

# Columbia Democrat.

"I have sworn upon the Altar of God, eternal hostility to every form of Tyranny over the Mind of Man."—Thomas Jefferson

H. WEBB, EDITOR AND PROPRIETOR.

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## OFFICE OF THE DEMOCRAT

SOUTH SIDE OF MAIN, A FEW DOORS BELOW MARKET-STREET.

### TERMS:

The COLUMBIA DEMOCRAT will be published every Saturday morning, at TWO DOLLARS per annum payable half yearly in advance, or Two Dollars Fifty Cents, if not paid within the year. No subscription will be taken for a shorter period than six months; nor any discontinuance permitted, until all arrearages are discharged.

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### COLUMBIA DEMOCRAT.

DECEMBER 5, '46.

## OFFICIAL DESPATCHES FROM GENERAL TAYLOR.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION, Camp near Monterey, Oct. 9, 1846.

SIR: I have now the honor to submit a detailed report of the recent operations before Monterey, resulting in the capitulation of that city.

The information received on the route from Ceralvo, and particularly the continual appearance in our front of the Mexican cavalry which had a slight skirmish with our advance at the village of Ramas, induced the belief, as we approached Monterey, that the enemy would defend that place. Upon reaching the neighborhood of the city on the morning of the 19th of September; this belief was fully confirmed. It was ascertained that he occupied the town in force; that a large work had been constructed commanding all the northern approaches; and that the Bishop's Palace and some heights in its vicinity near the Saltillo road, had also been fortified and occupied with troops and artillery. It was known from information previously received, that the eastern approaches were commanded by several small works in the lower edge of the city.

The configuration of the heights and gorges in the direction of the Saltillo road, as visible from the point attained by our advance on the morning of the 19th, led me to suspect that it was practicable to turn all the works in that direction, and thus cut the enemy's line of communication. After establishing my camp at 'Walnut Springs,' three miles from Monterey, the nearest suitable position, it was, accordingly, my first care to order a close reconnaissance of the ground in question, which was executed on the evening of the 19th, by the engineer officers under the direction of Major Mansfield. A reconnaissance of the eastern approaches was at the same time made by Capt. Williams, topographical engineer. The examination made by Major Mansfield proved the entire practicability of throwing forward a column to the Saltillo road, and thus turning the position of the enemy.—Deeming this to be an operation of essential importance, orders were given to Brevet Brig. Gen. Worth, to march with his command on the 20th to turn the hill of the Bishop's Palace, to occupy a position on the Saltillo road and to carry the enemy's detached works in that quarter, where practicable. The first regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, under command of Col. Hays, was associated with the second division on this service. Capt. Sanders' engineers and Lieut. Meade, topographical engineers, were also ordered to report to Gen. Worth for duty with his column.

At 2 o'clock, P. M., on the 20th, the second division took up its march. It was soon discovered, by officers who

were reconnoitering the town, and communicated to Gen. Worth, that its movement had been perceived, and that the enemy was throwing reinforcements towards the Bishop's Palace and the height which commands it. To divert his attention as far as practicable, the first division, under Brig. Gen. Twigg, and field division of volunteers, under Major General Butler, were displayed in front of the town until dark. Arrangements were made at the same time to place in battery during the night, at a suitable distance from the enemy's main work, the citadel, two 24 pounder howitzers, and a ten inch mortar, with a view to open a fire on the following day, when I proposed to make a diversion in favor of Gen. Worth's movement. The 4th infantry covered this battery during the night. Gen. Worth had in the meantime reached and occupied for the night, a defensive position just without range of battery above the Bishop's Palace, having made a reconnaissance as far as the Saltillo road.

Before proceeding to report the operations of the 21st, and following day, I beg leave to state that I shall mention in detail only those which were conducted against the extremity of the city or elsewhere, under my immediate direction, referring you for the particulars of Gen. Worth's operations, which were entirely detached, to his own full report transmitted herewith.

Early on the morning of the 21st, I received a note from Gen. Worth, written at half past 9 o'clock the night before, suggesting what I had already intended, a strong diversion against the centre and left of the town, to favor his enterprise against the heights in rear. The infantry and artillery of the first division, and the field division of volunteers, were ordered under arms; and took the direction of the city, leaving one company of each regiment as a camp guard. The 2d dragoons, under Lieut. Col. May, and Col. Woods' regiment of Texas volunteers, under the immediate direction of Gen. Henderson, were directed to the right to support General Worth, if necessary, and to make an impression, if practicable, upon the upper quarter of the city. Upon approaching the mortar battery, the 1st & 2d regiments of infantry, and battalion of Baltimore and Washington volunteers, with Capt. Bragg's field battery—the whole under the command of Lieut. Col. Garland—were directed towards the lower part of the town, with orders to make a demonstration, and carry one of the enemy's advanced works, if it could be done without too heavy loss. Major Mansfield, engineers, and Captain Williams and Lieut. Pope, topographical engineers, accompanied the column; Maj. Mansfield being charged with its direction, and the designation of points of attack.

In the meantime the mortar, served by Captain Ramsay, of the ordnance, and the howitzer battery under Captain Webster, 1st Artillery, had opened their fire upon the citadel, which was deliberately sustained, and answered from the work. Gen. Butler's division had now taken up a position in the rear of his battery, when the discharges of artillery, mingled finally with a rapid fire of small arms, showed that Lieut. Garland's command had become warmly engaged. I now deemed it necessary to support this attack, and accordingly ordered the 4th infantry, and three regiments of Gen. Butler's division, to march at once by the left flank in the direction of the advanced work at the lower extremity of the town, leaving one regiment (1st Kentucky) to cover the mortar and howitzer battery. By some mistake, two companies of the 4th infantry did not receive this order,

and consequently did not join the advance companies until some time afterwards.

Lieut. Col. Garland's command had approached the town in a direction to the right of the advanced work, (No. 1) at the Northern angle of the city, and the engineer office, covered by skirmishers, had succeeded in entering the suburbs and gaining cover. The remainder of this command now advanced, and entered the town under a heavy fire of artillery from the citadel and the works on the left, and of musketry from the houses and small works in front. A movement to the right was attempted with a view to gain the rear of No. 1, and carry that work, but the troops were so much exposed to a fire which they could not effectually return, and had already sustained such severe loss, particularly in officers, that it was deemed best to withdraw them to a more secure position. Capt. Backus, 1st infantry, however, with a portion of his own and other companies, had gained the roof of a tannery, which looked directly into the gorge of No. 1, and from which he pointed a most destructive fire into that work, and upon the strong building in its rear. The fire happily coincided in point of time with the advance of a portion of the volunteer division upon No. 1, and contributed largely to the fall of that strong and important work.

The three regiments of the Volunteer division under the immediate command of Major Gen. Butler, had in the meantime advanced in the direction of No. 1. The leading brigade, under Brigadier Gen. Quitman, continued its advance upon that work, preceded by three companies of the 4th infantry, while General Butler, had in the meantime advanced in the direction of No. 1. The leading brigade, under Brigadier Gen. Quitman, continued its advance upon that work, preceded by three companies of the 4th infantry, while General Butler, had in the meantime advanced in the direction of No. 1. The leading brigade, under Brigadier Gen. Quitman, continued its advance upon that work, preceded by three companies of the 4th infantry, while General Butler, had in the meantime advanced in the direction of No. 1.

The main object in the morning had been enacted. A powerful diversion had been made to favor the operations of the 2d division one of the enemy's advanced works had been carried and we now had a strong foothold in the town. But this had not been accomplished without a heavy loss embracing some of our most gallant and promising officers. Captain Williams, topographical engineer, Lieut. Terrett and Dilworth, 1st infantry; Lieut. Woods 2nd infantry; Capt. Morris and Field Bet. Maj. Barbour; Lieut. Irwin and Hazlett 2nd infantry; Lt. Hoskins 4th infantry; Lieut. Col. Watson Baltimore battalion; Capt. Allen and Lt. Putman Tennessee regiment and Lt. Heu Ohio regiment were killed or have sustained wounds received in this engagement while the number and rank of the officers wounded gives additional proof of the obstinacy of the contest and the good conduct of our troops. The number of killed and wounded incident to the operations in the lower part of the city on the 21st is 394.

Early in the morning of this day, (21st) the advance of the 2d division had encountered the enemy in force, and after a brief but sharp conflict, repulsed him with heavy loss. Gen. Worth then succeeded in gaining a position on the Saltillo road, thus cutting the enemy's line of communication. From this position the two heights south of the Saltillo road were carried in succession and the gun taken in one of them turned upon the Bishop's Palace. These important successes were fortunately obtained with comparatively small loss; Capt. McKaven, 8th infantry, being the only officer killed.

The 22nd day of September passed without any active operations in the lower part of the city.—The citadel and other works continued to fire at parties exposed to their range, and at the work now occupied by our troops. The guard left in it the preceding night, except Capt. Ridgely's company, was relieved at mid-day by Gen. Quitman's brigade. Capt. Bragg's battery was thrown under cover in front of the town to repel any demonstration of cavalry in that quarter. At dawn of day, the height above the Bishop's Palace was carried, and soon after meridian, the Palace itself was taken and its guns turned upon the fugitive garrison.—The object for which the 2d division was detached had thus been completely accomplished, and I felt confident that with a strong force occupying the road and heights in its rear and a good position below the city in our possession, the enemy could not possibly maintain the town.

During the night of the 22d, the enemy evacuated nearly all his defences in the lower part of the city. This was reported to me early in the morning of the 23d by Gen. Quitman, who had already meditated an assault upon those works. I immediately sent instructions to that officer, leaving it to his discretion to enter the city covering his men by the houses and walls, and advance carefully as far as he might deem prudent. After ordering the remainder of the troops as a reserve, under the orders of Brigadier General Twigg, I repaired to the abandoned works, and discovered that a portion of Gen. Quitman's brigade had entered the town, and were successfully forcing their way towards the principal plaza. I then ordered up the 2d regiment of Texas mounted volunteers, who entered the city dismounted, and, under the immediate orders of Gen. Henderson, co-operated with Gen. Quitman's brigade. Capt. Bragg's battery was also ordered up, supported by the 3d infantry, and after firing some time at the cathedral, a portion of it was likewise thrown into the city. Our troops advanced from house to house, and from square to square, until they reached a street but one square in rear of the principal plaza, and in near of which the enemy's force was mainly concentrated. This advance was conducted vigorously but with due caution, and although destructive to the enemy, was attended with but small loss on our part.

Captain Ridgely, in the meantime, had served a captured piece in battery No. 1, against the city until the advance of our men rendered it imprudent to fire in the direction of the cathedral. I was now satisfied that we could operate successfully in the city, and that the enemy had retired from the lower portion of it to make a stand behind his barricades. As Gen. Quitman's brigade had been on duty the previous night, I determined to withdraw the troops to the evacuated works, and concert with Gen. Worth a combined attack upon the town. The troops accordingly fell back deliberately, in good order, and resumed their original positions, Gen. Quitman's brigade being relieved after nightfall by that of Gen. Hamer. On my return to camp, I met an officer with the intelligence that Gen. Worth, induced by the firing in the lower part of the city, was about making an attack at the upper extremity, which had also been evacuated by the enemy to a considerable distance. I regretted that this information had not reached me before leaving the city, but still deemed it inexpedient to change my orders, and accordingly returned to camp. A note from Gen. Worth, written at 11 o'clock, P. M. informed me that he had advanced to within a short distance of the principal plaza, and that the mortar (which had been sent to his division in the morning) was doing good execution within effective range of the enemy's position.

Desiring to make no further attempt upon the city without complete concert as to the lines and mode of approach, I instructed that officer to suspend his advance until I could have an interview with him on the following morning at his headquarters. Early on the morning of the 24th, I received, through Colonel Moreno, a communication from General Ampudia, proposing to evacuate the town; which, with the answer, was forwarded with my first despatch, arranged with Colonel Moreno a cessation of fire until 12 o'clock, at which hour works continued to fire at parties exposed to their range, and at the work now occupied by our troops. The guard left in it the preceding night, except Capt. Ridgely's company, was relieved at mid-day by Gen. Quitman's brigade. Capt. Bragg's battery was thrown under cover in front of the town to repel any demonstration of cavalry in that quarter. At dawn of day, the height above the Bishop's Palace was carried, and soon after meridian, the Palace itself was taken and its guns turned upon the fugitive garrison.—The object for which the 2d division was detached had thus been completely accomplished, and I felt confident that with a strong force occupying the road and heights in its rear and a good position below the city in our possession, the enemy could not possibly maintain the town.

Upon occupying the city, it was discovered to be of great strength in itself, and to have its approaches carefully and strongly fortified. The town and works were armed with 42 pieces of cannon, well supplied with ammunition, and manned with a force of at least 7,000 troops of the line, and from 2,000 to 3,000 irregulars. The force under my orders before Monterey, as exhibited by the accompanying return, was 425 officers, and 6,220 men. Our artillery consisted of one 10 inch mortar two 24 pounder howitzers, and four light field batteries of four guns each—the mortar being the only piece suitable to the operation of a siege.

Our loss is twelve officers and one hundred and eight men killed; thirty one officers and three hundred and thirty-seven men wounded. That of the enemy is not known, but is believed considerably to exceed our own.

I take pleasure in bringing to the notice of the government the good conduct of the troops both regulars and volunteers, which has been conspicuous throughout the operations. I am proud to bear testimony to their coolness and constancy in battle and the cheerfulness with which they have submitted to exposure and privation. To the general officers commanding divisions—Major Generals Butler and Henderson, and Brigadier Generals Twigg and Worth—I must express my obligations for their efficient aid which they have rendered in their respective commands. I was unfortunately deprived early on the 21st of the valuable services of Major General Butler who was disabled by a wound received in the attack on the city. Major General Henderson commanding the Texas volunteers, has given me important aid in the organization of his command, and in subsequent operations Brigadier General Twigg rendered important services with his division, and, as the second in command after Major General Butler was disabled.—Brigadier General Worth was intrusted with an important detachment, which rendered his operations independent of my own. Those operations were conducted with ability, and crowned with complete success.

I desire also to notice Brigadier Generals Hamer and Quitman, commanding brigades in Gen. Butler's division. Lieutenant Colonels Garland and Wilson, commanding brigades in Gen. Twigg's division. Colonels Mitchell, Campbell, Davis and Wood, commanding the Ohio, Tennessee, Mississippi, and 2d Texas regiments, respectively and Majors Lear, Allen and Abercrombie, commanding the 3d, 4th, and 1st regiments of infantry; all of whom served under my eye and conducted their commands with coolness and gallantry against the enemy. Colonel Mitchell, Lieut. Col. McClung, Mississippi regiment, Major Lear, 3d infantry, and Major Alexander, Tennessee regiment, were all severely wounded, as were Captain Lamotte, 1st infantry, Lieut. Armstrong, 4th infantry, Adjutant Armstrong, Ohio regiment, Lieut. Suedder and Allen, Tennessee regiment and Lieut. Howard, Mississippi regiment, while leading them against the enemy's position on the 21st and 23d. After the fall of Col. Mitchell, the command of the 1st Ohio regiment devolved upon Lieut. Col. Weller, that of the 3d infantry, after the fall of Maj. Lear, devolved in succession upon Capt. Bamberger, and Capt. Henry, the former being also wounded.

The following named officers have been favorably noticed by their commanders: Lieut. Col. Anderson, and Adjutant Henderson Tennessee regiment; Lieut. Col. McClung, Captains Couper and Downing, Lieutenants Paterson, Calhoun, Moore, Russell and Cook, Mississippi regiment; also