The Pittsburgh Post.

James P. Barr, Editor & Proprietor. SATURDAY MORNING, MAY 9, 1863. Established 1842.

COMMERCIAL INFORMATION.

Arbitration Committee of the Board of Trade.

Wm. M. SHINN, V.-P. | JAS. I. BENNETT
JNO. S. DILWORTH | Wm. McCREERY.
DAVID McCANDLESS.

Movements of European Steamers.

FROM AMERICA.

Glasgow	New York	Liverpool	April	25
Bremen	New York	Bremen	April	25
Arabia	Boston	Liverpool	April	29
City Baltimore	New York	Liverpool	May	2
Persia	New York	Liverpool	May	6
Great Eastern	New York	Liverpool	May	9
Edropa	Boston	Liverpool	May	13
Australasian	New York	Liverpool	May	20

FROM EUROPE.

Europa	Liverpool	Boston	April	18
Borussia	Southam'n	New York	April	22
Etna	Liverpool	New York	April	22
Australasian	Liverpool	New York	April	23
City Washington	Liverpool	New York	April	29
Canada	Liverpool	Boston	May	3
City of Cork	Liverpool	New York	May	2
China	Liverpool	New York	May	9
Sidon	Liverpool	New York	May	16
Kedar	Liverpool	New York	May	30
Australasian	Liverpool	New York	June	13
Tripoli	Liverpool	New York	June	27

MONEY MARKET.

CORRECTED DAILY FOR THE MORNING POST BY MESSRS. KOUNTZ & MERTZ, BROKERS, NO. 115 WOOD-STREET.

The following are the buying and selling rates for Gold, Silver, &c.:

	Buying	Selling
Gold	1 47	00
Silver	1 34	00
Demand Notes	1 45	00

Eastern Exchange.

New York	par	¼
Baltimore	par	¼
Philadelphia	par	⅜
Boston	par	¼

Western Exchange.

Cincinnati	par	¼
Louisville	par	¼
Cleveland	par	¼
St. Louis	par	¼

PITTSBURGH OIL TRADE.

SATURDAY, May 8th, 1863.

There was quite a movement in the oil market yesterday, and a fair amount changed hands, principally at a slight advance. The pond freshet came off on Thursday evening, according to contract, and was attended with the destruction of some 3,000 bbls of oil. About 16,000 bbls were run out. The receipts were limited; there are, however, large quantities on the way.

The exports East were as follows: To New York—Crude, 327 bbls; Refined, 175 bbls. To Philadelphia—Crude, 726 bbls; Refined, 849 bbls; Benzole, 10 bbls. To Baltimore—Crude, 548 bbls.

Imports: Per A. V. Railroad—Crude, 453 bbls; Refined, 392 bbls. Per Monongahela—Crude, 213 bbls.

The Oil Exchange has received the following:

OIL CITY, May 8th.

"The pond freshet came off last evening. The amount of oil that arrived was about 18,000 bbls: some 3,000 bbls were smashed up during the run. Crude—Sales were made last evening and this morning at $4 per bbl, being an advance of $1 ⅌ bbl; sales were also made at 10c per gallon. The market was very firm and buoyant. The river is rising, with 4½ feet water."

Crude—The market was firm. We noticed no change in prices. Sales 250 bbls at 18c cash; 320 do, 18c cash; 110 do, 18½c; 300 do, 18½c; 200 do, 18¼c; these sales, of course, include packages. Sales 300 bb's in bulk at 13c; 400 bbls do at 13½c.

Benzole—Prices tend upward. Sales 25 bbls Deodorized, 30c cash, delivered on cars; 50 bbls do (Crude) 20c.

Refined—The market was unsettled. We omit quotations.

PITTSBURGH PRODUCE MARKET.

OFFICE OF THE DAILY POST,
Saturday, May 9th, 1863.

Remarks—The weather for some days past was unfavorable for out-door transactions. Our rivers are again at flood height, with plenty of water for coal boats and other purposes. Business improved a shade. The excitement in regard to the Army of the Potomac is dying away; besides, upon investigation, it was found not to be half as bad as represented. It seems the war correspondents send off, the worst rumors they can find, and afterwards go round and hunt up the particulars. The news from the West is of the best description. Grant and Sherman have captured Grand Gulf and made it their future base, so that the days of Vicksburg are numbered. So cheer up, there is a good time coming. We cannot always be successful, but we are certain to win at last. Flour—The market remains inactive, the sales being few and far between. It seems that buyers are determined to hold out and purchase only sufficient to meet the wants of the local trade. The stock in first hands is light. Bacon—Firm, with a moderate demand for local purposes. The supply in first hands is not large prices are unchanged, but tending upward. Grain—We have no change to notice. The receipts were light and sales likewise. The demand was limited. Groceries firm and in good demand. Our dealers are well supplied with the principal articles. Cheese—Market firm; we note a fair amount of sales making at former prices. The supply on hand is not large.

Flour—The market continues dull and inactive, the sales being limited to the wants of the home market. We note sales of 250 bbls ns f.; lowr Extra, $6@6 25; Extra Family, $6 90@7; 40 bbls choice at $7 50. Sales of lots from wagon at various prices.

Eggs—Sales 22 bbls in lots, 10½@11c. Prices tent downward

Cheese—Demand moderate. Sales 70 boxes, W R, 14c; 75 do Goshen, 14¾@15c.

Dried Fruit—The demand has fallen off. Peaches, 60 bush $3@3 25; 50 do on private terms. Apples, 100 bush at $1 87@1 60.

Hides—Sales 250 D Flint at 23c ⅌ lb.

Coffee—Sales 39 sacks Rio at 33½@33¾c. 10 bags do, 34c.

Molasses—Sales 25 bbls Orleans at 55c.

Sugar—Sales of 35 hhds Orleans at 12½c; 6 hhds Porto Rico, 12c; 10 bbls Crushed, 16c.

Potatoes—The receipts have increased, and prices have declined a shade; we note sales at lots composing about 1000 bush, at 80 90@85c per bush; the latter for choice.

Butter—Prices remain about stationary; sales 6 bbls roll at 20c, 5 do choice 21@22c.

Bacon—Firm with a fair demand; sales 25 000 lbs as follows: Shoulders, 6@6¼. Sides 7¾@8c. Plain Hams 8¾@9; sa e Hams 10c. 5000 lbs shoulders 6¼c; country meat fluctuates were with field.

Seeds—There being no special demand, sales of 30 bush. Flax $3 00; a decline.

Apples—Sales 60 bbls Russets $3 25 per bbl.

Grain—The market for some time past has been inactive; sales 1000 bush 55@56c, Corn—sales 500 bush 80c depot.

PROVISION MARKET.

Cincinnati.

Bulk and bacon sides received more attention to-day, resulting in sales of about 300 hhds at 4c for bulk shoulders loose; 4¾@4¾c packed; 5¼c for bulk sides packed; 4¾c for bacon shoulders packed, and 5¾c for bacon sides packed. The sales were fairly distributed to the different varieties of meat. In mess pork there appears to have been nothing done. Lard is quiet at 9¼@9¾c for country and city.

Chicago.

The Grain market opened quiet and lower this morning, but after the New York dispatches were received, gained strength and closed steady at an improvement on the opening figures.

The offerings of winter grades of wheat and No. 1 spring were meagre, and sales of the latter were made at a decline of 3c ⅌ bush on yesterday's quotations. No. 2 spring opened dull and lower, but rallied and closed steady at about 85c.

There was a fair inquiry for flour and for a slight concession considerable would have been done; but holders, as a general thing, asked former figures and sales were consequently small.

Corn opened dull and lower—sales being made at 47¼@47¾c; but it afterward became firmer and closed steady at 48c. Canal corn was moderately active at 49c for mixed afloat; 50c for white mixed; and 53c for nearly white.

Oats were in moderate request and steady at 56@56½c. Rye quiet at 76c. Barley in light supply and firm.

Glasgow Iron Market.

APRIL 24.—No. 1, 50s 3d to 50s 6d; No. 3, 49s 6d to 49s 9d. Warrants, 50s to 50s 6d; No. 3, 49s 6d to 49s 9d. Market dull.

RIVETERS.—TWO HUNDRED Boiler Riveters can find employment on iron gunboats under shelter, at the best wages. Machinists also wanted.

JAMES B. EADS,
Union Iron Works, St. Louis.

mh16-d3wa3d

BELT, CEMENT AND GRAVEL Roofing, of the best material and at the lowest prices.

DAILY POST.

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

REPLY OF

MAJOR-GENERAL FRANKLIN

To the Committee on the Conduct of the War.

On the 6th day of April last a report, purporting to be signed by the members of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War was published in many of the leading papers of the United States.

The Thirty-seventh Congress expired, by constitutional limitation, on the 4th of March previous. Some of the testimony embodied in the report has been taken since that time, and consequently this document has been spread before the country without having been submitted to either branch of Congress.

I do not refer to this irregular proceeding of a Committee which had ceased to have a legal existence, as a defense against the charges of which they have convicted me, but as one of the facts fairly to be considered in connection with the report itself and the purpose it was intended to subserve.

The committee have not devoted much space to me, either in citations of testimony or in statements of their own; but in that limited space they have presented me before the country as responsible for the loss of the battle of Fredericksburg, in consequence of disobedience of the orders of Gen. Burnside.

If this be true, I have been guilty of the highest crime known to the military law, for the commission of which my life is forfeit and my name consigned to infamy.

Justice to the country, to the administration which has given me important commands in its armies, and to myself, demands that I meet these grave allegations as promptly as possible; while from the peculiar circumstances of the case, the mode I adopt is the only one open to me.

Since the publication of the report I have received an answer to an inquiry at Adjutant general's office, informing me that there are no charges on file against me at the department to which, as a soldier, I am amendable. I am not at liberty to ignore a report which has already reached the hands of a majority of the loyal people of the United States, emanating from a committee of their representatives in Congress, because the legislative department of the Government has taken upon itself duties that belong to the executive. I cannot shut my eyes to the magnitude of the question in its immediate public aspect. If it affected only myself I might be well contented with the verdict which history will pass upon the transaction, under the sacred law which governs the ultimate triumph of the truth.

For two years we have been struggling against a rebellion so enormous in its proportions and so persistent in its purposes that it has become a revolution.

The Government has put into the field over seven hundred thousand men. To discipline these men and to lead them in the field, the country must depend upon such as have been educated. Hence it is a public question of the highest possible importance whether an officer who has held important commands since the beginning of the war is entitled to the confidence of the people or has justly forfeited his claims to it. It is a sad commentary upon the disjointed condition of the times that at this moment when the nation is offering all blood and treasure without stint in the effort to preserve inviolate the principles of civil liberty, a citizen of that nation however humble, shall be accused, tried and condemned of an infamous crime, before a tribunal sitting in a secret session, without notice, or even an intimation of the charges made against him, without the opportunity to confront or examine the witnesses brought against him; to be himself called and interrogated, in utter ignorance that he is under trial; and finally to be denied permission to procure witnesses, when the fact became apparent to him that he was, for some unexplained reason, in danger of condemnation.

Since the time when the corner stone of all civil liberty was laid under the Government from which we derive our laws, which gives to the meanest subject, or the greatest criminal, the right to meet his accusers face to face and to confront his witnesses, no parallel can be found, in the history of constitutional Governments, so startling in its violations of all that is sacred in personal rights as are the proceedings of the secret tribunals created by the Congress which has just now expired.

The report in question has been given to the press, but no part of the evidence is published except such extracts as the Committee have seen fit to embody in the report itself. Of my own testimony given before the Committe, but a small part is printed. I shall, therefore, submit to the public some facts stated by me to the Committee, which they have not published and some of the proofs which I requested the Committee to take, but which they had not the time to take the testimony.

Among the facts submitted by me to the Committee, which they have not noticed, are some which I must repeat in substance here:

Across the Rappahannock—Gen. Burnside's Order.

On the 12th day of December last, when I crossed the Rappahannock, I was in command of the left grand division of the Army of the Potomac, which numbered about 80,000 men. I was entirely crossed and posted in line of battle by 3 o'clock of that day. My command consisted of two corps of three divisions each. At 5 o'clock General Burnside came to my headquarters, with me, Generals William F. Smith and John F. Reynolds, corps commanders. The subject of conversation was a proposed attack on the enemy in the following morning, when I strongly advised Gen. Burnside to make an attack from my division upon the enemy's right, with at least 30,000 men, to be sent in at daylight in the morning. At that time two divisions of Gen. Hooker's command were on the North side of the river, near the bridges that I had crossed. In order to make such an attack as I had advised, I informed Gen. Burnside that these two divisions must be crossed during the night. I reiterated my request that I should receive my orders as early as possible, then I might make the necessary dispositions of the troops before daylight. He stated at once that I should receive my orders at any event before midnight, and at another that I should have them in two or three hours. He left my headquarters about 5 o'clock P. M. and I awaited his orders during the night. None reached me until 4 o'clock in the morning. At midnight I sent an aid to ask for them, and received the reply that they were being prepared and would be sent forthwith. The order which I received was brought by General Hardie, of General Burnside's staff, well known in the service as an able and zealous officer. It reached my hands at 7h 29m on the morning of the 13th. My command was then in the same position as when General Burnside left my headquarters the evening previous. The night had passed without orders, and General Hooker's two divisions were still on the other side of the river. With the lights furnished by this state of facts, General Burnside's order, though incongruous and contradictory on its face, admitted of but one interpretation, viz: that he intended to make an armed observation from the left, to ascertain the strength of the enemy—an interpretation also given to it by both of corps commanders. The order is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY POTOMAC,
"December 13th, 5,55 A. M.

Major-General Franklin Commanding left Grand Division, Army of the Potomac.

General Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain with you during the day. The General commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out *at once a division, at least*, to pass below Smithfield to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, *and its line of retreat open*. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road to its intersection with the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole of the ridge between those points.

He makes these moves by columns distant from each other, with the view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company will be 'Scott.'

I have the honor to be, General,

"Very respectfully, your obd't servant,

"JOHN C. PARKS, Chief of Staff."

Thus it will be seen that after ordering me to keep my whole command in readiness for a rapid movement down the Old Richmond road, I was directed to send out at once a division at least, to seize the hill at Hamilton's. After referring to the order to Gen. Sumner, he reiterates the direction to keep my whole command in readiness for the Richmond road movement.

For three hours before the order reached me I was satisfied that Gen. Burnside had given up the idea (if he ever entertained it) of making an attack in force from the left, for the delay in sending the orders made such an attack impossible with any reasonable chance of success. And in this connection it is not improper in me to state that a map, made by the rebel General Jackson's topographical engineer, has fallen into the hands of our officers since General Hooker has been in command, from which it is apparent that the enemy's position could not have been carried by any force less than that recommended by me on the afternoon of the 12th.

Gen. Burnside knew the strength in numbers and the position, as well as the desperate determination of the rebel army. Had he intended a movement in force, his orders both to myself and General Sumner would have been commensurate with such a purpose. Had he expected me to make such an attack upon an enemy whom I had met too often to be guilty of the folly of underrating, he would have given me the night in which to make a disposition of my troops for the conflict of the morrow, instead of leaving me to pass it in sleepless anxiety in my tent.

The Advance and its Prospects.

Gen. Burnside ought to have known, and doubtless did know, that to make his "main attack" and thereby bring on a general engagement on my front, under an order of this description, sent after daylight in the morning, was to send his troops to a useless and unavailable slaughter; and, therefore, he could not have intended it. I acted upon the order at once as nearly according to its literal directions as was in my power. The attack was ordered to be led by Gen. Meade, one of the ablest officers in our service, supported by Gen. Gibbon on his right, and Gen. Doubleday in reserve. These three divisions formed one of the two corps (Gen. Reynolds') under my command on the south side of the river. Shortly after, Meade advanced, the enemy's cavalry appeared on the left, accompanied by artillery, and Doubleday was ordered to drive them away. Soon after these troops were advanced, finding that the enemy was in force on all sides, I sent Gen. Stoneman to cross with one of his divisions, and before they had entirely crossed, his second division was also ordered over. The crossing of these divisions (which should have been made during the previous night had an attack in force been contemplated) occupied at least three hours. While this was going on, one of Gen. Smith's divisions was also ordered to report to Gen. Reynolds. Of these several movements General Burnside was kept informed, by reports made by Gen. Hardie to him, at intervals during the day; and between 7 40 A. M., and 3 40 P. M., it was reported to him by an officer of his own staff, that out of the eight divisions composing my entire command, including the two divisions that had been ordered across the river, six divisions had been employed in making the effort to seize Hamilton's hill, keeping the attacking force supported, and in checking the advance of the enemy, while but two divisions were left to protect the bridges, the right and the centre, and to keep the line of retreat open, and which two divisions were actually attacked during the day.

Reports of General Hardie.

After my testimony had been taken by the committee, and they had declined to call Gen. Hardie as a witness, I asked permission to hand them copies of the reports made by him to Gen. Burnside during the day. This request was granted, and although it is impossible to overrate the value of the testimony contained in these despatches, fourteen in number, sent from the field of battle by an officer of the staff of General Burnside, who could have no motive at the time to state anything but the exact truth, as the events were transpiring under his own eyes, yet no mention of, or reference to these despatches is made by the committee in their report. As they present a statement of the transactions of the day upon the left, as seen by a competent and impartial witness, I present them in full, in order in which they were sent. It will be noticed that the first despatch is dated 7.40 A. M. This despatch is as follows:

HEADQ'RS FRANKLIN'S DIVISION,
December 13, 7.40 A. M.

"General Burnside:

General Meade's division is to make the movement from our left; but it is reported that the enemy's skirmishers are advancing, indicating an attack upon our position on the left.

"4½ o'clock, P. M.—The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has just opened on our left, but the left is safe though it is too late to advance either in the left or front."

I am willing to abide by this testimony to determine whether I lost the battle of Fredericksburg in consequence of my disobedience of an order directing me "to attack with a division at least, and to keep it well supported."

On the night following I was with Gen. Burnside at his headquarters, when he informed me that he intended to renew the attack from the right, and to lead the Ninth corps in person. At two interviews during that night (which lasted at least two hours), he did not intimate to me any disapprobation of my conduct or of that of my officers and men during that day.

Gen. Burnside Expresses his Confidence in General Franklin.

Again I urged upon him that if the attack was to be renewed, to renew it from the left, but with such force and preparations as would command success. An order, however, for an attack from the right was given by him. On the following day I had another interview with Gen. Burnside, at his request, in which he informed me that strong protests were made against a renewal of the attack by Gens. Sumner and Hooker, and he abandoned the plan of another attack with expressions of the greatest reluctance. I was with him for two or three hours on that occasion; and during that interview he did not express or intimate in his language or deportment to me, that he was not entirely satisfied with my conduct and that of my officers and men. On the Wednesday or Thursday following, I had another interview with him, in which he so far stated very distinctly that I alone of his generals had "held up his hands," (as he expressed it;) that he had fully determined to resign his command, and to recommend me as his successor as the commanding general of the army of the Potomac. From that time until I was relieved from the command of the left grand division, although frequently called into consultation by General Burnside he never told me or gave me to understand that I had either miscontrued or disobeyed his orders, or was in any way responsible for the disaster of the 13th, or had in the least lost his confidence. Indeed, had he believed that I had disobeyed his orders on the 13th, he could not have discharged his duty to the country without preferring charges against me to that effect.

General Order No. 8.

It was during the period of time last referred to that the General Order No. 8, to which the committee have made reference to their report, was directed to be issued by General Burnside. The committee state that this order dismissed some officers from the service, subject to the approval of the President, and relieved others from duty with the Army of the Potomac; that General Burnside asked the President to sanction the order or accept his resignation as a major-general; *that the President acknowledged that Gen. Burnside was right*, but declined to decide without consulting with some of his advisers. As I was relieved from duty with the Army of the Potomac almost immediately after that interview with the President, I shall assume that I was one of the officers thus relieved in the order—an assumption I could not make from any evidence derived from Gen. Burnside's conduct to me when we were together, but which I am compelled to make because I have been so informed by gentlemen of high character who have seen and read the order.

General Burnside Demands Wholesale Decapitation.

It further appears from the report, that the committee had that order before them; and as they have seen fit to visit upon me solely the responsibility for the loss of the battle of Fredericksburg, without referring in any manner to the repulse on the right, or stating its fearful loss in killed and wounded, I feel at liberty to state, on the authority of these same gentlemen who have seen order No. 8, *that under that order General Hooker was one of the officers dismissed from service, subject to the approval of the President.* If, therefore, that order is invoked as a record of conviction, and by it General Hooker is dismissed while I am only relieved, I have the right to state the fact, and leave the public to judge of the motives of the committee, in stating that they have not considered it essential to report upon the operations of the right wing in this battle. Not only so, but I have the right to challenge the veracity of the statement "that the President acknowledged Gen. Burnside was right," when it was known to the committee that in the same order in which the President relieved General Burnside from the command of the Army of the Potomac he made General Hooker his successor.

But I shall not accept it as conclusive against my conduct, that General Burnside did recommend that I should be relieved. It is a part of the history of the times that after the failure of his attempt upon the rebel army behind the heights of Fredericksburg, he addressed a letter to General Halleck relieving the Secretary of War and General-in-chief from all responsibility for that movement; *and it is equally true, though not so publicly known, that shortly after that letter was published General Burnside made quite as formal and earnest a request to the President to remove the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief from the positions severally occupied by them*, as he did to dismiss certain of his officers in the Army of the Potomac. If it was true that the movement was his own, it was but an act of common justice to assume its responsibility.

Two Plans of Attack—The One Acted Upon.

Without intending to reflect upon that kind of magnanimity that takes the responsibility of a failure from the shoulders of those above us, and places it on the shoulders of those below us, I will prove by documentary evidence from Gen. Burnside's hand, that his plan as given to the committee, was not the plan on which he conducted the operations of the battle.

The committee have printed Gen. Burnside's plan of attack as given by him. By the side of this I print an extract from the letter of Gen. Burnside to Gen. Halleck, dated Dec. 10, six days after the battle, by which it appears that he intended to make his "vigorous attack," as he there calls it, over two miles from my front, and upon the heights in the rear of the town of Fredericksburg, and that part of his order to mean which he informed me of the orders which he had given to Gen. Sumner, showing that Gen. Sumner's movement was to be simultaneous with mine. In this he states the measures taken to avoid a collision between Gen. Sumner's forces and mine, while in the plan before the committee he is represented as testifying that he did not mean that Gen. Sumner should move *until he had taken the position designated in the order.*

General Burnside's plan of attack, as given by the Committee:

"The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour along around through a bad country. I obtained from a colored man, from the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their line in two; and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of their works."

Gen. Burnside's plan of attack in his letter to General Halleck:

"I discovered that he did not anticipate the crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg, and I hoped by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place to separate, by a *vigorous attack*, the forces of the enemy on the river below from the forces *behind and on the crest in the rear of the town*, in which case we could fight him with a great advantage in our favor. For this we had to gain a height on the *extreme right* of the crest which commanded a new road lately made by the enemy,' &c.

Extract from Gen. Burnside's order to me informing me of General Sumner's orders:

"He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from Gen. Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view of seizing the heights on both these roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog."

The statements in General Burnside's letter to General Halleck, his statement in the order of the 13th to me, and his statement of his plan before the committee, all agree upon one point at least—that he did not mean to make his "*main attack*" under either of those orders. Under the orders he issued he designed seizing, first the heights in rear of the town; next, the heights near Captain Hamilton's which he supposed would stagger the enemy; and then, he proposed to make a "*direct attack*" in the enemy's front, and drive him out of his works. The orders not only agree in this, but the facts, in all the significant proportions of its results, are killed and wounded, was before the committee, that General Sumner's command did actually move to seize "those heights on the crest in rear of the town," almost as soon as I did. At that time I had not only taken the position of Captain Hamilton's, but was crossing troops from the other side of the river to save those who had been sent to make the attempt. General Burnside was informed of all this by Gen. Hardie as the effort progressed. How then is it to be accounted for that General Burnside could have so far forgotten his intentions as to say "that he did not intend making the attack on the right until that position (my position) had been taken?" If he did not intend to do so, why did he make the attack before the contingency happened?

He knew that the position on the left was not taken; why then did he order Gen. Sumner forward if his intention was to keep him back until it was taken. If he did not intend that Gen. Sumner should move until I had taken the heights at Captain Hamilton's, what does this language in his order to me mean: "he has ordered another column of a *division or more* to be moved from Gen. Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection with the telegraph road, where they will divide with a view of seizing the heights on both roads. *Holding these heights with the heights near Captain Hamilton's* will, he hopes, &c. He makes these moves by columns distant from each other with a view of *avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces*, which might occur in a general movement during the fog."

This is the language of a simultaneous movement; and that no doubt may be left about it, he gives as a reason why he keeps the moving columns distant from each other, that they might not encounter each other in a fog. If both colums were to be moved at the same time, it is difficult to see how they could have collided in a fog.

It is, therefore, perfectly evident that under both orders issued that morning by General Burnside, he imagined that he could seize certain heights over two miles distant from each other, with the comparatively small force of a division sufficiently supported for each column, and that when these were taken, he expected to follow up by orders for a main attack with the "whole command," which I was to keep in "position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road." In the execution of these orders, the enemy discovered himself in force so much greater than General Burnside anticipated, that the plan proved totally inadequate to its expected results.

The disaster that followed is a matter of history, and considering the pressure to which the mind of the Commanding General must have been subjected since that time it is not difficult to find a reason why his present recollection of his plan differs so materially from the orders which he gave before the movement was made; but I submit that is an insufficient reason for visiting the consequences of the failure upon his subordinates in command.

Gen. Franklin Explains his Testimony Before the Committee.

After reciting the order, the Committee state that when last before them, I considered the meaning of the order to be an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was. They then proceeded as follows: "In his (Franklin's) testimony given when your Committee were at Falmouth, he says: 'I put in all the troops I thought it proper to put in. I fought the whole strenth of my command, as far as I could, and at the same time keep my connection with the river open.'" These two statements seem to be presented under the idea that they convict me of an inconsistency, and in the report furnished by the Committee to one of the newspapers, printed in pamphlet form, entitled "Tribune War Tract, No. 1," this statement of the committee is headed in capital letters, "Franklin's inconsistent statements." What inconsistency is there between my interpretation of the second clause of the order that it was for an armed observation. I *had* ascertained where the enemy was, and had been compelled to fight the whole strength of my command as far as I could, and at the same time keep my communication with the river open in resisting a superior force, which had discovered itself on three sides of me! But the committee, in quoting my testimony, for some reason satisfactory to themselves, have omitted to state what was testified by me in the same connection.

By referring to the testimony given by me at Falmouth, (which has heretofore been made public,) I find that the words immediately following the quotation made by the Committee are as follows: "The reason that we failed was that we had not troops enough to carry the points where the attack was made, *under the orders that were given.*" Why the Committee have omitted that part of my evidence, while from the quotation marks the reader is led to suppose the whole sentence is given, I shall not stop to inquire.

Number of Troops used by Franklin in the Attack.

The next statement in the report refers to the number of troops with which the attack was made by me, under the orders to send out "a division, at least," to seize the heights near Captain Hamilton's, and that is headed in the tract in the same conspicuous manner, "Franklin responsible for the defeat."

The Committee's statement on this subject occupies but a few lines and admits the sending out by me, under this order, of four divisions, numbering 16,500 men, as stated by them, without giving the number of Doubleday's division, which was nearly seven thousand more. The Committee name only Meade's, Gibbon's, Doubleday's and Birney's divisions as those by which the attack was made and supported. They had it in proof, and in Gen. Hardie's reports, that Newton's and Sickles's division also aided in that movement, while the divisions of Howe and Brooks also engaged the enemy during the day. However easy of explanation it may be that the employment of Newton's division was not referred to in the report, it is difficult to understand why Sickle's division should be omitted, when the only evidence they have published on this subject discloses, the fact that Sickle's division was also engaged.

The Committee further say, "that the attack was in reality made by one of the smallest divisions in my command, the division of General Meade, numbering about 4,500 men." They have omitted to state in that connection what was in evidence before them, that Meade's division was posted on the extreme left of my line, and the order being to attack at once, was consequently best posted for the attack. The Army of the Potomac had no braver soldier or better officer than Gen. Meade to lead his division to the attack.

The Committee next say, that "General Burnside, upon hearing of the small force urged to attack the enemy, sent an order to Gen. Franklin to make a vigorous attack with his whole force." The Committee do not state when General Burnside sent to me any order after that received at 7:30 A. M.; but if the ordinary construction is to be put on their language, they intend to be understood that a second order, was sent to me immediately after the receipt of General Hardie's first dispatch to Gen. Burnside, dated at 7:40 A. M., in which he was informed of what I proposed to do under the order. As before observed, this dispatch must have been received by General Burnside by 8 o'clock, A. M. So that, according to the report, General Burnside sent me a second order to make a "vigorous attack with my whole force," shortly after 8 o'clock, A. M. By referring to General Hardie's reports, it will be seen that the first dispatch from General Burnside, after that brought by him, is dated 2.25 P. M., in which he states:

"December 13—2.25 P. M.

"Despatch received. Franklin will do his best. New troops gone in. Will report soon again."

This order, so far from being an order to make a "vigorous attack with my whole force," directed me as follows:

"Your instructions of this morning are modified as to require *an advance upon the heights immediately in your front.*"

The response made to this modification of the order is shown by Gen. Hardie's despatch to his chief just given.

The committee then proceed: "Several of the witnesses testified that had the attack then be renewed with all the available force under General Franklin's command it would have been successful." Who these witnesses are is not stated, nor is a word of their testimony given. If any one upon whose opinion the public would place reliance, has been found to express such an opinion, it has been given in ignorance of the orders under which I was acting during the day, or upon the assumption that such an order as the committee state I did receive, was issued to me in the early part of the day. I have shown that no such order was issued, and that the second order that was issued was received at 2.25 P. M. In connection with this modified order it is necessary to state that immediately in front of one of my divisions was a narrow valley, held on both sides by the enemy, and protected by abatis and troops entering it were necessarily subjected to a fire from both sides. It is patent, from an examination of this last order, that so far from being an order to renew the attack upon the hill at Captain Hamilton's, it was a virtual abandonment of that at attempt. It was not allowed the opportunity to examine these witnesses, nor to produce those I named to the committee, who were with me during the day, and who alone were sufficiently acquainted with all the facts to form a respectable opinion on the subject.

Gen. Burnside's Testimony.

But whatever opinions may have been expressed before the committee by witnesses, whose names they have not given, the same committee submitted a report to the Senate on the 23d of December last, containing the evidence taken by them on the 19th of that month, in which the testimony of Gen. Burnside, taken immediately after the battle, is given. This has been printed by order of the Senate. From this document I make the following extract (referring to the battle of Fredericksburg):

Q. by Committee.—"What causes do you assign for the failure of your attack here?"

A. "It was found to be impossible to get the men up to the works; the enemy's fire was too hot for them; the whole command fought most gallantly; the enemy themselves say they never saw our men fight so hard as on that day."

Q. "Were the enemy's works very strong?"

A. "Their works are not strong works but they occupy very strong positions. It is possible that the points of attack were wrongly ordered; if such is the case I can only say I did it to the best of my ability."

Q. "Do I understand you to say that you expected General Franklin to carry the point at the extreme left of the ridge in the rear of the town, and thereby enable our troops to storm and carry their fortifications?"

A. "I did not expect him to carry that point, which being done would have placed our forces in rear of their extreme left, and which I thought at the time would shake their forces to such an extent that the position in front could be easily stormed and carried."

Q. "*To what do you attribute his failure to accomplish this?*"

A. "*To the great strength of the position and the accumulation of the enemy's forces there.*"

General Burnside then explained, that the delay in building the bridges gave the enemy time to accumulate his forces before he was able to order the attack.

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Q. "What was the conduct of the m

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*In addition to the forces referred to in these dispatches, a division from General Wilcox's corps reported to me late in the afternoon, and was put in the vicinity of the bridges; too late, however, to aid in any of the operations on the extreme left.