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The Patriot & Union.

THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 9 1863.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

[CONCLUDED.] At 10.45, a. m., of the 31st of August, Gen. Pope sends the following to Gen. Halleck, from Centerville:

"Our troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would, perhaps, have been better if Summer and Franklin had been here three, or four days ago. But you may rely upon our giving them (the enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington as long as this army is destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnaissance in our front at Cub run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I do not yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose."

On the 2d of September General Pope was ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his army came under the command of Gen. McClellan.

The following is from the testimony of Gen. Halleck: "Question. Had the Army of the Potomac been brought to cooperate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?"

"Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so." In relation to the command of Gen. McClellan, he himself testifies as follows: "Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General Pope?"

"Answer. I was for some little time—two or three days, two or three days, perhaps—without any position; merely as my camp, without any command. I received verbal orders from General Halleck to take command of the defense of Washington. In any way, however, expressly prohibited from, in my way, assuming any control over the troops under Gen. Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and General Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly."

The testimony of General Halleck upon the same point is as follows: "Question. What was the position of Gen. McClellan in regard to the troops of the Army of the Potomac as they landed at Aquia Creek and Alexandria? Were they under his command; and if so, how long did they remain under his command?"

"Answer. General McClellan retained the command of the army of the Potomac, as it landed at those two points, except such portions of it as were sent into the field under General Pope. Those portions were considered as temporarily detached from his command, but still belonging to his army, and he was directed that all orders sent from him to the troops as detached, while under General Pope's immediate command, should be sent through the headquarters at Washington. He retained command of all the troops of his army as they landed at those places until sent into the field, and reported to General Halleck; and they continued to remain under his command, with the exception of the detachments, until General Pope's army fell back on Washington, when all came under General McClellan's command.

"On his (General McClellan's) arrival at Alexandria he was told to take immediate command of all the troops in and about Washington, in addition to those which properly belonged to the Army of the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbally directed to take command for a formal order, which was issued from the Adjutant General's office. The order was for the Adjutant General's office was issued for General Pope's army to command the hill back, and was dated September 2; but Gen. McClellan had been in command ever since his arrival at Alexandria.

"Question. At what time did he arrive in Alexandria?" "Answer. He arrived at Alexandria on the 26th of August. The formal order was issued that he might have no difficulty with General Pope's forces; that they might not question his authority."

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND. Very soon after General Pope and his army fell back on Washington the rebel army entered Maryland. Preparations were immediately made by the authorities in Washington to follow them.

In relation to the command of the army in Maryland your committee will quote from the testimony of General McClellan and General Halleck. The testimony of General McClellan is as follows: "Question. How long did you remain in command of the defense of Washington, and what orders did you next receive, and from whom?"

"Answer. I do not think that order, as assigned to the defenses of Washington, was ever issued, or any order issued in its place. I had only verbal communications with General Halleck before I started on the Antietam campaign. It was never definitely decided, up to the time that I left, as to whether I was to go or not. I asked the question two or three times of General Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said that had not been determined. And I do not think that was one of those things that grew into shape itself. When the time came I went out."

The following is the testimony of General Halleck upon that point: "Question. By whose orders was General McClellan placed in command of the army that left Washington to operate in Maryland; and were those orders verbal or in writing?"

"Answer. As I stated the other day, the order was given verbally to General McClellan by the President, at G. M. C. Hall, on the morning of 9 o'clock in the morning, previous to Gen. McClellan leaving the city for Kentucky."

"I will add that G. M. C. Hall, in virtue of his being placed in command of the fortifications of Washington and the troops for defense within them, was really in command of all the troops here at that time. The question was discussed by the President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops that were to go into the field. The decision was made by himself, and announced to Gen. McClellan in my presence. I do not know what that decision was until I heard it thus announced."

In regard to the instructions given to Gen. McClellan his testimony is as follows: "Question. Did you have any interview with the President in relation to taking command of the troops for the Maryland campaign, or receive any instructions from him on that point?"

"Answer. I do not think he gave me any instructions after that morning, when I was told to take command of the army in front of Washington. I do not think he gave me any instructions about the Maryland campaign. "Question. After you commenced the movement did you receive any instructions from any one?"

"Answer. I received some telegrams that might be looked upon in the nature of instructions from General Halleck and from the President. The general tenor of General Halleck's dispatches was that I was committing an error in going so far away from Washington; that I was going rather too fast. He had the impression that the main force of the enemy was on the south side of the Potomac, and that they had only a small force in front of me to draw me on, and then they would come into Washington in rear. As late as the 7th of September, I recollect a telegram from General Halleck in which he pressed that same idea, and told me that I was wrong in going so far away."

The testimony of General Halleck upon that point is as follows: "Question. What instructions, if any, were given to General McClellan in relation to the conduct of the campaign in Maryland?"

"Answer. The day the President gave General McClellan directions to take command of the forces in the field, we had a long conversation in regard to the campaign in Maryland. It was agreed between us that the troops should move up the Potomac, and, if possible, separate that portion of General Lee's army which had crossed the Potomac from the remainder on the Virginia side. There were no definite instructions further than that understanding between us, as to the general plan of the campaign.

"I had arranged, however, to renew the attack at daybreak on the 19th, but I learned sometime during the night or early in the morning, that the enemy had abandoned his position. It afterwards proved that he moved with great rapidity, and, not being encumbered by wagons, was enabled to get his troops across the river before we could do him any serious injury. I think that, taking into consideration what the troops had gone through, we got as much out of them in this Antietam campaign as human endurance would bear."

ABOUT BURNSIDES. Shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg, General Burnside devised a plan for attacking the enemy in his fort. The main army was to cross at a place some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. The positions for the artillery to protect the crossing were all selected; the roads were all surveyed, and the corduroy was out for preparing the roads. At the same time a feint of crossing was to be made some distance above Falmouth, which feint could be turned into a positive attack should the enemy discover the movement below; otherwise the main attack was to be made below.

In connection with this movement of the main army, a cavalry expedition was organized, consisting of 2,500 of the best cavalry in the army of the Potomac, 1,000 of whom were picked men. The plan of that expedition was as follows: Accompanied by a brigade of infantry detailed to protect the crossing of the Rappahannock, it was to proceed up to Kelly's Ford; there the thousand picked men were to cross, and to proceed to the Rapidan and cross that river at Raccoon Ford; then to go onward and cross the Virginia Central railroad at Louisa Court House; the James river at Goodland or Carter's, blowing up the locks of the James River canal at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond and Lynchburg railroad at a point south of there, blowing up the iron bridge at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond, Petersburg and Weldon railroad where it crossed the Nottoway river, destroying the railroad bridge there; and then proceed on by General Pryor's command, and effect a junction with General Peck at Suffolk, where steamers were to be in waiting to take them to Aquia Creek.

To distract the attention of the enemy, and deceive them in regard to which body of cavalry was the attacking column, at the time the thousand picked men crossed the Rappahannock a portion of the remaining 1,500 was to proceed towards Warrenton; another portion towards Cutpage Court House; and the remainder to accompany the thousand picked men as far as Raccoon Ford, and then return. While this country expedition was in progress the general movement was to be made across the river.

On the 26th of December an order was issued for the entire command to prepare three days' cooked rations; to have their wagons filled with ten days' small rations, if possible; to have from ten to twelve days' supply of beef cattle with them; to take for a few days their arms and their artillery and cavalry horses, and the requisite amount of ammunition—in fact, to be in a condition to move at twelve hours' notice. Shortly after that order was issued General John Newton and Colonel John Cochrane—the one commanding a division and the other a brigade in the left grand division, under Gen. William B. Franklin—came up to Washington on leave of absence. Previous to obtaining leave of absence from General Fralick, they informed him and General William F. Smith that when they came to Washington they should take the opportunity to represent to some one in authority here the dispirited condition of the army, and the danger there was in attempting any movement against the enemy at that time.

When they reached Washington Gen. Cochrane, as he states, endeavored to find certain members of Congress, to whom to make the desired communication. Failing to find them, he determined to seek an interview with the President for the purpose of making the communication directly to him. On proceeding to the President's house, he there met Secretary Seward, to whom he explained the object of his being there and the general purport of his proposed communication to the President, and requested him to procure an interview for them, which Mr. Seward promised to do, and which he did.

That day the interview took place, and General Newton opened the subject to the President. At first the President, as General Newton expresses it, "very naturally conceived that they had come there for the purpose of injuring General Burnside, and suggesting some other person to fill his place." General Newton states, that while he firmly believed that the principal cause of the dispirited condition of the army was want of confidence in the military capacity of General Burnside, he deemed it improper to say so to the President "right square out," and the President concurred in the same idea indirectly. When asked if he considered it any less improper to do such a thing indirectly than it was to do it directly, he qualified his previous assertion by saying that his object was to inform the President of what he considered to be the condition of the army, in the hope that the President would make inquiry, and learn the true cause for himself. Upon perceiving this impression upon the mind of the President, General Newton and Cochrane state that they hastened to assure the President that he was entirely mistaken, and so far succeeded, that at the close of the interview they had called upon him, and that he hoped that good would result from the interview.

To return to General Burnside. The cavalry expedition had started; the brigade of infantry detailed to accompany it had crossed the Rappahannock at Richard's Ford, and returned by way of Ellis's Ford, leaving the way clear for the cavalry to cross at Kelly's Ford. The day they had arranged to make the crossing, General Burnside received from the President the following telegram: "I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general movement without letting me know it."

General Burnside states that he could not imagine, at the time, what reason the President could have for sending him such a telegram. None of the officers of his command, except one or two of his staff who had remained in camp had been told anything of his plan beyond the simple fact that a movement was to be made. He could only suppose that the dispatch related in some way to important military movements in other parts of the country, in which it was necessary to have co-operation.

Upon the receipt of this telegram, steps were immediately taken to halt the cavalry expedition, which was then on its way to Kelly's Ford, and to call a portion of it was shortly afterwards sent off to intercept Stuart, who had just made a raid to Dumfries and the neighborhood of Fairfax Court House, which it failed to do.

General Burnside came to Washington to ascertain from the President the true state of the case. He was informed by the President that some general officers from the Army of the Potomac, whose names he declined to give, had called upon him and represented that General Burnside contemplated soon making a movement, and that the army was so dispirited and

demoralized that any attempt to make a movement at that time must result in disaster; that no prominent officers in the Army of the Potomac were in favor of any movement at that time.

General Burnside informed the President that none of his officers had been informed of his plan, and then proceeded to explain in detail to the President. He urged upon the President to grant him permission to carry it out, but the President declined to do so at that time. General Halleck and Secretary Stanton were sent for, and then learned, for the first time, of the President's action in stopping the movement; although General Halleck was previously aware that a movement was contemplated by General Burnside, Gen. Halleck, with General Burnside, held that the officers who had made those representations to the President should be at once dismissed from service. General Burnside remained here at that time for two days, but no conclusion was reached upon the subject.

When he returned to his camp he learned that many of the details of the general movement, and the details of the cavalry expedition, had become known to the rebel sympathizers in Washington, thereby rendering that plan impracticable. When asked to whom he had communicated his plans, he stated that he had told no one in Washington except the President, Secretary Stanton and General Halleck; and in his camp none knew of it, except one or two of his staff officers who had remained in camp all the time.

He professed himself unable to tell how his plans had become known to the enemy. His correspondents, Gen. Halleck and General Burnside. General Burnside desired the distinct authority from General Halleck, or some one authorized to give it, to make a movement across the river. While urging the importance and necessity for such a movement, he candidly admitted that there was hardly a general officer in his command who approved of it. While willing to take upon himself all the responsibility of the movement, and promising to keep in view the President's caution concerning running any risk of destroying the Army of the Potomac, he desired to have at least General Halleck's sanction or permission for the movement. General Halleck replied that while he had always favored a general movement, he could not take the responsibility of giving any directions as to how and when it should be made.

General Burnside then determined to make a movement without any further correspondence on that subject. He was unable to devise any as promising as the one just thwarted by this interference of his subordinate officers, which interference gave the enemy the time, if not the means, to ascertain what he had proposed to do. He, however, devised a plan of movement, and proceeded to put it into execution. As is well known, it was rendered abortive in consequence of the severe storm which took place shortly after the movement began.

General Burnside, and also what had taken place during the battle of Fredericksburg, &c., General Burnside directed an order to be issued, which was styled general order No. 8. That order dismissed some officers from the service, subject to the approval of the President, relieved others from duty with the Army of the Potomac, and also pronounced sentence of death upon some deserters who had been tried and convicted.

General Burnside stated that he had become satisfied that it was absolutely necessary that some such examples should be made, in order to enable him to maintain the proper authority over the army under his command. The order was duly signed and issued, and only waited publication.

Two or three of his most trusted staff officers represented to General Burnside that should he then publish that order, he would force upon the President the necessity of at once sanctioning it, or, by refusing his approval, assume an attitude of hostility to General Burnside. The publication of the order was accordingly delayed for the time.

General Burnside returned to his camp, and came again to Washington that night at the request of the President, and the next morning called upon the President for his decision. He was informed that the President declined to approve his order No. 8, but had concluded to relieve him from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and to appoint General Hooker in his place. Thereupon General Burnside again insisted that his resignation be accepted. This the President declined to do; and, under some urging, Gen. Burnside consented to take a leave of absence for thirty days, with the understanding that, at the end of that time, he should be assigned to do duty, as he deemed it improper to hold a commission as major general, and receive his pay without rendering service therefor. Gen. Burnside objected to the wording of the order which relieved him from his command, and which stated that it was at his own request, as being unjust to him and unfounded in fact; but upon the representation that any other order would do injury to the cause, he consented to let it remain as it then read.

B. F. Wade and C. Chandler, on the part of the Senate. D. W. Gooch, John Covode, G. W. Julian and M. E. Odell, on the part of the House.

WHAT THE WAR IS COMING TO.

The Philadelphia Mercury, speculating upon the schemes and designs of the administration and its Abolition supporters in reference to the future, uses the following language: "We will declare it as our honest, deliberate conviction, that the war in which we are engaged is rapidly tending to the Union, and becoming a war, on the part of the administration and its party, against the rights and liberties of the States and people of the North, with a view to continue political power, with its immense and corrupting patronage, in the hands of those who now possess and wield it. The war upon the South is kept up, very obviously, as a cover under which the Republicans may hide their designs to carry the coming elections in the loyal States. It affords the pretenses of the administration an occasion to make the most powerful appeals to the people for support. It furnishes them, at the same time, with the pecuniary means to corrupt the masses. It justifies them in keeping up an enormous military force, which they may employ to suppress a free exercise of the right of suffrage while, under the plea of 'military necessity,' it gives an apparent sanction to Executive measures which, in suppressing free speech and a free press, tend to destroy all freedom of popular protest and action against the men and the party who are ruining the country. The people, of course, will not submit to such abuse. They will, as they discover the designs upon their liberties, rebel against them. As the controversy progresses, the power of the government will be more and

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