COLUMBIA
AND BL00MSBU11G GENERAL ADVERTISER.
IjEVI Jb. TATE, Editor.
TO IT OLD AND TItIM TUB TOROIT OP TRUTH AND WAVE IT O'ER THE DARKENED EAItTIT."
TERMS, 82,00 PER ANNUM.
VOL. 16. NO. 37.
BLOOMS BURG, COLUMBIA COUNTY, PENN'A, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1862,
VOLUME 26.
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Original Poetry
Ftr the Columbia Dcmycrat,
THE MOTHER'S LJINISNT.
BT ILD. JOHN SUTTON.
All I sail Is my spirit, w hen evenln? comes on,
As Joyless, Indeed, at the lljlit lirunUing morn,
Bo lonely I feel, every hour In the clay,
fHci tliath took my sweet little Alice away.
I call on her tnim, ns a source of relief,
Hut no call In answer, assuages my grief,
I look for her coining, hut look all In vain,
My darling will never return home again.
I list for the patting of her little feet,
I miss at the tahlu her own little scat,
A hundred mementoes, nunkcu my sigh?,
And cdi little olijcct wrings tears from my eyes.
The hud of our garden has gone to decay.
The bird In our window, tins (littoral away,
The l.amb of out hosom, is folded above,
And with the good Shepherd is feeding on love;
Then why should i;snrrov, or with her return t
While hope that I'll meet her, continues to burn.
One thought yet is left me. one blessed tho't given,
A child less on Uartli, but another in Heaven,
f till Water, Ott. 27, ISO'J,
National A flairs.
Lottor from Ex-Prosideut Bu
chauan. Ilis Reply (o (ifiierai Scolt.
THE DEOX.VI.Ya OF THE HrJtELUO.Y.
To the Editors or Tnu National
IsTEiji.iaE.vcER : On Wednesday last, 1
received the "National Intelligencer," con
taining Gen. Scott's address to the pub
l:c. This is throughout nn undisguised
censure of my conduct for the last months
of the Administration, in regard to the sev
en Cotton States now in rebellion. From
our past relations, I was greatly surprised
nt the appearance of such n paper. In
ono aspect, however, it was highly gratify
ing. It has justified mo, nay, it has ren
dered it absolutely necessary that I should
no longor remain si ent in respect to tho
charges which have been long vaguely cir
culating, but are now endorsed by tho re
sponsible name of Gen. Scott.
I. The first and most prominent among
tlicso charges is my refusal immediately to
garrison nine enumerated fortifications,
scattered over six of the Southern States,
according to the rcccommondation of Gen.
Scott, in his "views" addressed to the War
Department on tho 2!)'h and 30th of Oc
tober, 1800. And it has even been alleg
ed that if this had been done it might have
prevented the civil war.
This refusal is attributed, without tho
lcat cause, to tho influence of Governor
Floyd. All my cabinet must bear me wit
nets that I was tho President myself, re
sponsible for all tho acts of the Adminis-
(ration; and certain it is that during tho;
last six months previous to tho 2Bth of
December, 1800, tho day on which ho re
signed his offico, after my request, ho cx
1 crciscd loss influence on tho Administra
tion than any other member of tho Cabin
'it. Mr. Holt was immediately transfer-
ted from tho Post Offico Department to
that of War; so that, from this timo until t
the 4th of March, 1801, which was by far
tho most important period of tho Adminis
tration, ho performed tho duties of the Sec
retary of War to my ontiro satisfaction.
liut I did not immediately garrison these
nine fortifications, in such a manner, to
use the languago of Gen, Scott, "as to
"lake any attempt to take an ono of them
by furpriso or coup de-main rcdiculous?"
There is ono answer both easy and con-
c'uslue, oveu if other valid reasons did ex-
'st. Thero wore no available troops with
in reach which could bo sent to theso for
: tifications. To havo attempted a military
It operation on a scalo so extensive by any
; means within tho President's power would
t Wo been simply absuul. Of this Gcncr-
,nl ocott himself sooms to havo been con
duced, for on tho day alter tho dato of his
I! first 'views' ho addressed (on tho 30th of
October) supplemental views to tho War
li department in which ho statea: "1 here is
I' it, . l
D . ' 1 j
irecu nri comnunv in sostou. ouo ncro
ai tliu Narrows), ono nt rutsbure, one nt
vususta (Ga) ono at Baton Kojigc," in
'l five ompanios only within jjcnch to
garrsson or reinforce tho forts mentioned
in tho 'views.'
Fivo companies four hundred men to
occupy and reinforco nino fortifications in
six high'y excited Southern States 1 Tho
force ''within reach" was so entirely in
adequate that nothing more need bo said
on tho subject. To havo attempted such a
military movement with so feeble a force,
and tho Presidential election impending,
would havo been an invitation to collision
and secession: Indeed, if tho wholo Amer
ican army, consisting then of only sixteen
thousand men, had beou "within reach,"
thoy would havo been scarcely sufficient
for this purpose. Such was our want of
troops, that, althtough Gen. Scott, boliev
ingin opposition to tho opinion of tho
committee raised in tho House of Repre
sentatives, that the inauguration of Mr
Lincoln might bo interrupted by military
force, was only able to assemblo at Wash
ington, so lato as tho 4th of March, six
hundred and fifty three men, rank and file
of the army. And, to make up this num
ber, even tho sappers and miners were
brought from West Point.
But why was there no greater force
within reach7 This question could bo
bettor answered by General Scott himself
than by any other person. Our small
regular army, with tho exception of a few
hundred men, were out of roach, on our
remote frontiers, whero it had been con
tinuously stationed for years, to protect
the inhabitants and emigrants, on their
way thither, against the attacks of hostile
Indians. All were insufficient, and both
Gen. Scott and myself endeavored in vain
to prevail upon Congress to raise several
additional regiments for this purpose.
In recommending this augmentation of tho
Army tho General states, in his re
port to tho War Department, of
November, 1857, that "it would
not more than furnish the reinforce
ments now greatly needed in Florida, Tox
as, New Mexico. California, Oregon,
Washington, (T.,) Kansas, Newbraska,
Minnesota, leaving not a company for
Utah," And again, in his report of Nov
18.ri8. he says : j
"This want of troopi, to give reasona-1
blc f ccurity to our citizens in distant set- j
tlements, including emigrants on the plains
can scarcely be too strongly stated ; but 1 1
will only add, that as oltcn as we havej
been obliged to withdraw troops from
one frontier in order to reinforce another, J
the weakened points have been instantly '
attacked or threatened with formidable
invasion." j
Thsso ''views" of General Scott cxhib- j
it tho crude notions then prevailing even i
among intelligent and patriotic men on I
this subject of secession. In the first eon- j
tonec the General, whilst stataing that "to'
save timo tho right of secession may be
conceded," yet immediately says "this is
instantly balanced by tho correlative right
on tho part of the Federal Government
against an interior Stato or States to re
establish by force, if necessary, its former
continuity of territory." (For this ho
cites, "Paley's Moral and Political Phil
osophy, last chapter." It may bo thero,
but I have been unable to find it.) Whilst
it is difficult to ascertain his procisc moan
ing in this passage, ho renders what ho
did not mean quite clear in his supple
mentary 'viows.' In these ho says : "It
will bo soon that tho "views" only apply
to a case of secession that makes a aAi' in
the prosont Union. Tho falling oil say of
Texas, or all the Atlantic States, from
tho Potomao South, (tho very thing which
has occurred,) was not within tho scopo of
General Scott's ''provisional remedies
that is to say, to establish by force, if no
cessary, tho continuity of our territory. In
his 'views' ho also stated as follows : 'But
broak this plorious Union by whatever lino
or linos that political madnoss may con
trive, and there would bo no hopo of re
cruiting the fragments except by tho lacer
ation and despotism of the sword. To
effect such a result tho intestine wars of
our Mexican neighbors would, in compar
ison to ours, sink into mere child's play."
In tho general's opinion, "a snW.lor evil
(than these intestine wars) would bo to
form themselves into new Confederacies,
probably four." He then points out what
ought to bo tho boundaries between tho
now Unions; and at tho end of each goes
so far as cvon to iudicato tho cities whioh
ought to bo capitals of tho threo first on
this sido of tho Itocky Mouutaius, to wit,
"Columbia, South Carolina," 'Altona or
Quinoy, Illinois,' aud 'Albauy, New
York,' excluding Washington City alto
gethcr. This indication of capitals con
tained in tho original now in my possss
siou, is curiously omitted in tho version
nublMicd in tho National Intelligencer
Ho designates no capital for the fourth
jiuMviw.jm..j
Union on tho Pacific. Tho reader will
judge what encouragement theso viows,
proceeding from so dijlinguiohod a source,
must have afforded to tho secessionists of
the Cotton States.
I trust I havo said enough or more than
enough to convince every mind why I did
not with a forco of fivo companies, attempt
to reinforce Fort Jackson and St. Philip,
on tho Mississippi ; Fort Morgan, below
Mobilo, Fort Pickens and McCrco, in Pen
sacola Harbor, Fort Pulaski, below Sava
nna; Fort Moultrie and Sumptor, Charles
on Harbor, and Fort Monroo, in Virgin
ia. 'J hoso "views," both original and sup
plementary, were published by General
Seott in the National Intelligencer of Jan
nary 18, 1S01, nt tho most important and
critical period of the Administration.
Their publication, at that time, could do
no possiblo good, and it might do much
harm. To havo published them without
tho President's knowledge and concent,
was as much in violation of tho sacred con
fidence which ought to prevail between tho
commanding General of the army and tho
Commander-in-chief a3 it would have been
for the Secretary of War to publish the
same document without his authority.
What is of moro importance, their publi
cation was calculated injusiously to affect
the compromise measures then pending
before Congress and tho country, and to
encourage tho secctsionists in their mad
and wicked attempt to shatter tho Union
into fragments. For the great re?pcct
which I then entertained for the General,
I passed it over in silence.
It is worthy of remark that soon after
the Prcsidental election "representation of
what theso 'viows contained, ofmoro or
less correctness, were unfortunately circu
lated, especially throughout the Smth.
The editors of the 'National Intelligencer'
in assigning a reason for their publication
state that both in public prints and
in publio jpeeches allusions had
been made to them, and some misap
prehensions of their character had got
abroad.
II. and III. General Scott states that
he ar.-ived in Washington on tho lL'th and
accompanied by tho Secretary of War,
held a conversation with the President on
the l.r)th of December. Whilst I havo no
recollection whatever of this conversation,
he doubtless states correctly that I did re
fuse to Bond three hundred mon to rein
force Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie,
who had not then romoved to Fort Sum
tor. The reason for this refusal is mani
fest to all who recollect the history of tho
timo. liut twelve days before, in tho an
nual message of tho 3d Doccmbor, I had
urged upon Congress tho adoption of
amendments to tho Constitution of tho
sarao character with those subsequently
proposed by Mr. Crittended, called tho
''Ciittendeu Compromise." At that timo
high hopes were entertained throughout
tho country that theso wou'd be adopted.
Besides, I boliove, and this correctly, as
tho event proved, that Major Anderson
was then in no danger of an attack. In
deed he and his command were then trea
ted with marked kindness by tho authori
ties and people of Charleston. Under
theso circumstance, to havo sent such a
forco thero would havo been only to im
pair tho hope of compromise, to provoko
collision and disappoint the country.
Thero aro somo details of this conver
sation in regard to which tho General's
memory must bo defective. At present I
shall specify only one. I could not havo
stated that on a future contingent occasion
I would telegraph "Major Anderson, of
Fort Moultrie, to hold tho Forts (Moultrie
and Sumter) against attack;" because,
with prudent precaution, this had been
dono ecvcral days before, through a spe
cial messenger sent to Major Anderson for
this very purpose. I refer to Major Bu
oil, of tho army.
Tho General 's supplementary noto of
tho same day, presenting to me General
Jackson's conduct in 1833, during tho pe
riod of nullification, as an example, re
quires no special notice. Even if tho oases
were not entirely dilToront, I had previ
ously determined upou a policy of my own
as will appoar from my annual message.
This was, at overy hazard to collect tho
customs at Charleston and outsido tho
port, if need be, in a vcsicl of war. Mr,
Colcock, tho existing Collector, as I had
anticipated, roMgned his offico about tho
end of December and, immeniately there
after, I nomiiia'cd to tho Senate, as his
successor, a suitablo porson, prepared, at
any personal risk, to do hU duty. That
body, howovor, throughout its entiro sosb
ion, declined to act on this nomination.
Thus, without a t olloctor, it was render
ed impossible to collect tho revenue.
IV. General Scott's statement alleges
that tho "Brooklyn, with Captain Vodgcs'
company alone, left tho Chcsnpoako for
Fort Piokons, nhout January 2!2d and, on
tho 129th, President Buchanan having en
tered into a qu.vi armislici with loading
rebels at Ponsaeola and clscwhoro caused
Secretaries Holt aud Toucey to instruct,
in a joint noto, tho commander of tho war
vessels off Ponsaeola and Lieut. Slommer,
commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no
act of hostility aud not to land Captain
Vodgcs' company unless tho Fort should
bo attacked." Ho af.'orward states, with
in brackets, "that joint note I never saw,
but supposo the armistice was consequent
upon tho meeting of tho Peaco Convention
at Washington and was understood to tor
minato with it.''
Theso statement betray a singlular want
of memory on the part of General Scott.
It is scarcely credible that this very joint
noto, presented in such odious colors, was
submitted to General Scott on the very1
day it was prepared, (January 20th), and J
met Ins entiro approbation. I would not
make th'n assertion if I did not possess
conclusive evidence to prove it. Oil that
day Seorctary Holt addrefsed mo a noto,
from which tho following is an extract :
"I havo tho satisfaction of saying that on
submitting the paper of General Scott he
expressed himself satifficd with it, saying
that thero could be no objection to the ar
rangement in a military point of view or
otherwise." This requires no comment.
That tho General had every reason to bu
satisfied with the arrangement will appear
from the following statement :
A revolutionary outbreak had occurred
in Florida; tho ti oops of the United States
had been expelled from Pbnsacola and the
adjacent Navy Yard ; and Lieut. Slcm
mor, of the Artillery, with his bravo little
command, had been forced to take rcfuo
in Fort Pickens, where he was in iinmi- i
nent danger every moment of being cap- j
tured by a vastly superior force. Owing
to tho interruption of regular comniunica '
tions, Secretary Holt did not receive 1
information of these events until acveral j
days after their cccurrenco and then
throu.h a letter addressed to a third person, 1
Ho immediately informed the President of
the fact and reinforcements, provisions
and military stores were dispatched by tho j
Brooklyn to Fort Pickens, without a mo-
incut's unnecessary delay. She left For-
tress Monroe ou the 2 4th of January.
Well founded apprehensions, however,
were entertained at tho time of her do- I
pnrturc that the reinforcements, with the
vessel of war at no great distanen from i
Fort Pickens, could not arrive in timo to '
defend it against the impending attack, I
In thii stato of suspense and whilst Lieut, j
Slommer was in extremo peril, Senators j
Slidell, Hunter and Bigler received a tol- j
cgraphic dispatch from Senator Mallory, j
of Florida, dated at Ponsaeola, on the j
28th January, with tho urgent request that
they should lav it before tho President,
This dispatch expressed an earnest desire ,
to maintain tho peaco, as well as the most
posilivo ansurauce that no attack would ba
mado on Fort Pickens if the present status
should bo preserved.
'J his proposal was carefully considered,
both with a view to tho safety of the Fort
and to the unhappy effect which an actual
collision, cither at that or any other point
might produce on the Peaco Convention
then about to assemblo at Washington.
The result was that a joint dispatch was
carefully prepared by the Secretaries of
War and Navy, accepting tho proposal,
with important modifications, which was
transmitted by telegraph, on the 20th Jan
uary, to Lieut. Slommer aud to tho naval
commanders near tho station. It is too
long for transcription; suffico it to say it
was carefully guarded at evory point for
the security of the Fort and its frco com
munication with Washington.
Tho rciult was highly fortunate. Tho
Brooklyn had a long passage. Although
she loft Fortress Monroo on tho 21th
January, sho did not arrive at Pensacola
until tho Oth Febuary. Ira tho meantime
Fort I'iokens, with Lieut. Slommer (whose
conduct deserves high commendation.)
and his bravo little band, wero placed by
virtuo of this arrangement, in porfcot se
curity until an adequato f oroo had arrived
to defend it against any attaok. Tho fort
is still in our possession. Well might
Gen, Scott havo exprosscd his satisfaction
with this arrangement. Tho Gonoral was
correct in his supposition that this arran
gement was to expiro on tho termination
of tho Peace Convention,
V. But wo now cotuo to au important
period, vhen dates will bo essentially
necessary to dicntangle the statement of
Gon. Scott. Tho South Carolina Com
missioners wcro nppoiutcd ou tho 22d,
and arrived in Washington on tho 27th
Dccouibor. Tho day after their arrival it
was announced that Major Anderson had
removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sum
ter. TliN rendered them furious. On
tuo tamo uay tiioy auurescu an angry letter
to the President demanding tho surrender
of Fort Sumter. Tho President answered
this letter on tho 30th December by a per
emptory refusal. This brought forth a
reply from tho Commissioners ou tho 2d.
January, 1801, of such an insulting char
actor, that the President instantly returned
it to them with the following endorsement:
"Thi3paper,just presented to the President
is of such a character, that ho declines to
receive it." From that time forward, all
friendly, political aud personal intercoujo
finally ceased between tho rovoluntionary
Senators and the President, and he was
severely attacked by them in tho Senate,
aud especially by Mr. Jcffeison Davis. In
deed, their intercourse had previously been
of the coolest character, cv:r siucc the
President's anti secession message at tho
commencement of tho session of Congress.
Under these changed circumstances Gon.
Scott, by note on Sunday, tho 30th Decern,
bcr, addressd tho following iuquiry to the
President :
'Will the Prosideut permit Gen. Seott
without reference to the War Department
ai.d otherwise as secretly as possiblo, to
send two hundred and lift' recruits from
New York harbor to reinforce Fort Sum
ter, together with some extra muskets or
ri files, ammunition, and subsistence: 1
is hoped that a sloop of war" and cutter
may ho ordered for tho samo purpose to
morrow." The Gonoral seems not to havo known
then that Mr. Floyd was out of offics.
Never did a request meet a more prompt
compliance It was received on Sunday
eveniug, December 30th. On Monday
in. lining I gave instiui'tions to tho War
aud Navy Departments, and on Monday
evening Gen. f-'cott came to congratulate
me that tho Secretaries had issued the
necessary orders to the army aud navy
officers, and that they were in his posses
sion The Brooklyn, vwth troops, mili
tary stores, aud provisions, was to sail
foithwith from Fortress Monroe for Fort
Sumter. I am, therefore, utterly at a loss
to imagine why the General, in his state
ment, should hae asserted "that the
South Carolina Commissioners had alroady
been many days in Washington, and no
movement of defence (on the part of tho
United States) was permitted." These
Commissioners arrived in Washington on
tho 27th December; Gen. Scott's request
was mado to the President on tho 30th.
It was complied with on the 3 1st, and a
single day h all that represents the "many
days" of tho Geiwra'..
Again, Gonoral Scott asserts, in the face
of these facts, that tho President refused
to allow any attempt to be made to rein
force Fort Sumter because ho was hold
ing negotiations with tho South Carolina
Commissioners. And still again, that
"afterwards Secretary Holt and myself
endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship-of-war
for tho purpose, and were finally
obliged to employ tho passenger tteninGr
'Star of tho West.' " Will it be believed
that the substitution of the "SUr of the
West" for tho powerful war steamer
Brooklyn, of which ho no w complains, was
by the advico of General Seott himself!
I havo never heard this doubted until I
read the statement.
At tho interview already referred to be
tween tho General and myself, on tho eve
ning of Monday the 31st of December, I
suggested to him that, although I had not
recoived tho South Carolina Commission
ers in their official enpneity, but merely as
private gentlemen, yet it might he consid
ered an improper act to send tho Brook
lyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter
until I had veceivod nn answer from them
to my letter of tho preceding day ; that
tho delay could not continue more than
forty eight hours. Ho promptly concurred
in this suggestion as gentlemanly and
proper, and the orders were not transmit
ted to the Brooklyn on that ovening. My
anticipations wero correct, for on tho morn
ing of tho 2d of January I roceived their
insolent note, and sent it back to them. In
tho nicatiiimo, however, the Goncral had
become convinced, by tho reprcfentations
of a gentleman whom 1 forbear to name,
that tho better plan, as tho Secretaries of
War and tho Navy informed mo, tosccuro
scorccy and success nnd roach tho fort,
would ho to send a fast siuo-wheel mer
chandise etcamer from Now York with tho
roiuforceii'cut. Accordingly tho Star of
the Wost was selected for this duty. Tho
substitution of this mercantile steamer for
tho Brooklyn, which would havo boon nblo
to defend herself in case of nltaok, was
reluctantly yielded by mo to tho high mil
itary judgment of General Seott.
The change of programnio required a
brief epaco of time; but tho Star of tho
Wost, left Now York for Charleston on
tho evening of tho -Jth of January. Ou
tho very day, howovcr; whon this ill-fted
steamer left New York, a telegram was
dispatched by Ccn. Scott to Col. Scott to
countermand htr departure ; but it did
not reach its destination until after sho had
gone to sea. The reason for this counter
mand shall bo stated in the languago of
Secretary Holt, to ho found in a letter ad
dressed by him to Mr. Thompson, tho late
Secretary of tho Interior, on the fitli of
March, 1801, nnd published in tho Nation
id Intelligencer. Mr. Holt says :
''The countermand spoken of (by Mr.
Thompson) was nut more cordially sanc
tioned by tho President than it was by
Gen. Scott and myself; not because of
any dissent from tho order on tho part of
the President, but because of a letter ro
ceived that day from Major Anderson,
stating, in effect, that he regarded himself
secure in his position ; and yet more from
intelligence which lato on Saturday eve
ing (."ith January, l&til,) reached tho De
partment, that a heavy battery had been
erected among the sat.d hills at tho en
trance to Charleston harbor, which would
probably destroy an unarmed vessel (and
such was tho Star of tho West) which
might attempt to make its way to Fort
Sumter. This important informatiouaat
ialied the Government that there was no
present necessity for sending reiuforce
mcuts, and that when sent they should go,
not in a vessel of connnmorc but of war.
Hence the countermand was dispatched by
telegraph to Now York, but tho vessel had
sailed a short timo before it readied .the
officer (Co.. Seott) to whom it was address
ed." A statement of theso facts established
by dates, proves conclusively that tho
President was not only willing but anxious
iu the briefest period to reinforco Fort
Sumter.
On the -1th of January, tho day befora
the departure of the Star of tho West from
Now ork, as General Scott in his state
ment admits.succor was sent to Fort Taylor,
Key West, and to Fort Jefferson Tortugas
L haul, which reached the.- points in time
for their security. II nevertheless specu
lates on the con.-equences whicu might have
followed had the reinforcment not reached
their destination in duo time ; and even
expresses thu extraordinary opinion that
with the poisesion of these forts, "the
rebels might havo purchased an early re
cognition. i shall next advort to tho statement that
tho expedition under Capt. Ward, "of three
or four small steamers belonging to tho
Coast Survey, was kept back by something
liko a trues or armiiieo, made hero. em
bracing Charlestown and Ponsaeola har
bors, agreed upon between the late
President and certain principal seccders
of Soujh Carolina, Folida, Louisiana, &o.
And this truoo hated to tho end of tho
administration." Things altogether dis
tinct in their nature are often so blended
in t Iii:
is satjmcut that it is difficult to sep-
i them. Such is eminently the case in
ectingthc fact relative to churlostown
arato
connecting
with i cnsacola.
Having nlrcadv treated
of the charge
ol Having Hept Dark rcinlorcements troin
Pensacola, I shall now say something of
the charge of having also kopt them back
from Charleston. Neither a truce, nor
quasi truce, nor anything like it, was
over concluded between tho P-esulcnt
and any human authority concernuijr
Charleston. On the coutvaay, the South
Carolina Uommissioncrs, tirst ami last,
and all the time, wcro informed that the
President could never surrendes Fort
Sumter, nor deprive himself of iho most
entire liberty to send reinforcements to
it whenever it was believed to bo in
danger, or requested by Mijor Anderson.
It is strange that Gen. Scott was not
apprised of this well known fact. It was
then, with some astonishment, that I
learned from ths statement of tho Gen
eral that ho had, on tho 12ih March,
1801, advised that Major Anderson
should bo instructed to ev'tciiate tho fort
as soon as suitablo transportation could
be procured to carry himsc'fand his
comm.ind to New York, A military
necessity for a capitulation may havo ex
isted in ease there should pe an attack up
on the fort, or a demand for its surrender?
but surely none such could have existed
for its voluntary surrender and apandon
nirnt. Probably that to which the General
mean" to refer was not the quasi, but the
actual truce of arms concluded at Charles
ton on tho llth of January, 18dl, be
tween Governor Pickens and Mnjor
Anderson, without tho knowledgonient
tho Oth of
oftho President. It was on
January that tho Star of tho West, under
the American flag, was fired upon in tho
harbor ol Charleston, by order ot liov
ornnr Pickens. Immediately after this
outrage, Major Anderson pent a flag to
tho Governor, stating that lin presumed
tho act had been authorized, and for
that reason ho had not opened firo from
Fort Sumter on tho adjacent batteries ;
but demanding its disavowal, and, if this
woio not Kent in a reasonable timo lie
wonld consider it war, and fire on an
vessilthat attempted to Kive the harv
bor. Jvo days after this occurred, on
tho 11th January, Governor Pickcna
had the audacity to demand of Major
Anderson tho surrender of the fort. In
lib answer of the same date, the Major
made thu following proposition : "Should
your excellency deem fit, provious.to a
resort to arms, to refer this matter to
Washington, it would afford mo the sin
purest pleasure to depute one of my
officers to accompany any messenger
you may deem proper to bo the hearer
of your command." This proposition
was promptly, accepted by the Governor,
and, in pursuance thereof, he sent on
his part, Hon. J. W. Ilnync, the Attor
ney General of South Carolina, to
Washington, whilst Major Anderson
deputed Lieutenant Hall, of the United
States army, to accompany him. Theso
gentlemen arrived together in Washing
ton, on the evenine; of the 13th January,
when tho President obtained the first
knowledge of the transaction. But it
will be reeolected that no time intervened
between tho return of the Star ot the
West to Now York and tho arrival of tho
messenger hearing a copy of tho truce at
Washington, within which it would havo
been possible to send reinforcements to
Fort Sumter. Bjth events occurred
about tho samo time
Thus a trncc, or susprnsion of arms,
was concluded between tho parties, to
continue until the question ot the sur
render of the (orl should he decided by
tho President. Until this decision Major
Anderson had placed out of his own
power to ask for reinforcements, and
equally out of tho power of Government to
soud them without violation of public faith.
Thi3 was what writers on public law de
nominate "a partial truoo under which hos
tilities are suspended only in certain pla
ces, as between a town and tho army
besieging it." It is possible that thu
President, under the laws of war, might
have annulled this truce upon duo notico
to the opposite party; but neither Gen.
Scott nor any other purson suggested this
expedient. This would havo been to oast
a reflection on Major Anderson, who be
yond question, acted from the highest aud
purest motives. Did Gen. Scott ever pro
pose to violate this truce during its exis
tence ? If ho did, I am not now, and never
was, awaro of tho fact. Indeed I think
he would have been ono of the last men in
tho world to prope.-o such a incaEuro.
Col, Hayuo did not deliver tho letter
which he bore from Governor Pickens,
demanding the surrondcr of tho Fort, to
tho President, until tho 31st of January.
Tho documents containing the reasons for
this worrying delay were communicated
to Congress in a special message of tho 8th
of February, to which I refer tho reader.
On tho 5th of February, the Secretary of
War, under tho instructions of tho Presi
dent, gave a peremptory refusal to his do
mand in an able and comprehensive letter,
reviewing iho wholo subject, explaining and
justifyiug the eonduet of the President
throughout. Its concluding sentence is
both eloquent and emphatic.
"If, (say,Mr. Holt,)with all tho multiplied
proofs which exist of the Presidents anxiety
for peaco, and of the earnestness which ho
has pursued it. the authorities of that Stato
shall assault Fort Sumter and imperil tha
lives of tho handful of tho bravo and loyal
men shut up within its walls, and thus
pluugc our country into tho horrors of civil
war, tucn upon them and tho?e thoy rcp-
! present must rest tho responsibility."
j The truco was then ended, and Gci
i Scott is incorrect in statin? "that it h
cncral
statin; "that it lasted
to tho end of that Administration."
An onodition was miir-Hv fiMrd onf nf
jjcw York under tho supervision of Gen.
s'cott. to be ready for any contingency. Ho
lvri.nDgcd its details, and regarded the re-
inforcomcnts thus provided for as sufficient,
This wa9 rc!uly to saij for Fort gUuitcr 0n
flvc hours' notice It is of this expedition
tlint ncn. Scott thus snonL-s
,it taat tim0 ,vien tjlis ,
(the truce) had
passed away, Secretaries Holt and Toucey,
Captian Ward, of tho navy, and myself
wi'h the knowledge oftho PesidcDt, settled
uponupon tho employment, under tho Cap
tain, of threo or four steamors belonging
to the Coast Survey, but he was kept back
by the truco."
A strango inconsistency. Tho truco had
expired with Mr. Holt's letfcr to Colonel
Ilaync on tho Oth of February, and Gen
eral Scott, in his statement, says : "It
would havo been easy to reinforco tho
fort down to about tho 12tH of February."
Why, then, did not tho reinforcements
proceed I This was simply becauso of
communications Com Major Anderson.
It was most fortunately that they did not
proceed ; becauso tho threo or four small
steamers whioh were to bear themVould
novel havo reached tho fort, and iu tbu
nttompt must havo been captured or dc
Btroycd. Tho past inadequacy of tho
force providod to acoomplish tho objcot
wai demonstrated by iuformttion received
from Major Anderson at tho War Depart
mnt on tho last day of tht Administra
tion. I Ipurposfly forbear at present to Bar
nio.ro n this eubject, lest I might, howovcr
unintentionally, no injusiico to OU0 or
moro oftho brevity required by the naturo
of this communication. Tho facts rcla
1 ting to it, with tho appropriate accom
lnnnimonla. havo been fullv nrnsnntpl in n.
historical review, prcpascd a year ago
whioh will cro long bo published. This
review contains a sketch of tho four last
months of my Administration, it is im
partial ; at least such is my honoat convic
tion. That it has not yot been published
bus arisen sololy from an npprehonsion,
no longor entertained, that something
therein might bo unjustly prdvorted into
Ml
il
"V