

Williams vs. Ash, 1 Howard, 1; Rhodes vs. Bell, 2 Howard, 397. It is intended to establish, by these authorities, that the same tribunal which decreed the Dred Scott case against the citizenship of the negro, admitted the point in permitting him to be a plaintiff in the cases cited. This conclusion is not warranted by the premises, and is founded on an erroneous impression of the power and jurisdiction of the Court in which the error, complained of, originated. These cases were not taken from any United States court existing within the limits of any of the sovereign States of this confederacy, but arose in a United States court, holden in and for the District of Columbia, in the county of Washington. The courts of the United States, within the limits of the several States, are courts of limited jurisdiction. With some exceptions, not material to the question, in order to sustain an action in these tribunals, it is necessary that the plaintiff should be a citizen of a different State from the one in which the action is brought. If he be not a citizen of a different State, the State courts have jurisdiction; for the respective States have the general powers of sovereignty within their own limits. But the United States courts, when sitting within the District of Columbia, or within any of the Territories, are courts of unlimited jurisdiction. No State sovereignty exists there to interfere with their jurisdiction. Such United States courts have, therefore, all the powers of the State courts and the United States courts combined, subject only to the inherent powers granted to them by the act of Congress which created them. It follows, that it is not necessary, in any United States court, either within the District of Columbia, or within any Territory, for the plaintiff either to aver, or prove, that he is a citizen of any State, or of the United States. He may maintain his action in such courts without being a citizen. A negro may, therefore, maintain a suit in the United States court for the District of Columbia. No question of citizenship can arise to defeat the jurisdiction. The cases cited in the majority report, where negroes have been permitted to maintain actions at law, are all from the District of Columbia. They have, therefore, no application, whatever, to the question. They utterly fail to prove the doctrine for which they are cited. No one, having a proper acquaintance with the constitution of our National and State governments, would present them for the purpose of proving that a negro is a citizen of the United States, competent to maintain an action in a court where such citizenship was necessary to give jurisdiction.

After a careful examination of the whole subject, we are forced to conclude, that a negro, free or slave, is not a citizen of the United States within the intent and meaning of the 2d section of the 4th article of the constitution. Guided by the "past history" of our government and enlightened by the "judicial precedents" enumerated, the minority of our committee clearly recognize the wisdom and sound policy of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in reference to the first point raised in this issue.

2. The second question decided by the Court, is susceptible of just as clear and logical demonstration. It is necessary for us at this time, to enter into any examination of the rise and progress of negro slavery in the United States. How it came here, or what its moral or political influence upon society, are matters with which we have nothing to do. That it exists in fifteen States in this Union, is an indisputable fact, and that the right of property in a slave is recognized by the Constitution and guaranteed to every State, is just as positively settled and established. "This," says Chief Justice Taney, "is in language too plain to be misunderstood."

In taking a historical view of this question, we find that in England, this particular point engaged the attention of the courts as far back as the year 1749. At that period Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, sitting in a high court of chancery, held, that "a slave coming from the West Indies, either with or without his master, to Great Britain, doth not become free, and that his master's property or right in him, is not thereby determined or varied." The next case adjudged in the English courts, was the celebrated Somerset case, in which Lord Mansfield delivered the famous opinion that has connected his name indelibly with that important trial. The facts in this case which may be found at length in 20 Howell's State Trials, 1-50, are by no means the same which occur in the Dred Scott case.—Somerset, a negro slave, raised in Virginia, was taken by his master to England, and while in London, where black slavery did not exist, on a writ of habeas corpus, was set at liberty by Lord Mansfield. "His Lordship," says an intelligent writer upon this subject, "discharged him in England under the local law of that country. As to whether Somerset would have been entitled to his discharge if he had not been taken from England into slave territory, was not before the court. He did not pretend to decide whether slavery, under such circumstances, would have re-attached, because that question could not be raised upon the facts."

Again, we find this point reviewed in the case of the slave Grace, before the High Admiralty Court of England, and with Lord Stowell on the bench, reported in 2 Hazard's British Admiralty Reps. The facts were substantially as follows:—

"Grace was held as a slave in the island of Antigua, and was taken to London by her mistress, Mrs. Allen, as her servant.—Mrs. Allen, on her return from London to Antigua, took Grace with her. Under this state of facts, proceedings were instituted against Mr. Allen in the Vice Court of Admiralty of Antigua, charging him with having unlawfully imported as a slave, from Great Britain, into the island, a free subject of his majesty, against the statute. The Vice Court of Admiralty decided, that Grace was not free by reason of her visit to England, and gave judgment for the defendant, whereupon an appeal was taken to the High Court of Admiralty, of England. That court sustained the decision, and gave judgment for defendant with costs."

In pronouncing the decision of the court, Lord Stowell said:

"The objection, therefore, which constitutes the foundation of this suit, and the ground of unlawful treatment, is, that she was a free subject of his majesty, and under that character unlawfully imported as a slave, and was so treated. Now, this argument must be proved. * * * If she cannot plead with truth that she is a free subject, there is no ground for complaint.—In her being treated as a slave, her rights were not violated, and she has no injured rights to represent. It may be a misfortune that she is a slave, being so, she, in the present constitution of society, had no right to be treated otherwise."

"The sole ground upon which it appears to have been asserted (that she is free) is, that she had been resident in England some time, as a servant waiting upon her mistress; but without the enjoyment of any manumission that could alone deliver her from the character of a slave she carried with her when she left Antigua; for I think it demonstrable that she could derive no character of freedom that could entitle her to maintain a suit like this, founded upon a claim of permanent freedom merely by having been in England, without manumission. * * * If she depends upon such a freedom, conveyed by a mere residence in England, she complains of a violation of right she possessed no longer than whilst she resided in England, but which totally expired when that residence ceased, and she was imported into Antigua."

It cannot be denied that this opinion fore-shadowed the important decision in the Dred Scott case. Grace was a slave in Antigua—Scott was a bondsman in Missouri. Returning from England, the moment she set her foot upon the soil of her native island, her former servile condition re-attached to her person—taken back to the state in which he had lived a slave, it was held that he could not claim the privileges and immunities of a freeman under the *lex loci* Missouri.

In the interesting "Life and Letters" of the late Judge Story, (vol. 1. p. 552) may be discovered an entire approval of Lord Stowell's decision, which coming from so eminent a jurist, must carry with it overwhelming force and conviction. In answer to several letters addressed to him by Lord Stowell, in 1828 (immediately after the decision was rendered and courting his opinion of the case,) Judge Story replied as follows:

Salem, near Boston, Sept. 22, 1828.

My Lord—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of January and May last, the former of which reached me in the latter part of the spring, and the latter quite recently. * * * I have read with great attention your judgment in the slave case from the Vice Admiralty Court of Antigua. Upon the fullest consideration which I have been able to give the subject, I entirely concur in your views. If I had been called upon to pronounce a judgment in a like case, I should certainly have arrived at the same result, though I might not have been able to present the reasons which lead to it in such a striking and convincing manner. It appears to me that the decision is impregnable. In my native state, (Mass.) the state of slavery is not recognized as legal; and yet if a slave should come hither and afterwards return to his own home, we should think that the local law would reach upon him, and that his servile character would be re-negotiated. I have had occasion to know that your judgment has been extensively read in America (where questions of this nature are not of unrequited discussion) and I never have heard any other opinion but that of approbation of it expressed among the profession of the law. I cannot but think that upon questions of this sort, as well as general maritime law, it were well if the common lawyers had studied a little more extensively the principles of public a civil law, and had looked beyond their own municipal jurisprudence. * * *

I remain, with the highest respect,
your most obedient servant,
JOSEPH STORY."

To Right Hon. Wm. Lord Stowell.

In examining "judicial precedent" in the United States, upon this question, numerous authorities may be found to sustain the minority of your committee. Chancellor Kent, in the notes to his commentaries, vol. 2. p. 277, informs us "the law of Illinois enforces the comity due to travelers in passing over the state by protecting his property, and especially his slave, whom he brings with him for temporary use, and the slave does not thereby constitutionally become free." [Hillard vs. The People, 4 Scammon, 461.] He also informs us that "in some of the slaveholding States, if a slave from such a state goes lawfully into a non-slaveholding State and acquires a domicile there with his master, or is emancipated there by his master, he becomes emancipated and ceases to be a slave on his return. But if he be carried there for a temporary purpose and returns, his state of slavery is resumed.—(Lansford vs. Coppin, 14 Martin's Louisiana Reps. 405. 2 Marshall's Ken. Rep. 467. Blackmore vs. Phill. 7 Yerger's Rep. 452.)"

In the Kentucky case of Strader et al. vs. Graham, (10 Howard, 83) where it was claimed that slaves sent from Kentucky into Ohio for a temporary residence became free, it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States, that "under the 23d section of the judiciary act, this court has no jurisdiction over the following question, viz: 'Whether slaves who had been permitted by their masters to pass occasionally from Kentucky into Ohio acquired thereby a right to freedom after their return to Kentucky?' The laws of Kentucky alone could decide upon the domestic and social condition of the persons domiciled within its territory, except so far as the powers of the States in this respect are restrained or duties and obligations imposed upon them by the constitution of the United States." And the Chief Justice says "there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States that can, in any degree, control the law of Kentucky upon this subject. The condition of the negroes; therefore, as to freedom or slavery, after their return, depended altogether upon the laws of that State, and could not be influenced by the laws of Ohio."

In endeavoring to establish their position

the majority of the committee rely upon "the leading case" of Rachel vs. Martin, (4 Missouri Rep. 350, June term, 1836.) In reference to it they state that it is "substantially the same in every particular as the Dred Scott case." Every one who examines the case cited, will find that the majority err in applying its principles to the Dred Scott decision. The facts are not the same, and the principles involved are by no means identical. In Rachel vs. Martin, it appears that J. B. W. Stockton, an officer in the army of the United States, residing at Fort Snelling, in the Missouri Territory, wherein slavery was not prohibited by the Missouri compromise sent into a slave State, and purchased the slave Rachel. From the State of Missouri she was taken to the military post, aforementioned, and held there by her master as his "servant." Stockton lived in a free territory when he bought her, and never held her under the local laws of a slave State. "In this case," says Judge McGirk, in delivering the opinion of the Court, "the officer lived in the Missouri territory at the time he bought the slave, he sent to a slaveholding territory and procured her; this was his voluntary act, and done without any other reason than that of convenience, and he and those claiming under him must be held to abide the consequence of introducing slavery both in Missouri territory and Michigan, contrary to law." No one will dispute the soundness of these conclusions; but in the Dred Scott case a different state of facts appears on the record. Scott was held by his master in Missouri, under the local laws of that State, which recognized the institution of slavery, was removed to a free territory where his master temporarily resided, and was afterwards taken back to the slave State of Missouri. Stockton, or those who held under him, could not rest their claim on the *lex loci* Missouri, for he was a resident of a free territory when Rachel became his property. The principle decided in the Dred Scott case did not arise in Rachel vs. Martin, and like the point in the Somerset case, has no bearing upon the question. The Judge, in deciding the case, after reviewing the application of the ordinance of 1787 to the question before him, remarked—"In the case of Lagrang vs. Menard the court will raise other exceptions than those expressed in the ordinance; the case of Lagrang was one where the owner lived in Illinois and had his slave employed in Missouri, and the slave made occasional visits to his master's house in Illinois; the court declared that this did not work an emancipation." We, therefore, dismiss this branch of the subject, and after a careful and elaborate investigation of the decision of the Supreme Court, we beg leave to record our unqualified assent to the vital principles it contains and the great doctrines it enunciates.

Having thus disposed of the two leading points in the Dred Scott decision, we might leave the question without further comment, were it not for the unwarrantable position assumed by the majority of the committee in the conclusion of their report. They complain upon the questions of the unconstitutionality of the Missouri compromise and the effect of the removal of Dred Scott into a free State where his master had a temporary residence, the court traveled beyond the case before them, and had no jurisdiction; and therefore they argue, that upon these points, the decision was "extra judicial, *coram non iudice*, inoperative and void." All of the judges, however, (McLean and Curtis excepted) seem to have regarded these points as essentially involved in the case, and even Judge McLean, in his dissenting opinion takes the ground that the plea to jurisdiction, that is the plea involving citizenship, was not before the court; because the demurrer to the plea of jurisdiction had been sustained in the court below; and the defendant, that is the master, had pleaded over and justified the trespass on the ground that the plaintiff was his slave. On this plea the case was decided against the slave in the court below, and upon it the writ of error in behalf of Dred Scott was then prosecuted. Upon this view of the case Judge McLean proceeds to argue, as does Judge Curtis, the very points which the majority of the committee complain of as having been extra judicially decided.

The fact is apparent that upon the pleadings in this case, as taken up to the Supreme Court of the United States, the naked question of citizenship was not as necessarily involved as were the other parts in regard to the slavery of the plaintiff. As appears by the record, the defendant, who was master, denied by plea in abatement, this jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States, on the ground that the plaintiff "is a negro of African blood, and was brought into this country and sold as slaves," and, therefore, the plaintiff "is not a citizen of the State of Missouri." To this plea the plaintiff demurred and the court sustained the demurrer.—Thereupon, the defendant pleaded over and justified the trespass, solely on the assumption that the plaintiff, Dred Scott, and his family, were in fact his negro slaves. Upon these pleadings the court went to jury, and the only question before them was the slavery or freedom of the plaintiff. The jury decided that he and his family were slaves, and the writ of error then prosecuted was not based upon the question of citizenship, or jurisdiction of the court, for that had been decided in his favor, but upon the instruction to the jury, that his temporary removal with his master, first into a free State and next into a free Territory, did not work his emancipation against the laws of Missouri, to which State he and his family had returned.

This latter point, involving as it did the questions of the constitutionality of the Missouri compromise and the right of the master over the slave under our social compact, was more immediately and necessarily involved than the issue as to citizenship or jurisdiction, and therefore, if any part of the decision is to be regarded as "obiter dictum," it is rather the latter than the former. Indeed the whole court seem to have felt the necessity and importance of disposing of the very points complained of, and by none are they argued more carefully and earnestly than by the dissenting judges. The closing sentence in the published opinion of the Chief Justice is that "the plaintiff was not a citizen of Missouri and was still a slave, and therefore, had no right to sue in a court of the United States." The Court entertained, as they were obliged

by the pleading and every rule of practice, the question of slavery as well as that of citizenship, and their decision upon that point, so vital in its character and so controlling in its effects upon the future destiny of our people, will stand and be recognized as of as much, and even more authority than its opinion upon the other.

The majority of the committee have insulted the memory of Thomas Jefferson by invoking his great name and quoting his commanding authority, in favor of the reasonable sentiments contained in the resolutions, as reported. In this they have only imitated the gross want of candor which has so recently permitted the opposition to justify their feeble attacks upon the Constitution and the Union under the sanction of the great men of the Revolution who labored so successfully to establish both. The majority have quoted the language, but not the meaning of Jefferson. For upon reference to the letters from which garbled extracts have been taken, it appears that the illustrious founder of Democracy was inveighing in eloquent and forcible terms against that growing spirit of centralization of federal assumption of power, which from the days of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions of 1798, to the present time, the democratic party has strenuously resisted; and never so successful as in the recent Presidential contest, when in the disregard of State Rights and strict constitutional construction was carried by the Republican party to the most dangerous and irreparable extremes.—The opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States, which Thomas Jefferson then deprecated, seemed to lend the sanction of that high tribunal to federal interference in purely State affairs.

But happily for the perpetuity of this Union, his gloomy forebodings have not been justified by the result. For not only has the Supreme Court itself been controlled by wiser and more mature counsels, but the federal government with all its power and influence, has recognized and sustained to the fullest extent, the sacred justice of State Rights, and placed upon safe and unassailable ground the vital principle of POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY in Territories—in itself, only an extension and necessary application of the former. And if the sage of Monticello were now alive and in our midst—if he could dwell upon the proud triumphs of the Democratic party, so true, so constant, and so faithful to the Constitution as it came from its framers—his dark presages as to federal encroachments upon the sovereign rights of the separate States, would give place to bright and prophetic visions of the permanency and grandeur of this confederate Republic.

In conclusion, the minority of your committee have no fears that the Dred Scott decision will not be sustained and upheld by the calm good sense of the American people. In the frenzied outburst of defeated sectionalism, tones of unmeasured denunciation may be hurled against it by the party whose hopes it destroys and whose principles it overwhelms. But in the future, as in the past, the great mass of our people will be true to that high tribunal, as they have ever been to the Constitution and the Union. And if ever the broken fragments of constitutional liberty strew our pathway—if the exultant tread of internal foes should ever echo through our deserted halls and linger among the brilliant trophies of our national greatness—it will be in that fatal hour, when the strength and binding force of the judiciary shall be forever lost in the treasonable resistance of degenerate factions.

WILLIAM H. WELSH,
JAMES H. WALTON.

May 11, 1857.

STAR OF THE NORTH.
R. W. WEAVER, EDITOR.
Bloomburg, Wednesday, May 27, 1857.

Democratic Nominations.
FOR GOVERNOR,
WILLIAM F. PACKER,
of Lyncoming County.
FOR CANAL COMMISSIONER,
NIMROD STRICKLAND,
of Chester County.

THE LEGISLATURE adjourned *sine die* on last Friday, and Mr. Ent came home on Friday evening. The proposition to have the state guarantee the payment of \$3,000,000 to the Sanbury & Erie Railroad Company was lost. The bill to repeal the act erecting a State Road from this place to Laport was defeated in the Senate by a strict party vote, after having passed the House. The bill to extend Third Street in Bloomburg was also lost in the Senate after having passed the House.

The session was one of 16 weeks, and the nearly 900 bills passed, among which is the greatest number of bank charters ever passed at one session of the Legislature, at least since the famous bank explosion of 1837-38.

Nearly at the close of the session, a communication was received from Mr. Maffitt saying that the recent floods on the Upper North Branch Canal had taken away 315 feet in length of the Horse Race Dam, allowing the whole water of the river to pass through it. Some \$30,000 would probably be required to repair the injury. That sum was appropriated for the repair.

THE DANVILLE TRAGEDY.—Dr. Simington last week returned from Philadelphia with the necessary chemicals, retorts and other apparatus to test poison. The contents of the stomach of the late Mrs. Clark were analyzed, and, in the judgment of five of the physicians present, arsenic was discovered beyond the shadow of a doubt. The contents of the stomach of the late Mr. Twigg will be submitted to a similar analysis.

The Report of Mr. Welch on the Dred Scott case presents a forcible view of the reasoning on the points involved, in such style and manner as to be adapted for popular circulation. The subject has been much perverted and abused, and it is important that every man who has a vote should get correct and intelligent views about it. He can do this by reading the report we publish to-day, and its importance and clearness will justify the large space we give to it.

The gas at Danville gave out last week about 9 o'clock each evening. The makers complain of bad coal.

The Apportionment Bill.
The bill as passed was arranged or compromised by Henry D. Foster on the part of the Democrats and Mr. Jordan on the part of the Opposition. The only excuse for agreeing to it lays in the fact that the Governor and Senate were with the Opposition, and the House in rather doubtful condition. Under these circumstances the bill is perhaps as good as could have been procured. If the facts are not against us there will be a Democratic majority in both branches of the next Legislature. After that Philadelphia will be re-districted, and the chances are about even in the State; which is a shame, because there is a large Democratic majority on the popular vote.

Our district, as usual fares about the worst of all; and we have a surplus of taxables in the district over both the Senatorial and Representative ratio. For a Senator the ratio is 17,011, while our district of Columbia, Montour, Northumberland, and Snyder contains 18,827. The first three counties 14,679 which ought to have entitled them to a Senator much rather than the 28,168 taxables of Lancaster should entitle it to two Senators. Where several counties are joined in a district the discrimination ought always to be in their favor, and where one county is entitled to several Senators the discrimination should be against it. Lancaster and Lebanon were formerly a district with two Senators, and have now together 35,160 taxables, which would have given 17,580 to each Senator, a number less than is in the district fixed for us. But because Lancaster and Lebanon were Opposition counties they were allowed to spread, and a Democratic district was crowded.

This seems to have been the general rule in forming the bill. The Opposition district of Butler and Beaver has only 14,601 taxables, and the other one of Indiana and Armstrong only 13,103; in both instances less than our three counties of Columbia, Montour and Northumberland contain. The Democratic counties of Northampton and Lehigh are crowded together for a district, though they contain 21,827 taxables.

But in the Representative district we are still more wronged. Our four counties of Montour, Columbia, Sullivan and Wyoming contain 12,264 taxables, while the ratio for a member is 5,976. The three counties of Montour, Columbia and Sullivan contain 9,757 taxables; which is a larger number than is found in the double district of Dauphin with 9,024, of Bulter with 8,500, of Potter and Tioga with 8,763, or of Bradford with 9,714. But these are Opposition counties, and therefore the favor to them and the injustice to us. If three counties are united in a district there is certainly more reason to let them be below the ratio than where one county has two members, or where only two counties are united.

But the Opposition evidently went upon the principle of "divide and conquer." If they could not here form an anti-Democratic district, they could at least make one clumsy and cumbersome; in which, from the large number of counties, there would naturally be a greater chance for mischief on account of discord, dissension, and jealousy between rival counties and rival candidates of the party in the majority.

We have no objection to Snyder or Wyoming counties as a part of our district, but we know excellent men in both of them.—We promise ourselves pleasure and profit from the new political associations which our county thus forms from the centre of the state almost to the Northern line. But we do object to having districts made cumbersome and clumsy with four counties, when each district ought only to have embraced three to be fair and just with the others of the State.

Republicanism is Abolitionism.
When Republicans grow ashamed of the infamous sentiments which some of their party utter they try to evade responsibility by saying that the Anti-Slavery party is a different thing from the Republican party. We say it is the same, and the wicked men who lately abused their country and reviled their God at New York were Republicans. We give extracts last week from their doings in which "Rev. Mr. Frothingham thought civil war or a dissolution of the Union was the only hope of emancipating the slave."

To show that this man was of the Republican party we go a little further in the proceedings and find the following:—

"Rev. Mr. Frothingham from New Jersey, deplored the defeat of the Republican party."

"It had a candidate (he said) brave generous, chivalric, of spotless character, with a foreign reputation. The cause of freedom never had such combination of favorable circumstances."

Put that in your Black Republican pen and smoke it, before you attempt to deny that you are of the Abolition party. And hide your face in shame before the honest, patriotic men who last fall attempted to drag into a treasonable vote for your clan.

Count in Montour County.
Count was held in Montour county on last week, and was so fortunate as not to find a single case on the civil list for trial. The notorious Henry Warner was tried on two indictments for grand larceny. On one he was convicted and on the other acquitted for want of necessary evidence. In the first case a motion for a new trial is pending until September term.

Several persons were tried for selling liquor to minors and on Sunday, and all of them, were sent to the county jail and fined from \$20 to \$75, according to the aggravation or mitigation of the case.

In the whole county 16 tavern licenses were granted, and 3 for restaurants. Three applicants for tavern licenses, 6 for eating house license and 5 for license to sell liquor in a store were unsuccessful. No license was granted to sell liquor in any store, and many of the most respectable citizens of Danville had signed remonstrances against granting any such licenses. Court adjourned on Wednesday morning.

Governor Pollock has appointed Elias E. Walton, of Berwick, an Aid to his Excellency, with the rank of Lieut. Colonel.

Where is the Pope?
The Unitarian Conference at Alton, Illinois, lately passed a resolution declaring that the Constitution of the United States was a failure, and that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case has no binding power.

It is said that in old times the Pope of Rome used to claim authority for his church in temporal affairs, but as his ashes have been enough scolded for such impudence it was hardly to be expected that in Know-Nothing America there would be Protestants to follow his example.

It was said too that the Pope pretended to absolve people from their obligations and obedience to the temporal authorities. But let these Know-Nothings look to Illinois, and they will find there a bold attempt to set up an *imperium in imperio*; and a most infamous attempt to instigate lawless anarchy. If the citizen can be thus absolved from observance of one legal decision, he may be taught to disregard the whole municipal code, and to follow only his passions and lusts. This is Sewardism or that "higher law" doctrine which forms the whole basis of political Republicanism. This Spirit of Evil knows nothing of the structure of the human mind or of human government—ignores the infirmity of human nature, and arrogates to every degenerate child of frail humanity the perfection of human reason. It claims that every McKim and Warner may interpret the law to suit his own mind; and that a conference of priests may whenever they please abrogate the Constitution of the Republic or annihilate the Supreme Court with a bull of excommunication. Surely it is no wonder that the people rebuked the fell and foul spirit last fall. These Republican priests in Illinois evidently acted more with the bitter and malicious hate of Douglass before their eyes than in the spirit of Him who said "render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's."

A Glean of Daylight.
In the darkness, we are glad to find any ray of hope which may indicate a check upon the sale of the Main Line. The Harrisburg correspondent of the Pennsylvania gives the following, which we only fear is too good to be true.

"The Main Line bill has been signed by the Governor, and the works are already advertised for sale. The announcement of this hasty action on the part of the Executive caused some excitement in town on Saturday evening, and it is generally believed that a sale, to be of any effect, cannot be made. I am informed that an application for an injunction against the transfer of the line will be made to the Supreme Court, and some of the Judges have expressed the opinion private that any property holder, on the portions of the line proposed to be abandoned, has the right to make such application, and the application once made will be granted, and will effectually bar a transfer for the present. If this is correct, the public will observe that there are yet great difficulties in the way of the consummation of the objects of this bill.

If the court issues an injunction against the transfer of these works, the whole subject will naturally come before the next Legislature, and therefore the sale of the Main Line bids fair to become an important question in the approaching political campaign."

To Tax Collectors.
The Board of Commissioners of Sullivan County have passed the following resolutions:

1. Resolved, That we require that Collectors of County, State and Militia taxes, in the County, to pay in the taxes charged on their duplicates as follows: On the 12th day of June and the 11th day of September, what monies they shall then have collected, and make final settlement December 11th.

2. Resolved, That on failure of any said Collectors to make payment at the times herein designated, we will proceed in accordance with the act of Assembly to collect the same at the earliest possible period.

The Post office at Pealer's, in this county, has been discontinued, as no person seemed anxious to attend to it properly for the small profits, and the neighborhood can be pretty well accommodated at other office. We are told that an application is made for a new office on the State Road at Mr. Howell's store, where the Astory people and the neighborhood generally could be accommodated.

The Danville Democrat says Geo. Peabody, the London millionaire has bought the Liberty Furnace property in Montour county, and it will probably be soon again put in operation.

The Executor of the McHenry estate advertises some valuable real estate for sale.

Several articles are crowded out to-day. One on Utah and the Mormons will appear next week.

Holloway's Ointment and Pills.—The idea that cancer is incurable cannot be entertained by persons who have witnessed the effect of these remedies on the terrible disease. The ointment penetrates the substance of the cancer, and reaches its minutest ramifications in the flesh, checking its progress and gradually restoring the parts affected to a sound condition, while the pills, acting upon the blood as a powerful detergent, destroy the seeds of the malarial in the circulation. The testimony on the value of this is abundant and conclusive.

WHITE TEETH, PERFUMED BREATH AND BEAUTIFUL COMPLEXION—can be acquired by using the "Balm of a Thousand Flowers." What lady or gentleman would remain under the curse of a disagreeable breath, when by using the "Balm of a Thousand Flowers" as a dentifrice, would not only render it sweet, but leave the teeth as white as alabaster? Many persons do not know their breath is bad, and the subject is so delicate their friends will never mention it. Beware of counterfeits. Be sure each bottle is signed F. FRIDGEE & CO., N. Y.

For sale by all Druggists.

Feb. 18, 1867-6m.

MARRIED.
On the 14th inst. by the Rev. J. A. DeMoyer, Mr. Geo. W. SANDERS, of Pine Bluff, Col., and Miss ELIZABETH G. DOUGLASS, of Sullivan County.

DEED.
In Berwick on the 18th inst., Mrs. HARRIET DIETRICH, wife of Capt. Jacob W. Dieterich, aged about 35 years.

In Derry township, Montour county, Pennsylvania, March 17th, 1857, of typhoid pneumonia, Mr. SAMUEL W. LOWMEYER, in the fifty-seventh year of his age.

BLOOMSBURG BOOK STORE.
THE undersigned would in this way call the attention of the public to the Book Store at the old stand, next door to the "Exchange Hotel," where at all times can be found a good assortment of books, including Bibles, Hymn Books, Prayer Books, Histories, Books of Poetry, Novels, and School Books; also all kinds of stationery of the best quality.

A considerable deduction made upon the price of School Books and Stationery to those who buy by sell again.

Just received, a good assortment of WALL PAPER, which I would ask all to call and examine before purchasing elsewhere.

CAROLINE CLARK,
Successor to Isaac G. Clark.

Bloomburg, May 25, 1857-1yr.

TRIMMINGS AND NOTIONS, fancy articles, a good assortment of Hosiery of the best quality; also gloves, mitts, markers, Caps, Combs, dress trimmings and ladies sewing silk, thread, etc., to be had next door to the "Exchange."

AMELIA D. WEBB.
Bloomburg, May 25, 1857.

AN ASSORTMENT of confectionary, jewelry, Perfumery soaps, hair oils, &c., Pomades, to be had at

C. CLARK'S Book Store.

40,000 JOINT AND LAP SHINGLES for sale at the Arcade by
MAY 27, '57. A. C. MENSCH.

COTTON and Wool Carpet for sale cheap at the Arcade by
MAY 27, '57. A. C. MENSCH.

MORTICED POSTS on hand and for sale at the Arcade by
MAY 27, '57. A. C. MENSCH.

WOOD & COAL for sale at the Arcade by
A. C. MENSCH.