverptiol. ..... -May9
. Boston ..Liverpool _May .43',
~ ..41a7 20
Mreori,
38
AOrtaisia.-.:-..Sonthimetr-.:NowYork..'.Apiilt 22.
•=na.,.._.....,...Liyerp001..:..J.:New•Y0rk...Aprg 22
At4stialeSiesLl4lyctrpooL.,..z.New York... April -28'1
C/tYWOhinsrton LiverpooLNew York...A_pril 29
Capada ... ...-Liverpool Boston .. . y2... e e r F p Dooool i .
New
't7 Yoric...May „China York...MaY 7 9
Sidon • ' Literpobt New York... May 18.
Seder...:.:.
.New York-Mtk.7 'SO
h m .straiass e r .-Livespool:.. - .::NewrYork.j'a ste
York -.June 27
Ljvcr
, • . atom.x•ARRET "'•
001, 4 6 68 3 L • bantt:, TOE TMII YORAM POST BY
• . KBBBIBEC1C0131017& imam BBOYEBA!
NO.ii&WOOD-BTBBBB.
following are the buying and selling rites
for Gold, Silver. Ace.:
1
Demand ..... I
45
ete .!1;e11111/1M
- ....
parr
..... Par
I Rreaters Exchange.
Lwisv
.....
ille par •
StClev '; par
eland par
Louis. ... Par
'IPItTSBURGII I O4,
-SATORDA.Y. May .9tb; 18+4
There was gmite &move - Mont in the M 1 market
;yesterday, and a. faits =amount- eltingieliarnri,
Nincipallyst a slight advanee,,....„ThaPnnd fresbet
•otatie off ca TffursdaY evening, according to , 'tin
tract, and was attended with .the , destructien of .
4 1 01216 3,600 Ws 'cif - oil.'
_About 18.000 - bbl - SLWtre
' Tan out. - The - receipts were limited; tlierd :a
however, largo Quantities on the wry.
Tho expos rEast, wer9Far4ollow - a;:.. Toir
Toßie. 227' bbts - i n 175 bbls. To
Philadelphia--Crude, 726 bbls; Refined. 849 bbis;
It
.engole,:lo bbls._ 548
blue
, Pertlt..V. Railroad—Crude, 483 bids:
.riefuir 4 .l22;bbls. Per ktonongah'elniiide. 213
bblart
r sExcbMige has renelireff . , the ~olloce"
Olc ' city, filiy Rh;
"The pond freaket came Off,-Actst:e*i The
amopnt of oil that arrived 'was about 1 8 , 0 0 0 Wl4 ;
„ same, .000 bbis were smashed nil during tr tun.
ermli - r-sai n - , wer e math ? last evening - an d • this:
nioraing at $4 Per bbl,'/Yetng an of $1
bbl sales were also madent 100 per gallon. 'The
rn
market withvery firm ami buoyant. The river
is g - 434 feet vrater-.•.' .
Pritq47.The market was firm. We naleed
change no
ie prices. S,ales 250131tirent 12.0 cash.; 3so
do,lBe crith ; 110 d0,'13.34c; -30 7;10.18 ) 41. 200 . dp,
131,4 c;
:these - sales, Of course: include .nkelrO3op•
Ailes'3oo . l3b's in bulk at 13c; 40013b15 - do at 13
Benaole—Prices tend upward:'Peres 25 bbis
DeaderlieV,'3o43 cash, delivered on cars ; 50 bbls lo
(cri e te/20C....
Refined—The market was unsettled. WO omit
quotations.
PITTSBURGH PRODUGE MARKET
OFFICE OF THE DAILY Mn 7 POST,}
- Saturday, thilEP. , • '
Reittittrkir-The _Weather kir L some 'ciayi Peat
was unfavorable for out-door transactions. 04
rivers are again at flood height, with plenty of
water for coal boats and other purposes. Busi.
ness improved ik.shade.-• The excitement in re*
Bard td the Army of the Potomac is dying away
besides, upon investigation, it was found not td
be half as bad as represented. It seems the war
correspondents send off, the worst rumors they
can find, and afterwards go round and hunt Eiji
the particulars. The news irons the West is of the
best description. Grant and Sherman have cap 4,
tared Grand Gulf and made it their future base,)
so that the days of Vicksburg aro - membered.:
So cheer up, there is a good time coming. wq
cannot always be successful, but we are ceriain tee'
win at last. Flour-The market remains intietire.l l
tkefalexPeing few 7,and -far hetween,l:o'stenis;!
ithithrisiirs wie r deterteirecrtet bold out and par-il
chase only sufficient to meet the wants of the;
local trade. The stock in first hands is light.;
Bacon-Firm, with a moderate demand for local
Purposes. The supply ill - first• hands is not largo
Prices are unchanged, but tending upward.
Grain-We have no change to notice. The re
ceipts were, light and- sales Riceisfiiit.:ll4..dci
raittittlwrialitriited. Groceries firm and in geed
demand. Our dealer are *ell supplied with the
principal articles. Cheese - Marketfirm; we note
a fair amount of sales making at former prices.
The supply on hand is not large.
Flour-The market continues dulland inac
tive, the B Hlekb`tinglimited to the wants of the
home markekr.ffe note sales of 250 Able •;•ria fa=
P®6 25: Family $ 6 90®7; 40
Pblivelloiee at $7 50. r Wes of lotsfrom wagon at
vario s I ricer.
Sal 22 bbls in lots, 10 %'@1.10. Prices
tenctwerwxrcrard
Cheese-Demand moderate. Sales 70 boxes,.,
AV 13,1.4a;45 do G05hen.:14310154. •
Disietrerlstsl--The• demand - has fallen off.
Peaches. 60 bush $34q13 25; 60 do on private.t , mme.,l
Apples. 100_buah at .$1 8701 60. : -
v ,
liiitdese--iBalea 25013:Mint at. 220-11 lb. " • °`
Coffee , -Salet3o - seeks Rio at an4 , 533,;(0. 10
hairs do, 34c.
• . • ,
6
Alis,p4- sides f , 25 bbl.l Orleansat
Orleans at - I.2ke ;
Porto Rico, 12c : 10 bbla Crashed. 16e.
Potatoes -The receipt, have. increased. and
prices have declined a • shade ' note salts at
iota composing about 1000 bosh. at so. sag9so Per,
beau:the latter for choice. •
platter--Prices remain about stationary; sales 6 ,
bbls roll at 20c sdo choice 2l ® 22c. .
liaCrotn.r..lffirrn With 'a fairdemand; sales 2 5 '
ME, 'is follows; :Shetalders:'6()6,A.- bides 7% , 09c.
plain Rams SWAY 47 8 C Hams 10e. 0000 Ihs .ahoul
ders 6XLm.coardry meat 4:WAG:rink were with - Rad.'
rseeamil•- - There being no special demand, sales
of 30 bush. Flax $3 00. p decline. . : .
APPlewi-Salos6olbis Russets' $3 25 per bbl.
Grain-The market for some time past has
been insetiTei salespoOblash fifi®63a, Corn -sales
e:
50) bush 90 deptit.-
'ffiR OVISiiITrifACItHET
4 :ilme.hiiitiff: '-
Bulk and bacon_aidea-receired- .re—aWntion--
to-day, resulting in nales.of_nbout: I I ldiffit'fiLtr
for bulk stionbierii.loose: 4,4Vi40-1-fileked'V'
for bulk aides panted; "Me for bacon shoulders
pae ed. Ipad,s3" a o for - bacon .itidea,:f4F-kli'llie
sales were firiri3 distriblited to .tb
rin ifernritp.va- y
eties..of meat. ',hi ruesn pork tberedlirppertralto
hare' bent 'n6thinn done, Lard Quiet..-at 9.si(gs
f....k4c for country land Brig ;
, • I, Ic l .l..teeckt , ..
The Giain. niarket-.opened quiet and isorpr thin
monag; "after the. New • York -dianatcliett
were t:eceived, gained strength-and closed Stetat
at an tmprerentent-on thenpinting thn 3
The.effe, waitf wtiriter ;grades- of irtfunT, ata4.
No. reran M were meagrei . and Mika Of the latter
were modeAiroelontf.orlef hush on yester
day's andanis , Na.2,:artring opengd dull and
lower - bdt'raJ n 4 and -dosed- steadrarsaxil49sot
The'ret watta fair ittottlitotir tnictattfslighi
coneessioa considerable would balm been 4me;
bat holders tot a, genera:thing, Asked' . former
serves ;tad siiles:vrere ocuisenningtpfimali;
Corn op en Sit 'all andloirere-isles b'eing - nintle"
at 47 %@rine: but i 6 afterward
._bihs:astte runner I
and closed
a garAiteti id..tansifiserry aritoden ! . !
ately ad:lite-for mixed atioatlJOnfar-whi
mixed; and-63e for nearkt(Up_;,,, r,
Oats were iziA*Airste se mmer and
my and firm ®s6 %n• -45 ' 4, -9 111 94d ' 73 sia - Barel: itill)ght
krak.arskriEr,
Arm!. 24,—g0. 1,50 s 3a kars o - _ ,_• Au nt;
t 503 Od Nv. 3Ds 68 to Ms 04: afaiket dnl l ,
it, 1 vE i. *Rs. •—/ r UP o—unatmegrb
iO3 nar :a p i
14 rcao lt en:wham =zit idoebizsta 14, h= 4 W aUg
" u
rablid3wail
.u.-,...; TAMES B. BAD -
Union ben Works. St. Lou Lout.
____
WI ELT, CEMENT AND letiltAVE
AL! itooflosh of the best mstarial stet the iowo
pricer.
. . .
J, T - _,, • ;r, -- 1 ,-tf. - z-V? ..ii . ,/.',t ' - '', '' '' '
.: - . A ' A tt,i r,i 1 .:11.' 1 .1 - : - ..',::. 11 . `.ii J'..t..: - J11!. - ...,
1,-,' ' . /..'1 . . i
..t
I --:,..,::. : ....• _3.- •• • . ...
i'.- ; . :
•-.. ... ! '• 0 I ' i H. •. ,
...- i ; .•.• ...
•,• . . ,
. • ..
; , 7 , ,r, .:- IP ~ , . • • .
1 .:.i.1'.. -- / , : . , , . .'t
• .
.-
( '. 4 • i7i... - ::: .? ' . '' ' ;''''''
I
4
..,...,20.. ..:._.
• ,
~ . . ...... !,. i; , i . •
. ,
_, . ...... . .„. .._ . . ,
...,_ ... . . . .
. .
'4 :..4 ; \ :..."' ' ' . ...... ' ' - • . -.... N., j .ft...\
- i k
•.• .
.
, ....„....._. ..,.:„ ...,
.. ...
,„, • ~.. ~..... ::: ~ . .....•:.: ~..,,, •„„ ...,. ..,... 1 , ~
:.• r
• ~.......______ . ,
~ ~ . , . , . • .
~..410
~
, . ...
.... •., .. _ .. A i $ .. , .
•;„ ,-.•,• .• ,
-I r. .
1 .._ ~.
....... ,• ~, : . .-
. ._
..iisr,, ditt .„,,......,...........:,;..: r.• .• ~.....„
.„....: , . • ii.
...
ririrmr,,,
10
, ~. , Jr, : rroprietolte • -:--- . -: i -:-
' • - I.ia am • • , 11 1I se inli AL lIT Imr.drik.Trs levr-;:,...!.: r _ I . _ - : .• -
,/
/
/
Err
On The 6th day of Aptitiast ot:t,
ptirportingto,besigned by: the-. members
-"Of •
the Joint-Cottimittee On *the C;:litr i net
of the War wad t • piablished many, of
,:the'leading papers of the United. Staies.
n The Thirty-seyentlt Congress espied,
by-ctiniti 41
ro - limitati
on, on the of
Marsh preyions. qopfe:of the testimbny
embodied an report has Veen' l- fi4en
since that - timer.and consequently this-doe
!menthes been 'Spread before the, cam
try without having been submitted to either
.hranchzof:Congreite:. ' I
-`
do'fiet refer to this irregular proceed
ins of.) a Conimittee fiat cat:LS:ea to
'have a legal existence, as'a defense against
the chargeS or which they have; convicted
...me, but as one' of the facts Addy to! be 1 1
-ceneidered in oorinection - with the iepprt
itself and it'was inten_ded I to
snbserve.
The committee have' no devoted: Ade h
space fo me, either" in citations(' of tejti- 1
mony or in atatementeof their own . but
-in-that lfmitedspace they have' presented I
nit.o, 4 Oforailielcoantry as responsible for
the losebr the battle of Fredericksburg,
in consequence. of .disobedience of the
dere of, Oen. Burnside. '
If this Intftrue,'l have been guily of the"
highest Crime known to the military JaW; -
for the .bommission• of full life
is, forfeit and. -my name consigned, to.. In
tamy.
. ,
Anstieetn ' the country, to the' adminis-
Eriktion... which has given me impOrtant
comniands in its armies, and to myself,
ktharidCtlfiffr Meet these grave t ega
the
as possible ; while from
the
,pecnliar,cirenpistances; of. tho Fife,
the Mode' raaopi-is the.only One *pea to
Sinai. they pnlititation . or the report !I
havereceived,aii answer to an inquiry. at
djntantgeneral's office, informing _me
4hat.there43re no:Charges on against
me at the tlepartintlnt to which, as a sol
dier, .I. , arnendable. lam not at , lib
inty, to ignore a report which has already
reached. the _hands of a ;majority of _the
qoyilliseople - orthe United States, emahat
ing from avonimittee of their representa
tives in Congress, because the legislative
.department (if- flm flovernment hart taken
upon itself duties that belong to the ex
ecutive. I cannot shut my eyes: to the
magnitude -of the question in its immediate
public aspect. If it afiected only myself
I. might be be 'welt contented with the
verdict which history will pass upon the
Ftransaction under the sacred law which
governs the. ultimate triumph cf the,
truth.
For two years, we have been struggling
against a rebellion so enormous in its pro
portions and so persistent in its purposes
that it has become a revolution.
The Government hae phi into the field
over seven-.hundred- thousand - men. TO
discipline these . men and to lead them in
the field, the.'country must depend upon
inch as have bee*. ' •
Baying Selling
-.4r. -----. ~- --- ,pr ev,an anintitna
min,- f the chtorgea made lagainet him,
withitut the opportunity to confronter ex
aniine the witnesses brought againstbib:4
to bp himself called and interrogated, in
utter ignorance that he is under trial;
and finally to be.. -denied permission to
procure witness)*
_when the: fact busamS
apparent th him that he was, for some
nnexplained reason, in danger of contlem
mitinni I- ' ni •
Since the time whert the corner stone
of ,al l liivil-liburty vats laid Ural ei the Grot
. eine:tent-from whieh we ; derive otir. laws,
'which gives to the Meanest subject '
or the
igreateat crinfinal;the right to meet his so
!caters face to faca and to confront his
Witnesses. no parallel can be found, in the
history of constitutional Governments, so
startling in its violations of all that is sa
bred in personal rights as are the pro
beedings of the secret tribunals created,
b' the Oungresci-whichihas: just now . ex:
Fred.- - -
The report in question has been given
to the press,, but A0.. - partrof , :this cgidence
ib Pakilbilihdra'apt•stich estiacts' Its - the
,Committee have seen-fit to embody in the
report itself. Of nitbiirittktitnony given
before the Committe, bat a small part is
printed. I shall, therefore, epbmitto thts
pnbricAdare: facts stated 1 by,lme fofilla
,:Opttrinittbis; 'which they - have not published
aid
_some of the proofs which I requested
j the Committea ( to take, but whidh! -they
l'hed not the time to take the testimony.
iAmong, the
_facts ftubmitted by me t,
the CoMmittee, which they have not no
deed, are some which': I most repeat in
substance here :
i
Across th4;rllloPpit hannock---Gen:.litirn
sidOrder.
On the. 12th day, e ta
of Deceinher.last, when
I.,tb
I 4rossed - the Rappahannock, I was in
conimand of the left grand division of the
.Army of the Potomac, which numbered
but 80,000 men. I was entirely crossed
an posted in line of battle by 3 o'clock of
that day- My command consisted of two
!: - .eorps of three divislonsi each., _ At 5
! .,o!itilock Geneial Ilurnsid - e - Caine to my
1 Nes dquartgra,, with. me, Generals William
F. Smith mod' John' F. Reynolds, corps
coilatnadderg. The-, subject of convey se i.i
tion*a.ya proposed attack, on the ienem.4 l
bri the following morning, when I strongly
adiised Gen. Barnsicje , toTphla an attack
from my division upon the enemy's right,
With at least 30,000 men, to be sent in at
daylight in: thp mbrtdog. _CAI.] thitt ',time
two divisions dif Giarillooller'd command
..:ere on the North side of thariver, diear
helmidges that I had - crossed: In order
itk, Make_ Bock. an attack aSJI.Tr - 4.
:vise'd. klakinneti - -Gen.' Rititiside Vat
- heae two divisions must be, crossed 4lu-,
-ring the aight:i - . 1 !reiterated Ty rqqoiit
at I filaiuld receive my Orders as early,
as possible, then :I might make the - ifeces ,
goo disEmitionci. of the- roops_bef o ie 'd ay :.
WO #fa- b e at
= tin`b-e -I that should
receive - ffir 'Otiferif at - any event before
-Paditi Wi
ghh --- nOltkittifer . that .1.- should
' - have' - e iliftri3wAtti,three hours. . lieletti
:my beadqnartug;:aliltit 4 tV,clock P. M.
and I awaited liiir • orders daring the
iiiiht, --, xone - zewied - :peniltilltii.elo o l- t.
it — i, Aht E M - dirang. At mtglmilsent an
aid" to ask for them, and received the reply
that they were being prepared and Would
be sent forthwith. The order which I re
ceived was brought by General Hardie,
of (General Burnside's ate, well known
DAILIV POST'
•
TIM DAME OF FREDEBICKSBIIIG
REPLY OF
MAJOR-GENERAL FRANKT 11T .
TO the Committee on the Confin e of
the War.
in
tha aerviee-aa , aivahle and ealotie Cifi-
Cer.,..,ltzeached-my hinds at 71} 2pm on
thejzoorning.of the. 'My ' comm and
Was then in the setae- :Position. Eke When
General''' drnidde left my,headquarters
the evening previons:„The night had pass.
ed ifthikitordeti.'iihd General Hooker's
two 'divisions were still on the other Side
of the river.. With the jightslarnished by
this ••atete' of faCti. General Burnside's
oideF r though iticonilrucus and contradic
.t*:Pn'ite face, admitted of but one inter
pretation viz.: that Ile intended to make
tiha'rrncid ' oOse'rtation from the left, toles
certain the strength of the enemy—an
interpretation also given to it by both of
corps commanders. The order is as fol
lows :
r " HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC,
"December• 13th. 6 65 11.; M.
i Mtjoi , Gen'eral - :Franklin Commanding.
left Grand Division, Army of the Po
tomac.
General Hardie will carry this dispatch
to you and remain with you during the
day. The-General commanding direts
that Yoti...keep y command in
our Whole,
position for a rapid movement down hel
old Richmond road, and you will send at
at once 'a division; at least, to pass , belbw.
Stititb field to seize. if possible, the leights '
'near Captain Hamilton's, on this side' ,of
the Massaponaa,, taking care to keep) it
well supperted,' and - its lane of ret4at
open. He has ordered another . coliuo n ;of
a divisibn or rnoi e to be moved from
Geperal Sumner's , command up lbe Pia ° k
road to its intermition With the telegraph
road,. where they will divide, with• a view
to setzinr - the"heights on both . . of those<
roatla..:lHolding - these heighti; with the
heights. near. Captain Hamilton's 'will;
he hopes,' compel the enemy ;to evacuate
the' whole of the ridge between those
points.
• • Ehif •illakes these.moves columns .dis.
tant from each • Other, with the view of
aviodingthemossibility of a' collision: of
our own forces, which might occur in n
genersimovement duringtho: fog. Twip
of Generallfooker's divisions are in your
rear at the bridges,.and will remain there
as supports. Copies of instructions to
Generals Sumner and .Hooker will he f:1-
Warded ti34oir by.iin orderly very soon
You will keep your whole command in
readinesirto move as soon as the fog !Mi.
The watchword, which, ifpossible, Should
be given to every company will-ke , 'Scott;'
I have the honor to-he t General.
"Very resoectfulli your obd't servant,
"JOHN c. EARNS, Chief of Staff."
he seen that after ordering
me ioleep my whole command In readf
riesii for a rapid movement down the Old
Richmond road, I Was directed to send
out at once a division at least, to seize
the hill at Hamilton's. After referring
to the order to Gen. Suniner, he reiterates
the direction to keep my whole command
in readiness for the Richmond road move.
meat-
For three hones before ;the order reach.
'ed mei was eatis fi ed tat Gen. 'Burnside
ha4l givenumthe idea (if he ever enter
twined it) of making - ael !attack: in. force
from theleft, - for the delay in sending the
orders made such an attack impossible,
aith any resernuible - -chance of success;
And in this conneeVnelit itP:tlintrriYpike
in me to state that a map, made by the
rebel General Jackson's topographieal
engineer, has fallen !nth the hands of our
officers since General Hooker Las been
in command, from which it is apparentl
that the enemy's position could not have;
been carried by any force less than that,
recommended by me on the afternoon of
the 12th.
. —Gem &inside -- knew the strength in
numbers and the position, as well as the
desperate determination of the rebel army. I
Had he intended a movement in force, his
orders both to myself and General Sum',
ner amnia' have been aornmensurate with
such a purpose. Had he expected me to
makasuch an week upon an enemy whom
I had met too often to be guilty of the
folly of underrating, he would have given
me the night in which to make a dispo•
sition of my troops for the conflict of the
ruorrovr,:iesteml of leikitingMe_td pass it
in - glee-Nese anxiety in my tent.
The Advance and its Pro , , , peete.
Gen. Burnside ought to have known,
and doubtless did know, that to make his
, "main attack" and thereby bring on a g3n
eral engagement on -my front, under an
.order of this description, sent after day
light in the morning, was .to send his
.
troops tcea useless and unavailable slaugh
ter; and, therefore, he could not have in
tended it. I acted upon the order at once
as nearly according to its literal directions
as was in my power. The attack was or, dered to be led by Gen. Meade, onemf_the
ebleEitMillberg in - our'service, supported
by Gen. Gibbon on his right, and Gen.
Doubleday in reserve. These three di
visions fornsedmee of the two wine (Gen.
Reyn'olds') under my command on the
Smith side of the ritr, Shortly 'after,
Meade advatieed, the' 00 erny's'cavalry ap
peared on the left, accompanied by artil
lery, and Doubleday `teas ordered to drive
them away. Soon after these troops were
advazie - e4i 4ttlitg that 'ere enemy wee in
foree'on all sides, I sent Gen. Stoneman
to cross with one of his divisions, and
Wore they had entirely crossed, his sec
end eliyision wait ialst ei-rdered 'Abit
_oresitink of--thesnidivnilons
have been made during.the-previous night
I hid an attack in force been contemplated)
occupied at ieas,t.,titeeet iiog. l l 3 , • •Whi la thbi
was gofßeen, one of Gen. Smith's di
! visions was also ordered to report te. Gen.'
Reynolds. Of these several movements
General Burnside was kept informed, by
reports made by Gen. Hardie to him,. at ,
intervals during the day; and between 7.40
A. M., and 3 40 P M., it was reported to
him by kin officer *Vs own staff, that out
-of the eight divisinne composing — my entire
command, including this tarp divisions that
had been ordered acrosa -4he river, six di
vieftms had been employed in making The
effort. to Fieig.agemiltonis hill, keeping the
attacking force supported, and in checking
the 'advance of the enemy,: while but two
divikions were lift to protect the bridges,
the right and the 'Centre, ancl to keep the
line of retreat open, and which two di.
visions were actually attacked during the
day.
;Reports: of.46tenezAtinardlo.
After my testimony had been taken by
the committee, and they had declined to
fay Gen. Hardie.as a witness, I asked`per
misSion to hitrid them copies of the reports
made by him to Gen. Burnside( during the
day. This request *as granted, I and al
. hough it is impossible to overr ate the
value, of the testimony contained in these
despatches, fourteen in number, sent from
,thelitil.iof, battle by an officer oflthe attdr
faf Genera Ilirnaide,i conldhave'no
mota l eltalie time to,,,,stata anjthiftg bat:
theJeiact trtithiiiiihii,eventtewerelraffs."
wind underhis own eyearyet_no'nrention•
of, or reference to these despatches is made
by-the tommitteeiit-diesreport. As. they
PrbSerit a statement-of 'the transactions of
the flay upon the lefty As geerr. by a 2.ompe- -
teut and itupartial . witness, fpreSent them
in full, in order in which they were Sent.
It 01il be noticed that the first despatch is
dattrd '7.40 A. It' This despatch is as
follows:
HEADQ'S.B FB.ANTS-1-IN'9 DIVISION( ' }
December 13,', 7.40 A. M.
"General Burnside:
General Meade'S division is to make the
movement from our left; but it is reported
that the enemy's skirmishers are advanc
ing, indicating an attack upon cur position
on the left.
JAS. A. HARDiH,
"Brig. Gen. Vol., Asst. Inspr.F.9en."
The telegraph station connecting with
General Burnside's headqnarteks. Was
one-third of a mile from my headqnar
ters, so that by 8 O'clock of. that morning
General Burnside was informed y ' his
assistant inspector general of the fa'ct thatl
I had sent Gen. Meade's divieion ta make
the movement directed by him. I Submit
with entire confidence, that hag General
Burnside, upon the receipt of Ger - 4 -Har
die's. first dispatch, discovered -that I had
either misapprehended his order, or was
sending too small' a force to its execution,
he would at the moment have corrected
my misapprehension
So far from that Gen. Burnside did not
communicate_ with me in any manner
from that time unit 2:25 p. m. of that day,
when he sent me an order in writing, in
which it was stated that my instructions
of this morning were so far Modified
as to require an advance upcin the
heights immediately in my front. General
Hardie's dispatch upon the receipt of this
order . % as follows :
HEADQUARTERS, LEFT GRAND DIVISiONI
December 13, 2.25, P,
• General Burnside :
"Dispatch received. Franklin will do
his best. New troops gone in. Will re
port soon again.
JAS. A. HARDIE,
"Brigadier General Volanteera."
Later in the day, and after 3 o'elodk,
when every regiment that I coal spare
was engaged in various parts of th field
(as will appear by referring to. H die's'
report, and flan. Burnside's own t Hato
ny hereafter given), with an enem that
greatly outnumbered us, and when all my
energies were directed to save the wing
' from being overpowered, and its tine eif
retreat cut off, I received a verbal; mss
sage front General Burnside, by onelof his
' staff, that General Sumner's troop's were
' being ;hard :pressed, with a request to
make a diversion in his favor it I could.
To this I also responded that I would do
my best. t '
For the details of what was done-by me
during the day, I have General Hardie's
' dispatch to speak for themselves.—
He was at my side from shortly after sun
rise until sunset. He not only knew of
every order and movement made by me,
or under my direction, but was perfectly
competent to judge of their wisdom-103d
sufficiency. .
In the performance of an act of common
justice he has placed these dispatches at
my disposal.*
The following are copies of all Gwen
sent by him on the lath of December, the
day of the battle:
"EfEADQ'RS Fnassz.ix's GRAND DIVN,
December 13, 7 40 A. M.
"General Burnside :
"General Meade's division is to'make
the movement from our left; but it is
Init. reported that the'eneicuy's skirmishers
are advancing, indicating an attackupoct
our position on the left."
ild , =firmrallit - 8 yßeil
moved Doubleday supports im.,
Meade's skirmishers erigaged, however, at
once with the enemy's skirmishers. liat•
tery opening, on Meade, probably, from
position on old Richmond road."
" 11 o'clock,—Meade advanced
half a mile, and holds on. Infantry of
enemy in woods in front of extreme left,
also in front of Howe. No 1088 so far of
great importance. General Vinton badly
but not dangerously wounded."
"LATen.—Reynolds has been forced to
develop his whole line. An attack or
some force of the enemy's troops on our
tell suns probable as far as can now be
judged. Stoneman has been directed to
cross one division to support our left.—
Report of eavalry pickets from the other
aide of the river, that the enemy's troops
were moving down the river on this side
during the latter part of the night.—
Ho we's pickets- reported movements in
itheir front same direction. Still they
ihave aztrong force well posted, with bat
iteries there.''
"12 o'clock M.—Birney's division is
now getting into position. That done,
Reynolds will order Meade to advance.—
Batteries over the river are to shell the
enemy's - position in the woods in front of
Reynolds' left. He thinks the effect will
be to protect Meade's advance. A column
Of the enemy's infantry is passing along
the crest of the hills from right to left, as
we look at it."
"12 o'clock '6 P. M.—General Meade's
line is advancing in the direction prescrib
` ed this morning. ,
te"l o'olcok P. M.—Enemy opened bat
ry on Reynolds, enfilading .Meade.—
Reynolds hall opened all his batteries on
it—no_report yet. Reyn - oldit hotly • en
' gaged at thig mement, will report in a few
momenta again.," -
o'clock P. M.—Heavy engage
nients of infantry. Enemy in force where
battery is. Meade is assaulting- the hill
will report in a few minutes again."'
,"1 25 o'clock P. M.—Meade is in the
woods in his front ; seems tocbe able - to
hold on. Reynolds , will push Gibbon in,
if necessary. The eattery and , woods re
fetred to must be near Hamilton's House.
The firing infantry is prolonged and quite
heavy; 'things look well enough. Men
in :fine spirits.
"140 - 45'elocli P. M.—Meade having car-
ried a portion of the enemy's. position in
the woods, we have three hundredprison-I
I ere. Enemy'e,battery on extreme left-re I -
tired, 'Tough work; men fight well. Gib-
bon has advanced to Meade's right ; men
fight well; driving
.the enemy, Mendell
- has _suffered severely 7- IDoub A
ledayo. l
Ideade's.left, not engaged.i."-
',2f O'clock P. M.—Gibbon and Meade
driVen back- from the woods.- ' Newt
gone forward. Jackson's corps of the on
enemy attacks on the left. General Gib- 1
bon slightly wounded. General Bayard
mortally wounded by a shell. Things
do not look. i es well on_Reynold's front,
still we'll have new troops in anon."
"2.26 P. M.--. Dispatch received.—
Franklin- Will do, his best, New troops
gone in k willreport soon again."
"3 o'clock P. M. — Reynolds seems to
be holding his own. Things look better
somewhat."
"3.40- o'clock' P. M.—Gibbon's and
Meade's divisions are badly used - up, and
I fear another advance on the enemy on
our left cannot be made this afternoon.'
Thoubleday''.s division will replace Meade's'
-as soon &sit van be collected, and if it - be
done in . time, of course, another attack
will be made. The enemy are in:force in.
the woods on our left towards Hamilton's”
End are threatening the safety_ of that
portion of our They seemed to have
detached a portion of their force to our
front, where Howe and Brooks are now
engaged. Brooks has someprisoners, and
is down to the -railroad. Just as soon as
tke(left is safe; our forces here will be pre
pared for, a front attack, but it may be
too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are
*ln addition to the forces referred to in
these dispatches, a division from General
Wilcox's corps reported to me late in the
afternoon, and was put in the vicinity of
the bridges; too late, however, to aid in
any of the operations on the extrema haft
engaged , in front, - anyhow. Nct wiftet tend
ing• the unpleasant item I relate, the
morale
' generally of, the . troops is .good."
o clock, P. IL—The enensyis still
in force on our left and front: An attack
on our batteries in frontlas been repulsed.
A new attack has just Opened-on our left,
but the left is safe though it ie too late to
advance either in the left or front.."
I am willing to abide by this testimony
to determine whether I lost the battle of,
,Fredericksburg in consequence of my dis
obedience of an order directing me 'to
attack with a division at least, and to kee
it well supported." p
Out the night following I was with Gen.
Burnnside at his..headquarters, when, he
informed me that lie intended to renew
the attack' from the nght, and to lead the
Ninth 'corpsin person, At two interviews
daring that night (which lasted at least
two hoots), he did not intimate to me any
d i sapprobation of my- conduct or of that
of my officers and men daring that day.
Gen. Burnside Expresses his Confi
dence In General Frankitn.
Again I urged upon him that if the at
tack was to be renewed, to renew it from
the left, but with such force and prepara
tions as would 'command success. An
order, however, for an attack from the
right was given by him. On the follaw•
ing day Lhad,anotherinterview with:Gen.
Burnside, at his request, in which he in
formed me that strong protests were ; made
against a renewal of the attack by Gees.
Sumner and Hooker, --- and he abandoned
the plan of another attack- with expres,
sions of the greatest relnetance. 1 was
with him fdr two or three hours on that
occasion ; and during that interview he
did not express or intimate in his language
or deportment. to me, that he was not en
tirely satisfied with my conduct and that of
my efficert3 and men. On tho Wednesday
orahursday following, I had an other inter
view with aim, in which he so far stated
very distinctly that I alone of his generals
bad "held up his hands," (as be express
ed it;) that he had fully determined to re
sign hisboinmand, and to recommend me
as his successor as the commanding gen •
eral of the army of the Potomac. From
that time until .I was relieved from the
command of the left *and division, al
though freqeently called into consultation
by General Burnside he never told me or me to understand that I had either
miecotstriled or disobeyed his orders, or
was in any way responsible for the disas
ter of the 18th, or had in the least lost his
confidence. Indeed, had he believed that
had disobeyed hie orders on the lath, he
could not have discharged hit, duty to the
country without prefenng charges against
me to that effect.
General Order No. 8,
it was daring the period of time last re
ferred to that the General Grder No. 8, to
which the committee have made refer
ence to, their report,, was directed to be
issued by General Burnside. The com
mittee state that this orderdismissed some
cflicers from the service, subject to the
approval of the President, and relieved
others from duty with the Army of the
Potomac; that General Burnside asked
the President to sanction the order or an
cept his resignation as a major-general ;
that the President acknowledged that Gen.
Burnside ttriaright;but'deulined to decide
without consulting with some of his advi
sers. As I was relieved from duty with'
the Army of the Potomac al most immedi
ately after that interview with the Presi
dent, I shall assume that I was one of the
officers thus relieved in the order—an as
sumption I could not make from any evi•
deuce derived from Gen. Burnside's con
duct to me when we were together, but
which I am compelled to make because
have been so informed by gentlemen of
high character who have seen and read the
order.
General Burnside Demands 'Wholesale
DeoapltatlOO.
It farther appears froth the report, that
the committee lied that, order before them;
and as they have seen fit to visit upon me
solely the responsibility fcir the loss of the
:battle of Fredericksburg, without referring
in any manner to the repulse on the right,
or stating its - fearful ' 10138 in killed and
wounded, I feel at liberty to state, on the
authority of these same gentlemen - who
have seen-order No. 8, that under that or
der General Hooker was one of the officers
dismissed from service, subject to the ap •
prova/ of the President. If, therefore,
that order ie invoked as a record of con
viction, and by it General Hooker is dis
missed while I am only relieved, I have
the right to state the fact, and leave the
public to judge of the motives of the com
mittee, in stating that they have not 'Con
sidered it essential to report upon the oper
ations of the, right wing in this battle. Not
only, so, but I have the right to challenge
th e veracity of the statement"that the Pres
ident acknowledged Gen. Burnside was
right," when it-was known to the commit
tee that in the same order 'in - which the
President relieved General Burnside from
the command-of the Armyof the Potomac
he made General Hooker his successor.
But I shall not accept it as conclusive
against my conduct, that General Burn
:Ode did recommend that I should be re
part of the history-of the
times that after the failure of his attempt
upon the rebel army behind the heiglits'of
Fr'ederiekshurg, he addrepsecl'a lettei to
General .Hallecit relieving the `Secretary
of:War and General-in- chief froth allre- I
spensibility for that movement; and ft is
equally true, though not 80 publicly known,
that shortly after that letter ) was published I
General Burnside made quite' as formal
and -earnest a request to the President to
remove the Secretary of War and the
Geheral in -chief from the positions sew.
erally occupied by. them,fae-hei did to dis
miss certain of -his oflicera in the Army of
:the, Potomac;., If at .wae Arlie that the
movement was hie own, it was but en act
'or common justice to assume its respond
bility; -
Uri Plans or Attack—The One Acted
- upon ;
Without intending to reflect upon that
kind of- magnanimity that takes the re
sponsibility of a failure from 'the should
ers of those above us, and place's it on the
Shoulders of ttiOse below us, I will prove
bidocumentarrevidence from Gen. Burn
side's - hand; that-his plan begiven to the
cominittee, was not the plan on which he
conducted the operations of the battle.
The committee have pt:hited Gen. Burn.
side'S plan of 'attack as given by him. By
the side of this forint an extract from the
leiter of - Gen..Burnside to Gen. Halleck,
- -dated Dec. 10, six days after the battle,
by which it appears 64 lei intended to
makhlis "vigorous attack," as - he there
calls it,,over two miles from mt, front, and
upon the heights in. the rear of the town of
Fredetickibing, and that part of his order
to Meii. n, Which he informed me of the, or
ders yThich he had given to Gen. Sumner,
showing that Gen. Samnees-movement
was-to be simultaneous with mine. In
this he states the measures taken to avoid
a collision between Gen. Sntnner's forces
and mine,. while in the plan before the
conimittee he is represented as testifying'
that he did not mean that Gen. Sumner
should move until he had taken the posi
tion designated in the order.
General Burnside's plan of attack, as giv
en by the Committee:
" The enemy had cut a road along in
inthA roar of Chia 1ine,nf1urta1.k...1.......4=.
• made our attack, by'meatia.or Which, they
connected the two wings Of their twiny,
arid avoided a long ' detodr,along .around;
through a'bad country r'cibpsined from'
a . cobared . titats; from the ipther. Side
of the town, information in regard - - i tO thii
new road, whiCh proved to be 'correct.; ' I
wantedto obtain pbsseSeion Of that new
road, and that.tvas mY reason for'making
an attack- on the extreme left. I'did hot
intendlo make the attack on the right on.
til that position—bad been taken, which I
supposed would staggef the enemy,. ca.'
Ling theii line in two; and then I propoied
to make a direct attack on their front and
drive them out of their works."
Gen. Burnside's plan of attack in his 4t-
ter to General Halkck
.1
"I discovered that he did not anticl
pate the crossing of our- whole forcefat
F redericksburg,-. and. I hoped by rapidly
throwing the whole command over at that
place to separate, by a vigorous attack,'
the forces of the enemy onthe river below
from the forces behind and on. the crest in
the rear of the town, in which case we
could fight him with a great advantage in
our favor. For this we had to gain , a
height on .the extrenis right•of the crest
which commanded anew road latel made
by the enemy,' &c. y
.Extract from Gen. Burnsitle's order lo.she
.
.
informing me of General Sumner's ot.
ders :
"He has ordered another column of a
division or more to be moved from'Gen.
Sifinner'a command 'an the plank road to
its intersection of the telegraph road;where
they will divide,.with_avie w of seizing the
heights on both these roads. Holding
these heighte, Withthe heights near Capt.
Hamilton's, will, I - hope, conmerthe ene
my to evacuate the• whole ridge between
these pointa. He, makes these moves by.
Columns, di - tent.from each other * . with a I
view of avoiding -the possibility of a colli
sion of our own Throes, which might occur
in a general movement during the
The statements in General Bayne
letter to General Halleck, his atatenient
in the order'of the 18:h tome, ancliyis
statement of his plan before the domicile
tee, all agree upon one point
that he did not mean to nz
make his ''"ail
attack" under either of those orders. f--1
Under the he Id e ed
seizing, first orde
he ra
4 heightsssue h
hi reardesi of gn
the
town; next, the heights near Contain Hain ,
ilton's which he supposed would stagger
the enemy; and then, he proposed to make
a "direct attach," in the enemy's front,
and drive him out of his works. 'The
orders not only agree in this, but the"fact, !
in all the significant proportions of its 're. '
sults, in killed and wounded, was before,
the committee, that General Sumner's
command did actually move to seize,
"those heights on thecrest in rear of the
town," almost as soon as did. ALL that
time I had not only taken the position of
Captain Hamiltoa's, bat was crossing
troops from the other side of the river to
save those who had been sent to make
the attempt. General Burnside was in—
formed of all this by Gen:Hardie-es the
effort progressed. How then is it to be
accounted for that Generalltain side could
have so far forgotten his intentions as-to
'sayllthat he did not intend making: the
attack on, the righthntil that position (iiry
position) had been taken?" If he did
not intend to do so, why did he make the
attack before the contingency happened?
He knew that the position on the left
was not taken; why then did he order Gen.
Sumner forward if his intention was to
keep him back until it was taken. :If he
did not intend that Gen. Sumner should
moire until 1 had taken the, heights at
Captain Hamilton's, what does this lan
guage in his order to , me mean: "he has
ordered another column of a division or
more to, be moved from Gen. Sumner;a
command up the plank road to its inter ;
section with the.telegraph road, where
•they will divide with a view of seizing the
heights on bath roads. Holding these
heights with the heights near Captain
Hamilton's will, be hopes, &c. HeMakee
these moves by columns'distant from each
other with, a view of avoiding' the possi-.
bility of collision of our owl forces,.
which might occur In a general move
ment daring the fog." •
This is the language of a simultaneous
movement; and that no doubt may be
left about it, he gives as a reason why
keeps the moving columns distant froin,
each other, that they might not encounter
each other in a fog, It both colums Were
not to be moved at the same time,.it is
difficult to see how they could have colli
ded in a fog.
It is, therefore, perfectly' evident thht
under both orders leaned that morning-by
General Burnside, he imagined- that he
could seize certain' heights over twit) miles
distant from each other, with the compar
atively small force of a diVision sufficiently
supported for each column, and that when
these were taken; he keipepted to follow
up by orders for a Main attack , with the
"whole command," • which I was to keep'
in "poaition for a rapid movement down
the old Richmond road." In the execs-:
lion of these orders, the enemy discovered
himself in force so mu& greater-than
General Burnside antieiPated, that . 'the
plan,proved t otaltyilnadeqtatetci•its ex
pected resulti.
The - disaster that: follSwhd is a matter of
history, and considering the • presi3nre to
Which the mind of the Commanding Gen
eral must have been subjected since that
time it is not difficult to.fiad a reason why,
his present recollection of his plandiffers
so materially from the orders which he
gave before the movement Made; brit
I.submit that is an insufficient reasen for
visitidg the consequences of.-the failure
upon his subordinates in comnitincl. •
Oen. FranalliC
,Te!itt-.
mony Senn% the doinzbittee,
• After reciting the 'order; the- Cotntriit. 1
tee stale that when last before tbezn,Teen-.
sidered the meaning Of . the order, to be an
armed observation to ascertain" wherethe
enemy was. They then proceeded as
lows : "In his (Franklin's) testimony given
When your Committee were at Falmouth;
he says : pat in, all the troops I thought
it proper to pat in. I fought the whole
strenth of my command, as far as reould,
and at the same time keep toy connection
with the river open.' " These two state.
statements seem to be presented under the
idea that 'they convict me of an inconsis
tency, and in. the report furniihed by the
Committee to one of the newspiipers,
printed in pamphlet form, entitled Trit
lame War Tract, No. I," thia statement
of the committee is headed in tapifal let
ters "Franklin's ineonsistentstatediehts."
What inconsistency is, there between my
interpretation_ of the second clause of,the
order that it was for an armed observe. I
tion. had aseertained Where the enemy
was, and had been, compelled to - fight the
whole strength of my, command-as-far as , I
could, and at the same time keep, my cote!'
amnieation with' the river open in resist..-
Mt a superior force, which`had.discovered
itself on three sides of Mel Bat the com
mittse,' in quoting my tustittonyp. far 'softie
reason satisfactory to themselves have
omitted to state what was testified' by me
in the same connection.
• I
By referring to the testimony given by
me at Falmouth,( which has heretofore
been made - public,) I find that the words
immediately following the quotation made
areas follows:- { 'The reason that .we fail
•ed was -that we had not troops - eneugh to
carry the -i pintirivhere the, attack was
made,tinder' he`Wer e
_that were given."
Why the - C t o ' ittee have . - omitted I. ' that
part'of mYevnietiee, while from. the quo-
L
Itatien roarlarthe'rettder is led to suppose
' the whole sentence' is given, I Shall, not
stop to inquire... ,
' l Vambe'r' of Troops , need 'by Frauklin
16 14eAtiae.14.
~ ..,
n .
' • The next' statement i the report, refers
to the niiinher of troops with , which. tfe
. . m
.
attack was made by under the orders
to send - out "is division, ,nt 'caste' toSeize
tlisi.lieig,ltts neer:Captain Hamilton's,-and
tthat is headed 'in .the tract, in the same
coriftpieneits manner, ,„`Franklin resonsi •
hie for p
the defeat." • • • •
The Committee's statement on this sub
jeet Occdpies brit a few lines' and. admits .
the sending out by me, under this order,
of four divisions, numbering 18,500 men,
as stated - 1;y theist; withoptgiving'the num
ber of .DpUbledaY's * division, wlaicli-was
nearly seven thousand - more. The Com
mittee name ,only-Meade's, Gibbon's,
Doubleday's' and , Birney,'s divisions'. as
those by which the attack was made and
supported. They_ had it[in proof, , and in
Gen. Harclie's report's, that New ton's and
Sickles's division"also aided in that move
ment, while the divisions
.of Howe and
Brooks also engaged the enemy •during
the day. Hinivever easy of explanation
' it; may be that the employment of Newton's+
it
divieion
is cm 'het
.ieferred . to-in the report,
• difficult" to:miilrstand- why Sickle's
division,should be innitted, when the only
' evidence' they luive published on this sub•
ject diseloses, the fact that Sickle's.divis
' ion was also ehgaged..• . . .
The Committee further say,"that the
attack was in' reality made by one of the
smallest divisionsin, mycommand,-the di
. vision of General Meade,numbering about
4,500 men." .They have omitted.to•state
'in that connectio,n,whatz was in evidence
before them, that. Meatia's division ". was
• posted on the eitreineleft.of s myline, and
the order beingto attack at once, wa.s con
segnentlybest posted:for the attack.., The
Arniy betote had no braver sol
dier orter 9fficer than Gen. Meade to
16id hie division to the. attack. ,
The Committee , next say, that "General
Burriside;'46o hearing of the small force
orgeredrto attack the enetny,sent an order
'to Gen. Franklin to Make a vigorous at
•tack with his whole force." The Ccn•
mitten do not state when - General Burn
side sent to me any order after that re-
Ceiited at 7:30.A. M.; bat if the ordinary
construction is to be put on, their language,
theyintend to be .underetood that a Sec
ond orde receipt
Was
of
of lt, tone m immediately
after the Gen e
Hardin s first
dispatch to Gen. 'Burnside,: dated at . 7:40
A. M.., in Which he was informed of 'what
.1 . propased to do underthe order. 'As he
' fore obssived, this dispatch. must have
been received by General •13tumside by 8
o' r cloclr, A. M. :Sci 'that,-e.e.cording to the
report;'General Burnside sent wee sec-•
ottd.order to make a`.!vigorons attack with
Mho force," ahortly often 13 o'clock,
A. By refeting [-to General Hardie's
reports, it will beseen '. that the, first: dist
patch from Geneaal Burnside, after that
brought by him, is, dated 2:25 P, M., in
whiettite states; .
''"DeOdhilie` P. .•• •
"Despateli receivedr iff—.2.25 .
Franklin will do ,,
his best. New troops gone in. Will re
port•snon again."
This order, so far from being an order
to make ‘
a 4 vigorcitiaattack with my whole
force," directed"nes es follows:
. "Your instructions of-this morning are
I
modified as to regeire an advance upon .
the heights immediate/y •in your front.” ..
- The response order
i - sho nui wn- t ,bi. , Qen. Hardie's -
I despatch to hisehiefjoat . given. .
The committee then - proceed: "Several
Of the witnesses testified that. had the at
tack then be reriewed.viiili all the available
force under General`been command
'it would have been, Suceessful." - • Who
these witnesses are is not stated, nor is a
word of their testimony given. If aoy. one
.
upon whose opinion the public would place
reliance, has been fenati to express such
an opinion, ithas been'given in ignorance
of the orders-under • which I was acting
--
during the day, or ntiore,the assumption
that such an order as the Conniaitfee state
I did receive, was issued to me in the early
part: of thn day. I have shoWn that no
such order- was issued, and that the
second order that was issued was:received
rit 2.25 P. M. ' In connection with this
modified order itiertecessai.y to state that
itnmediately -in front' of one bf,my divi- .
dons was • a narrow valley; - held on- both
aides by the eneiny,..andprotected,by aba
'tilt and troops entering - it were neeessarily.
subjected to a fire from both sides. It is
pateat,- from an examination of this last
order,
thatso . far from being an order to
renewthe attack upon the-hill At. Captain
Hamilton's, it was a virtual abandonment
of that at attempt. It watinot alloWed the ..
opportunity to exe.mineiqlnte wiliissses, , .
nor to produce those'l•nariied to ,the.eont
mittee,..whorieere - iitlf ine'ditring the' day, ,
and .who alone were sufficiently aciinainted
with, all the facts to fiirinkrespectable ,
.oriittion ma the Satject.'' r ' ;''' [ .
-,• 1 [ - Geru Burnside's Titittraop.yr. -. •..
But whatever oPinions may have been... -
expressed before this committee by wit
tiessesi whose tiatneetthey lutie not given,
the 'same committee subinitted firmert to .•
the' Senate on 'tliti.23d oflpeceinberjast,
containing the.evidenee takenhy them:on •
the 19th of that month "in *filch the tea.
timonyof Gen: Btirnsid . e; taken immedi
ately-after the battle, is. given . =This has
been. printed - bY . order, ..6f the Senate.
From this doeturient I malsetini following.. -- -- -
extract4referritig 'to the battle of Freder- .., .
icksburg) .. : .
.. . .• . .„ - -
Q. by - Chmtnittee.-r--"W,hat Causes do - • . _
you hasten for. the j fitildie'of your attack - ....
here?"
,
A. "It was tohnd ft) .
be iinpossible to •
get the men up to the works; the enemy'B
fire' was too, hot for them; the corn- '
mend fought most gallantly; the enemy
theraielves say they never saw our men
fight so hard as on that dny."
strong?"
Q; • Were the - enemy's works - very,
" -
•
A. "Their, works area not strong work's
but they ocenpy-very strong positions. It
is possible that the • points of attack were
wrongly-ordered; if such is the case I can
billy-say I did to the best of mg ability."
Q.. !To,' understand_yon to say that
youlfpected General Franklin to cam. _
"the'pottit at the:the
left of the ridge -
in the rear of the town, and thereby ena
ble our troops to: storm and carrytheir
fortifications?"
A. .".t did- not expect him to carry ,
that
,Point; which heingdone would have Placed
'our forces in rear of their extreme left,
and which I 'thought at the time would .
shake'their forces to such an extefitthat"
the petition- infrontconlilbe eaaily storm
e:d and urried.'r '
"'To what doyen attkibute his fail
ure to'riecomplieh this!" '
VT9,46 Malign? igtheftlispoiition -.
and the accumulation of thsenenly'sforces -
there,"
itieneral Burnside then explained, that
the delay in building the bridges gave the
enemy time to accumulate his forces bo
fore he was able to order the attack,
* * * * *
_ ..Q.A‘Whsit was num Ans