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LEVI L. TATE, Editor, Publisher & Proprietor.

"To hold and trim the torch of Truth and Wave it o'er the darkened Earth"

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SELECT POETRY.

AN OLD MAN'S DREAM.

Oh for one hour of youthful joy!
Give back my twentieth spring!
I'd rather laugh a bright haired boy
Than reign a gray-haired king.

Off with the wrinkled spoils of age!
Away with learning's crown!
Tear out life's wisdom written page,
And dash its trophies down!

One moment let my life blood stream
From boyhood's fount of flame!
Give me one giddy, reeling dream
Of life all love and fame!

My listening angel heard the prayer,
And calmly smiling said,
If I but touch thy silvered hair,
Thy hasty wish had sped.

But is there nothing in thy track
To bid thee fondly stay,
While the swift seasons hurry back
To find the wished for day?

Ah, truest soul of womankind!
Without thee, what were life?
One blisss I cannot leave behind
I'll take—my—precious—wife!

The angel took a sapphire pen
And wrote in rainbow hue;
The man would be a boy again,
And be a husband too!

And is there nothing yet unsaid
Before the change comes?
Remember, all these gifts have fled
With those dissolving years!

Why yes; for memory would recall
My fond paternal joys;
I could not bear to leave them all;
I'll take—my—girl—and—boys!

The smiling angel dropped his pen.—
Why, this will never do;
The man would be a boy again,
And be a father too!

And so I laughed—my laughter woke
The household with its noise—
And wrote my dream, when morning broke,
To please the gray-haired boys.

Webster on the Love of Home.

The following noble sentiments were uttered by Daniel Webster: It is only shallow-minded pretenders who make either distinguished origin a matter of personal merit or obscure origin a matter of personal reproach. A man who is not ashamed of himself need not be ashamed of his early condition. It did happen to me to be born in a log cabin, raised among the snow drifts of New Hampshire, at a period so early that when the smoke rose from its rude chimney, and curled over the frozen hills, there was no similar evidence of a white man's habitation between it and the settlements on the rivers of Canada.—Its remains still exist; I make it an annual visit. I carry my children to it and teach them the hardships endured by the generations before them. I love to dwell on the tender recollections, the kind ties, the early affections, and the narrations and incidents which mingle with all I know of this primitive family abode; I seem to think that none of those who inhabited it are now among the living, and if ever I fail in affectionate veneration for him who raised it and defended it against violence and destruction, cherished all domestic comforts beneath its roof, and through the fire and blood of seven years revolutionary war shrunk from no toil, no sacrifice to serve his country and to raise his children to a condition better than his own, may my name and the name of my posterity be blotted from the memory of posterity.

A NAME.—The Woods of Lancashire, England, are a distinguished family for character, wealth and talent; the eldest son, John Wood, has been returned member of Parliament for Preston several times, and proved himself a steady supporter of civil and religious liberty. A laughable circumstance once took place upon a trial in Lancashire, where the head of the family, Mr. Wood, senior, was examined as a witness. Upon giving his name, Ottiwell Wood, the judge, addressing the reverend person, said, "Pray, Mr. Wood, how do you spell your name?" The old gentleman replied—

O double T
I double U
E double L
Double U
Double O D.

Upon which the astonished lawgiver laid down his pen, saying it was the most extraordinary name he had ever met with in his life, and after two or three attempts, declared he was unable to record it. The court was convulsed with laughter.

"Do make yourselves at home ladies," said a hostess to her visitors one day.—"I am at home myself, and wish you all were."

BUCKALEW'S REPORT

The Kansas Question.

IN SENATE—Feb. 24, 1858.

Mr. BUCKALEW, from the Select Committee to which was referred certain resolutions relating to the admission of Kansas into the Union as a State, made the following report:

That the Committee, in addition to reporting back to the Senate the resolutions referred to them—the one with a recommendation that it be indefinitely postponed, and the other in an amended form—deem it proper to state the grounds upon which their action is founded.

So pertinacious and vehement have been the efforts to render this measure of admission obnoxious and unpopular, and so much is the peace and harmony of the country involved in a correct understanding of it, that your committee believe that some examination of the subject in the Legislature, to be followed by the expression of its judgment, in the form of a resolution, will disabuse the minds of many from false impressions, and have a salutary effect upon public opinion.

Our experience in Pennsylvania in making and amending constitutions may be examined, to aid us in solving the difficulties of this Kansas question. For that purpose some reference will be made to our own constitutional history. In 1776, in consequence of a circular from the committee of safety of Philadelphia to the committees of the several counties, enclosing the resolution of the Continental Congress of the 15th May, members were appointed from the several counties to a Provincial Conference, which met in Philadelphia on the 18th June, and adjourned finally the 25th of the same month. This conference recommended the election of delegates, to assemble in convention, and form a constitution for Pennsylvania, as an independent State, and provided the manner in which the elections for that purpose should be held. In consequence of this recommendation, delegates were chosen by the people, who assembled in convention on the 15th day of July, 1776, and proceeded to form the constitution of that year, without submitting it to a vote of the people or other process of ratification. That constitution, it will be seen, had a revolutionary origin, and it continued in force fourteen years, until 1790. It contained some faults which disturbed its practical operations. The legislative department consisted of a single body, as in colonial times, and the executive consisted of a council and president, the latter being selected by the joint vote of the council and assembly. A council of censors was also established, who were to review, from time to time, the conduct of the different departments of the government, and report to the people any violations of the constitution by either; and they were empowered by a two-third vote of their number, to call a convention to amend the constitution.—A single legislative body, a plural executive, and a censorial council to criticise official action, but without power to enforce its judgment, were the three capital errors of that constitution; and the arrangement for amendment through the action of the censors was found to be impracticable. A majority was in favor at one time of a convention, and at another against it; but at no time could an affirmative two-thirds vote be obtained. Finally, under the pressure of necessity in favor of change, the subject was taken up by the Legislature, and on the 24th of March, 1789, in General Assembly, resolutions were adopted setting forth that alterations and amendments to the constitution were immediately necessary; reciting from the Declaration of Independence the assertion of the right of the people to alter or to abolish their government, and to institute a new one, and also the clause of the bill of rights in the then existing constitution—"That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community—and that the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government in such manner as shall be to that community judged most conducive to the public weal." From all which, as well as the nature of society and the principles of government, it manifestly appeared that the people have, at all times, an inherent right to alter and amend the form of government in such manner as they shall think proper; and that they are not and cannot be limited to any certain rule or mode of accomplishing the same, but may make choice of such method as may be best adapted to the end proposed, and that for further reasons assigned, the delay of the mode prescribed in the constitution for amendment ought not to be admitted. It was therefore proposed and earnestly recommended to the citizens of the Commonwealth to take this subject into their serious considerations, and, if they concurred in opinion with the Assembly that a convention for the purpose of revising and altering the constitution of the state ought to be called, it was submitted to them whether it would not be convenient and proper to elect members of such convention at the next general election, and that, upon their pleasure being signified at the next sitting it would provide by a law the time and place of the meeting of the convention, and for the payment of expenses incurred thereby. These important resolutions were adopted by the decisive vote of forty-one to seventeen. At its next session the General Assembly called a convention "for the purpose of reviewing, and if they see occasion, altering and amending the constitution of the State." The resolutions for that purpose were adopted by a vote of thirty-nine to seventeen on the 15th of September, 1789. These legislative proceedings resulted in the constitution of 1790, and would seem to stand justified by the reasons assigned, and by the further one, that although the constitution of 1776 provided a mode of amendment, it did not forbid other modes; and that therefore the ordinary law-making power could initiate the necessary proceeding of change. That constitution of 1790 was proclaimed by the convention, and put in force by it, without any submission of the instrument, or any part of it, to a popular vote. It remains in force to this day, a period of sixty-eight years, modified only by certain amendments to which it has been subjected.

In 1825 a law was passed by the Legislature for taking the sense of the people upon the question of a convention to make amendments. That proposition was however rejected.

Ten years later—in 1835—a law was passed, entitled, "An act to provide for calling a convention with limited powers." It provided for a vote "for the purpose of ascertaining the sense of the citizens of this Commonwealth, on the expediency of calling a convention of delegates, to be elected by the people, with authority to submit amendments of the State Constitution to a vote of the people, for their ratification or rejection, *and with no other or greater powers whatsoever.*" The vote taken in pursuance of this act was in favor of a convention, and by the subsequent act of the 29th of March, 1836, provision was made for electing the delegates, and for the submission of the amendments proposed by them. Without pausing to explain the particular reasons which actuated the Legislature and people, it is clear that the convention of 1837-8, the members of which were elected with reference to these laws, possessed only limited powers. They could not form a new constitution, nor abrogate the old, nor put their amendments in force. They could only frame propositions of amendment, requiring a vote to give them validity.

Those amendments of 1838 were adopted, and the constitution of 1798 was so far changed as they expunged old matter or introduced new. Among those amendments was one in relation to future amendments, which now constitutes the 10th article of the constitution, and provides that amendments may be proposed by a majority of all members elected to each House of the General Assembly at two successive sessions, which, upon being approved by a public vote, will take effect. Under this provision one amendment was adopted in 1850, and four in 1857. If this provision regarding changes in the constitution, should receive the same construction as did the provision in the constitution of 1776, it does not furnish an exclusive mode of amendment; and the legislative power of the State is competent at any time to provide for calling a constitutional convention, the powers of which, whether general, or special and limited, will depend upon the law under which the delegates are chosen. And as this section of our present constitution does not forbid other modes of amendment than that provided by it, it is clear that this construction must be accepted as the true one.

Let the facts of this sketch be applied to the convention and constitution of Kansas, and difficulties and misconceptions regarding them will disappear. The Legislature of that Territory passed an act for taking the sense of the people at an election in 1856, upon the question of a convention to form a constitution for Kansas. Subsequently, on the 19th of February, 1857, the Legislature passed the law for the election of delegates to the convention.

The delegates were elected in view of these acts, and their powers were, of course, general, and similar to those of our conventions of 1776 and 1790—the only conventional bodies ever assembled in this State from whose hands came forth an entire constitution. The necessary consequence is, that the constitution framed by the Kansas convention would be valid, and subject only to the acceptance of Congress under that provision of the constitution of the United States which gives it jurisdiction over the admission of new States. It is not necessary here to inquire whether the slavery clause of that instrument stood upon different grounds from other parts of it. If that be affirmed, the answer is, that it was submitted to popular decision. If no such legal obligation existed, it was not necessary to submit it, and the doing so was a voluntary act of the convention, with reference to political reasons and public expectation, rather than legal course. The constitution, therefore, comes before Congress a lawful instrument, and sanctioned by ordinary legal and constitutional principles.

Now, upon questions of public or political right, the whole country and all its inhabitants are under LAW, and judgment must be given in favor of that party or individual whose position stands sanctioned by it. If our system were not so, through all its parts, it would be worthless, and speedily dissolved under the breath of revolution, or be struck down by the strong arm of force. Nor is this condition of things incompatible with true liberty and freedom. Our system has abundant facilities for amendment, change and reform, in connection with power to enforce existing laws and rights, public and private. And that people who cannot control their passions, but will strike at law or constitution, otherwise than by legal and orderly modes of amendment, are unfit for free governments, and cannot long maintain them.

The lawful and regular character of the proceedings for the formation of the Kansas constitution, and the validity of that instrument, as presented to Congress, having been shown, and the argument illustrated by our own constitutional history, it remains to notice some of the leading objections heretofore made, and to give them a fair reply.

1st. The objection that the constitution is unchangeable until 1864, is fully answered by the citations already made from Pennsylvania constitutional history. We may conclude that the same power will exist in the people of Kansas to change their constitution through a regular process, as that exercised by our own people in changing the constitution of 1776. The cases are alike upon the question of power, and the one is solved by the decision of the other. Any one who accepts our Pennsylvania practice as regular and lawful, will not doubt that, upon admission, the people of the new State of Kansas will have power, through a convention, to amend or change altogether their fundamental law, retaining in any case its republican form. This power stands upon the solid foundation where our fathers placed it: and upon general grounds of reason where a constitution provides for its own amendment, the mode or time so provided cannot be exclusive, unless others are expressly prohibited.

Every presumption should be made in favor of popular right in legal instruments of government, and the power of changing them must remain entire, unless expressly limited or forbidden. The Kansas constitution does not forbid amendment before 1854, and it does contain a declaration of popular power over constitutions similar to those quoted by our Legislature of 1789, in a case precisely similar to the present one.

2d. Upon the final adjournment of the Kansas convention without its submission of the whole constitution formed by it to a vote, objection was made to it upon that ground; and a constitutional philosophy altogether novel was produced upon the occasion to sustain that objection, by Robert J. Walker, the Governor of the Territory. It may be found expounded at large in his subsequent letter of resignation, and it constitutes the material point in the message of Mr. Secretary Stanton to the Territorial Legislature, on the 8th December, 1857. It was this, shortly stated—that the people cannot make or amend a constitution through agents, sovereignty being "inalienable, indivisible, a unit, and incapable of delegation," in whole or in part. The practical result arrived at by Governor and Secretary, from this doctrine, was the invalidity of the Lecompton Constitution; without a popular vote upon the whole of it. Strange as it may seem, all this is spread out in official documents, and constitutes the leading ground of objection by Governor Walker to the constitution, as stated by himself. Nothing more untenable and more opposed to constitutional principles, as understood and practiced in this country, could be produced.

Doubtless under our republican system, the people are sovereign, and constitutions must proceed from them: but they would no longer be sovereign if stripped of the power of appointing agents or representatives to act for them. Governor Walker quotes no authority for his doctrine, except himself. He says he stated it in an address in 1853, and again in a pamphlet given to the country in 1856. It is not perceived how its reception can strengthen it, in the absence of reason to sustain it, and in the face of authority against it, the most weighty and conclusive. Such authority is furnished by the Constitution of the United States, and by that of Pennsylvania.

The former was prepared by a convention, the members of which were selected by the State Legislatures, and it was ratified by conventions in each State, elected for that purpose. No part of it was ever submitted to a popular vote. The amendments proposed to it by Congress in 1789, 1793 and 1803, were ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the States, pursuant to the fifth article of the constitution, relating to amendments. And now, and hereafter, any amendment whatsoever may be ratified by Legislatures or conventions in three-fourths of the States, upon being proposed by two thirds of both Houses to Congress, or by a convention called by Congress, upon application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the State.

It will thus be seen that the sovereign people of Pennsylvania acted through their Legislature, in selecting members to the convention which formed the Constitution of the United States: that on three occasions they have ratified amendments to it through their Legislature, and that by the fifth article, to the execution of which they have bound themselves, any future amendment may be proposed by Congress, or a convention, (under certain restrictions,) and ratified by Legislatures, or conventions, in three-fourths of the States. The only exceptions, from this power of amendment is, that no State can be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate—And in fact, with the exception of State representation in the Senate, any and all parts of the constitution may be changed, against the opposition and protest of Pennsylvania, if other States and Congress give to it adequate support. She has bound herself to all this by becoming a party to the Union, and cannot be relieved from her obligations by any refined philosophy, whether proceeding from men of distinction or not.

Such is the character of the constitution-making and amending power, as illustrated by the Constitution of the United States. And when we turn to our own State, the case is equally clear. Both of our State constitutions were formed by conventions; neither were submitted to a popular vote; and we are living at this moment under a constitution so formed; and it is manifest that a new constitution might now be established through a convention in the same manner and having equal validity with former ones.

The notice of this objection becomes important when we consider it as an assigned reason of the difference between Gov. Walker and the National Administration, leading to his resignation, and also as the reason stated by Secretary Stanton for convening the Territorial Legislature in 1857, and recommending to it the passage of an act for a vote to be taken on the Lecompton Constitution. It is directly connected with the conduct of those officials, and distinctly put forward by the latter as the ground upon which the vote in January upon the constitution could be justified.—Without this, according to the admission of Mr. Stanton to the Legislature, there would have been no legal pretence for the 4th of January vote, and therefore the force to be assigned to that vote will, according to him, depend altogether upon the soundness of the objection; but as we have demonstrated that the objection is wholly groundless—that not only is it not sustained by authority or reason, but is utterly condemned by the high authority of the constitution of the United States and of Pennsylvania—the whole foundation for the January vote is destroyed, and it stands without validity, or force and effect upon the constitution against which it was directed. And at the same time the policy of the administration as against the Governor and Secretary is vindicated, and those officers condemned, upon the ground selected by themselves. It is undisputable that the people, in selecting a convention to form a constitution, may, and do, delegate to them the whole power necessary to establish it, unless there be some expressed limitation.

Having thus shown the untenable nature of the position assumed by Messrs. Walker and Stanton, upon which they threw their official influence against the constitutional party in the Territory, and at the same time demonstrated the futility of the January vote by the failure of the reason assigned for it by the man who recommended it, and whose official act caused it to be taken, we might conclude this part of the subject. But the warmth with which the 4th of January vote is pressed as an independent objection to the constitution will excuse something further on that point: And it may be confidently asserted, upon general grounds, that not only was it without legal effect upon the constitution, but was in itself wholly irrelevant and void. No Legislature in the country ever assumed jurisdiction over the formation or ratification of a constitution, except upon an express delegation of power for that purpose; and the assumption of such power by a representative body, in the absence of express grant, must be, of necessity, an usurpation, and its acts relating thereto, wholly void. The taking of the sense of the people on the question of calling a convention, and providing the legal facilities for electing the delegates, rests upon precedent and necessity; but neither reason extends the ordinary legislative power to the subjects of formation and ratification. If this were not so, the Legislature might remove constitutional restraints upon itself at its own pleasure, or assail other departments of the government in their jurisdiction; and, in the case of a Territorial Legislature, might extend its own existence, or retain power in the hands of its own party against a constitution obnoxious to them. And the same reason will apply against accomplishing the same ends directly through a popular vote. Certainly the Legislature cannot do through others what it is prohibited from doing itself. If the Lecompton Constitution was a valid instrument prior to the 4th of January, which has been proved, it would continue so until the power of the people, acting regularly through well established and well-known legal forms and principles, should amend it, or substitute another in its place. Certainly, this can only be done (in the absence of constitutional provision,) through a popular convention, where deliberation and delay will secure wise and just changes. The destruction of a constitution after it is once made, without the substitution of another, was never heard of in the United States, and such an attempt has no foundation, either in reason or law. The man who would assert the power of our Legislature to submit the constitution of this State to a public vote, and upon a majority being given against it, that it should stand annulled and destroyed, would be justly regarded as foolish or insane. No such revolutionary principles exist in our political system, and we may hope the time will be long before they are admitted or practiced.

3d. The objection made to admission which has probably had most effect upon public opinion, is that stated in Governor Walker's letter of resignation, after his exposition of inalienable sovereignty, already refuted. It is, that a large part of the people of the Territory had no opportunity to vote for delegates to the constitutional convention. If this were true in point of fact and to that extent suggested—if nineteen or fifteen counties of the thirty-eight composing the territory were wholly disfranchised, without fault or neglect of their own—if the territorial act providing for the census, registry of votes, and conducting of the election, was so imperfectly executed that its objects were wholly or mainly frustrated, and that without fault or neglect of these disfranchised—then indeed, would it appear hard and unreasonable to hold those opposed to the constitution to be bound by it, and to fasten it upon them by congressional acceptance. This objection involves disputed matters of fact, and the committee, having carefully examined it, are prepared to substantially deny its force. The facts upon which it rests have been most disingenuously and unfairly stated, while others which qualify it have been suppressed or withheld.

The Territorial Legislature passed a law for taking the sense of the people upon the question of a convention to form a constitution, and subsequently, on the 19th of February, 1857, passed a law for the election of delegates to the convention. Both these acts obviously contemplated the possession of general powers by the convention. In neither was there any limitation or restriction whatsoever. And the delegates having been elected in view of these laws, possessed the power of forming and enacting a constitution, subject only to the ratification of Congress, as heretofore shown. The act of February, 1857, upon examination, appears to be entirely fair and just. It extends the right of suffrage to every *bona fide* inhabitant of the territory on the third Monday of June, 1857, who, being a citizen of the United States and over twenty-one years of age, shall have resided three months in the county where he offers to vote; and provides adequate penalties against illegal voting, fraudulently hindering a fair expression of the popular vote, and unlawful attempts to influence the electors. And as a further guard against fraud, and to secure the elective franchise from prostitution, a registration of the voters is required to be compiled from a census previously taken by the sheriffs and their deputies. The census returns are to be filed in the office of the probate judge, showing the number of qualified voters resident in the county or district, on the first of April, and to be posted in public places. And the probate judge from the time of receiving them, is to hold his court open until the first of May, for the purpose of correcting them, by adding names or striking out those improperly inserted. Provision is also made for vacancies in the office of Sheriff, by authorizing the probate judge to act in his place; and in case of vacancy, in both offices, the Governor is to appoint some competent resident citizen to perform their duties. The other details of the act are equally unexceptionable, and tend to the production of a fair and honest election.

It is to be further observed upon this act, that voters omitted from the census would have full notice of the omission, and ample opportunity to have their names added, by the probate judge, to the register of names. Full time is also afforded for the proceeding. But it is notorious and undenied that the great body of those who did note vote at the subsequent election in June, withheld themselves from enumeration and registry, and instead of assisting the officers, as good citizens should have done, interposed all possible obstacles in their way, extending in some cases to actual intimidation and force; because they denied the authority of the Territorial Government and laws, and intended by their conduct to refuse a recognition of them. Yet over nine thousand names were registered, although many who were registered, did not vote for delegates, as in many, if not most of the districts there was no serious opposition to the candidates named.—But the case is even yet stronger than these facts make it. A part of the nineteen counties, so often spoken of, were wholly without inhabitants: they were counties *upon paper* established in expectation of future settlement. Beside these, most of the counties composing the nineteen had an inconsiderable population: settlements in them having just begun. It is said that four only of the whole number had any considerable population, and that these were the very ones where the Topeka party were strong, interposed resistance to the law, and neither desired nor attempted to qualify themselves for voting at the election. It is not necessary to go into minute details, nor to explore the causes remote or immediate, which induced opposition to that as well as other territorial laws, although such inquiry would strengthen the general conclusions already stated. As far as the objection to the powers and proceedings of the convention, on the [redacted] in amending the constitution; that such majority, if it exist, cannot nullify and hold for nought a constitution regularly formed; in short, that majorities equally with minorities are bound by existing constitutions and laws. The other reply is furnished by the late masterly and conclusive message of the President, transmitting the constitution to Congress. It is there shown by the most satisfactory evidence, that the great portion of this alleged majority is made up of insurgent and revolutionary elements.

The official dispatches, even of Gov. Walker himself, stamp upon the Topeka party, both designs and overt acts to subvert and nullify the Territorial laws, as well as to resist any constitution, however unexceptionable, to be made by a convention convened under them. In fact, armed bands, organized in open hostility to the authority of the laws, to resist their execution, and to uphold the authority of the illegal and revolutionary Topeka constitution and government, have openly traversed the Territory in the accomplishment of their designs, and yet exist under the lead and countenance of the leaders of faction, turbulence and disorder. No proposition can be clearer than that revolutionists, and those who openly aid and consort with them, waive for the time being their political rights under the government against which they rebel, and can have no legal claim to be consulted in those political proceedings which are conducted under the regular authority of the laws. And for them to demand that their voices shall be counted to destroy the powers and work of a convention which they repudiated from the outset, and in the election of the members of which they neither desired nor attempted to participate, is both impudent and monstrous.

If there be fault upon the part of the government with reference to this insurgent and misguided population, it is that they have been treated with extreme leniency and forbearance, illy requited by continued turbulence and resistance to authority upon their part. And that the appeal should now be gravely made, in their behalf, for the rejection of a legal constitution and the continuance of excitement and disorder in the Territory until they shall be pleased to subside into order and regularity, may be classed among the curiosities of faction. With equal propriety might the appeal be made in behalf of the insurgents of Utah against the attempt to enforce upon them the jurisdiction and authority of the United States.

Sound and conclusive reasons existing for the positions assumed, every consideration demands that speedy and final action be taken for the settlement of this question that has so long harrassed the public mind and worked an alienation of that feeling of confidence, respect and friendship that should reign supreme among the citizens of all parts of the Union. A postponement of the recognition of the legal position now maintained by this territory for admission may fearfully increase that which already exists—revolution, faction and discord. No good citizen can longer desire a continuance of an agitation that only engenders a spirit of hostility and bitter animosity between different sections of the confederacy, and if prolonged, must ultimately lead to consequences of the most disastrous nature. The admission of Kansas into the Union under an organic instrument, complying in every respect with the Federal Constitution, would signally vindicate the supremacy of law, bring order out of confusion, establish the reign of peace where lawless faction now holds its sway, calm the turbulent elements of party feeling no longer sustained by the hope of power, and leave the new State free to pursue her progress in an uninterrupted career of prosperity.

C. R. BUCKALEW,
JOHN C. EVANS,
SAMUEL J. RANDALL,
GEORGE W. MILLER.

THE MARRIED MAN.—How is it that girls can always tell a married man from a single one? The fact is indisputable. The philosophy of it is beyond our ken. Blackwood says that "the fact of matrimony or bachelorship is written so legibly in a man's appearance, that no ingenuity can conceal it. Everywhere there is some inexplicable instinct that tells us whether an individual (whose name, fortune and circumstances are totally unknown) be he, or be he not, a married man. Whether it is a certain subdued look, such as that which characterizes the lions, in a menagerie, and distinguishes them from the lords of the dessert, we cannot tell; but, that the truth is so, we positively affirm."

POOR LIVING.—A good Methodist minister at the West, who lived on a very small salary, was greatly troubled at one time to get his quarterly instalment. He had called on his steward a number of times, but had each time been put off with some excuse. His wants at length becoming urgent, he went to his steward and told him that he must have his money, as his family were suffering for the necessaries of life. "Money!" replied the steward. "You preach for money! I thought you preached for the good of souls!" "Souls!" replied the minister; "I can't eat souls, and if I could, it would take a thousand such as yours to make a decent meal."

BREACH OF PROMISE.—A young American lady in Paris threatens to sue President Buchanan for breach of promise. She says that dining at her father's table years ago, he said to her—"My dear Miss, if ever I should be President, you shall be mistress of the White House."

☞ Why are shawls like husbands? Because every woman should have one.