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REPLY OF MAJOR GENERAL FRANKLIN TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. • On the 6th day of April last a report, pur porting to be signed .by the members of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, was published in many of the leading papers in the United States. The Thirty-seventh Congress expired, by constitutional limitation, on the 4th of March previous. Some of the testimony embodiedin the report has been taken since that time, and consequently this document has been spread before the country without having been sub mitted to either branch of Congress. I do not refer to this irregular proceeding of a committee which had ceased to have a le gal existence, as a defence against the charges of which they have convicted me, but as one of the facts fairly to be considered in connec tion with the report itself and the purpose it was intended to subserve. The committee have devoted much space to me, either in citations of testimony or in state ments of their own; but in that limited space they have presented me before the country as responsible for the loss of the battle of Fred -ericksburg, 'in consequence of my disobedience of the orders of Gen. Burnside. If this be true, I have been guilty of the highest crime known to the military law, for the commission of which my life is forfeit and my name consigned to infamy. Justice to'the country, to the administration which has given me important commands in its armies, and to myself, demands that I meet these grave allegations as promptly as possi ble ; while, from ;the peculiar circumstances of the case , the mode I adopt •is the only one open to me. Since the publication of the report I have received an answer to• an inquiry at the Adju tant General's office, informing me that there are no charges on Ale against me at the de partment to which, as a soldier, I am amenable. lam not at liberty to ignore a report which has already reached the hands of a majority of the loyal people of the United States, ema nating from a committee of their representa tives in Congress, because the Legislative De partment of the government has taken upon itself duties that belong to the Executive. I cannot shut my eyes to the magnitude of the question in its immediate public aspect. If it affected only myself, I might be well contented with the verdict which history will pass upon the transaction, under the sacred law which governs the ultimate triumph of the truth. • For two years we have been struggling to subdue a rebellion so enormous in its propor tions and so persistent in its purposes that it has become a revolution. This government has put into the field over seven hundred thousand men. To discipline these men, and to lead them in the field, the country must de pend upon such as have been educated, to some extent-at leas; in military science - . - Hence it is a public question of the highest possible importance, whether an officer who has held important commands since the beginning of the war is entitled to the confidence of the people or has justly forfeited his claim to it. It is a sad commentary upon the disjointed condition of the times that at the very moment when the nation is offering its blood and treasure with out stint in the effort to preserve inviolate the principles of civil liberty, a citizen of that na tion, however humble, shall be accused, tried, and condemned of an infamous erime before a tribunal sitting in secret session, without no tice, or even an intimation of the charges made against him ; without the opportunity to confront or examine the witnesses brought against him ; to be himself called and interro gated, in utter ignorance that he is under trial ; and, finally, to be-denied permission to pro duce witnesses, when the fact became apparent to him that he was, for some unexplained rea son, in danger of condemnation. Since the time when the corner stone of all civil liberty was laid under that government from which we derive our laws, which gives to the meanest subject, or the greatest crimi nal; the right to meet his accusers face to face and to confront his witnesses, no parallel can be found, in the history of constitutional gov ernment, so startling in its violations of all that is sacred in personal rights as are the proceedings of the secret tribunals created by the Congress which has just expired. The report in question has been given to the press, but no part of the evidence is published, except such extracts as the committee have seen fit to embody in the report itself. Of my own testimony, given before the committee, but a small part is printed. I shall, therefore, submit to the public some facts, Batted by me to the committee, which they have not pub lished, and some of the proofs which I reques ted the committee to take, but which they de clined upon the ground that they had not the time to take the testimony. Among the facts submitted by me to the committee which they have not noticed, are some which :I must repeat in substance here : ACROSS THE RAEPAHANNOUIC--GEN. BURNSIDE'S ORDER On the 12th day of December last, when I crossed the Rappahannock, I was in command of the left Grand Division of the Army of the Potomac, which numbered about 40,000 men. It was entirely crossed and posted in line of battle by three o'clock of that day. My com mand consisted of two corps of three divisions each. At , 5 o'clock General Burnside came to my headquarters, where he met, with me, Gen erals Wm. F. Smith and John F. Reynolds, corps commanders. The subject of conversa tion was a proposed attack upon the enemy on the following morning, when I strongly ad vised General Burnside to make an attack from any division upon the enemy's right, with a column of at least 30,000 men, to be sent in at daylight in the morning. At that time two divisions of General Hooker's command were on the north side of the river, near the bridges that I had crossed. In order to make such an attack as I advised, I informed General Burn side that these two divisions must be crossed during the night. I reiterated my request that I should receive my orders as early as possi lie, that I might make the necessary disposi tions of the troops before daylight. He stated at one time that I should have my orders in any event before midnight, and at another that I should have them in two or three hours. He left my headquarters about 6 o'clock p. m., and I awaited his orders during the night. None reached me until seven and a half o'clock in the morning. At midnight I sent an aid to ask for them, and received the reply that they were being prepared and would be sent forth with. The order which I received was brought by General Hardie, of General Burnside's staff, well known in the service as an able and zealous officer. It reached my hands at 7h. 20m. on the morning of the 13th. My com mand was then in the same position as when General Burnside left my headquarters the ...----------, '-- • __ , fr , --- _ •.: , , 1 : - - -_ • . --,,,, k, •-1 —_,,,Lt, s.Tt.. ' .:1. . _ _7'- - • tU. , - • 0 n • p 4. -'-.t- _ • ~_,_...._",;....„,_,... ~,.._._ t. _... L, ~,tv,.,....,__ . (tit tot ..= _ _ ......... .•..___. _ VOL. 6.-NO. 216 evening previous. The night had passed with out orders, and General Hooker's two divisions were still on the other side of the river. With the light furnished by this state of facts, Gen. Burnside's order, though incongruous and con tradictory on its face, admitted of but one in terpretation, viz: that he intended to make an armed observation from the left, to ascertain the strength of the enemy—an interpretation also given to it by both of my corps comman ders. The order is as follows : "HEACQUARTZES ARMY OF Palouse, Deaambar 18, 5.55 a. m. Major General Frawklin, , Comtnanding Left Grand Division, Army of Potomac "General Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and t'emain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the Old Richmond road ; and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass be low Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well sup ported, and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the Plank road to its intersection with the telegraph road, where they will divide with a view to seizing the heights on both of these roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, be hopes, com pel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge be tween these points. " He makes these moves by columns distant from each other, with the view of avoiding the possibility ,of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement dur ing a fog. Two of Gen. Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions given to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be for warded to yon by an orderly very soon. Yon will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 6 Scott,' "I have the honor to be, General, "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "Jowl G. PARKE, Chief of Staff." Thus it will be seen that after ordering me to keep my whole command in readiness for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, I was directed to send out at once a division at least to seize the hill at Hamilton's. After referring to the order to Geteral Sumner, he reiterates the direction to keep my whole com mandin readiness for the Richmond road move. ment. For three hours before the order reached me I was satisfied that General Burnside had given up the idea (if he ever entertained it) of making an attack in foroe from the left, for the delay in sending the orders made such an attack im possible with any reasonable chance of success. And in this connection it is not improper in me to state that a map, made by the rebel General Jackson's topographical engineer, has fallen into the bands of our officers since General Hooker has been in command, from which it is apparent that the enemy's position could not have been carried by any force less than that recommended by me on the afternoon of the 12th. General Burnside knew the strength in num bers and position as well as the desperate de t.-rming.tron of tie rebel - army. — Had he in tended a movement in force his orders both to myself and General Sumner would have been commensurate with such a purpose. Had he expected me to make such an attack upon an enemy whom I had met too often to be guilty of the folly of underrating, he would have given me the night in which to make a disposition of my troops for the conflict of the morrow, in stead of leaving me to pass it in sleepless anx iety in my tent. THE ADVANON AND ITS raosrson. General Burnside ought to have known, and doubless did know, that to make his "maid' attack," and thereby bring on a geneial en garment on my front, under an order of this description, sent after daylight in the morning, was to send his troops to a useless and una vailable slaughter, and therefore he could not have intended it. I acted upon the order at ones, as nearly aeoording to ite literal direc tions as was in my power. The attack was ordered to be led by General Meade, one of the ablest officers in our service, supported by General Gibbon on his right and General Dou bleday in reserve. These three divisions formed one of the two corps (Gen. Reynolds') under my command on the south side of the river. Shortly after Meade advanced, the ene my's cavalry appeared on the left, accompanied by artillery, and Doubleday was ordered to drive them away. Soon after these troops were advanced, finding that the enemy was in force on all sides, I sent to General Stoneman to cross with one of his divisions, and before that had entirely crossed, his second division was also ordered over. The crossing of these di visions (which should have been made during the previous night, had an attack in force been contemplated) occupied at least three hours. While this was going on, one of Gen. Smith's divisions was also ordered to report to General Reynolds. Of these several movements Gen eral Burnside was kept informed, by reports made by General Hardie to him at intervals during the day ; and between 7.40 a. m. and 3.40 p. m. it was reported to him by an officer of his own staff, that out of the eight divisions composing my entire command, including the two divisions that had been ordered across the river, six divisions had been employed in ma king the effort to seise Hamilton's hill, keeping the attacking force supported and in checking the advance of the enemy, while but two di visions were left to protect the bridges, the right and the centre, and to keep the line of retreat open, and which two divisions were actually attacked during the day. REPORTS OF GENERAL HARDIE After my testimony had been taken by the committee, and they had declined to call Gen. Hardie as a witness, I asked permission to hand them copies of the reports made by him to Gen. Burnside during the day. This request was granted ; and although it is impossible to over state the value of the testimony contained in these dispatches, fourteen in number, sent from the field of battle by an officer of the staff of General Burnside, who could have no motive at the time to state anything but the exact truth, as the events were transpiring under his own eyes, yet no mention of or reference to these dispatches is made by the committee in their report. As they present a statement of the transactions of the day upon the left,•as seen by a competent and impartial witness, I present them in full, in the order in which they were sent. It will be noticed that the first dis patch is dated 7.40 a. m. This dispatch is as follows, -viz ; MUDQUARTSRS - FRANKLIN'S GRAND DIVISION, } December 13, 7.40, a. m. GENERAL BUENSIDE :—Gen. Meade's division is to make the movement from our left ; but it is reported that the enemy's skirmishers are ad vancing, indicating an attack upon our position on the left. JAS. A. HARDIE, Brig. Gen. Volunteers, Asst. Inspr. Gen. The telegraph station connecting with Gen. Burnside's headquarters was about one-third of a mile from my headquarters, so that by 8 o'clock of that morning General Burnside was RARRISBURG, PA:, WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1863 informed by his assistant inspector general of the fact that I had sent Gen. Meade's division to make the movement directed by him. I submit, with entire confidence, that had Gen. Burnside, upon the receipt of Gen. Hardie's first dispatch, discovered that I had misappre hended his order, or was sending too small a force to its execution ; he would at the moment have corrected my misapprehension. So far from that, General Burnside did not communicate with me in any manner from that time until 2.25 p. m. of that day, when be sent me an order in writing, in which it was stated that my instructions of this morning were so far modified as to require an advance upon the heights immediately in my front. General Hardie's despatch upon the receipt of this order is as follows : HEADQUARTERS LEFT GRAND DIVISION, 1 December 13,225 p. m. 5 General Burnside Dispatch received. Frank lin will do his best. New troops gone in. Will report soon again. JAS. A. HARDIE, Brig. Gen. Vole. Later in the day, and after 3 o'clock, when every regiment that I could spare was engaged in various parts of the field (as will appear by referring to Hardie's reports, and Gen. Burn side's own testimony hereafer given,) with an enemy that greatly outnumbered us, and when all my energies were directed to save the wing from being overpowered, and its lines of re treat cut off, I received a verbal message from Gen. Burneide, by one of his staff, that Gen. Sumner's troops were being hard pressed, with a request to make a diversion in his favor, if I could. To this I also responded that I would do my best. For the details of what was done by me du ring the day, I leave Gen. Hardie's dispatches to speak for themselves. He was at my side from shortly after sunrise until sunset. He not only knew of every order and movement made by me, or under my direction, but was a perfectly competent judge of their wisdom and autragency. In the performance of an act of common jus tice he has placed these dispatches at my dis posal* The following are copies of all those sent by him on the 13th of December, the day of the battle : HEADQUARTERS FRANKLIN'S GRAND DIVISION, December 13, 7 40 a. m. General Burneicle: General Meade's division is to make the movement from our left ; but it is just reported that the enemy's skirmishers are advancing, indicating an attack upon our po sition on the left. 9 o'clock a. m.—General Meade just moved out. Doubleday supports him. Meade's skir mishers engaged, however, at once with the enemy's skirmishers. Battery opening, on Meade probably, from position on old Rich mond road. II o'clock a. m.—Meade advanced half a mile, and holds on. Infantry of enemy in woods in front of extreme left-ilalso in front of Howe. No loss, so far, of great importance. General Vinton badly, but not dangerously wounded. LATER..—Reynolds has been forced to de velop his whole line. An attack of some force of enemy's troops on our left seems probable, as far as can now be judged. Stoneman has been directed to cross nne division to support our left. 'deport of cavalry pickets from the other ride of the river, that enemy's troops were moving down the river on this side during the latter part of the night. Howe's pickets reported movements in their front, same direc tion. Still they have a strong force well posted, with batteries there. 12 o'clock m.—Birney's division is now get ting into position. That done, Reynolds will order Meade to advance. Batteries over the river are to shell the enemy's position in the woods in front of Reynolds' left. He thinks the effect will be to protect Meade's advance. A column of the enemy's infantry is passing along the crest of the hills from right to left, as we look at it. 12.5 p. m.—Gen. Meade's line is advancing in the direction you prescribed this morning. 1 o'clock p. m.—Enemy opened a battery on Reynolds, enfilading Meade. Reynolds has opened all his batteries on it—no report yet. Reynolds hotly engaged at this moment; will report in a few moments again. 1.15 o'clock p. m.—Heavy engagements of infantry. Enemy in force where battery ie. Meade is assaulting the hill. Will report in a few minutes again. 1.25 o'clock p. m.—Meade is in the woods in his front ; seems to be able to hold on. Reynolds will push Gibbon in, if necessary. The battery and woods referred to must be near Hamilton's house. The infantry firing is pro longed and quite heavy. Things look well enough. Men in fine spirits. • 1.40 o'clock p. m.—Meade having carried a portion of the enemy's position in the woods, we have three hundred prisoners. Enemy's battery on extreme left retired; tough work; men fight well. Gibbon has advanced to Meade's right ; men fight well, driving the ene my. Meade has suffered severely. Doubleday, to Meade's left, not engaged. 2.15 o'clock p. m.—Gibbon and Meade driven back from the woods. Newton gone forward. Jackson's corps of the enemy at tacks on the left. Gen. Gibbon slightly woun ded. Gen. Bayard mortally wounded by a shell. Things do not look as well on Reynolds' front, still we'll have new troops in soon. 2.25 o'clock p. m.—Dispatch received.— Franklin will do his best. New troops gone in—will report aeon again. 3 o'clock p. m.--Reynolds seems to be hold ing his own. Things look better somewhat. 3.40 o'clock p. m.—Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon as it can be col lected, and if it can be done in time, of course another attack will be made. The enemy are in force in the woods on our left towards Ham ilton's, and are threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They seem to have de tached a portion of their force to our front, where Howe and Brooks are now engaged. Brooks has some prisoners, and is down to the railroid. Just as soon as the left is safe, our forces here will be prepared for a front attack, but it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are engaged in front anyhow. Notwith standing the unpleasant items I relate, the morale generally of the troops is good. 4.30 o'clock p. m.—The enemy is still in force on our left and front. An attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed. A new attack has just opened on our left, but the left is safe, though it is too late to advance either to the left or front. I am 'willing to abide by this testimony, to determine whether I lost the battle of Fred ericksburg in consequence of my disobedience of an order directing me to attack with a division at least, and to keep it well sup ported. On the night following I was with General Burnside at his headquarters, when he in- *ln addition to the fames referred to in these dis patches, a division from General Wilcox's corps repor ted to me late in the f • %, and was put in the vi cinity of&S.A however, to aid in any \ left. formed me that he intended to renew the attack from the right and to lead the Ninth corps in person. At two interviews during that night (which lasted at least two hours) he did not intimate to me any disapprobation of my con duct, or of that of my officers and men, during that day. GENERAL BURNSIDE EXPRESSES HIS CONFIDENCE IN QENERAL FRANKLIN. Again I urged upon him that if the attack was to be renewed to renew it from the left, but with such force and preparations as would command success. • An order, however, for an attack from the right was given by him. On the following day I had another interview with General Burnside, at his request, in which he informed me that strong protests were made against a renewal of the attack by Generals Sumner and Hooker, and he abandoned the plan of another attack with expressions of the greatest reluctance. I was with him for two or three hours on that occasion, and during that interview he did not express or intimate in his language or deportment toward me, that be was not entirely satisfied with my conduct and that of my officers and men. -On the Wednes day or Thursday following I had another inter view with him, in which, so far from expressing any dissatisfaction with me, be stated very distinctly that I alone of his Generals had • held up his hands," as he expressed it; that be had fully determined to resign his command, and to recommend me as his auccessor, as the Commanding General of the Army of the Poto mac. From that time until I was relieved from the command of the Left Grand Division, although frequently called into consultation by General Burnaide, he never told me, or gave me to understand, that I had either misconstrued or disobeyed, his orders, or was in any way responsible for the disaster of the 13th, or had in the least lost his confidence. Indeed, bad he believed that I had disobeyed his orders on the 13th, he could not have discharged his duty to the country without preferring charges against me to that effect. GENERAL ORDER NO. 8 It: was during the period of time last referred to that the General Order No. 8, to which the committee have made reference in their re port, was directed to be issued by Gen. Burn side.. The committee state that this order dismissed some officers from the service, sub ject to the approval of the President, and re lieved others from duty with the Army of the Potomac; that General Burnside asked the President to sanction the - order or accept his resignation as Major General; that the Presi dent acknowledged that General Burnside was right, but declined to decide without consult ing with some of his advisers. As I was re lieved from duty with the Army of the Poto mac almost immediately after this interview with the President, I shall assume that I was one of the officers thus relieved in'the order— an assumption I . could not make from any evi dence derived from General Burnside's conduct to me When we were together, but which lam compelled to make because I have been so in formed by two gentlemen of high character who have seen and read the order. GENERAL BURNSIDE DEMANDS WHOLESALE ! ' DE- CAPITATION It further appears from the report that the committee had that order before them; and as they have seen fit to visit upon me solely the responsibility for the lose of the battle of Fredericksburg, without referring in any man ner to the repulse on the right, or stating its fearful loss in killed and wounded, I feel at liberty to state, on the authority of these same gentlemen who have seen order No. 8, that under that order General Hooker was one of the officers dismissed from service. subject to the approval of the President. If, therefore, that order is invoked as a record of conviction, and by it General Hooker is dismissed while I am only relieved, I have the right to state the fact, and leave the public to judge of the mo tives of the committee, in stating that they have not considered it essential to report upon the operations of the right wing of this battle. Not only so, but I have the right to challenge the verity of the statement " that the Presi dent acknowledged Gen. Burnside was right," when it was known to the committee that in the same order in which the President relieved General Burnside from the command of the Army of the Potomac, he made Gen, Hooker his successor. But I shall not accept it as conclusive against my conduct, that General Burnside did recom mend that I should be relieved. It is a part of the history of the times that after the fail ure of his attempt upon the rebel army behind the heights of Fredericksburg,- he addressed a letter to General Halleck, relieving the Secre tary of War and the General-in• Chief from all responsibility for that movement ; and it is equally true, though not so publicly known, that shortly after that letter was published, Gen. Burnside made quite as formal and ear nest a request to the President to remove the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief from the positions severally occupied by them, as he did to dismiss certain of his officers in the Army of the Potomac. If it was true that the movement was his own, it was but an act of common justice to assume its responsibility. TWO PLANS OF ATTACK—THE ONE ACTED UPON. Without intending to reflect upon that kind of magnanimity that takes the responsibility of a failure from the shoulders of those above us, and places it upon those below us, I will prove by documentary evidence from General Burnside's band, that his plan, as given to the committee, was not the plan on which he con ducted the operations of the battle. The committee have printed General Burn side's plan of attack as given by 'him." By the side of this I print an extract from the letter of General Burnside to General Halleck, dated December 19, six days after the battle, by which it appears that he intended to make his 4g vigorous attack," as he there calls it, over two miles from my front and upon the heights in the rear of the town of Fredericksburg, and that part of his order to me in which be in formed me of the orders which be had given to General Sumner, showing that Gen. Sumner's movement was to be simultaneous with mine. In this he states the measures taken to avoid a collision between General Sumner's forces and mine, while in the plan before the committee he is represented as testifying that he did not mean that General Sumner should move until I had taken the position designated in the order. GENERAL BURNSIDE'S PLAN or ATTACK, AS GIVEN BY THE COMMITTEE • • The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where we made our at taok, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour through a bad country. I obtained from a colored man, from the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road, whichproved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position bad been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy, cutting their line in two ; and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of their works. GENERAL BURNSIDE'S PLAN OF ATTACK IN HIS LETTER TO GENERAL HALLECK I discovered that he did not anticipate the PRICE TWO CENTS. crossing of our whole force at Fredericksburg, and I hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command over at that place, to separate, by a vigorous attack, the forces 9f the enemy on the river below from the forces behind and on the crest in the rear of the town, in which case we could fight him with great advantages in our favor. For this we had to gain a height on the extreme right of the crest which com manded a new road lately made by the enemy, &c. EXTRACT FROM GENERAL BURNIDE'S ORDER TO ME, INFORMING ME OF GENERAL SUMNER'S ORDERS He has ordered another column of a divis ion pr more to be moved from Gen. Oumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both these roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He •makes these moves by col umns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. The statements in Gen. Burnside's letter to Gen. Halleck, his statement in the order of the 13th to me, and his statement of his plan before the committee, all agree upon one point at least—that he aid not mean to make his "main attack" under either of those orders. Under the orders he issued he designed seizing, first, the heights in rear of ,the town ; next, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, which he supposed would stagger the enemy ; and then, he pro posed to make a "direct attack" in the enemy's front and drive him out of his works. The orders not only agree in this; but the fact, in all the significant proportions of its results, in killed and wounded, was before the committee, that Gen. Sumner's command did actually move to seize. " those heights on the crest in rear of the town," almost as soon as I did. At that time I had not only taken the position at Capt. Hamilton's, but was crossing troops from the other side of the river to save those who had been sent to make the attempt. Gen. Burnside was informed of all this by Gen. Hardie as the effort progressed. How then is it to be ac counted for that Gen. Burnside could have so far forgotten his intentions as to say " that he did not intend making the attack on the right until that position (my position) had been taken ?" If he did not intend to do so, why did he make the attaok before the contingency happened ? He knew that the position on the left was not taken ; why then did he order General Sumner forward if his intention was to keep him back until it was taken ? If he did not intend that Gen. Sumner should move until I had taken the height at Captain Hamil ton's, what does this language in his order to me mean; "He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from Gen. Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection with the telegraph road, where they will divide with a view of seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights with the heights near Capt. Hamilton's will, he hopes, &o. He makes these moves by column's distant from each other with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog." This is the language of a simultaneous movement ; and that no doubt may be left about it, be gives •as a reason why he keeps the moving columns distant from each other, that they might not encounter each other in a fog. If both commas were not to be moved at the same time, it is difficult to see how they could have collided in a fog. It is, therefore, perfectly evident, that under both orders issued that morning, by General Burnside, he imagined that he could seize cer tain heights over two miles distant from each other, with the comparatively small force of a division sufficiently supported for each col umn, and that when these were taken, he ex pected to follow up by orders for a main attack with the "whole command," - which I was to keep in "position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road." In the execution of these orders, the enemy discovered himself in force so mu ch greater than Gen. Burnside an ticipated, that the plan proved totally inade quate to its expected results. The disaster which followed is a matter of history; and considering the pressure to which the mind of the commanding general must have been subjected since that time, it is not diffi cult to find a reason why his present recollec tion of this plan differs so materially from the orders which be gave before the movement was made ; but I submit that is an insufficient reason for visiting the consequences of the failure upon his subordinates in command. GENERAL FRANKLIN EXPLAINS HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE After reciting the order, the committee state that when last before them I considered the m4aning of the order to be an armed observa tion to ascertain where the enemy was. They then proceeded as follows : "In his (Franklin's) testimony, given when your committee were at Falmouth, he says : I I put in all the troops that I thought it prudent and proper to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command as far as I could, and and at the same time keep my connection with the river open.' " 'These two statements seem to be presented under the idea that they con vict me of an inconsistency, and in the report furnished by the committee to one of the news papers, printed in pamphlet form, entitled "Tribune War Tract, No. 1," this statement of the committee is headed in capital letters : "Franklin's inconsistent statements." What inconsistency is there between my interpreta tion of the second clause of the order that it was for an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was, and in the statement that in sending in this armed force of obser vation I had ascertained where the enemy was, and had been compelled to fight the whole strength of my command as far as I could, and at the same time keep my communication with the river open, in resisting a superior force, which had discovered itself en three sides of me ? But the committee, in quoting my tes timony, for some reason satisfactory to them selves, have omitted to state what was testi fied by me in the same connection. By referring to the testimony given by me at Falmouth (which has heretofore been made public), I find that the words immediately fol lowing the quotation madq by the committee in their present report are as follows: "The reason that we failed was that we had not troops enough to carry the points where the attack was made, under the orders that were given." Why the committee have omitted that part of my evidence, while from the quotation marks the reader is led to suppose the whale sentence is given, I shall not stop to inquire. IMBIBER OF TROOPS USED BY FRANKLIN IN THE ATTACK The next statement in the report refers to the number of troops with which the attack was made by me, under the orders to send out "a division, at leest," to seize the heights near Captain Hamilton's,. and that is headed in the tract in the same conspicuous manner, "Frank lin responsible for the defeat." The committee's statement on this subject occupies but a few lines, and admits the send. PUBLISHED EVERY MORNING, 1817NDAYS NICKPTID, BY 0. BARRETT & CO MI DAILY Payittor ABU DSOS Will be eeread to enb scribers reading in the Borough for TRN OUSTS Pia woos; paysible to the Carrier. Mail oubeeribere, RTa DOLLAU PER ANNUM. THE WNICELY PATRIOT SAD UNION is published at ?w0 DOLLARS PIM ANNUM, invariably in advance. Ten sold* to one address,, fif teen dollars. Cmmected with this establishment is an =tamely@ .708 OFFICE, containing a, variety of plain and fancy type, unequalled by any establishment in the interior of the State, for which the patronage of the public is so- United. ing out by me, under this order, of four divi sions, numbering 16,600 men, at' stated by them, without giving the number of Double day's division, which was nearly 7,000 more. The committee name only Meade's, Gibbons's, Doubleday's and Birney's divisions, as those by which the attack was made and supported. They had it in proof, and in General Hardie's reports, that Newton's and Sicklea's , divisions also aided in that movement, while the divi sions of Howe and Brooks also engaged the enemy during the day. However easy of: ex planation it may be that the employment of Newton's division was not referred to in the: report, it is difficult to understand why Sick-, lea's division should be omitted, when the only evidence they have published on this subject discloses the fact that Sickles's division was also engaged. The committee further say " that the attack was in reality made by one of the smallest di visions in my command, the division of Gen. Meade, numbering about 4,500 men." They have omitted to state in that connection, what was in evidence before them, that Meade's di vision was posted on the extreme left of my line, and the order being to attack at once was consequently best posted for the attack. 'The Army of the Potomac bad no braver soldier or better officer than Gen. Meade to lead his di vision to the attack. The committee next say that " Gen. Burn side, upon bearing of the small force ordered to attack the enemy, sent an order to General Franklin'to make a vigorous attack with his whole force. " The committee do not state when General Burnside sent to me any order after that received at 7.30 a. m.; but if the or dinary eonstruotion is to be put upon their language, they intend to be understood that.a second order was sent to me immediately after the receipt of General Hardie's first dispatch to General Burnside, dated at 740 a. m., in which he was informed of what I proposed to do under the order. As before observed, this dispatch must have been received by General Burnside by 8 o'clock a. m. So that, accord ing to the report, General Burnside sent me a second order to make a " vigorous attack with my whole force," shortly after 8 o'clock a. m. By referring to General Hardie's reports, it will be seen that the first dispatch from Gen. Burnside, after that brought by him, is dated 2.25 p. m., in which he states " December 13-2.25 p. m.—Dispatch re ceived. Franklin will do his beat. New troops gone in. Will report soon again." . This order, so far from being an order to make a "vigorous attack with my whole force." directed me as follows : Your instructions of this morning are so far modified as to require an advance upon the heights immediately in your front." The response made to this modification of the order is shown by Gen. Hardie'e dispatch to his chief, just given. The committee then proceed : " Several of • the witnesses testified that had the attack then been renewed with all the available force under General Franklin's command, it would have been successful." Who those witnesses *are it is not stated, nor is a word of their testimony given. If any one upon whose opinion the public would place any reliance has been found to express such an opinion, it has been given in ignorance of the orders under which I was acting during the day, or upon the assumption that such an order as the committee state I did receive was issued to me in the early part of the day. - I have shown that no such order was issued, and that the second order that was is sued was received at 2.25 p. m. In connec tion with this modified order it is necessary to state that immediately in front of one of my divisions was a narrow valley, held on both sides by thg enemy, and protected by abattie, and troops entering it were necessarily sub jected to a fire from both ,ides. It is patent, from an examination of this last order, that so far from being an order to renew the attack upon the hill at Captain Hamilton's, it was a virtual abandonment of that attempt. I wee not allowed the opportunity to examine those witnesses nor to produce those I named to the committee, who were with me during the day, and who alone were sufficiently acquainted with all the facts to form a respectable opinion on the subject. GEN. BVBNSIDE'S TESTIMONY But whatever opinions may have been ex pressed before the committee by witnesses, whose names they have-not given, the same committee submitted a report to the Senate, on the 23d day of December last, containing the evidence taken by them on the 19th of that month, in which the testimony of Gen. Burn side, taken immediately after the battle, is Siven. This has been printed by order of the enate. From this document I make the fol loW4ig extract, referring to the battle of Fred ericksburg: Q. By . committee.—" What cause do you assign for the failure of your attack here ?" A. "It was found to be impossible to get the men up to the works; the enemy'e fire was too hot for them ; the whole command fought most gallantly ; the enemy themselves say they never saw our men fight so hard as on that day." Q. "Were the enemy's works very strong ?" A. "Their works are not strong works ; but they occupy very strong positions. It is pos sible that the points of attack were wrongly ordered ; if such is the oase, I can only say I did to the best of my ability. * * * * * * * Q. "Do I understand you to say that you expected Gen. Franklin to carry the point at the extreme left of the ridge, in the rear of the town, and thereby enable our troops to storm and carry their fortifications ?" A. "I did expect him to carry that point, which being done would have placed our forces in rear of their extreme left, and which' I thought at the time would shake their forces to such an extent that the position in front could be easily stormed and carried." • Q. "To what do you attribute his failure to accomplish that ?" A. "To the great strength of the position and the accumulation of the en'emy's forces there." Gen. Burnside tben explained that the delay in building the bridges gave the enemy time to accumulate Me forces' before he was able to order the attack. * * Q. "What was the conduct of the officers and men during the attack ?" A. "With the exception of a single regi ment, it was excellent.'! Q. "Will you state as nearly as you can the whole number of our troops that were en gaged ?" A. "We had about 100,000 men on the other side of the river." Q. "What part of that number were actu ally ezigaged.in battle ?" A. "Every single man of them wan under artillery fire, and about half of them were at different times formed in columns of attack. Every'man was put in column that could be got tn. With this evidence of the General comman ding the army before them, a committee of Congress, in a report submitted to the public without the testimony, deliberately states : "The testimony of all the witnesses before your
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