THE PITTSBURGH GAZETTE.

PUBLISHED BY WHITE & CO.

PITTSBURGH:
MONDAY MORNING, JULY 31, 1848.

PHILADELPHIA NORTH AMERICAN.
Advertisements and Subscriptions to the North American and United States Gazette, Philadelphia, received and forwarded from this office.

NEW YORK EXPRESS.
We will receive and forward free of expense, advertisements and subscriptions for this paper.

COMMERCIAL LIST AND PHILADELPHIA PRICE CURRENT.
Subscriptions to this valuable paper will be received and forwarded from this office.

☞ THE PITTSBURGH DAILY GAZETTE is published Daily, Tri-Weekly, and Weekly—The Daily is Seven Dollars per annum; the Tri-Weekly is Five Dollars per annum; the Weekly is Two Dollars per annum, *strictly in advance.*

☞ ADVERTISERS are earnestly requested to hand in their favors before 3 P. M. and as early in the day as practicable. Advertisements not inserted for a specified time will invariably be charged until ordered out.

FOR LATEST Commercial Intelligence, Domestic, Markets, River News, Imports, Money Markets, &c. see third page.

Democratic Whig Nominations,
FOR PRESIDENT,
ZACHARY TAYLOR,
OF LOUISIANA.
FOR VICE PRESIDENT,
MILLARD FILLMORE,
OF NEW YORK.

ELECTORAL TICKET.
SENATORIAL ELECTORS.
THOMAS M. T. MCKENNAN, of Washington.
JOHN P. SANDERSON, of Lebanon.

DISTRICT ELECTORS.

1, Joseph G. Clarkson,	13. Henry Johnson,
2. John P. Wetherill,	14. William Colder,
3. James M. Davis,	15. William M'Ilvaine,
4. Thos. W. Duffield,	16. Charles W. Fisher,
5. Daniel O. Hiner,	17. Andrew G. Curtin,
6. Joshua Dungan,	18. Thos. H. Davidson,
7. John B. Steele,	19. Joseph Markle,
8. John Landis,	20. Daniel Agnew,
9. Joseph Schmucker,	21. Andrew Loomis,
10. Charles Snyder,	22. Richard Ryan,
11. William G. Hurley,	23. Thomas S. Sill,
12. Francis Tyler,	24. Sam'l A. Purviance.

FOR CANAL COMMISSIONER,
NER MIDDLESWARTH,
OF UNION COUNTY.

Antimasonic and Whig Nominations.
FOR CONGRESS,
MOSES HAMPTON,
OF PITTSBURGH.
FOR ASSEMBLY.
LEWIS C. NOBLE, of Indiana.
CHRISTIAN SNIVELY, of Wilkins.
M. SWARTZWELDER, of Pittsburgh.
HENRY LARGE, of Mifflin.
REGISTER.
HEZEKIAH NIXON, of Lower St. Clair.
REGISTER.
JOHN SCOTT, of Ross.
CLERK OF THE COURTS.
DANIEL M'CURDY, of Elizabeth Borough.
AUDITOR.
JOHN K. POSTER, of Baldwin.

See next page for Telegraphic News.

MR. CORWIN'S GREAT SPEECH.—We give up our space almost wholly to Mr. Corwin's speech, delivered in the Senate, on Monday, the 24th inst. in opposition to the Compromise Bill. We feel assured we could not afford our readers a treat they would more highly appreciate. The report from which we copy, made expressly for the New York Tribune, is full, and we have no doubt faithful. As the Washington Union said, the speech is a brilliant and remarkable production.

MR. CORWIN'S GREAT SPEECH, Against the Territorial Bill.

Reported for the New York Daily Tribune.

[We omit the introductory portion of the speech, for want of room, and come at once to the reasons given by the eloquent speaker for opposing it.]

And now I intend, in few words, to state why I object to this Compromise bill. Sir, there is no one—there can be no one—who feels more deeply every subject of legislation which comes before the Senate should be settled harmoniously, and, if it might be so, with the unanimous concurrence of every Senator. But, sir, in my judgment, with this subject as it stands before us, it would be arrogant presumption to undertake to vote upon this bill, with a question before us which we undertake to transfer to the Judiciary Department of the country. How is this? Is it not a new thing in your legislation, when a system of policy is proposed, and the constitutional propriety of that policy is questioned, to pass an act for the purpose of getting a case before the Supreme Court, that that Court may instruct the Senate of the United States as to constitutional duty in the matter? Sir, if we know certainly what that law will be, need there be any hesitancy how we shall vote upon this bill? Can any one suppose that the Senator from Georgia, or the Senator from South Carolina, if they believe that the litigation that is proposed by this bill to be brought into the judicial tribunals of the country would result contrary to their determination of what the law should be, that they would be in favor of such a bill? Does any one believe that if the Senator from Vermont could anticipate that the Supreme Court of the United States might decide that Congress, being silent upon the subject, had allowed Slavery to pass, at its pleasure, into these newly acquired Territories, and become parts of the municipal institutions of those Territories, and to decide, also, that if Congress had enacted a prohibitory law, it could not have gone there, he would vote for this bill. Certainly he would not. Is there any necessity that there should be a prohibitory law passed in order that the question of Slavery shall be presented with the aid of Congressional legislation to the Supreme Court of the United States? I will not undertake to say that I differ with the Senator from Vermont in a single legal proposition that he has laid down. I regard Slavery as a local institution. I believe it rests on that basis as the only one that can give it a moral existence. I believe it cannot be carried, by the power of the master over his servant, one inch beyond the territorial limits of the power that makes the law. I believe that a slave carried by his master into the territory about which we are talking, if Slavery be abolished there, will be free from the moment he enters the territory, and any attempt to exercise power over him as a slave will be nugatory. That is my judgment. But I would guard against any doubt on this subject. I would *so act* that there should be nothing left undone on my part to prevent the admission of slaves: for I am free to declare that if you were to acquire the country that lies under the line, the hottest country to be found on the globe, where the white man is supposed not to be able to work, I would not allow you to take slaves there, if Slavery did not exist there already. More than that—I would abolish it if I could, if it did exist. These are my opinions, and they always have been the same. I know they were the opinions of Washington up to the hour of his death, and they were the opinions of Jefferson and of others who, in the infancy of the institution, saw and deplored its evils, and deprecated its continuance, and would have taxed themselves to the utmost to exterminate it then. I possess no opinion on the subject that I have not derived from those sources.

I have only to say that those opinions have always received the concurrence of my own understanding upon the best investigation that I have been able to give to the subject. I find the institution existing in several States of the Union, under the guarantees of the Constitution, and I find that as a legislator, I am forbidden to act upon the subject by the Constitution, which I am sworn to support, and being thus forbidden, I would not interpose as I would upon every spot on the face of the earth where by law I am not forbidden. Sir, what has been your practice on this subject, if at any time in the progress of the affairs of this Government you have acquired Territory where Slavery existed, what did you do with it? With the forecast of a statesman, you took upon yourselves the difficulties of managing it.

When Louisiana was acquired, such was the tone of public sentiment—and I take upon myself to say that if it had been in the power of Congress to abolish it then, they would have done so—if they had not seen the state of things that would have been consequent upon such an act, they would have abolished Slavery in Louisiana.—What did they do in regard to the Northwest Territory in 1787? These were the men who gave directions to pubhc opinion. Would to God they had something to do with public opinion now. They abolished Slavery in the Northwest Territory. It is true it did not exist there to any great extent, except in a few French settlements, comprehending Illinois and a part of what is now the State of Indiana. And why did they do it? Why did the men who then exercised the power of the whole Confederacy—the men who were the leading spirits who formed the Constitution of the United States—why did they, in 1787, abolish Slavery in that Territory? Did their opinions suddenly change, so as to entertain such an abhorrence of Slavery that they abolished it wherever they could, though sovereignty piled on sovereignty endeavored to invade that land consecrated to free institutions by that law? Thus was the patrimony of Virginia transferred to the United States; and thus did they who offered that patrimony, and nobly gave it to the whole Union, forbid that Slavery should ever pollute its soil. And, Sir, is there any name on the historic page of Virginia more illustrious than that of Jefferson? Why, there is scarcely a Virginian who does not to have an opinion contrary to the lightest thought that he ever expressed. And is it so, that we are now to be required, for the sake of some imaginary balance of power, to carry Slavery into a country where it does not now exist? That, Sir, is the question propounded by this bill. The Senator from Vermont is satisfied that Slavery cannot be extended to these Territories. I believe, if his confidence in the judicial tribunals of the country were well founded, that Slavery could not possibly go into these Territories, provided the Senate is right both as to law and the facts. I ask every member of the Senate—perhaps I may be less informed than any—whether Slavery does not exist by some Mexican law, at this hour, in California.

Mr. Hannegan [in his seat.] It does exist. Peon Slavery exists there.

Mr. Corwin.—I would thank the Senator from Indiana if he will inform me what Peon Slavery is; and really I ask the question for the purpose of obtaining information. I desire to know its conditions. Is it transmissable by inheritance?—Does the marvellous doctrine of which the Hon. Senator from Virginia spoke as being part and parcel of the law adopted in Virginia—*partes sequitur ventrum*—prevail? Is that holy ordinance, that the offspring of the womb of her who is a slave must be born also a slave? Also there recognized.

Mr. Hannegan.—As I understand, Slavery exists in California and New Mexico, as it does throughout the Republic of Mexico, and is termed Peonn Slavery—Slavery for debt, by which the creditor has a right to hold the debtor through all time in far more absolute bondage than that by which any Southern planter holds his slaves here.

Mr. Corwin—So it has been described to me. I have not seen the Mexican laws upon the subject, but the statement just made agrees with that of many gentlemen who profess to know something on the subject, and therefore I am inclined to think so, and that these people are subjects of that inferinal law. The Senator from Delaware, the other day, informed us that the Committee have not given the people of California and New Mexico the right of suffrage, because they were incapable of exercising it—because a large proportion of them were of the colored races. Now, supposing that to be the case, and supposing the proposition to be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States—Was Slavery an institution of New Mexico?—what would be the answer? If the Senator from Indiana were there to make response, he would reply in the affirmative; he would say that the institution of Slavery was there—that to be sure it had its modifications and its peculiarities, but that it was still Slavery, though there might not have existed a law as strong as that glorious principle of free government spoken of by the Senator from Virginia—*partes sequitur ventrum.* If Sir, these three Latin words can condemn to everlasting slavery the posterity of a woman who is a slave, may not that municipal regulation of which we are now speaking, in California and New Mexico, with equal propriety be denominated Slavery? I find, then, Slavery, as it is called, existing there to a degree; and to all practical purposes, as lasting and inexorable as in the State of Virginia, and, therefore, the whole of the hypothesis of the gentleman from Vermont falls to the ground as a matter of fact, inasmuch as the Supreme Court will decide that Slavery existed there, and that therefore the whole slave population of the United States may be transferred to that country.

Mr. Phelps—The gentleman will excuse me, I spoke of African Slavery.

Mr. Corwin—Of that I am aware. I speak now of the general proposition. Now, this is a very curious spectacle presented this day and for weeks past in the American Congress, and one cannot help pausing at this point, and reflecting upon the events of the last few years. On looking back at what has happened in that period, I am sure that the magnanimous spirit of the Senator from S. C. himself will be obliged to concede to the Northern States at least some apology for the slight degree of excitement on this subject. His hipothesis is, that into every portion of this newly acquired territory—California not excepted—every slaveholder in the United States has a right to migrate tomorrow, and carry with him his slaves—holding them there forever, subject only to the Abolition of Slavery when these Territories shall be made into States, and come into the Union. What, then, would be those few chapters in our history? We find ourselves now in the possession of Territories with a population of one hundred and fifty thousand souls, if I am correctly informed, in California and New Mexico. The best authenticated history of the social institutions of that population, informs us that there exists there at this moment a species of Slavery as absolute and inexorable as exists anywhere on the face of the earth; and that about five in six of the population of that country are subjected to the iron rule of this abominable institution there.

Now, I do not expect that any man will rise up and say that because an individual happens to be the debtor of another, shall have his own person sold into Slavery? and not only that, but that the curse shall extend—worse than that of the Hebrew, not to the third and fourth generation, but to the remotest posterity of that unfortunate man.—Nobody will pretend to rise up in defence of such a proposition as that. Now, then, I will give over the criticism. Suppose there is a law in New Mexico, which obliges a man to work all the days of his life because he happens to owe him five dollars by some means contrived by the creditor to keep him always his debtor. Do you intend that that law shall exist there for an hour? Well, you have made a law here that your law makers who are to go to New Mexico and California, shall not touch the subject of slavery; and if that which is designated in the popular language of that country Slavery, exists there, do you, indeed, send abroad, as you promised to do, your missionary of liberty? You went there with the sword, and made it red in the blood of these people! What did you tell them? "We come to give you freedom." Instead of that, you enact in your code here—blood! that of Pharaoh—that there shall be judges and law-givers over them, but that they shall make no law touching that Slavery to which five out of six of them are subjected.

I think these things are worthy of consideration. I have looked at them with some concern, because I was one of those who predicted from the beginning that this country would be the result of your acquisition. I have always thought since that hour when you went abroad with your hypocritical pretence that you had gone forth in the spirit of love, to give liberty to the captives and to set the Paynes free, that when you had got your foot upon the neck of these people your cuckoo note would be changed—that this dove-like accent would become the roar of the lion—and that, instead of extending the blessings of peace and the oil of consolation to the oppressed of Mexico, you would put the iron heel of Negro Slavery as well as that of Peon Slavery upon them. All this I have expected. I was ready to say that you are free! Why, you make a spectacle worthy of anybody's curiosity about the noon of the Nineteenth Century. We turned around and said to the world that we designed to take nothing by conquest, and for two years, while you progress through Mexico and all that land is crimsoned with blood—while you make your way as manifest as that of Cain, being silent upon the subject, had allowed Slavery to pass, at its pleasure, into these newly acquired Territories, and become parts of the municipal institutions of those Territories, and to decide, also, that if Congress had enacted a prohibitory law, it could not have gone there, he would vote for this bill. Certainly he would not. Is there any necessity that there should be a prohibitory law passed in order that the question of Slavery shall be presented with the aid of Congressional legislation to the Supreme Court of the United States? I will not undertake to say that I differ with the Senator from Vermont in a single legal proposition that he has laid down. I regard Slavery as a local institution. I believe it rests on that basis as the only one that can give it a moral existence. I believe it cannot be carried, by the power of the master over his servant, one inch beyond the territorial limits of the power that makes the law. I believe that a slave carried by his master into the territory about which we are talking, if Slavery be abolished there, will be free from the moment he enters the territory, and any attempt to exercise power over him as a slave will be nugatory. That is my judgment. But I would guard against any doubt on this subject. I would *so act* that there should be nothing left undone on my part to prevent the admission of slaves: for I am free to declare that if you were to acquire the country that lies under the line, the hottest country to be found on the globe, where the white man is supposed not to be able to work, I would not allow you to take slaves there, if Slavery did not exist there already. More than that—I would abolish it if I could, if it did exist. These are my opinions, and they always have been the same. I know they were the opinions of Washington up to the hour of his death, and they were the opinions of Jefferson and of others who, in the infancy of the institution, saw and deplored its evils, and deprecated its continuance, and would have taxed themselves to the utmost to exterminate it then. I possess no opinion on the subject that I have not derived from those sources.

I have only to say that those opinions have always received the concurrence of my own understanding upon the best investigation that I have been able to give to the subject. I find the institution existing in several States of the Union, under the guarantees of the Constitution, and I find that as a legislator, I am forbidden to act upon the subject by the Constitution, which I am sworn to support, and being thus forbidden, I would not interpose as I would upon every spot on the face of the earth where by law I am not forbidden. Sir, what has been your practice on this subject, if at any time in the progress of the affairs of this Government you have acquired Territory where Slavery existed, what did you do with it? With the forecast of a statesman, you took upon yourselves the difficulties of managing it.

When Louisiana was acquired, such was the tone of public sentiment—and I take upon myself to say that if it had been in the power of Congress to abolish it then, they would have done so—if they had not seen the state of things that would have been consequent upon such an act, they would have abolished Slavery in Louisiana.—What did they do in regard to the Northwest Territory in 1787? These were the men who gave directions to pubhc opinion. Would to God they had something to do with public opinion now. They abolished Slavery in the Northwest Territory. It is true it did not exist there to any great extent, except in a few French settlements, comprehending Illinois and a part of what is now the State of Indiana. And why did they do it? Why did the men who then exercised the power of the whole Confederacy—the men who were the leading spirits who formed the Constitution of the United States—why did they, in 1787, abolish Slavery in that Territory? Did their opinions suddenly change, so as to entertain such an abhorrence of Slavery that they abolished it wherever they could, though sovereignty piled on sovereignty endeavored to invade that land consecrated to free institutions by that law? Thus was the patrimony of Virginia transferred to the United States; and thus did they who offered that patrimony, and nobly gave it to the whole Union, forbid that Slavery should ever pollute its soil. And, Sir, is there any name on the historic page of Virginia more illustrious than that of Jefferson? Why, there is scarcely a Virginian who does not to have an opinion contrary to the lightest thought that he ever expressed. And is it so, that we are now to be required, for the sake of some imaginary balance of power, to carry Slavery into a country where it does not now exist? That, Sir, is the question propounded by this bill. The Senator from Vermont is satisfied that Slavery cannot be extended to these Territories. I believe, if his confidence in the judicial tribunals of the country were well founded, that Slavery could not possibly go into these Territories, provided the Senate is right both as to law and the facts. I ask every member of the Senate—perhaps I may be less informed than any—whether Slavery does not exist by some Mexican law, at this hour, in California.

Mr. Hannegan [in his seat.] It does exist. Peon Slavery exists there.

Mr. Corwin.—I would thank the Senator from Indiana if he will inform me what Peon Slavery is; and really I ask the question for the purpose of obtaining information. I desire to know its conditions. Is it transmissable by inheritance?—Does the marvellous doctrine of which the Hon. Senator from Virginia spoke as being part and parcel of the law adopted in Virginia—*partes sequitur ventrum*—prevail? Is that holy ordinance, that the offspring of the womb of her who is a slave must be born also a slave? Also there recognized

with the shouts of men made men. What does it all mean? It means that they have been redeemed from political servitude; and in God's name I ask, if it be a boon to mankind to be free from political servitude, must it not be accepted as matter of some gratulation that they have been relieved from absolute subjection to the arbitrary power of others? What do we say of them? I am not speaking of the propriety of this thing; it may be all wrong, and those poor fellows in Paris, who have stout hands and willing hearts, anxious to earn their bread, may be very comfortable in fighting for it. It may be all wrong to cut off the head of a King or send him across the Channel. The problem of Free Government, as we call it, is not, it seems, yet solved. It may be highly improper and foolish in Austria and Germany to send away Metternich and say, "We will look into this business ourselves." According to the doctrine preached in these Halls—in free America—instead of sending shouts of congratulation across the water to these people, we should send to them groans and commiseration for their folly, calling on them to beware how they take this business into their own hands—informing them that universal liberty is a curse; that as one man is born with a right to govern an Empire, he and his posterity (as Louis Philippe of Orleans maintained when he announced that his son should sit on the throne when he left it) must continue to exercise that power, because in their case it is not exactly *partes sequitur ventrum*, but *partes sequitur pater*—that is all the difference. [Laughter.] The Crown follows the father! Under your law the chain follows the mother! [Subdued manifestations of feeling.]

It was a law in the Colonies about '76 that Kings had a right to govern us. George Guelph, then said "*partes sequitur pater*"—My son is born to be your ruler. And at the very time when Virginia lifted up her hand and appealed to the God of justice—the common father of all men—to deliver her from that accursed maxim and its consequences, that one man was born—as Jefferson said—booted and spurred to ride another, it seems that by the Hon. Senator's account of it, she adhered to another maxim, to wit: that another man should be born to serve Virginia. I think this maxim of Kings being born to rule, and others being born only to serve, are both of the same family, whence I imagine they came, long ago, together. I do not think that your *partes sequitur ventrum* has much quarter shown it at Yorktown on a certain day you may remember. I think that when the lion of England crawled in the dust, beneath the talons of your eagles, and Cornwallis surrendered to George Washington, that maxim that a man is born to rule, went down, not to be seen among us again forever, and I think that *partes sequitur ventrum*, in the estimation of all sensible men, disappeared along with it. So the men of that day thought, and we are thus brought to the consideration of a proper interpretation of that language of those men who have been somewhat criticised by the Senator from South Carolina. What did they mean when they said in the Declaration of Independence that all men are born equally free? They had been contending that if we on this side of the water were to be taxed by the Imperial Parliament of England, we had a right to say who should represent us in that Parliament. I need not refer gentlemen to the arguments then advanced. I need not refer the Senator from Virginia to his own local history, which informs him that, throughout the whole Revolutionary period, the people in all the shires and towns were meeting and passing Resolutions that book of American Archives that you have authorized to be perpetuated, will show, you complaining to the crown of England of the importation of slaves into this country. And why did they complain? Let their own documents tell the story. Then men in that generation in Virginia, in Connecticut—as the Senator before me will see by referring to that book in MSS—everywhere throughout the Colonies said—"While we are contending for the common rights of humanity, against the Crown of England, it does not become us to enslave men and hold them in slavery." They objected to the introduction of slaves into this country through the intervention of the slave trade, because it was a wrong perpetrated upon the slave himself, and especially because it prevented the settlement of the country by artisans, mechanics, and laboring husbandmen.

I remember the assertion that not three counties in the State of Virginia can be named in which resolutions of that character were not passed. In 1781, not far from this Capitol, where we are now engaged in talking about the transfer of the slave trade to the shores of the Pacific Ocean, there was a meeting at Fairfax, at which one George Washington, Esq., presided. Some young gentlemen may know something of him. He was a bachelor planter, sir, at Mount Vernon. The resolutions passed on that occasion declared the intention of the meeting to refrain from purchasing any slaves and their determination to have nothing to do with the slave trade—because the introduction of slaves into this country prevented the settlement by free whites. This, then, was the opinion of Virginia at that time; and it was the opinion in Georgia too. A convocation of men from every County in the State assembled—as I find by this book—assembled at Darien, and resolved the very same things, giving the same reasons. The men of that generation understood the work of founding a new country. They knew what was best for the rising people just struggling into existence. If their opinions are worth any thing—if the opinions of the venerated men are to be considered as authority—I ask Southern gentlemen what they mean when they ask me to extend to the distant shores of the Pacific Ocean the slave trade from Maryland and Virginia, and that almost unknown country beyond them? Suppose this Confederation of ours had been formed before a slave existed in it, and suppose here in the year of grace 1848 you had acquired California and New Mexico, and you were told that Carolina existed a modified system of slavery there, and that they wanted laborers there, would a Senator rise in his place, and say we will authorize the African slave trade in order to introduce laborers into that Colonies? If you would not bring them from the shores of Africa—bringing them with *partes sequitur ventrum* brand on them—some—tell how can you prove to me that it would be right to transfer them to Maryland? If slavery were a curse to you in the beginning, but struck its roots so deep into your social and municipal system, as we have then said, that it could not be eradicated entirely, how is it that you call upon me to trample on the dictates of conscience and duty, to transfer this curse to an area of square miles greatly exceeding that of the thirteen States, when the Confederation was formed? If it is so, that it is an evil—and so all your Statesmen have pronounced it, and all your eminent men, with the exception of a few in modern times, have regarded it, how is it that you call upon me to extend it to those vast dominions which you have recently acquired? Is it true that I am obliged to receive into my family a man with the small pox or the leprosy, that they may be infected? I suppose that you do not consider it in that light now. But the gentleman from Virginia has said that it must be done. Why? Because it is compassion to the slave. He cannot be nurtured in Virginia; your lands are worn out. Sir, that statement sounded ominous in my ears. Is gave rise to some reflection? Why are your lands worn out? Are the lands of Pennsylvania worn out? Are those of Connecticut worn out? Is not Massachusetts productive to day than when the foot of the white man was first impressed upon her soil? Your lands are worn out because the slave has turned pale the land wherever he has set down his black foot! It is slave labor that has done all this. And must we then extend to these regions the curse which produces sterility wherever it is found, till blank and desolation desolation shall cover the whole land? If you can call upon me as a matter of compassion to send the slave to California and Oregon, you can call upon me by the same sacred obligation to receive him into Ohio as a slave; and I would be just as much bound, as a citizen of Ohio, to say that the Constitution should be construed so as to receive slaves there, because they have made the land in Virginia barren, and they and their masters were perishing, till Ohio had also become a howling wilderness. That reason will not do. Sensative as they may appear to the morbid benevolence spoken of—with which I have no sympathy at all—and tender hearted as I am, I can see through that—the citizens of Ohio cannot accept these inn on such terms.

What is there in the way, then, of my giving an intelligent vote on this subject? Nothing at all.—I would take this bill in a moment if I had faith in the processes through which I believe it is to pass until it becomes law in the chamber below. But I have not that faith, and I will tell the gentleman why. It is a sad commentary upon the perfection of human reason that, with but very few exceptions, gentlemen coming from a Slave State—and I think I have one behind me who ought always to be before me [Mr. BADGER]—with a very few exceptions, all eminent lawyers on this floor from that section of the country have argued that you have no right to prohibit the introduction of Slavery into Oregon, California and New Mexico; while, on the other hand, there is not a man in the Free States, learned or unlearned, clerical or lay, who has any pretensions to legal knowledge, but believes in his conscience that you have a right to prohibit Slavery. Is not that a curious commentary upon that wonderful thing called human reason!

Mr. UNDERWOOD—It is regulated by a law.

Mr. CORWIN—Yes, by 36 deg 30 min, and what is black on one side of the line and white on the other, turning to jet black again when restored to its original locality. How is that? Can I have confidence in the Supreme Court of the United States when my confidence fails in Senators around me here? Do I expect that the members of that body will be less careful than the Senators from Georgia and South Carolina to form their opinions without any regard to selfish consideration? Can I suppose that either of these gentlemen, or the gentleman from Georgia, on the other side of the Chamber, [Mr. JOHNSON] or the learned Senator from Mississippi, [Mr DAVIS] who thought it exceedingly infamous that we should attempt to restrain the Almighty in the execution of His purposes as revealed to us by Moses—can I suppose that these Senators, with all the terrible responsibilities which press upon us when engaged in legislating for a whole Empire, came to their conclusions without the most anxious deliberation? And yet, on one side of the line, in the Slave States, the Constitution reads yea, while on the other, after the exercise of an equal degree of intelligence, calmness and deliberation, the Constitution is found to read nay.

I admire the Supreme Court of the United States as a tribunal: I admire the wisdom which contrived it. I rejoice in the good consequences come to this Republic from the exercise of its functions. I also revere the Senate of the United States; but here is the most august body in the world, they say, composed of men who have wasted the midnight oil from year to year—men who in cloisters, in courts, in legislative halls, have been reaping the fruits of ripe experience coming here, and suddenly their mighty intellects, able to scan every thing however minute, and comprehend every thing however grand, utterly fail them, and they kneel down in dumb insignificance and implore the Supreme Court to read the Constitution for them. I think the Senator from South Carolina must have had some new light upon the subject within the last few years, and that several of my Democratic friends on all sides of the Chamber must have been smitten with a new love for the Supreme Court. Do you remember the case adverted to by the Senator from New Jersey to-day? I recollect very well, when we did not stop to inquire how the Supreme Court had decided or ordained. It had decided, with JOHN MARSHALL at its head—a man whose highest conjectures on the subject of Constitutional law have always had with me as much weight as the well considered opinion of almost any other man—that Congress had power to establish just such a Bank as you had; but with what infinite scorn did Democratic gentlemen—Jackson Democrats as they chose to be called—curl their lips and turn up their noses when referred to that decision of the Supreme Court. Then the cry was, "We are Judges for ourselves; we make no law unless we have power to enact it." Now, however, the doctrine is that here is a tribunal competent to put the matter at rest forever. Thank God, though all should fail, there is an infallible depository of truth, and it lives once a year for three months in a little chamber below us. We can go there. Now I understand my duty: here to be to ascertain what Constitutional power we have, and when we have ascertained that, without reference to what the Supreme Court may do—for they have yet furnished no guide on the subject—we are to take it for granted that they will concur with us. I agree with gentlemen who have been so lost in their encomiums upon that Court, that their decision whether right or wrong, controls no action. But we have not hitherto endeavored to ascertain what the Supreme Court would do. I wish them to know that in my mode this wonderful response is to be obtained—not from that Delphic Oracle, but from that infallible divinity, the Supreme Court. How is it to be done? A gentleman starts from Baltimore, in Maryland, with a dozen black men who have *partes sequitur ventrum* born into their skins and souls all over; he takes them to California, 3000 miles off. Now I don't know how it may be in other parts of the world, but I know that in the State of Ohio it is ordained that the law is carried wherever it goes.

What then is the admirable contrivance in this bill by which we can get at the meaning of the Constitution? We pray for it, we agonize for it, we make a law for it, and that it may be speedily known—for, if not speedily known, it may as well never be known, if Slavery goes there and remains there for years—I pray according to all experience it is eternally. Let it but plant its roots there, and the next thing you will hear of will be the earnest appeals about the rights of property; it will be said: "The Senate did not say we had no right to come here. The House of Representatives, a body of gentlemen elected from all parts of the country on account of their sagacity and legal attainments, did not prohibit us from coming here; we thought I had a right to come here. the Senator from South Carolina said I had a right to come: the Hon. Senator from Georgia said I had a right to come here; his colleague said it was a right secured to me somewhere high up in the clouds, and not belonging to the world. The Senator from Mississippi said it was the ordinance of Almighty God; am I not then to enjoy the privileges thus so fully secured to me? I have property here, several of my women have bonne children, who have *partes sequitur ventrum* born with them; they are my property."

Then the appeal will be made to their fellow citizens around them, and it will be asked whether you are prepared to strike down the property which the settler in those Territories has thus acquired? That will be the case unless the negro from Baltimore, when he gets there and sees the Peons there—slaves not by *partes sequitur ventrum*, but by a much better title—a verdict before a Justice of the Peace—shall determine to avail himself of the admirable facilities afforded him by this bill for claiming his freedom. Suppose my friend from New Hampshire, when he goes home, gets up a meeting and collects a fund for the purpose of sending a missionary after these men, and when the missionary arrives there he proposes to hold a prayer meeting, he gets up a meeting as they used to do in Yankee times, "for the improvement of gulls." He goes to the negro quarter of this gentleman from Baltimore and says, Come! I want brother Cuffee, it is true he is a son of Ham but I want to instruct him that he is free. I am very much afraid, I think that the missionary would fare very much as the spies of old Joshua, in the hands of him of Baltimore. So you see the negro is to start all at once into a free Anglo Saxon in California the blood of liberty flowing in every vein, and its divine impulses throbbing in his heart. He is to say "I am free, I am a Californian! I belong to the *manifest destiny* of the West! Well he is brought up on a writ of habeas corpus—but—but—to whom? Very likely one of those gentlemen who have been proclaiming that Slavery has a right to go there; for such are the men that Mr. POLK is likely to appoint. He has prejudged the case. Let the fate of his opinion the slave has been brought before him in Ohio be—he dare! There is his recorded judgment printed in your Congressional Report, what will he say? You are a Slave Mr. CALHOUN was right. Judge BERRIEN of Ga., a profound lawyer, whom I knew well, was right. I know these gentlemen well, their opinion is entitled to the highest authority, and in the face of it it does not become me to say that you are free! So, boy, go to your master, you belong to the class *partes sequitur ventrum*, you are not quite enough of a Saxon." What then is to be done by this bill? Oh! a writ of error or appeal can come to the Supreme Court of the United States. How! The negro, if he is to be treated like a white, taking out an appeal, must give bond to secure the costs of the subject matter in dispute. And what is that? If you consider it is the mercantile value of the negro, it may be perhaps $1,000 or $2,000. But he cannot have the appeal according to this bill, unless the value of the thing in controversy amounts to the value of $2,000. But, then, there comes in this duality of personal liberty: what is it worth? Nothing at all—says the Senator from South Carolina—to this fellow who is to be driven without it. And under all this complexity of legal quibbling and litigation, it is expected that the negro will stand there and contend with his master, and coming on to Washington, will prosecute his appeal two years before the Supreme Court, enjoying the opportunity of visiting his old friends about Baltimore! [Laughter.]

It must be conceded that there is a vast difference between a case thus submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States in the absence of all Congressional action, and that in which Congress shall have decided that Slavery should not exist in the Territory, because the Supreme Court in that case quoted so often from Peters, found that Congress had the power to legislate for the Territories. The Senator from S. C. concurs in that decision.

Now, if we can make any law whatever, not contrary to the express prohibitions of the Constitution, if we can enact that a man with $50,000 worth of bank notes of Maryland shall forfeit the whole amount if he attempts to pass one of them in the Territory of California. We may say if a man carry a menagerie of wild beasts there worth $500,000 and undertakes to exhibit them there, he shall forfeit them. The man comes back with his monkey under his arm, and says that the law forbade him to exhibit his animal there; it was thought that as an economical arrangement, such things should not be tolerated there. That you may do, be of the lions and tigers goes back, having lost his whole concern.

But now you take a fellow that you say is brother to the monkey—with wool on his head, and *partes sequitur ventrum* engraved on him somewhere else, and somehow Congress is impotent, all the power of the sovereignty of this country is impotent to stop him. That is a strange sort of argument to me. It has always been considered that when a State forms its Constitution it can exclude Slavery. Why so? Because it chances to confer no power. If it be a proper subject of legislation in a State, and we have transferred to us by virtue of this bloody power of conquest as some say, or by an abstract question—are there not duties devolving upon us, for the performance of which we may not be responsible to any earthly tribunal, but for which God who has created us will hold us to a strict accountable? What is your duty above all others to a conquerred people? You say it is your duty to give them a Government—you may you not then do everything for them which you are not forbidden to do by some fundamental axiomatic truth at the foundation of your Constitution? Shall we then how have in this instance, and I submit. Though I believe it ought to be otherwise, yet if any Constitution of my country so ordains, I yield. The Constitution of the United States declares Slavery to be an evil.

Southern gentlemen have said that they would have done away with it if possible, and they have apologized to the world and to themselves for the existence of it in their midst. These honest old men of another day never could have appealed to God in the way they did had they not been willing to strike off the chains from every negro in the Colonies, if it had been possible for them to do so without upturning the foundations of society. I do not revive these things to wound the feelings of gentlemen. I know some of them consider this institution as valuable; but many of them I also know regard it as a curse. But, thank God, Slavery is not in Oregon, it is not in California, and when I find that you have trampled down the people in order to extend your dominion over them, I feel it to be my duty, when you appeal to me to make laws for them, and the supreme tribunal has said that I have the power to do so, to avert from such a curse, and establish free institutions, under which no man can say that another is his property. I do not doubt this power. I know that it has been considered of old, from 1787 till the present hour, to be vested in Congress. The judicial tribunals in the West have considered it so, and the Supreme Court of the United States have said in that decision so often referred to, that it was so. Have they found any restrictions upon us? No. And what would you do if you were in Oregon to day? What would you do, and you, and you? Would any man here, if he were acting in a legislative capacity in that country, say, "I feel myself bound to admit this evil into this country, for the benefit of some of the States who are overburdened with them." If this were true, it would be the duty of the free States, in that fraternal spirit which ought to prevail between the various States of the Union, to admit slaves whenever the Slave States become overburdened with them. Do we so act in legislating for our States? No: we say—"Enjoy your Slaves, or feel them as you will, but it is our wish that there shall be no Slavery here." You may implore a State, if you will, to take Slaves into its bosom for your convenience, but they do not feel themselves bound by any Governmental obligation to do it. Am I not, then, bound to lay the foundations of that State for whose future progress I am to be responsible, in the way which I think the most likely to produce beneficial results to the people there? And when I find myself possessed of this power, and clothed with commensurate responsibility, no threats of dissolution of the Union, no heart burnings here nor there, and least of all—that which we have heard much of out of doors—the coming Presidential Election, shall deter me from pursuing this course. If in my power, in the language of the Ordinance of '87, I would have it enacted that Slavery shall never exist in that country. Then, when my black man comes to the Supreme Court of the United States, as provided in this bill, that court must overrule the case in Peters, or else I have misunderstood the extent of that power. Then we will have acted upon the subject—we will have forbidden Slavery; and subject were very careful to keep upon that line. That is the reason I prefer the Ordinance of '87 to this so called Compromise Bill.

I have no doubt that every Senator who assented to that bill convinced himself that it was the best we could pass. I have no doubt that our friends from the North thought it would be effective in preventing Slavery in these Territories. But I see that the Senator from South Carolina does not think so. He supports the bill for the very reason that it will admit Slavery;—the Senator from Vermont, for the reason that Slavery cannot get there. Now, in this confusion of ideas, I desire that Congress, if it have any opinion, express it. If we have any power to legislate over these Territories, how long would it take to write down the six articles of the Ordinance of '87? Those of us who think that that ought to be a fundamental law in the organization of our Territories will vote for it; and those of us who believe otherwise will vote against it, and which ever party triumphs, will give law to Oregon and California, bearing the responsibility. But I must say that I do not like what appears to me—I say it in no offensive sense—a shuffling off of the responsibility which is upon us now, and which we cannot avoid. The Supreme Court may overrule our decision; but if we think we have power to ordain that Slavery shall not exist in that Territory, let us say so; if not, let us so decide.—Let us not evade the question altogether.

That the Hon. Senators who reported this bill, had its passage very much at heart I have no doubt nor do I feel disposed to deny that every man of them believed that it was just such a measure as was calculated to give tranquility to the agitated minds of the people of this country. Well, I do not know that agitation farther than that I will look to it as a matter I know what it is—what my powers and my duties are. I have heard much of this—I have been myself a prophet of dissolution of this Union; but I have seen the Union of these States, heard so much of late, that I am not afraid of dissolution. Perhaps, indeed, when this cry of wolf has been long disregarded, he may come at last to be expected; but I do not believe that the people of the South are going to sever themselves from this Republic, because they will not establish Slavery here and there. If we have no power to pass this law, let the people of the South go to the Supreme Court, and have the question decided. It will only be a few months till the Court resumes its sessions here, and the question can then be tried. If the decision be against us, the gentlemen of the South can at once commence their emigration to their territories.—Let us then make the law as we think it ought to be made.

I am the more confirmed in this course which I am determined to pursue, by some historical facts elicited in this very discussion. I remember, it was said by the Senator from Virginia, the other day, and happily found it this morning, and the reference was all that I exp