



Choice Poetry.

THE SORROWING CHILD.

The following sweet and touching lines from the pen of a gifted daughter of South Carolina, whose productions are "house hold words" throughout the land. She has written much, in prose and verse, and her "Northern" and "Southern Harps" are well known, both at home and abroad: I walked me mourning through the crowded street, When many gay and happy ones I met, For 'twas a festive day, The bells chimed forth their loud and merry peal, The children frolicked with unweary zeal, The merry hours away, I was all eye, all ear, all sympathy, And my own youthful days came back to me; I was a child again; While the ten thousand thoughts I could not speak, Plashed from my roving eye, and flashed my cheek, And fired my busy brain, At length I saw a poor and lonely child, Her cheek was pale, her sunken eye was wild, As on the scene she gazed; Her pale lips quivered, yet she shed no tear, But ran her little fingers through her hair, As though the child were crazed, Then must my heart have pined on my face Sweet Pity's holy and attractive grace, For as I silent stood, And looked upon the poor forsaken child, Her pale cheek glowed, her eyes grew far less wild, And altered seemed her mood, She gazed upon me for a moment, then, And then I saw a large reductive tear, Roll slowly down her cheek; And presently her little arms outspread, She forward sprang, and raised her lovely head, And tried in vain to speak, Of all the sights that greet us here below, There is no sight so sad, so full of woe, As childhood in distress! Oh, how my sympathizing heart did ache! And how I longed to see that heart to wake, The child my love's bright light!

Political.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CANVASS.

The Great Speech of Mr. Breckinridge at Lexington, Ky. LEXINGTON, Ky., Sept. 5.—Everything was propitious for the great Breckinridge Barbecue which came off to-day, at Ashland, a mile and a half from the city. At an early hour the roads from all directions were crowded with people. At 11 o'clock A. M., a salute of thirty-three guns announced the arrival of Mr. Breckinridge. He was hailed with an enthusiastic demonstration. At twenty minutes after 11 Mr. Breckinridge arose and said:— SPEECH OF MR. BRECKINRIDGE. I beg you, my neighbors, friends and old constituents, to be assured that I feel profoundly grateful for the cordial welcome you have extended to me. The circumstances under which I appear before you are novel and unusual. I do it in obedience to the request of friends whose intellectual service I have been accustomed to observe, and if it be an uncommon thing for a person in my position to address assemblies of people, I can only say that I hope to discuss topics which are in a manner not altogether unworthy the attitude which I occupy. I shall certainly indulge in no language which, in my opinion, will fall below the dignity of political discussion.—The condition of my health and my position make it impossible for me to extend my voice over this vast assembly, but I trust I will become stronger as I proceed. I have been asked, fellow citizens, to speak at my own home, because I and the political organization with which I am connected have been assailed in an unusual manner and charged with treason to my country. I appear before you to-day for the purpose of repelling certain accusations which have been made against me personally, and industriously circulated through other States of the Union, and through the press of this State, and which I stand ready to justify. [Great applause.] And surely if any time the justification could be found by any man for addressing the people in the position which I occupy, it will be found in my case. Anonymous writers and wandering orators have chosen to tell the people that I individually am a disunionist and a traitor to my country—and they declare, with assurance, that I have exhibited a treason that makes, by comparison with it, Burr a

patriot and the memory of Arnold respectable. But, fellow-citizens, before I come to those topics, I desire to make and prove a comprehensive statement in regard to my position in connection with the Presidency of the United States. I have been charged with intriguing for this nomination. I have been charged with leaping before the wishes of the people and desiring to thrust myself before them for the highest office in their gift. To that, I answer that it is wholly untrue. I have written to nobody, soliciting support. I have intrigued with nobody. I have promised nobody. To these statements I challenge contradiction from any human being. [Cheers.] Mr. Breckinridge, resuming—I did not seek or desire to be placed before the people for the office of President, by any Convention, or any part of any Convention. When I returned to the State of Kentucky in the spring of 1859, and was informed that some partial friends were presenting my name to the public in that connection, and a certain editor (whose presence I see here,) in this State, had hoisted my name for the Presidency, I said to him: "Friend I am not in any sense a candidate for the Presidency," and I desired that my name should be taken down from the head of their columns. It was done. A very eminent citizen of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, (Mr. Guthrie,) was presented for that office. I was gratified to see it, and as far as my own declarations were concerned, I united cordially in presenting him for the suffrages of the American people—though at no time, in or out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, did I do an act or utter a word which would bring my name in conflict with his, or that of any other eminent American citizen who desired, or whose friends desired for him, that position. And if you took the trouble to read the proceedings of the Charleston Convention you will remember that when I received the vote of Arkansas, one of my friends arose and withdrew my name declaring that I would not allow it to come in opposition to the gentlemen before the Convention. When that Convention assembled at Baltimore, my feelings and my conduct were still unchanged. After the disruption which took place there, my name without any solicitation on my part, was presented as a candidate. Previously, not desiring such a thing possible, I said I did not desire to be presented to the American people, but I am content with the honors which have been heaped upon me by my State and my country, and I look forward with pleasure to the prospect I have of serving my country in the Senate of the United States for the next six years. My name however was presented, and I felt that I could not refuse to accept the nomination under the circumstances without abandoning vital principles and betraying my friends. It is said I was not regularly nominated for the Presidency; but that is a question I have not time to discuss to-day, and it has already been thoroughly exhibited and discussed upon before the people. I refer you to the bold letter of your delegates from this Congressional district. I refer you to the masterly and exhaustive speech recently delivered by my honorable friend in whose grounds we are met. I can only say that the Convention which assembled at the Front Street Theatre, at Baltimore, was devoid not only of the spirit of justice but of the forms of regularity. [Cheers.] The gentleman whom it presented never received a vote required by the rules of the Democratic organization. Whole States were excluded and disfranchised in that Convention, not to speak of individuals; the most flagrant acts of injustice were perpetrated for the purpose of forcing a particular dogma upon the Democratic organization; and the gentleman who is the representative of that dogma and principles, which I will be able to show are repugnant alike to reason and the Constitution. Owing to the impropriety of those proceedings, a decided majority of the delegates from your own State withdrew from the Convention declaring that it was not a National Convention of the real Democratic organization. The entire delegation from the fifteen Southern States, and of California and Oregon, with large minorities from other States, making in whole or in part delegations from almost two-thirds of the States of the Confederacy, represented a National Democratic Convention, depending upon the authority and loyalty of the Democratic party. But after all the great question is, what are the principles (which ought to command themselves to the American people) at issue in this canvass. These I will discuss before I am done, but before I proceed further, I will group together and answer a number of personal accusations, some of which emanated in the State of Kentucky and others elsewhere, by which, through me, it is attempted to strike down the organization with which I am connected. It begets in me almost a feeling of humiliation to answer some of them but as I have imposed upon myself the task I will go through them all as briefly as I can. [Cheers.] I believe it has been published in almost every Southern newspaper of the opposition party, that I signed a petition for the pardon of John Brown, the Harper's Ferry murderer and traitor. This is wholly untrue. So much for that. [Cries of "God!" It has been extensively circulated and circulated that I was in favor of the election of Gen. Taylor to the Presidency, and opposed to the election of Cass and Butler. This also is wholly untrue. In the year 1847, there was a meeting in the city of Lexington, in which I participated, in which Gen. Taylor was recommended for

the Presidency of the United States. A difference of opinion existed at that time as to the political sentiments of that distinguished gentleman. I was assured upon grounds satisfactory to me, that they coincided with my own political opinions, and I united in the meeting. Pretty soon afterwards, I went to Mexico, and when I returned, twelve months afterwards, in 1848, I found the campaign in full blast with Gen. Taylor the candidate of the Whigs, and Cass and Butler as the nominees of the National Democracy. It is well known to thousands of those within the sound of my voice that as soon as I returned home, I took the stump in behalf of the Democracy, and maintained its doctrines to the best of my ability—[Voice—All right!—] and I was not afraid to do it, because they were the representatives of my principles, and you may judge of my zeal, as one of those gentlemen was my old commander and my friend. It was said that I was not present, and did not vote at the election at Lexington, in 1848, and that is true, but with that fact has gone the explanation which my opponents have never published, showing that it was my intention to be absent during the canvass, but it was not my intention to lose my vote. You all know that at that time as a citizen, I could vote anywhere in the State, (being before the revision and adoption of our present Constitution,) but it so happened that there were six or eight gentlemen accompanying me, all of them belonging to the Whig party, and they proposed to me that if I would not return to my own town and vote they would not. If we had all voted, there would have been six or seven votes cast for Taylor, and only one cast for Cass and Butler. [Cheers.] I accepted the proposition and we went hunting, [laughter,] and if every man had done as well as myself, we would have carried the State by forty thousand majority.—[Applause.] Among those with me I remember the names of three of my friends—Thomas L. Redd, Nelson Butler and George P. Jewett. Another charge has been extensively circulated throughout the Southern States that I was an emancipationist in 1849, or at least voted for an emancipationist at sometime. Mr. B. read an extract from a letter from the Hon. George Robertson, published in a Southern paper, having reference to his position on this question and alluding to his private affairs, and commented on it at some length, and with much severity. I come to the fact that the only time I knew of the question of emancipation being raised was in 1849, when we were electing delegates to the Convention to form a new constitution. Then Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Sly were emancipationists. Mr. Wickliffe and I canvassed the county to the best of our abilities in opposition to emancipation, believing that the interests of both races in the Commonwealth would be promoted by the continuance of their present relation. At the polls Dr. Breckinridge voted against me and I against him, [cheers] because we were representing opposite principles, and just so would it be again under similar circumstances. So much for that charge. But I have seen pamphlets published and circulated all over the Union, for the purpose of proving that I was a Know Nothing in the State of Kentucky. [Laughter.] I have no doubt that a very considerable proportion of those listening to me were members of that Order in that year, and if there is a man among you who belonged to the Order who ever saw me in one of your lodges, who did not know that I was recognized as one of the most uncompromising opponents of that Order, let him be good enough to say so now. I believe I was the first gentleman in Congress who took a position against the organization. When I returned home in the spring of 1855, it was making great progress in this Commonwealth, and although I had withdrawn from public life to attend to my private affairs, I opposed it in repeated speech as all over Kentucky. This statement may not be very acceptable to some gentlemen within the sound of my voice, but I do not want to deceive any man. I stand upon my principles, and am willing to view them without the slightest regard to consequences. I am represented to this day as having said that I would make a difference between one of my own religious belief and another and that between an unnaturalized and naturalized citizen I would make a political difference. I never uttered such a sentiment. [Great applause.] The underlying principle with me was this: that the condition of citizenship being once obtained, no question, either of birth or religion, should be allowed to commingle with political consideration. [Applause.] I deem it only necessary to make these statements here succinctly and pass on, because I am speaking to assembled thousands who know this injustice. But, fellow-citizens, to come to more extended topics, it has been asserted that I and the political organization with which I am connected, have abandoned the ground on which we stood in regard to the territorial question in 1854 and '56,—that we then occupied a position which is now occupied by the friends and supporters of Mr. Douglas, and by that eminent gentleman himself. I deny it, and I shall now proceed to prove this denial—both as to myself and as to the party therein involved. There was a body to whom we could refer the question, and we thought it unnecessary further to debate it, each party agreeing to acquiesce in the decision as rendered by the said body. I think that is a pretty plain statement on that point. I make it to show that there was a vote taken by the Southern friends of the measure in Congress, and, among them, a vote taken by your humble speaker to support the decision. Mr. Breckinridge here read some extracts from his speech delivered in the House of Representatives in 1854. We

were willing, he continued, to have the question decided by the courts of the United States. Again I say it was contended upon one hand, (upon the idea of the equality of the States under the Constitution,) that the common property in the territories, and the common property in the slaveholding States may remove to the Territories with their slaves and there legally hold them until the Territory is resolved into a State. In that capacity it may exclude them. On the other hand, it is said that slavery, being in conflict with common right, can exist only by the force of positive law, and it is denied that the Court ever furnished the law. I said that we demand that all citizens of the United States shall be allowed to enter the common territory with the Constitution alone in their hands, for that instrument protects the title of the master to his slave in this common territory. You cannot complain if it does not protect his title. We ask no help from Congress. If difficulties occurred, we were to let them be submitted to the Court. Now upon my own personal vindication: The doctrines announced by me in that speech were just as I have ever declared in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, such as I have ever declared in every public address that I have made in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Pennsylvania. Afterwards, when it was understood that I had been charged, or that I had admitted that this power belonged to the Territorial Legislature, in the month of September or October, 1856, the editor of the Kentucky Statesman, published in this city, alluding to this charge, made the following statement, to which I beg leave to refer you. Mark you, this was before the Presidential election of 1856. Mr. Breckinridge then read from an editorial in the Kentucky Statesman of October, 1856, in which it was stated that, during his tour through Indiana and Ohio, he (Mr. B.) avowed the sentiments he had often proclaimed in Kentucky, and which are already embodied in the Cincinnati Platform, that he denied that the Democratic party was in Federal relations a pro-slavery party; that it was neither such a party nor an anti-slavery party; that it negated the interference of the Federal Government whether to introduce or exclude slavery, and left the Territories open to common settlement from all the States; that each State was entitled to form its own Constitution, and enter the Union without discrimination by Congress on account of its allowance or prohibition of slavery; and that the statement that Mr. B. advocated squatter sovereignty was untrue. Mr. Breckinridge then continued.—In the autumn of the same year I received a Louisiana paper containing some remarks made by General Mills, who heard my speech, in which he denied that I had admitted this doctrine of the Territorial power. He sent me a slip containing his speech. In the same month, before the Presidential election, I answered him, saying: "Hands off of the whole subject by the Federal Government except for one or two protective purposes mentioned in the Constitution; the equal rights of all sections in the common territory, and the absolute power of each new State to settle the question in its Constitution. These are my doctrines and those of our platform, and what is more, of the Constitution. [Great cheers.] Now, fellow citizens, against the statement of that distinguished Senator, in which he undertakes to prove allegations against myself by himself, I thus oppose my own statement. Next in proof, I read to you from my speech in 1854, in Congress, the article in the Lexington paper, before the Presidential election, the testimony of Gen. Mills, who heard that speech at Tippecanoe, and my own letter in answer to the latter gentleman, containing my opinion of the question at that time, and what has ever since been my opinion. ("You are talking right.") I think I have proven as fully as could be expected in the limits of a speech, that the charge is unfounded in fact, and I will add that the position I assumed, was that taken by all the Southern friends of the Nebraska bill, and by a portion of its Northern friends. These were our private opinions—these were opinions we urged on all proper occasions, but we did not undertake to force all others to agree to them. We had agreed to refer that to the highest tribunal in the Union. Now, gentlemen, having vindicated myself and the constitutional Democracy from the charge of having abandoned the position they took in 1854-56, I turn upon my accuser and undertake to show that he himself abandoned the agreement he solemnly made at the time the Kansas Nebraska bill passed the Congress of the United States, (great applause,) and I do not make myself a witness against him to do it. I will prove it by himself. [Applause.] On the 24 of July, 1856, in the debate upon a bill to authorize the people of Kansas to form a Constitution preparatory to admission into the Union as a State, when the question arose as to what was the true meaning of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and the limitation of the power of the Territorial Government, Mr. Trumbull offered the following amendment as an additional section to the bill: "And he it further enacted, that the provision in the act to organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, which declares it to be the true intent and meaning of said act not to legislate into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution

of the United States, was intended and does confer upon, or leaves to the people of the Territory of Kansas, full power to exclude slavery from said Territory, or to recognize or regulate it therein." That was Mr. Trumbull's amendment, against which an overwhelming majority of the Senate voted, including Gen. Cass and Senator Douglas. Let me, however, do Mr. Douglas the justice to say that he voted against that amendment, not because he did not believe the Territorial Legislature had the power to exclude slavery from the Territory, but because he did not believe it was consistent to decide the question legislatively which they had agreed to leave to the Court. Gen. Cass said (Mr. B. here quoted from Gen. Cass) to show that the North and South differed about the powers that might be given a Territorial Legislature, and that the Kansas bill left that to be adjudicated by the Court by which alone the constitutional question could be settled. Finally, (Mr. Breckinridge continued,) Mr. Douglas in the same debate used the following language, in speaking of the attempt of his colleague to coerce an opinion out of him upon the question whether the Territorial Legislature had the power to exclude slave property before they became a State. [Mr. Breckinridge here read from Mr. Douglas' speech a declaration that this point in the Nebraska bill was a judicial question which he would not discuss, because by the bill it was referred to the Courts.] Mr. Breckinridge continued.—On the 15th of May last in the Senate Mr. Douglas said—[Here Mr. B. read an extract from Mr. Douglas' speech concluding with the assertion—] "We agreed to refer it to the judiciary"—We agreed to abide by their decision." I think I have shown that upon the point of disputes between the friends of the Kansas bill as to the power of territorial legislation to exclude slave property it was agreed to refer it to the Supreme Court, and when it had been judicially determined we should abide by their decision. Now bear with me while I read a very little from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred Scott case. Let us for a moment turn to the calm, enlightened, judicial utterance of the most august tribunal upon the earth. [Repeated applause.] This opinion was concurred in by all the Judges except two, and was uttered by the illustrious Chief Justice of the United States. Mr. Breckinridge quoted at considerable length from the Dred Scott decision, commenting on the points maintained in that opinion, and continued as follows:— Now, my fellow citizens, what is the authoritative decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, to whom we agreed to refer this disputed question of the power of the Territorial Legislature? They decide that the Territories have been acquired and are held by the Federal Government, and that the citizens of all the States may hold and enjoy their property in them until they take upon themselves the functions of sovereignty, and are admitted into the Union—nothing less than a State being competent to determine the question of slavery or no slavery. They declared that the citizen enters any Territory with the Constitution in his hand, and that the Federal Government can exercise no power over his property there which that instrument has not conferred; and they declare that since the less can it force a territorial government to exercise those powers which it could not confer upon any local government—a right to distinguish between slave property and other kinds of property, for no distinction exists—that property in slaves is recognized by the Constitution of the United States—that there is no word in that instrument which gives the Congress of the United States greater power over it, or which entitles that property to less protection than any other property,—and that the only power which the Congress of the United States has in its guarding and protecting the rights of citizens. Language could not make it plainer. I have heard it said that the case which went to the Supreme Court of the United States was not the case which went from the territories, but a case that went from a State, and therefore nobody is bound until a case comes from a territory and is regularly taken up. We agreed to refer it to the supreme judicial tribunal upon any case properly arising and coming before that august body. It was a proper case and properly decided by the Court. It covers the points of difference between the friends of the Nebraska bill. It is candid, clear and statesmanlike. Now I have shown you the points of difference between us in that bill, and the agreement between the friends of the bill. I have shown you the decision of the Supreme Court. We have arrived at a point where there should have been harmony and peace—a point agreed upon. The only point of difference had been determined by the highest judicial authority of the Union. Of course the constitutional question was settled according to the agreement. The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered in 1857. Everything was quiet until the year 1858, when the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglas) was a candidate for re-election from that State, and then for the first time in the history of American politics we find the opinion advanced that there was a mode by which the subordinate authorities may overrule

the opinion of the highest court in the Union. Then we find the agreement to abide by the decision of the Court violated, and the declaration made that a subordinate territorial authority may confiscate or exclude from the territory the property of citizens of the Southern States without regard to the opinion of the Supreme Court to the contrary. In a debate between Senator Douglas and Mr. Lincoln, the former said: "The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is—can the people of a Territory in any lawful way, against the wishes of the United States, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of the State Constitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr. J. has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that in my opinion the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution." That question we agreed, in the Kansas-Nebraska bill, to refer to the Supreme Court, and it was decided, as I have just shown you, the year before this speech was made by Mr. Douglas, in which decision they say that neither Congress nor the territorial legislature has the power to exclude slavery, but its only right and duty is to guard and protect it. I have shown you that Mr. D. agreed to submit the question to that Court and that he acquiesced in the decision. I quoted Mr. D. again concerning what he called "an abstract question." The question may be "abstract," but it is one involving the equality of the States of this Union, and the vital rights of more than half of them. [Applause.] "It matters not," says Mr. Douglas, "what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question, whether slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution. The people have the lawful means to introduce or exclude as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations. It matters little as to the right to go into the Territories. The people may lawfully exclude it." I have shown you that in 1856, in the Senate of the United States, he said that if the Constitution authorizes it to go there and protects it, no power on earth can take it away. I would like to see those statements reconciled. [Great applause.] Whether the Constitution did authorize it to go there, and protect the individual in his property, was a question which he agreed to refer to the court. This I have proven not by myself but by him. He now says, "no matter which way the court decides, it may be excluded."— [Prolonged applause.] If I were disposed to imitate the bad example of an eminent man, I might say as he said about me, that there is not an honest man in the United States who can deny that the agreement was made, that the decision was made in accordance with our views of the Constitution, and that the agreement has been violated by the Senator and his personal adherents, who agreed to abide by it. [Applause.] Do not we state our principles fairly? Do we not state them in the very language of the Supreme Court? Do we not stand upon the Constitution as adjudicated by the Court? And do not we express our reasons in temperate, manly and respectful arguments? The pure language in which the Supreme Court states the question and decides it, and the manner in which it is stated by the distinguished Senator from Illinois, are questions upon which the highest intellects of the country are exercised, engaging the anxious attention of your wisest and best men, engaging the attention of the most august tribunal on earth, debated in your Senate, debated in your House of Representatives, debated before an anxious people—questions which are stated from one end of the country to the other. The cry is, "Is it not well argued in the decision? How firm and yet temperate, without any appeal to sectional passion and prejudice?" The question whether your property is the same as other property; whether it has the same rights in the Territories as other property; the statement as made "that you shall not force slavery down the throats of an unwilling people"—these arguments consist of an appeal to the passions of one section of the Union against another. Mr. Douglas admitted that slave property stands upon the same footing with other property. The Supreme Court decided that under the Constitution it stands on the same footing and it has the same right to protection in the common territories as other property. Yet we hear the accusation about "forcing slavery down the throats of an unwilling people." Who wants to do it? Does the existence of the question of protection of private property in this Union imply that the Southern States are forced to take charge of such property? Substitute this word "property" for the word "slaves," and see how it would read. You attempt to force slavery down the throats of an unwilling people—you attempt to force property down the throats of an unwilling people.—[Laughter and cheers.] Why the territorial authority is the creature of Congress—Congress is the creature of the Constitution—the Constitution of the States and the people of the States—and here you would have a territorial Legislature, three or four members removed from the original source of power, with the right to exclude every