Pittsburgh Gazette.

THURSDAY MORNING, MARCH 6.

We give up all our available space to-day, to the DEFENSE OF GEN. FREMONT. We think it but bare justice that he should be heard by the American people, in reply to the long, loud, and repeated charges made against him; and we have no doubt our readers expect this at our hands. The documentary evidence accompanying the defence, and which fortifies it in every particular, it is wholly out of our power to give complete; but we may, at our leisure, give some choice extracts. Throughout the whole, Gen. FREMONT bears himself with dignity, and gives most conclusive evidence that he is a noble patriot, and an honest man.

THE WAR IN THE WEST.

GEN. FREMONT'S DEFENSE.

HIS STATEMENT AND EVIDENCE,

AS PRESENTED

To the Joint Committee

OF THE

TWO HOUSES

ON THE

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

To the Hon. MR. WADE, *Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, &c.*

Agreeably to a suggestion from the Committee, I make the following statement concerning my administration of the Western Department: notwithstanding my unwillingness to engross the time of the Committee, I shall have to ask that they will take the trouble to look over the documents which I have appended to this statement; and which comprehend the most important letters, orders, and telegraphic communications concerning some of the most important events and acts of the period referred to. The magnitude of the Department and its interests, the amount of business required to be done, the inadequacy of means, and the short space into which many events were crowded, together with the many accusations, and the strained and rigorous account to which the Western Department has been held, make it impossible to present the subject with fairness in a brief paper. In my desire not to cumber this statement, and having respect to my character of witness before your Committee. I have omitted facts and considerations in vindication of myself on points where I have been attacked, but into which I shall ask the Committee to examine. This paper is only directed to leading points, leaving their details, and what is more directly personal to myself, to the testimony of witnesses I have asked to have summoned, and to the accompanying papers.

When in July last I was assigned to the command of the Western Department, it comprehended with Illinois all the States and Territories west of the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains, including New Mexico.

No special object was given me in charge to do, nor was I furnished with any particular plan of a campaign. The general discussions at Washington resulted in the understanding that the great object in view was the descent of the Mississippi, and for its accomplishment I was to raise and organize an army, and when I was ready to descend the river, I was to let the President know. My command was then to be extended over Kentucky and down the left bank of the Mississippi. For military reasons it was judged inexpedient to do so in the beginning.

Full discretionary powers of the amplest kind were conferred on me. Not a line of written instructions was given me. The leading object of the campaign being settled, the details of its accomplishment and the management of my Department were left to my own judgment.

While at Washington, I informed myself fully of the unprepared condition of the West, and its want of arms, from the Governor of Illinois.

Of the Illinois contingent 7,000 men were unarmed. Their cavalry was without horses or sabers, their artillery companies had hardly any guns, and were wholly without equipments. Upon this information I procured an order for 7,000 stands of arms, which, upon my arrival in New York two days after, I found had been countermanded. Upon my complaint to Washington, and upon the direct interposition of the President, Major Hagner was sent to aid me in procuring what I judged immediately necessary for the Department. With him I arranged for getting together from various arsenals, and forwarding to St. Louis, arms and equipments sufficient for the complete equipment of an army corps of 23,000 men.

In the meantime, the rebellion in the West was daily assuming a more threatening aspect. In the North-West aggravated disorders had broken out. Gen. Pope was urgently requesting to take the field with the remainder of the Illinois contingents; Gen. Harding was asking re-enforcements for Cairo and the South-East, and General Lyon for Springfield and the South-West.

Urged by this serious condition of affairs, I applied to Gen. Scott for permission to take the field immediately, with any instructions he might have to give me. Having received this permission, and being informed there were no instructions for me, I left New York on the day following the battle of Manassas, and reached my command at St. Louis on the 25th day of July.

At this time the State of Missouri was throught rebellious. A rebel faction in every county, at least equal to the loyal population in numbers, and excelling it in vindictiveness and energy. The Local Government was in confusion and unaided to aid. St. Louis itself was a rebel city, and, as a rule, the influential and wealthy citizens were friendly to secession.

Of the new levies of the Federal troops, few were in the field—the term of enlistment of the three months' men was just expiring—the troops in service had not been paid; were badly equipped and badly supplied; and, in addition to the rebel parties which swarmed throughout the State, a Confederate army of nearly 50,000 men was already on its southern frontier.

Gen. Pope was in North Missouri with nearly all my disposable forces; Gen. Lyon was at Springfield with about 7,800 men, and Gen. Prentiss was holding Cairo with seven regiments. Gen. Lyon's troops were in greater part three months' men, whose term of service was ending, and all of Gen. Prentiss' force was in the same condition.

The arms collected for me in New York had been diverted to Virginia, and I had neither money nor credit. Want of arms and want of money were the chief difficulties to be met, while the necessity to meet the enemy on three sides at once was urgent and imminent. There was no lack of men. The loyal population of the West, and among them the Germans, with a noble unanimity, were willing to come in mass to the standard of the Union.

The saving of time demanded by these most urgent circumstances, made me especially anxious to retain the services of the Home Guard regiments and three months-men, whose term of service was just expiring. These were themselves anxious to remain in service, but the destitution of their families, made so by their absence and failure to receive the pay due them, rendered this impossible. In this necessity I directed the use of part of an unappropriated sum lying in the United States Treasury, and reported the reason and fact of my conduct to the President in the following letter.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. Louis, July 30, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: You were kind enough to say as occasions of sufficient gravity arose, I might send you a private note.

I have found this command in disorder, nearly every county in an insurrectionary condition, and the enemy advancing in force by different points of the southern frontier. Within a circle of 50 miles around Gen. Prentiss there are about 12,000 of the Confederate forces, and 5,000 Tennesseans and Arkansas men, under Hardee, well armed with rifles, are advancing upon Ironton. Of these, 2,000 are cavalry, which yesterday morning were within 24 hours march of Ironton. Col. Bland, who had been seduced from this post, is falling back upon it. I have already re-enforced it with one regiment, sent on another this morning, and fortified it. I am holding the railroad to Ironton and that to Rolla, so securing our connections with the South. Other measures, which I am taking, I will not trust to a letter, and I write this only to inform you as to our true condition, and to say if I can obtain the material aid I am expecting, you may feel secure the enemy will be driven out and the State reduced to order. I have ordered General Pope back to North Missouri, of which he is now in command. I am sorely pressed for want of arms. I have arranged with Adams' Express Company to bring me everything with speed, and will buy arms to-day in New York. Our troops have not been paid, and some regiments are in a state of mutiny, and the man whose term of service is expired, generally refuse to enlist. I lost a fine regiment last night from inability to pay them a portion of the money due. This regiment had been intended to move on a critical post last night. The Treasurer of the United States has here $300,000, entirely unappropriated. I applied to him yesterday for $100,000 for my Paymaster General Andrews, but was refused. We have not an hour for delay. There are three courses open to me. One, to let the enemy possess himself of some of the strongest points in the State and threaten St. Louis, which is insurrectionary. Second, to force a loan from Secession Banks here. Third, to use the money belonging to the Government, which is in the Treasury here. Of course I will neither lose the State nor permit the enemy a foot of advantage. I have infused energy and activity into the Department, and there is a thorough good spirit in officers and men. This morning I will order the Treasurer to deliver the money in his possession to Gen. Andrews, and will send a force to the Treasury to take the money, and will direct such payments as the exigency requires. I will hazard everything for the defence of the Department you have confided to me, and I trust to you for support.

With respect and regard I am yours, truly,
J. C. FREMONT, Maj. Gen. Commanding.

To the President of the United States.

I respectfully ask the attention of the Committee to this letter, because the Investigating Committee in their report, have made this act a serious charge against me, holding me up to the reprobation of the country, as having acted in a manner "arbitrary and illegal," dangerous to "constitutional liberty and in defiance of law and superior authority"—(Page 78 and page 116.)

They further say that this act was "alarming, unjustifiable and deserving severest censure, especially as there was no pretense of any military or other necessity to justify this outrage."

That no reply was made to the above-quoted letter, or objection made to the act, will be sufficient to satisfy the Committee that I was expected to do any act which in my judgment the public service might require; or, to use the words of a Cabinet Minister in the confidence of the Administration:

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1861.

DEAR GENERAL: I have two telegrams from you, but find it impossible now to get any attention to Missouri or Western matters from the authorities here. You will have to do the best you can, and take all needful responsibility to defend and protect the people over whom you are specially set.

* * * * * * *

Yours, truly, and in haste. M. BLAIR.

I ask the Committee to couple the facts set out in these letters, and the distress of Gen. Lyon for want of money with which to retain his troops, with the censure of the Committee.

With what has been said concerning the situation of affairs in Missouri, a glance at the map will make it apparent that Cairo was the point which first demanded attention. The force under Gen. Lyon could retreat, but the position at Cairo could not be abandond—the question of holding Cairo was one which involved the safety of the whole North-west. Had the taking of St. Louis followed the defeat of Manassas, the disaster might have been irretrievable, while the loss of Springfield, should our army be compelled to fall back upon Rolla, would only carry with it the loss of a part of Missouri—a loss greatly to be regretted, but not irretrievable. Having reinforced Cape Girardeau and Ironton by the utmost exertions, I succeeded in getting together and embarking with a force of 3,000 men five days after my arrival in St. Louis.

From St. Louis to Cairo was an easy day's journey by water, and transportation abundant. To Springfield was a week's march, and before I could have reached it, Cairo would have been taken, and with it, I believe, St. Louis.

On my arrival at Cairo, I found the force under Gen. Prentiss reduced to 1,200 men, consisting mainly of a regiment which had agreed to await my arrival.

A few miles below—at New Madrid—Gen. Pillow had landed a force estimated at 20,000, which subsequent events showed was not exaggerated. Our force, greatly increased to the enemy by rumors, drove him to a hasty retreat, and permanently secured the position. To these facts the accompanying papers and the testimony of Gen. Prentiss and other officers is offered to the Committee.

I returned to St. Louis on the 4th of August, having in the meantime ordered Colonel Stephenson's regiment, from Booneville, and Colonel Montgomery, from Kansas, to march to the relief of Gen. Lyon.

Immediately upon my return from Cairo, I set myself to work, amid incessant demands upon my time from every quarter, principally to provide reinforcements for Gen. Lyon.

I do not accept Springfield as a disaster belonging to my administration. Causes wholly out of my jurisdiction had already prepared the defeat of Gen. Lyon, before my arrival at St. Louis. His letter to me of the 9th August, with other papers annexed, will show that I was already in communication with him, and that he knew his wants were being provided for. It will be seen that I had all reasonable expectations of being able to relieve him in time, and that he then able to adhere to the course indicated in his letter, a very short time would have found him efficiently sustained:

SPRINGFIELD, MO., Aug. 9, 1861.

GENERAL: I have just received your note of the 6th inst., by special messenger.

I retired to this place, as I have before informed you, reaching here on the 5th. The enemy followed to within ten miles of here. He has taken a strong position, and is recruiting his supplies of horses, mules and provisions by forages into the surrounding country; his large force of mounted men enabling him to do this without much annoyance from me.

I find my position extremely embarrassing, and am at present unable to determine whether I shall be able to maintain my ground at Springfield. If I can resist any attack from the front, but if the enemy move to surround me I must retire. I shall hold my ground as long as possible, though I may, without knowing how far, endanger the safety of my entire force, with its valuable material, being induced, by the important considerations involved, to take this step. The enemy yesterday made in force about five miles distant; and has doubtless a full purpose of making an attack upon me. * * *

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
N. LYON, Brig.-Gen. Vols., Commanding.

Major-General J. C. FREMONT, Commanding Western Department, St. Louis, Mo.

Upon the 10th August General Lyon was killed in battle.

The charge that Gen. Lyon had in any way suffered from my neglect was a surprise upon me. I heard nothing of it at the time, and believe it to have been an after thought. Further to disprove it, in connection with what has been said above, I refer to the statements of Adjutant-Generals Harding and Kelton, through whose hands the business of the Department at that time passed. Col. Harding was Gen. Lyon's Adjutant General, charged with the management of affairs in Missouri during his absence.

In the letter referred to, he says:

Gen. Fremont was not inattentive to the situation of Gen. Lyon's column, and went so far as to remove the garrison of Booneville, in order to send him aid. During the first days of August, troops arrived in the City in large numbers. Nearly all of them were unarmed; all were without transportation. Regiment after regiment lay for days in the city, without any explanation, for the reason that the Arsenal was exhausted, and arms and accoutrements had to be brought from the East. From these men Gen. Lyon would have had reinforcements, although they were wholly unpractised in the use of the musket, and knew nothing of movements in the field, but in the meantime the battle of the 10th of August was fought. CHESTER HARDING, Jr.,
Late Ass't Adj't.-Gen. upon the Staff of Brig.-Gen. Lyon.

It was under this great necessity, a greater than which is not is not likely to occur during this war, and to provide among other demands—relief for Gen. Lyon—that on the 6th of August I made the purchase of Austrian guns, for which I am censured by a Committee charged to investigate frauds." (Page 40.)

Your Committee will be enabled to judge whether the purchase of these arms, at this time, can be appropriately called "a manifest improvidence."

I abstain from pursuing this subject further than to say that although it was a good arm, the arm itself was not a matter of choice, as this telegram will show:

ST. LOUIS, July 29, 1861.

To Major HAGNER, *Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York:*

The Agent of Adams' Express Company here has offered to bring me, by passenger train, any arms directed to me. Send everything you have for me by passenger trains, for which the Express Company will provide. Your letter of 24th received. There were no arms at the Arsenal here to meet the order given for the 5,000. We must have arms—any arms no matter what. J. C. FREMONT, Maj.-Gen. Com'g W. D.

Twelve thousand had been in service, thirteen thousand were new. They were percussion muskets—solid and strong—pronounced by Austrian officers to be considered, in that service, a good weapon, preferred by Gen. Asboth for his division, in their unaltered condition, and were in the hands of some of my best regiments at Springfield, and scattered over the country in various corps, although the Committee say "they were not in use." I think it due to myself to say that this Committee came to St. Louis during my absence in the field, and no notice was at any time given me that my military acts were to be brought under examination, nor has any copy of the testimony, collected during their proceedings, been furnished me, of which I might avail myself in reply.

On the 18th of August intelligence of the battle of Wilson's Creek reached me at St. Louis. In expectation of an immediate advance by the enemy, I informed the President and Governors of the neighboring States, requesting that all the disposable force that could be spared should be sent at once to Missouri. Fortunately, dissension in the camp of the enemy prevented them from using that success, and gave time, which I used, to carry on as rapidly as possible the plan I had adopted for the defense of the State. This was to fortify Girardeau, Ironton, Rolla, and Jefferson City, with St. Louis as a base, holding these places with sufficient garrisons, and leaving the army free for operations in the field. It certainly seems superfluous to speak of the importance of St. Louis, but as the expediency of fortifying it has been questioned, it may be well to remind the Committee that it was the first military position in the Western Department. Many of the things I am required to prove are as self-evident as this. St. Louis, then, is situated on the great highway of the Mississippi river at a point where it is crossed by all the principal roads from the east, having itself seven different lines of communication to the interior and opposite ends of the State; that it is the great center of politics and trade, and the object to which the efforts of the enemy were constantly directed and invited by the powerful and wealthy rebel portions of the citizens. It was certainly prudent to render permanently secure, beyond the reach of contingency, this great depot for supplies and reserves, and safe retreat for an army in the possible event of a disaster.

The importance of fortifying St. Louis had early occupied the attention of Gen. Lyon, who had decided upon a plan much the same as that now adopted, and under the advice of the same officer by whom the present sites were selected, but which he was unable to carry out.

The necessity of these fortifications was concurred in by officers of unimpeachable loyalty and capacity, And such also was the judgment of the loyal inhabitants, to whom they gave, for the first time, a sense of protection and security. They were laid out with a view to command the city itself, as well as the approches to it. The defenses which rest upon St. Louis constitute the dyke which separates the South from the North-West. It is easy, after a precaution has been successful, to say that it was not needed. I did not choose to expose myself to the chances of a neglect—either at St. Louis or Paducah—for both of which I have been censured, and with equal ignorance in either case. The unfairness of this attack consists in judging what was necessary for St. Louis then by its condition when I left the Department.

I ask the Committee to bear in mind that the plan for the defense of the State, and my operations generally, were all conducted in reference to the descent of the Mississippi, to which all preparations tended. To complete the defense of St. Louis, after the withdrawal of the army, five regiments of infantry, with one battalion of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery were considered amply sufficient.

It has been objected that I did not employ the troops under my command, instead of hired labor, for this work. I did this in the exercise of my judgment. I did not consider it expedient to employ the volunteer troops in a work of this magnitude, involving so much labor and exposure. The hot suns and heavy night dews of the unhealthy months of August and September need to be avoided in that climate. The troops were as little acquainted with arms that all their time was needed to fit them for the field; while on the other hand, the employment of hired labor was of great service in tranquillising the city, and relieving the wide-spread distress the war had entailed on it and which private charity had exhausted itself in endavoring to relieve.

Concerning the contract for this work the Committee of Investigation say that it was made under the "special order and direction of Gen. Fremont," and concerning the payments that they were made upon his "personal order." The following extract will show that not only was I recognized to have this power, but that I was so late as the 3d of September counselled to exercise it by the Quartermaster-General General Meigs:

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1861.

[Extracts from Letter of the Hon. M. Blair, P. M. G.]

"Meigs begged me this afternoon to get you to order 15-inch guns from Pittsburgh for your gunboats. He says that the boats can empty any battery the enemy can make with such guns. He advises that you contract for them directly yourself, telling the contract you will direct your ordnance officer to pay for them."

* * * * * * *

Concerning the contractor the Committee say that he is "a Californian who followed Fremont to St. Louis."

I left California for Europe on the 1st of January. On the 1st of August, I think, Mr. Beard left there, coming overland to St. Louis.

I never wrote him, or in any way communicated with him, or knew of his intended coming. His arrival was equally a surprise and a pleasure to me.

I knew him to be a man of unusual energy and capacity, accustomed to the management of men on large works, and immediately applied to him to undertake the building of the fortifications. I sent an officer with him to make his examinations, and he began his work, I think, on the second day after his arrival. I assigned him one of my ablest officers to lay out and superintend the work, and to remain constantly with him, give him every facility he asked, and drove him to the extent of his capacity. Six thousand men were employed upon it, working night and day, and it was finished rapidly, in a workmanlike and durable manner. Extra pay was allowed to the laborers, 40 cents per day, I think, and extra expenses incurred under the pressure authorized. I was satisfied with him and the work done by him. I asked no bond from him, because he was a stranger and could give none. He began his work before the contract was made; an accident delayed its execution by General McKinstry. When the prices for his work were under discussion and were referred to me by Gen. McKinstry, I directed this officer to reduce them to what was just and reasonable to both parties, having reference to the circumstances under which the work was done, and the extra prices that had been paid, so as to leave the contractor what might be strictly a fair profit on his labor, and his decision, whatever it was, was approved by me. For cost of construction and other details with which I am not acquainted, I respectfully refer the Committee to the testimony of the Quartermaster and the contractor, whom I have asked to have summoned.

To show their nature and value, the report and testimony of the engineers, who planned and were superintending the work, will be furnished the Committee. The object aimed at was the completion of the city defenses in the shortest possible time. The works are thoroughly and well built, covering and comprehending the city itself and the surrounding country on a length of about ten miles, and the total cost is, I think, less than $300,000.

In my judgment, having in view the time and manner in which they were built, the money was well applied, and as a measure of expediency and policy, it was fully worth to the Government what it cost.

And while examining into the conduct and events of the war, I think it right to call the attention of your Committee to the fact that a Committee charged to "investigate frauds" came into a Department which was under martial law, in the midst of civil dissensions encouraging insubordination, discrediting and weakening the authority of the Commanding General then absent in the field, and I offer testimony to show that their conduct while at St. Louis created a public opinion that their special object was to make out a case against myself which should justify my removal from that Department. [See page 79 of that report.] And I offer testimony to show that they avoided and declined to receive, and have suppressed, testimony which militated against this object, and further to show that there are in their report many inaccuracies and perversions and some positive falsehoods.

The labors of the Investigating Committee appear to have resulted in a single resolution, in which the purchase of certain arms by myself is made a prominent subject. With respect to the sale of these arms by the Government, I have nothing to say. They were new, and I am told were sold without being condemned. The contract price at which they were bought by the Government was, I believe, $17 50. The price at which they are set down in the Ordnance Manual is $21. After they had been rifled and otherwise improved, I purchased them at $22. Taking into consideration the advance in price of arms, caused by the war, I submit that the purchase is not deserving of special censure. I have digressed from the rule laid down at the outset in this paper, but the passage of the resolution, which is soon to be before the House, would be a vote of censure, and as the report itself, together with the official accusations have been broadly spread over the country, I respectfully ask that the Committee will cause this statement, together with the accompanying documents, to have equal and immediate publicity given to them, in order that Congress may act understandingly, and the censure asked for go where it properly belongs.

The turbulent condition of the State at the end of August, rendered it in my judgment necessary to issue a proclamation extending martial law to the State of Missouri, and enforcing some penalties for rebellion.

As explanatory of some of the difficulties of my position, and of my ideas concerning the conduct of the war in my Department, I refer the Committee to the annexed correspondence with the President in this connection.

So late as the 6th, to the 10th September, as accompanying papers under this date show, no immediate danger was apprehended for Jefferson City or Lexington.

Price was still on the Upper Osage, and I was organizing as rapidly as possible a force to march from Rolla and from Jefferson City upon Springfield, with the intention of forcing him to retreat or cutting off his communications with Arkansas. Want of transportation, arms, and money was delaying this movement. We had just effected lodgments at Paducah and Fort Holt, and were occupied in contesting with the rebels in Western Kentucky, for which reinforcements were constantly required. The condition of North Missouri required a vigorous effort to suppress rebellion in that quarter, and an expedition, which occupied a considerable part of our real force was sent there under Generals Pope and Sturgis.

These three points, on which we were actually engaged, fully taxed our resources.

At this time I sent for Gen. Hunter, to give him command of the movement upon Springfield. On the 11th, it will be seen that Gen. Pope, with all the force under his command, was fully occupied in North Missouri.

On the same day I received the rumor, and only as a rumor, of Gen. Price's arrival at Clinton, more than 300 miles from St. Louis.

Upon the 12th, a dispatch from Gen. Davis informed me of Col. Mulligan's arrival at Lexington. Col. Mulligan reports a portion of his command—Col. Marshall's regiment of cavalry—as scouring the country. The same day another dispatch from him informs me that Price is reported near Warrensburg, with a force variously estimated from 5,000 to 15,000 men. He informs me measures were being taken to begin fortifying Lexington. Finally, it appears that General Davis was giving his attention vigilantly to that section of country.

It will be seen, from the telegrams of this day, that Cairo was requiring more troops.

On the 13th, two regiments were ordered from St. Louis to Jefferson City, and two others from Jefferson City, to the relief of Lexington [Lexington is 240 miles from St. Louis, and 115 from Jefferson City], and, in the opinion of Gen. Davis, who was occupied with that place, it was deemed expedient. And generally, it will be seen, that all possible activity and promptitude was used in sending forward troops to the points threatened along the Missouri river, and meeting, with all our disposable force, the movements of General Price. It will be seen that up to the 13th, Boonville, not Lexington, was considered the threatened point.

On the 14th Gen. Sturgis was directed to move, with all practicable speed, upon Lexington. Gen. Pope's dispatch of the 16th gave me every reason to believe, as he did, that a re-enforcement of 4,000 men, with artillery, would be there in abundant time, and if the Committee will take the time to read the accompanying papers, it will be seen that from every disposable quarter where there were troops the promptest efforts were made to concentrate them on Lexington, but chance defeated these efforts.

Also on the 14th, in the midst of this demand for troops, I was ordered by the Secretary of War and Gen. Scott to "send 5,000 well-armed infantry to Washington without a moment's delay."

It will in some degree explain my condition to insert the following telegram:

[Vol. 2, page 96.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
St. LOUIS, Sept. 15, 1861.

To Col. E. D. TOWNSEND, *Asst. Adj.-Gen. Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C.*

Reliable information from the vicinity of Price's column shows his present force to be 11,000 at Warrensburg, and 4,000 at Georgetown, with pickets extending towards Syracuse. Green is making for Booneville with probable force of 3,000. Withdrawal of force from this part of the Missouri risks the district from Paducah, loses Western Kentucky. As the best, I have ordered two regiments from this city, two from Kentucky and will make up the remainder from the new force being raised by the Governor of Illinois.

J. C. FREMONT, Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

It is well to recall the fact, that the State of which I had the task to obtain possession, and which was in active rebellion, contained a white population of over a million—equal to that of Virginia, and 150,000 greater than that of Kentucky, and that the difficulties were increased by the fact that the several important points need to be occupied for that purpose, were very distant from the centre of operations at St. Louis, with long lines of communication to be kept open in the midst of a brave and enterprising enemy:

To St. Joseph	330 Miles.
To Sedalia	189 "
To Jefferson City	125 "
To Rolla	118 "
To Ironton	(about) 80 "
To Cairo and Paducah	200 "

[Vol. 2, page 73.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
September 14, 1861.

To the Hon. SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*

Subjoined is a list of our total force, with its distribution:

St. Louis (including Home Guard)	6,899
Under Brig.-Gen. Pope (including Home Guard)	6,483
Lexington (including Home Guard)	3,400
Jefferson City (3 Home Guard)	3,677
Rolla	4,760
Ironton	3,007
Cape Girardeau	650
Birds Point and Norfolk	3,510
Cairo (including McClernand's Brigade)	4,820
Fort Holt, opposite Cairo, Kentucky shore	2,596
Paducah	7,791
Under Gen. Lane	2,200
Mound City, near Cairo	900
Total of present and absent on detached duty	55,293

J. C. FREMONT, Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

To these difficulties began now to be added the loss of consideration and credit which the apparent withdrawal of the confidence of the Government caused. The visit of high officers charged with inquiring into the affairs of my Department, and the simultaneous and sustained attacks of leading journals, accumulated obstructions to my movements until I was openly removed from the command of the Department.

Except the victory, little advantage resulted to Price from the capture of Lexington, exposed and resting upon a broad river which there was no chance for a large army to cross in case of defeat. As a military position its occupation had no value for him. On the contrary, had I possessed the means of transportation to move forward my troops rapidly, I should have been well content to give up Lexington for the certainty of being able to compel Price to give me battle on the north side of the Osage—as he could not cross the Missouri without exposing himself to certain defeat, no other course would have remained open to him. In fact, when I did go forward, the appearance of my advance at Sedalia was the signal for his precipitate retreat.

I ask the attention of the Committee to the unreasonableness of expecting a General to be always successful. Admitting even that the Western Department had been thoroughly well supplied with men and arms, it could hardly have been expected that no single casualty could have been met with in the course of the campaign. And it would seem more reasonable to judge of the capacity of the commander by the general results of his operations.

From this statement and the accompanying papers, the Committee will form some idea of the condition of the Department when I assumed command, at the end of July.

At the end of October, when I had succeeded in organizing and equipping an army, and was beginning to handle it in the field, we were everywhere, and uniformly along the whole extent of our lines successful against the enemy. At Springfield, one of the most brilliant actions, and at Fredericktown, one of the most admirably conducted battles of the war had been fought. Isolated railroads had been connected at St. Louis, and were in full and continuous operation over their whole extent. Additional cars had been provided, and at twenty-four hours' notice 10,000 men could be moved upon them from any one point to the opposite side of the State. All our posts, as far as the railroad went, had been fortified and connected by telegraphs, which were everywhere in full operation, and the daily mails were running to Springfield, from which place an officer, alone and in uniform, could ride through with safety to St. Louis. Quiet and comparative peace had been restored to the State, and the enemy was in full retreat before us, to its southern boundary. A compact had been entered into with him, under which the authority of the State and Federal Courts was acknowledged; liberty of opinion and security of person were guaranteed to both sides; all guerrilla parties suppressed, and the war strictly confined to responsible officers, and the armies in the field.

The State was, in reality, reclaimed, and in condition to leave the army free for the especial object of descending the Mississippi. The rebels already acknowledged the inutility of resistance to the Federal authority; the doubtful came to the side of power, and the loyal, who had borne the brunt of war—when to stand by the Union involved danger and losses—were everywhere encouraged to new efforts and rewarded for their past aid.

The Fall rains were over, the weather of the Indian Summer had come, the hay was gathered and the corn hardening, and we were about to carry out the great object of our campaign under the most favorable auspices, with fewer hardships from exposure and impediments from transportation than at any other season. The spirit of the army was high. It was mainly composed of Western men, whose interest as well as whose patriotism was involved in opening the Mississippi River, for the preparations to which they had contributed every possible effort, and we had every reason to believe that the campaign would open with a signal victory in the defeat or dispersion of the rebel army, with a move on Memphis as the immediate result.

These were the circumstances under which, without reason assigned, I was relieved of my command.

It is not grateful to me to have been myself compelled to set out the merits of my administration; but it was necessary in order to call attention to points which otherwise might not have been presented, and which are necessary to a clear understanding of the subjects inquired into. Many acts which have been censured were, I think, for the public good. I know they were with that intention. I do not feel that in any case I overstepped the authority intended to be confided to me.

Myself, and the officers and men acting with me, were actuated solely by a desire to serve the country, and I feel assured that this is realized by the people of the West, among whom we were acting.

Respectfully,
J. C. FREMONT,
Major-General U. S. A.

NEW ADVERTISEMENTS.

BOOK STORE TO LEASE.—I will lease my BOOK STORE, from April 1st, and sell the store fixtures to the incoming tenant. This is an eligible opening. Rent moderate. Enquire at the store. WM. S. RENTOUL,
No. 85, Clair street.

AGENTS WANTED, to canvass in the city for some splendid new English Books. mr5-3td

NOTICE.—Whereas Letters of Administration to the estate of Joseph Grindrod, late of the city of Pittsburgh, deceased, have been granted to the subscriber, all persons indebted to the said estate are requested to make immediate payment, and those having claims or demands against the estate of the said decedent will make known the same without delay to JOHN OGDEN, Adm'r,
mh5:1d&tw F No. 187 First street, Pittsburgh.

THE MAGAZINES,
THE DAILY AND WEEKLY PAPERS,
THE NEW BOOKS,
THE MAPS AND CHARTS,
THE PORTRAITS OF THE GENERALS
(Lithograph and Steel Plate) and other distinguished persons.
PHOTOGRAPH ALBUMS,
PHOTOGRAPH CARDS,
THE UNION STATIONERY PORTFOLIO,
FASHIONABLE LETTER PAPER ENVELOPES,
VISITING CARDS, etc., etc.,
Can be had at
JOHN P. HUNT'S,
Masonic Hall, Fifth street, Pittsburgh, and N. E. corner South Common and Federal street, Allegheny City.
N. B.—Initials and Crests stamped on Envelopes and Paper. Call and see specimens. mh5

BOOKS! BOOKS! —
Medical Uses of Electricity—Garrott;
Recreations of a Country Parson;
Queens of Society;
Spare Hours, by J. Brown, M. D.;
Men, Women and Books, by L. Hunt;
Titcomb's Books;
A Good Fight, by C. Reade;
Personal History of Lord Bacon;
Life of Sir Philip Sidney;
Songs in Many Keys—O. W. Holmes;
Poems, by Rose Terry;
Liberty and Slavery—Bledsoe;
Lectures on Apocalypse—Butler;
Life and Speeches of Douglas;
Histo y of all Religions, etc., etc.
J. L. READ, 78 Fourth street.

FOR SALE—A valuable Country Seat, containing 13 acres, beautifully situated on Pennsylvania Avenue, 3 miles from the city, 1 mile from East Liberty, and one-third of a mile from Shady Side Station on the P. R. R. The East Liberty Horse Cars pass in front of the premises. This property challenges comparison with any in the country for beauty of location. Inquire of
C. B. SEELY,
mh6:1moodes 114 Fifth street, Pittsburgh.

PROPOSALS FOR COAL.—To COAL MERCHANTS.—Proposals will be received at the office of the Water Works, up to MARCH 15TH, for furnishing the Works with COAL FOR ONE YEAR from the first day of April, 1862. The bids to state the price per bushel for each house. The one-third of the amount furnished at the lower house to be Nut Coal. If required, the upper house to be furnished with all Lump Coal. For further particulars, enquire at the office of the Water Works.
By order of the Committee.
mh6:3td JOSEPH FRENCH, Sup't.

PROPOSALS FOR CASTINGS.—To FOUNDERMEN.—Proposals will be received at the office of the Water Works up-to MARCH 15TH, 1862, for furnishing the Works with MISCELLANEOUS CASTINGS that may be required at the Works for one year from the first day of April, 1862. Also, for furnishing 674 feet of PIPE. For further particulars, enquire at the office of the Water Works.
By order of the Committee.
mh6:3td JOSEPH FRENCH, Sup't.

50 BBLS. N.Y. SYRUP—Ex. Golden;
122 bags. Rio Coffee—fair;
150 do do do prime and choice;
40 half chests Young Hyson Tea;
30 do do O. P. do
75 do do Black do
60 butts Tobacco—5s and 10s;
100 boxes Pearl Starch;
50 bbls. Coffee Sugar, A.;
40 do Crushed do standard;
10 do Granulated Sugar.
In store and for sale by
J. S. DILWORTH & CO.,
mh0 Wholesale Grocers, Second street.

GROCERIES—
60 hhds. P. R. Sugar;
25 bbls. Crushed do;
150 do N. O. Molasses;
200 bags Coffee;
100 half chests G. P. and Imperial Teas,
50 do do Black do
90 caddies G. P. do
20 boxes German and Glenn Soap;
100 do Rosin do
In store and for sale by
mh6 BROWN & KIRKPATRICKS.

SODA ASH, &c.—
300 casks Soda Ash;
200 bags Nitrate Soda;
50 kegs Arsenic:
200 boxes Clay,
On hand and for sale by ALEXANDER KING.

SUNDRIES—
300 boxes Country Window Glass;
25 bags Clover Seed;
10 barrels Tanner's Oil;
50 half chests Black Tea.
For sale by mh5 ALEXANDER KING.

FOR RENT—A two story Brick House on Esplanade street, Allegheny City, No. 4.
mh6 ALEX. KING, 273 Liberty street.

ALEXANDER KING, WHOLESALE GROCER, Importer of SODA ASH, No. 273 Liberty street, Pittsburgh, Pa. mh6

DEPUTY QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Philadelphia, Feb. 27, 1862.

PROPOSALS FOR FORGES.—Proposals will be received at this office until twelve o'clock on FRIDAY, March 7th, 1862, for supplying the Quartermaster's Department with SIXTY TRAVELING FORGES, with Blacksmith and Shoeing Tools complete. The forges are to be similar to those made by the United States Ordnance Department. They are required immediately.
G. H. CROSSMAN,
Deputy Quartermaster General, U. S. A.
mr4:2td PHILADELPHIA, Pa.

CITY FREIGHT DELIVERY.—The undersigned are now fully prepared to receive orders for paying charges and delivering freight from any of the railway depots to any part of the city, and can assure those who favor them with their orders that they shall receive prompt attention, as we have facilities for prompt delivery of merchandise of all descriptions. One of the firm will be constantly found at Duquesne Depot, post No. 6.
fe26:1wd McFADEN & HANNY.

DRY GOODS.

EXTRAORDINARY INDUCEMENTS TO CASH BUYERS.

C. HANSON LOVE & CO.,

Are selling best PRINTS, both LIGHT and DARK, for 12½ cents.

EXTRA SHIRTING MUSLIN, yard wide, at 12½.

All kinds of DRESS GOODS, both *plain* and *fancy*, at

GREATLY REDUCED PRICES.

To make room for

SPRING GOODS,

CALL EARLY FOR GOOD BARGAINS.

C. HANSON LOVE & CO.,
74 Market Street.
fe22

PHYSICIANS.

D. DaHAVEN & SON,
MANUFACTURERS OF
COOK, PARLOR AND HEATING STOVES,
Warehouse, No. 21 Federal street,
ALLEGHENY CITY.

We would call the attention of builders and others to our large assortment of COMMON AND FINE ENAMELED GRATE FRONTS, MANTELS, &c.; also, to our new COOKING RANGE, which we have just brought out and which contains some improvements not found in any other range.
CAST IRON HOUSE FRONTS, IRON RAILING, and all kinds of CASTINGS made to order.
jy16:1yd D. DaHAVEN & SON.

DR. CHARLES H. STOWE,
PHYSICIAN AND SURGEON,
Office, No. 36 FEDERAL STREET,
(Opposite Colonnade Row, near Suspension Bridge,)
jy16:1y ALLEGHENY CITY.

DR. M. O. JONES,
102 WILLIS STREET,
my21:1yr PITTSBURGH.

NEW ADVERTISEMENTS.

MAUVE INK,

PHOTOGRAPH ALBUMS,

DIARIES FOR 1862.

FOR SALE BY

W. S. HAVEN,

Corner of Wood and Third Streets, Pittsburgh.

SPRING GOODS.
1862.

CLOTHS, CASSIMERES AND VESTINGS.

We have now in store a complete stock of SPRING GOODS, all new and desirable styles, which have been carefully selected in New York with a desire to please the most fastidious, and comprising in all, the various NEW FABRICS and NOVELTIES of the season.

☞ We would respectfully solicit an early call from our patrons and the public to test the merits of the same for themselves.

SAMUEL GRAY & SON,
MERCHANT TAILORS,
mh1:1wd No. 19 FIFTH STREET.

BROCKEDON'S BI CARBONATE OF SODA PILLS,
The most wholesome and efficient remedy for ACIDITY OF THE STOMACH ever yet discovered. Many of our well-known citizens, after having given them a trial, were so delighted with their effects, that if they were designed