LOIB1A
srrSro . ., , . 1 "r rss ..'.sssasag
4 - I Uavo sworn upon tho Altar of God, eternal hostility io every form, of .Tyranny over tlio Mliirl of Man."-llionws Jefferson.
; , . - Ly-' 11 " "
' " ' ' PitlNTED AND PUBLISHED BY H, WEBB'. '
Volume IV. B1L.QOMSBURO, COLUMBIA COUNTY, PA. SATURDAY4, MARCH 13, iS-li Nnniliw 10.
' -- - . , " , , ..
.5.,
OF
wiraiAM ii- hAjuusox.
IN SENATE,
Thursday, March 4, 1841.
At 1 1 o'clock tho Senalg was called to or
ler by Mr. Dickens, its. Secretary.
, After the credentials of several now mem
bers had been presented, the Diplomatic
vcorps, and tho Judges of tho Supreme
Court of the United Slates, entered Hie Seu
'ntp chamber, and look tho'seats assigned
for Ihcni in front of the Secretary's tnde,
Tho Hon, John Tyi.kr, Vice President
elect, and tho Hon. Richard M. Johnson
ex-Vice President, then entorcd the cham
"ber with the Commiiteo of Arrangements.
J He oath ol otlico having been admims
tered by Mr. Kino, the President pro tern.
The VICE PRESIDENT addressed the
Senate;
General WILLIAM HENRY HARRI
SON, President of the United States electi
then 'er.tereti iho Senate chamber with the
Commiiteo of Arrangements, and was con
'ducted to the seat assigned for him, imme
diately in Iront ot Hie Secretary s table
At twelve o'clock, those assembled on
the floor of iho Senate proceeded td the east-
orn portico of tho Capitol, in the following
order :
. J ne iwnranai ol me JJistnct ol uoiumbia
Tho Supreme Court of the United States
J he bergeant-at-Arms ol tho Senate;
Thn Onmmiitfio of Arrangements:
The President elect, the Vice President,
I ci . ' . r- . i -i
anu oocreiary oi mo senate;
Tho Members of the Senate;
The Diplomatic corps;
-riio Mayors of Washington, George
iTMorof lllo Senator
On reaching the portico, the President
elect and Chief Justice Taney wero con
ducted to seats in front of a large platform
erected for tho purpose, and those who fol
lowed in the procession having taken their
seats, the President elect rose and delivered
the following
INAUGURAL ADDRESS1.
Called from a retirement which i had
supposed was lo continue fot the residue
of my life, to fill the Chief Executive of
fice of this great and free nation, I appear
before yout fellow citizens, to take the oaths
which tho Constitution prescribes, as a ne
cessary qualification for the performance of
its duties. And in obedience to n custom
coeval with our Government, and what I
believo to be your expectations, I proceed
to presont to you a summary of the princi
ples which will govern me, in tho discharge
of the dunes which I ahull bo called upon
to perform.
It was tho remark of a Roman Consul,
in an early peridd of that celebrated Repub
lic, that a most striking contrast was observ
able in the conduct of candidate for offices
of power and trust, before and after obtain
ing them thoy seldom carrying out in the
latter caso the pledges and promises made
in the former. However much the world
may have improved) in many respects, in
the lapse of upwards of two thousand years,
since the remark was made by tho virtuous
and indignant Roman, I fear that a strict
examination of the annals of some of tho
modem elective Governments, would de
velope similar Instances of violated confi
dence. Although the fiat of the people has gone
forth, proclaiming me Chief Magistrate of
this glorious-Union, nothing upon their part
'remaining to be done, it may be thought
thai a motive may exist to keep up tho de
lusion under which they may be supposed
'to have anted in relation lo my principles
and opinions; and perhaps there may be
uomo in this assembly who have come here
either prepared to condemn those I shall
"now deliver, or, approving them, to doubt
'the sincerity with which they are ullered.
'But the lapso of a few mouths will confirm
or dispel their fears. The outline of prin
ciples to govern, and measures to be adopt
ed, by an Administration not yet begun,
Will soon be exuhanged fur immutable his
tory; and I shall stand, cither exonerated
by my countrymen, oi classed wilh the
mass of those who promised that they might
deceive, and Haltered with the intention to
betray.
However strong may be my present pdr
posq to realize the expectations of a mag
nanimous and confiding people, I too well
Understand the infirmities of human naturo,
and tlio dangerous temptations to which 1
shall be exposed, from the magnitude of
the power which it has been the pleasure of
Hie noonlo to commit to my hands, not to
place my chief Confidence upon the aid of
that Almighty Power which has hitherto
protected me, and enabled mo to bring to
favorable issues other important, but still
greatly inferior trusts, heretofore confided to
wo by my country.
Tho broad foundation upon which our I
Constitution rests, being tho people a
breath of theirs havinc made, as a breath
an unmake, chance, or modify it It can
bo assigned to none of the great divisions
of Government but io that of Democracy.
II such is its theory, those who aro called
upon to administer it must recognise, as its
catling principle, the duty of shaping their
measures so as to produce the greatest good
to the gieatest number. Iiut, with these
broad admissions, if we would compare tho
sovereignty- acknowledged to exist in the
mass ofotir people wilh the power claimed
by othcr sovcteiguiies, even by ihose which
iave been considered most purely Demo
cratic, we shall find a most essential differ
ence. All others lay claim to power limi
ted only by their own will. The majority
ol our citizens, on the contrary, possess :
sovereignty with the amount of power pre
cisely equal to that which lias been granted
lo them by the parties to (he national com
pact, and nothing beyond. Wc admit ol
no Government by Divine right believing
that, so far as power is concerned, the ben'
eGcieht Creator has made no distinction a
mongst men, that all are upon an equality,
and that tho jihly legitimate light lo govern
is an express grant m power from the gov
erned. The Constitution of the United
Slates is tho instrument containing this grant
ol power to tho 6tvcral departments corn
posing tho Government. On an cxamina
lion of that instrument, it will bo found to
contain declarations of power granted, and
ol power withheld. 1 he latter is also sus
ceptiblc of division, into power which the
majority had tho right to gtant. but whic!
they did not think propor lo intrust to thei
agents, and that which they coulufljefj
granted, not bein.E0r)nwp-- '
J&Se'a'by each individual American citizen,
which, in his compact with the others, he
has never surrendered. Some of them, in
deed, he is unable to surrender, being, in
the language of our system, unalienable.
The boasted privilege of a Roman citizen
was to him a shield only against a pelty
provincial ruler, whilst tho proud democrat
of Alberts could console himself Under a
sentence of dcath,.for.ajur)poaed.. violation
of the national faith, which ho one Under
stood, and which at times was the subject
of the mockery of all, or of banishment
fiom his home, his family, and his country,
with or without an alleged cause; that it was
the act, not of a single tyrant, or hated aiis
tocracy, but of his assembled countrymen.
Far different is the power of our sovereign
ty. It can interfere wilh no one's faith,
prescribe forms of worship for no one's
observance, inflict no punishment but after
well ascertained guilt, the result of investi
gation tinder rules prescribed by the, Con
stitution itself. These precious privileges,
and those scarce less important, of giving
expression to his thoughts and opinions,
either by writing or speaking, unrestrained
but by the liability for injury to others, ahd
that of a full participation in all tho advan
tages which flow from the Government,
ihe acknowledged properly of all, the A
merican citizen derives from no charter
granted by his fellow man. He claims them
because he is himself a man, fashioned by
the same Almighty hand as the rest of his
species, and entitled to a full share of the
blessings with which he has endowed them.
Notwithstanding the limited sovereignty
possessed by the people of tho United
Stales, and the reslricted grant of power to
tho Government whibh they have adopted,
enough has beon given to accomplish all the
objects for which it was created. It has
been found powerful in war, and hitheiio,
juslico has been administered, an intimate
union eilccled, domestic tranquility preserv
ed, and personal liberty secured to the citi
zen. As was to be expected, however,
frdm the defect of language, and the neces
sarily sentenious manuer in which the Con
stitution is written, disputes have arisen as
to the amount of power which it has actu
ally granted, or whs intended to grant.
This is ni ore particularly the caso in rela
tion to that part of the instrument which
treats of tho legislative branch. And not
only as regards the exercise of powors
claimed under a general ciause, giving that
body the authority to pass all laws neces
sary to carry into effect the specified pow
er; bin in relation to the latter also. It is,
however, consolaSnry to reflect, that most
of the instances of alleged departure from
the letter or spirit of tho Constitution, have
ultimately received tho sanction of a major
ity of the people. And the fact, that many
of our statesmen, most distinguished for
talent and patriotism, have been at ono time
or other of ihcir political career, on both
sides of each of tho most warmly disputed
question?, forces upon us tho inference that
the errots, if errors there were, are attribu
table to the intrinsic difficulty, in many in
stances, of ascertaining the intentions of the
framers ol theUonstitulion, rather than the in
due
enceof any sinister or unpatriotic motive, j
but tho cVcat dancer to our institutions
does not appear to riio tob'c in a usurpation,
by the uovernmenl, ol power not granted
by the people,, but by tho accumulation, in
ono of .the departments, of that which was
assigned to cjthers. Limited as aro the
powers which; have been granted, still e
nough have been granted lo constitute a des
potism, il concentrated in ono ol the de
partments. This danger is greatly height
ened, as it has been always observable that
men are less jealous of encroachments ol
one department upon another, than upon
their own reserved rights.
When the Constitution of the United
Slates first came from tho hand of the Con
vention which formed it, many of the ster
nest republicans of tho day were alarmed
at the cxtentjol the power winch had been
granted lo Ihe Federal Government', and
mure particularly ol that portion which hau
been assigned to tho Lixecutive branch
There were in it features w'hich appeared
not to be in harmony with their ideas of
3implo representative Democracy', or Re
public. And knowihir the tendency ot
power to increase itself, particularly when
exercised By a single individual, predictions
were made that, ai no very remote period,
tho Govcrnmcn't'would terminate in virtual
monarchy. It would nol become nic to sav
that the' fears of these patriots have been al
ready realized. But, as 1 sincerely believe
that the tendency of measures, and
men's opinions, for some years past, has
been in that direction, it Is, 1 conceive
strictly proper thai I should lake this occa
ctftt. Ift pannil l! noLiiruiiKna 1 li!it'l lit.--''
r ... f .., ... ...i loaricst ihe
1UIC imvcii ui illy uav ' .. -r . n
. b -t - tendency, if it really ex
KraTitl restore tho Government to its pris.
ttne health and vigor, .as far as this can be
eiiected by any legitimate excreiibe of th
power placed in mv hands,
I proceed to slate, in as summary a man
ner as I cm, my opinion of the sources of
mo evils which have been so extensively
i.i f , . . . . -r
compiameu oi, anu the correctives whic
. I. 1 ' 1 ri i- i -
may ua amjiicu. oome oi the ormer are
unquestionably to be found in ihe defects of
the Constitution; others, in my judgment
aro auriuutauie to a misconstruciioti ol som
Of lla nrni-Iinnn:.af H.r-..-.t-U-il. tl.
gibility of the same individual to a second
term oi me presidency. J ho sacacious
mind of Mr. Jeffeison earlv saw and lament
ed this error, and attempts have been made
hitherto without success, to apply the amen'
datory power ot the Slates lo its correction
As, however, one mode of correction
in the power of every President, and conse
quently in mine, it vould be useless, an
perhaps invidious to enumerate the evils o
which, in the opinions of many of our fel
low-citizens, this error ot the sages wh
framed the Constitution may have been th
source; and the bitter Iruits which we are
still to gather from it, ii il continues to dis
figure our system. It may be observed
however; as a general remark, that Repub
lics can commit no creator error than to
adopt or continue any feature in their sys
terns of government which may bo calculat
ed to create or increase the love ol powe
in the bosoms of those to whom necessity
obliges them to commit the management of
their affaiis. And, surely, nothing is more
likely to produce such a statu of mind than
the lung continuance of an officer of high
trust. Nothing ban bo more corrupting,
nothing more destructive of all thole noble
feelings which belong to ilie character of a
devoted republican patriot:
When this corrupting passion once takes
possession of the human mind,lifte the love
of gold it becomes insatiable. It is the
never-dying worm in hisbosom.grows wilh
his growth, and strengthens with the de
cling years of its victim. If this bo true, it
is the part of wisdom fur a republic to limit
tho service of thai officer at least to whom
she has entrusted tho management of her
foreign relations, the execution of her laws,
and the command of her armies and navies,
lo a period so short as to prevent his for
getting that he; is the accountable agent, not
tho principal the servant, not the master.
Until an amendment to the constitution can
be affected, public opinion may secure tho
desired object. I give my aid to it, by re
newing the pledge heretofore given, that,
under no circumstances, will I consent to
servo a second term.
Hut if there is danger to public liborly
from the acknowledged defects of tho Con
stitution, in tho want of limit to the contin
uance of tho Executive power in the same
hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less
from a misconstruction of that instrument,
as it regards the powers actually given. 1
cannot conceive that, by a fair construction,
any or either of its provisions would be
found to constitute the President a part of
tho legislative potvor. It cannot bo claimed
from the power to recommend, since, al
though enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a
privilego which ho holds in common wilh
every other citizen. And although there
may be something more of conGdeuccin thejtt
propriety of tho measures rccommqnded in j
the one case than in the other, in the obli
gation's of ultimate decision there can be no
fference. In the languago of tho Consti
tution, "all the legislative powers which it
rants "arc vested in the Congress of Iho
United Stales." It would be a solecism in
ancuaco to say that any portion of these is
nol included in the whole'.
It may be said, indeed that tho Constitu
tion has given to the Executive thn power
to annul the rets of tho legislative body', by
clusmg lo them his assent. So a similar
power has necessarily resulted from that in
sirilmcnt to the Judiciaryjand yet tho Jndi
ciarv forms no part ol tho Legislature.
l'hcrc is. it is true, this diffeicnco between
these grants of power. The Executivo can
put Ins negative upon the acts ol the Legis
lature for other cause than that of want of
conformity lo the Constitution, whilst the
Judiciary can onlv declato void those which
violate that instrument. Lint the decision ol
the Judiciary is final in sucli a case, where
as, in every instance where the veto of ihe
Executive is applied, it mav be overcome
by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress. I he necaii-o upon the acts of
tho Legislative bv the Executive authority
and that in the hands of one individual
would seem lo be an incongruity in our sys
tern. Like some others ot a similar char
acter, however, it appears io bo highly ex
pedient, and if used only wilh the forbear
ance, and in the spirit .whieh.wnfi intended
by its 'authors, it may be productive of gr at
good,and be found one of the best safeguards
iu me union, ai use period nt the lorma
Hon of the Constitution, the principle does
noi appear io nave enjoyed much favor
ihe Stalo Governments. It existed but
two; and in ono of these there was a plural
'.xccuiive. n we wcuid search lor Hi
motives which operated upon the purely
patriotic and enlightened assembly which
framed the Constitution, for the adoption of
a provision so apparently repugnant to the
leading Democratic principle that ihe majo
ity should govern, we must reject ihe idt
mav mey anticipaieu trom it any benefit to
tho ordinary course of legislation. Thev
knew too well ihe high degree of inlell
the enlightened character of the Slate Legis
latures, not to Vive the fullest confidence
that the two bodies elected by them would
be worthy representatives of such constitu
ents, and, of course, that they would require
no aid iu conceiving and maturing the mea
sures which the circumstances of tho coun
try might require; and it is preposterous to
suppose that a thought could for a moment
have been entertained that the President,
placed al tho capital, in tho centre of the
country, could better understand the wants
and wishes of the people than their own
immediate representatives, who spend a
part of every year among them, living with
them, often laboring with them, and bound
to them by the triple tio of interest, duty,
and affection. To assist or control Con
gress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could
nut, I conceive, have bceii tho motive for
confening tho vetd power on the President.
This argument acquires additions! force
from the fact of its never having been tiius
used by the first eix Presidents; and two
of them wero members of tho convention,
one picsiding over its deliberations, and the
other having a larger share in consummat
ing tho labois of that august body than any
other person. But if bills were never re
turned to Congress by either of the Presi
dents above referred to, upon the ground of
their being inexpedient, or not as well adapt
ed as they might be to tho wants of ihe. peo
ple, the veto was applied upon that of want
of conformity to tho Constitution, or because
errors had been committed from a too hasty
enactment.
There is another ground for tho adoption
of l(ie veto principle, which had probably
moro influence in recommending it to the
Convention than any other. I refer to the
security which it gives to the just and
equitablo action of the Legislatuio upon all
paris of the Union. It could not but have
occurred to the Convention that, lii a coun
try so extensive, embracing so groat a va
riety of soil and climate, and, consequently,
of products, and which, from the same cau
ses, must over oxhibit a great difference in
the amount of tho population of its various
sections, calling for a great diversity in the
employments of the people, that the legisla
tion of the majority might not alwnys justly
regard the rights and interests of the minor
ity and that acts of this character might bo j
paSEcdjundcran express gram by the woids
of tho Constitution; and, therefore, not with
in the competency of the judiciary to de
clare void; that, however enlightened and
patriotic they might suppose, from pan ex
perience, tho member of CongrCHs might
be, and however largely partaking in I lie
general of the liberal feelings of tho people,
it was impossible to expect that bodies so
consutuicu snoutu not sometimes be con
oiled by local interests and sectional feci-
ings. Jt was proper, thcrcforp, to provide
some umpire, from, whose situation, and
mode of appointment more independence;
and freedom from such influences might be
expressed. , Such a one was allorded by the
Executive Department, constituted by the
Constitution, A pprcqn elected to. that high
office, (laving his constituents iu every sec
tion, State, and subdivision of tho Union,
must considor himself bouno by tho most
solemn sanctions to guard, protect, and dc-
r l .i. L;L... -r ii i e
icim uiu ngius oi an, anu .oi every portion.
great or small, jrom tho Injustice and op
pression of the rest. I consider iho veto
power, therefore, given by the Constitution
to the Executive ot the Uoitcd States solely
as a conservative power, to be used onlyi
1st, to protect the Constitution Irom viola
tion; 2dly, tho people from Iho effect!, of
hasty legislation, where their will has been.
probably disregarded or nut well Understood
nd, 3dly, to prevent tho effects of combi
nations violative of the right of minorities'.
lr. reletcncc to the second of these objects,
I may observe, that I consider ji the right
and privilege of tho people lo decide dispu
ted points of tho Constitution, arising frorrj
the general grant of power" to .Congress to
carry into effect tho powcr3 expressly given!
And l believe, with Mr. ftladisonj "lhat
repeated recognitions, under varied circumJ
stances, in acis ol tho legislative, Executive;
and Judicial branches of the Government'
accompanied by indications in, different
mmlos of the concurrcnco of the general
will of ihe nation, as affording lo the Piesij
dent sufficient authority for his considering
such disputed points as settled." i
Upwards of half a century has clasped
since the adoption of our present form of
Government. It-would be an object morq
highly desirable than the gratification of the
curiosity of speculative statesmen, if iis
precise situation could be ascertained, a
:. i.:i.:. i r .i ..
lull viiiuil iiiauu ill lilt: iinRrniinnq ri nil. I
. V 1. 1, k. .
of its Departments, of the powers whicli
they respectively claim and exercise1, of ho
ihe crllisions whiah have occurred between K
them, or between the whole Government
and ihose of the States, or either of them.
We could then compaie our actual condi-
its operations, anu ascertain whether the
predictions of the patriots who opposed its
adoption, or the confident hopes of its ad;
vncates, have been best realized. Tho
great dread of the former seems to have
been that the reserved powers of the Slates
would be absoibed by ihose of the Fedeial
Government, and a consolidated power es
tablished, leaving to the Stales the shadow
only, of lhat independent action for which,
they had sb 2ealously contended, and on
the preservation of which they relied as the
last hope of liberty. Without denying that
the result to which they looked wilh so
much apprehension is in the way of being
realized, it is obvious that they did not
clearly see the mode of its accomplishment,
The General Government has seized upon,
none of tho reserved rights of the States.
As far as any open warfare may liavo gono,
the State authorities have amply maintained
their rights. To a casual observer, our
system presents no appearance of discord
between the different members which com
pose it. Even the addition of many new
ones has produced no jarring. They movo
in their respective orbits in pcrlect harmo
ny wilh tho central head, and with eacbj
other. But there is still an under current at
work, by which, if not seasonably chockA."',
the worst apprehensions of our anti-fcderi?K'
patriots will be realized. And not only
will tho Stato authorities bo overshadowed
by tho great increase 6f power in the Exe- i
cutivo Department of the General Govern-
ment, but the character of that Government,'
if not its designation, be essentially and iadi
cally changed. This stato of tilings hag '
been in partoffected by causes inherent in, 1
ihd Coustitulion, and in part by tho never I
failing tendency of political power lo in- i
crease itself. I3y making the President tho i
sole distiibuter of all tho patronage of ihe
Government, the framers of ihe Constitution! '
do not appear to havo anticipated at how
short a period it would become a formidable
instrument to control the free operations of
the State Governments. Of trifling- impor
tance at first, ithad.early in Mr. Jefferson's '
administration, becomo so powerful as to 1
crealo great alarm in the mind of that patri
ot, from the potent influence it might exert
in controlling tho freedom of tho elective
fianchiso. If such could have then been
ihe effects of its influence, ho w much grea
ter must be the danger at this lime, quad
rupled in amount, as it certainly is, and;
moro completely under the conlrjl of tho.
Executivo will, than their construction of
their powers allowed, or tho forbeauiiw
characters of all the early Presidents, pc
mittcd litem to make? But it is not by the
oxtent.of its patronage alone lhat the Execu- '
live Department has become dangerous, bu
by tlio uso which it appears may be mado
of tho appointing power, to bring under jti'
n